From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Huaitong Han <huaitong.han@intel.com>,
jbeulich@suse.com, jun.nakajima@intel.com, eddie.dong@intel.com,
kevin.tian@intel.com, george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com,
ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com, stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com,
ian.campbell@citrix.com, wei.liu2@citrix.com, keir@xen.org
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xen.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 09/10] x86/hvm: pkeys, add pkeys support for guest_walk_tables
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2015 16:52:01 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <564A09B1.5000300@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1447669917-17939-10-git-send-email-huaitong.han@intel.com>
On 16/11/15 10:31, Huaitong Han wrote:
> This patch adds pkeys support for guest_walk_tables.
>
> Signed-off-by: Huaitong Han <huaitong.han@intel.com>
>
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c
> index 773454d..7a7ae96 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c
> @@ -124,6 +124,46 @@ void *map_domain_gfn(struct p2m_domain *p2m, gfn_t gfn, mfn_t *mfn,
> return map;
> }
>
> +#if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS >= 4
> +uint32_t leaf_pte_pkeys_check(struct vcpu *vcpu, uint32_t pfec,
> + uint32_t pte_access, uint32_t pte_pkeys)
> +{
> + unsigned int pkru_ad, pkru_wd;
> + unsigned int ff, wf, uf, rsvdf, pkuf;
> +
> + uf = pfec & PFEC_user_mode;
> + wf = pfec & PFEC_write_access;
> + rsvdf = pfec & PFEC_reserved_bit;
> + ff = pfec & PFEC_insn_fetch;
> + pkuf = pfec & PFEC_protection_key;
> +
> + if (!pkuf)
> + return 0;
> +
> + /*
> + * PKU: additional mechanism by which the paging controls
> + * access to user-mode addresses based on the value in the
> + * PKRU register. A fault is considered as a PKU violation if all
> + * of the following conditions are ture:
> + * 1.CR4_PKE=1.
> + * 2.EFER_LMA=1.
> + * 3.page is present with no reserved bit violations.
> + * 4.the access is not an instruction fetch.
> + * 5.the access is to a user page.
> + * 6.PKRU.AD=1
> + * or The access is a data write and PKRU.WD=1
> + * and either CR0.WP=1 or it is a user access.
> + */
Please fix the alignment of the comment.
> + pkru_ad = READ_PKRU_AD(pte_pkeys);
> + pkru_wd = READ_PKRU_AD(pte_pkeys);
> + if ( hvm_pku_enabled(vcpu) && hvm_long_mode_enabled(vcpu) &&
> + !rsvdf && !ff && (pkru_ad ||
> + (pkru_wd && wf && (hvm_wp_enabled(vcpu) || uf))))
> + return 1;
Same comments as patch 8 for the PV case.
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +#endif
>
> /* Walk the guest pagetables, after the manner of a hardware walker. */
> /* Because the walk is essentially random, it can cause a deadlock
> @@ -141,6 +181,7 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m,
> #if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS >= 4 /* 64-bit only... */
> guest_l3e_t *l3p = NULL;
> guest_l4e_t *l4p;
> + uint32_t pkeys;
> #endif
> uint32_t gflags, mflags, iflags, rc = 0;
> bool_t smep = 0, smap = 0;
> @@ -225,6 +266,7 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m,
> goto out;
> /* Get the l3e and check its flags*/
> gw->l3e = l3p[guest_l3_table_offset(va)];
> + pkeys = guest_l3e_get_pkeys(gw->l3e);
> gflags = guest_l3e_get_flags(gw->l3e) ^ iflags;
> if ( !(gflags & _PAGE_PRESENT) ) {
> rc |= _PAGE_PRESENT;
> @@ -234,6 +276,9 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m,
>
> pse1G = (gflags & _PAGE_PSE) && guest_supports_1G_superpages(v);
>
> + if (pse1G && leaf_pte_pkeys_check(v, pfec, gflags, pkeys))
> + rc |= _PAGE_PK_BIT;
> +
> if ( pse1G )
> {
> /* Generate a fake l1 table entry so callers don't all
> @@ -295,7 +340,6 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m,
> gw->l2e = l2p[guest_l2_table_offset(va)];
>
> #endif /* All levels... */
> -
Spurious deletion.
> gflags = guest_l2e_get_flags(gw->l2e) ^ iflags;
> if ( !(gflags & _PAGE_PRESENT) ) {
> rc |= _PAGE_PRESENT;
> @@ -305,6 +349,12 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m,
>
> pse2M = (gflags & _PAGE_PSE) && guest_supports_superpages(v);
>
> +#if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS >= 4
> + pkeys = guest_l2e_get_pkeys(gw->l2e);
> + if (pse2M && leaf_pte_pkeys_check(v, pfec, gflags, pkeys))
> + rc |= _PAGE_PK_BIT;
> +#endif
> +
> if ( pse2M )
> {
> /* Special case: this guest VA is in a PSE superpage, so there's
> @@ -365,6 +415,11 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m,
> goto out;
> }
> rc |= ((gflags & mflags) ^ mflags);
> +#if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS >= 4
> + pkeys = guest_l1e_get_pkeys(gw->l1e);
> + if (leaf_pte_pkeys_check(v, pfec, gflags, pkeys))
> + rc |= _PAGE_PK_BIT;
> +#endif
Without modifying the caller's logic, setting _PAGE_PK_BIT in the return
value isn't going to get propagated to the guest correctly.
~Andrew
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-11-16 16:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-11-16 10:31 [PATCH 00/10] x86/hvm: pkeys, add memory protection-key support Huaitong Han
2015-11-16 10:31 ` [PATCH 01/10] x86/hvm: pkeys, add pkeys support for cpuid handling Huaitong Han
2015-11-16 12:00 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-11-19 14:39 ` Wu, Feng
2015-11-16 16:58 ` Wei Liu
2015-11-16 10:31 ` [PATCH 02/10] x86/hvm: pkeys, add pku support for x86_capability Huaitong Han
2015-11-16 13:35 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-11-16 10:31 ` [PATCH 03/10] x86/hvm: pkeys, add the flag to enable Memory Protection Keys Huaitong Han
2015-11-16 13:56 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-11-16 10:31 ` [PATCH 04/10] x86/hvm: pkeys, add pkeys support when setting CR4 Huaitong Han
2015-11-16 14:02 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-11-20 1:16 ` Wu, Feng
2015-11-20 10:41 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-11-16 10:31 ` [PATCH 05/10] x86/hvm: pkeys, disable pkeys for guests in non-paging mode Huaitong Han
2015-11-16 14:03 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-11-16 10:31 ` [PATCH 06/10] x86/hvm: pkeys, add functions to get pkeys value from PTE Huaitong Han
2015-11-16 14:16 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-11-16 14:42 ` Jan Beulich
2015-11-16 10:31 ` [PATCH 07/10] x86/hvm: pkeys, add functions to support PKRU access/write Huaitong Han
2015-11-16 15:09 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-11-16 10:31 ` [PATCH 08/10] x86/hvm: pkeys, add pkeys support for do_page_fault Huaitong Han
2015-11-16 15:25 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-11-16 10:31 ` [PATCH 09/10] x86/hvm: pkeys, add pkeys support for guest_walk_tables Huaitong Han
2015-11-16 16:52 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2015-11-16 16:59 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-11-16 10:31 ` [PATCH 10/10] x86/hvm: pkeys, add xstate support for pkeys Huaitong Han
2015-11-16 16:52 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-11-16 17:45 ` [PATCH 00/10] x86/hvm: pkeys, add memory protection-key support Andrew Cooper
2015-11-17 10:26 ` Jan Beulich
2015-11-17 16:24 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-11-17 16:36 ` Jan Beulich
2015-11-18 9:12 ` Wu, Feng
2015-11-18 10:10 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-11-19 7:44 ` Wu, Feng
2015-11-19 8:44 ` Jan Beulich
2015-11-19 8:49 ` Wu, Feng
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