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From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>,
	Ben Catterall <Ben.Catterall@citrix.com>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xensource.com, keir@xen.org,
	ian.campbell@citrix.com, george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com,
	Aravind Gopalakrishnan <Aravind.Gopalakrishnan@amd.com>,
	jbeulich@suse.com,
	Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC 3/4] HVM x86 deprivileged mode: Code for switching into/out of deprivileged mode
Date: Wed, 12 Aug 2015 14:33:08 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <55CB4B14.8060704@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <55CB4A56.1000600@citrix.com>

On 12/08/15 14:29, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 11/08/15 19:29, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
>> On 08/11/2015 01:19 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>>> On 11/08/15 18:05, Tim Deegan wrote:
>>>>>>> * Under this model, PV exception handlers should copy themselves
>>>>>>> onto
>>>>>>> the privileged execution stack.
>>>>>>> * Currently, the IST handlers  copy themselves onto the primary
>>>>>>> stack if
>>>>>>> they interrupt guest context.
>>>>>>> * AMD Task Register on vmexit.  (this old gem)
>>>>>> Gah, this thing. :
>>>>> Curious (and I can't seem find this in the manuals): What is this
>>>>> thing?
>>>> IIRC: AMD processors don't context switch TR on vmexit,
>>> Correct
>>>
>>>> which makes using IST handlers tricky there.
>>> (That is one way of putting it)
>>>
>>> IST handlers cannot be used by Xen if Xen does not switch the task
>>> register before stgi, or IST exceptions (NMI, MCE and double fault) will
>>> be taken with guest-supplied stack pointers.
>>>
>>>> We'd have to do the TR context switch ourselves, and that would be
>>>> expensive.
>>> It is suspected to be expensive, but I have never actually seen any
>>> numbers one way or another.
>>>
>>>> Andrew, am I remembering that right?
>>> Looks about right.
>>>
>>> I have been meaning to investigate this for a while, but never had
>>> the time.
>>>
>>> Xen opts for disabling interrupt stack tables in the context of AMD HVM
>>> vcpus, which interacts catastrophically with debug builds using
>>> MEMORY_GUARD.  MEMORY_GUARD shoots a page out of the primary stack to
>>> detect stack overflows, but without an IST double fault hander, ends in
>>> a triple fault rather than a host crash detailing the stack overflow.
>>>
>>> KVM unilaterally reloads the host task register on vmexit, and I suspect
>>> this is probably the way to go, but have not had time to investigate
>>> whether there is any performance impact from doing so.  Given how little
>>> of a TSS is actually used in long mode, I wouldn't expect an `ltr` to be
>>> as expensive as it might have been in legacy modes.
>>>
>>> (CC'ing the AMD SVM maintainers to see if they have any information on
>>> this subject)
>>>
>> I actually didn't even realize that TR is not saved on vmexit ;-/.
>>
>> Would switching TR only when we know that we need to enter this
>> deprivileged mode help?
> This is an absolute must.  It is not safe to use syscall/sysexit without
> IST in place for NMIs and MCEs.
>
>> Assuming that it is less expensive than copying the stack.
> I was referring to the stack overflow issue, and whether it might be
> sensible to pro-actively which TR.

Ahem! s/which/switch/

~Andrew

  reply	other threads:[~2015-08-12 13:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-08-06 16:45 [RFC 0/4] HVM x86 enhancements to run Xen deprivileged mode operations Ben Catterall
2015-08-06 16:45 ` [RFC 1/4] HVM x86 deprivileged mode: Page allocation helper Ben Catterall
2015-08-06 19:22   ` Andrew Cooper
2015-08-07  9:57     ` Ben Catterall
2015-08-07 13:14       ` Andrew Cooper
2015-08-10  8:50       ` Tim Deegan
2015-08-10  8:52         ` Tim Deegan
2015-08-10  8:55           ` Andrew Cooper
2015-08-10 10:08             ` Tim Deegan
2015-08-06 16:45 ` [RFC 2/4] HVM x86 deprivileged mode: Create deprivileged page tables Ben Catterall
2015-08-06 19:52   ` Andrew Cooper
2015-08-07 13:19     ` Ben Catterall
2015-08-07 15:20       ` Andrew Cooper
2015-08-06 16:45 ` [RFC 3/4] HVM x86 deprivileged mode: Code for switching into/out of deprivileged mode Ben Catterall
2015-08-06 20:55   ` Andrew Cooper
2015-08-07 12:51     ` Ben Catterall
2015-08-07 13:08       ` David Vrabel
2015-08-07 14:24       ` Andrew Cooper
2015-08-11  9:45     ` Ian Campbell
2015-08-10  9:49   ` Tim Deegan
2015-08-10 10:14     ` Andrew Cooper
2015-08-11  9:55       ` Tim Deegan
2015-08-11 16:51         ` Ben Catterall
2015-08-11 17:05           ` Tim Deegan
2015-08-11 17:19             ` Andrew Cooper
2015-08-11 18:29               ` Boris Ostrovsky
2015-08-12 13:29                 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-08-12 13:33                   ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2015-08-17 13:53                     ` Ben Catterall
2015-08-17 15:07                       ` Tim Deegan
2015-08-17 15:17                         ` Jan Beulich
2015-08-18 10:25                           ` Ben Catterall
2015-08-18 10:26                             ` Ben Catterall
2015-08-18 14:22                               ` Jan Beulich
2015-08-18 16:55                         ` Andrew Cooper
2015-08-19 10:36                           ` Ben Catterall
2015-08-12 10:10               ` Jan Beulich
2015-08-12 13:22             ` Ben Catterall
2015-08-12 13:26               ` Tim Deegan
2015-08-20 14:42       ` Ben Catterall
2015-08-11 10:35     ` Ben Catterall
2015-08-06 16:45 ` [RFC 4/4] HVM x86 deprivileged mode: Trap handlers for " Ben Catterall
2015-08-06 21:24   ` Andrew Cooper
2015-08-07 12:32     ` Ben Catterall
2015-08-07 13:19       ` Andrew Cooper
2015-08-07 13:26         ` Ben Catterall
2015-08-10 10:07   ` Tim Deegan
2015-08-11 10:33     ` Ben Catterall
2015-08-17 13:59       ` Ben Catterall
2015-08-17 14:58         ` Tim Deegan
2015-08-17 15:14           ` Jan Beulich
2015-08-12  9:50 ` [RFC 0/4] HVM x86 enhancements to run Xen deprivileged mode operations Jan Beulich
2015-08-12 11:27   ` Ben Catterall

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