From: "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>
To: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>,
Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>,
Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>, Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 1/6] libelf: rewrite symtab/strtab loading for Dom0
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 18:55:29 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <56A11B91.30909@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <22177.5520.10709.9657@mariner.uk.xensource.com>
El 21/01/16 a les 18.29, Ian Jackson ha escrit:
> Roger Pau Monne writes ("[PATCH v4 1/6] libelf: rewrite symtab/strtab loading for Dom0"):
>> Current implementation of elf_load_bsdsyms is broken when loading inside of
>> a HVM guest, because it assumes elf_memcpy_safe is able to write into guest
>> memory space, which it is not.
>>
>> Take the oportunity to do some cleanup and properly document how
>> elf_{parse/load}_bsdsyms works. The new implementation uses elf_load_image
>> when dealing with data that needs to be copied to the guest memory space.
>> Also reduce the number of section headers copied to the minimum necessary.
> ...
>> #define elf_hdr_elm(_elf, _hdr, _elm, _val) \
>> do { \
>> if ( elf_64bit(_elf) ) \
>> - elf_store_field(_elf, _hdr, e64._elm, _val); \
>> + (_hdr).e64._elm = _val; \
>
> This seems to bypass the safe store mechanism which was introduced to
> fix XSA-55.
This macro is only used to store fields inside of a structure that's
allocated on the stack, and it doesn't involve any kind of pointer
magic/arithmetic. The way it was used previously in this function indeed
required the use of the _safe mechanism in order to prevent writing into
arbitrary memory places, because we were actually modifying guest memory
IIRC.
I could restore the previous behaviour, but that would mean adding some
handlers in order to access the structure. Since this is only used for
Dom0, which already makes use of the elf_memcpy_unchecked function as
called by elf_store_val which is in turn called from elf_store_field, so
it's not like we were protected previously anyway.
Roger.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-01-21 17:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-01-21 16:51 [PATCH v4 0/6] HVMlite: DomU fixes and a Dom0 preparatory patch Roger Pau Monne
2016-01-21 16:51 ` [PATCH v4 1/6] libelf: rewrite symtab/strtab loading for Dom0 Roger Pau Monne
2016-01-21 17:29 ` Ian Jackson
2016-01-21 17:55 ` Roger Pau Monné [this message]
2016-01-21 18:44 ` Ian Jackson
2016-01-22 8:11 ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-22 9:58 ` Roger Pau Monné
2016-01-21 16:51 ` [PATCH v4 2/6] libxl: introduce LIBXL_VGA_INTERFACE_TYPE_UNKNOWN Roger Pau Monne
2016-01-22 10:59 ` Ian Campbell
2016-01-21 16:51 ` [PATCH v4 3/6] libxl: initialise the build info before calling prepare_config Roger Pau Monne
2016-01-22 11:00 ` Ian Campbell
2016-01-21 16:51 ` [PATCH v4 4/6] x86/PV: allow PV guests to have an emulated PIT Roger Pau Monne
2016-01-22 10:48 ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-22 11:03 ` Ian Campbell
2016-01-21 16:51 ` [PATCH v4 5/6] libxl: add options to enable/disable emulated devices Roger Pau Monne
2016-01-22 17:04 ` Roger Pau Monné
2016-01-25 9:33 ` Ian Campbell
2016-01-21 16:51 ` [PATCH v4 6/6] x86/HVM: report the set of enabled emulated devices through CPUID Roger Pau Monne
2016-01-22 10:57 ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-22 12:43 ` Roger Pau Monné
2016-01-22 13:24 ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-22 14:41 ` Roger Pau Monné
2016-01-22 15:02 ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-22 15:41 ` Roger Pau Monné
2016-01-22 13:34 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-22 14:59 ` Roger Pau Monné
2016-01-22 15:31 ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-22 15:51 ` Roger Pau Monné
2016-01-25 11:23 ` Jan Beulich
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