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From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 29/31] x86/pv: Provide custom cpumasks for PV domains
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2016 14:42:01 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <56A23FB9.5010206@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <56A24BB202000078000CA263@prv-mh.provo.novell.com>

On 22/01/16 14:33, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 22.01.16 at 15:24, <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> wrote:
>> On 22/01/16 09:56, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>>> On 16.12.15 at 22:24, <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> wrote:
>>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
>>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
>>>> @@ -203,7 +203,9 @@ static void __init noinline probe_masking_msrs(void)
>>>>  void amd_ctxt_switch_levelling(const struct domain *nextd)
>>>>  {
>>>>  	struct cpumasks *these_masks = &this_cpu(cpumasks);
>>>> -	const struct cpumasks *masks = &cpumask_defaults;
>>>> +	const struct cpumasks *masks =
>>>> +            (nextd && is_pv_domain(nextd) && nextd->arch.pv_domain.masks)
>>>> +            ? nextd->arch.pv_domain.masks : &cpumask_defaults;
>>> Can nextd really ever be NULL here?
>> Yes, when using this function to set the defaults in the first place
>> during AP bringup.
> Ah, I then didn't spot this second use.
>
>>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
>>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
>>>> @@ -578,6 +578,12 @@ int arch_domain_create(struct domain *d, unsigned int domcr_flags,
>>>>              goto fail;
>>>>          clear_page(d->arch.pv_domain.gdt_ldt_l1tab);
>>>>  
>>>> +        d->arch.pv_domain.masks = xmalloc(struct cpumasks);
>>>> +        if ( !d->arch.pv_domain.masks )
>>>> +            goto fail;
>>>> +        memcpy(d->arch.pv_domain.masks, &cpumask_defaults,
>>>> +               sizeof(*d->arch.pv_domain.masks));
>>> Structure assignment, to make the thing type safe?
>>>
>>> Also there's a change missing to the cleanup code after the "fail"
>>> label.
>> What change are you thinking of?  I suppose an xfree() wouldn't go amis,
>> to prevent a problem for whomever introduces a new failure path, but I
>> don't see a bug in the code as-is.
> I don't understand this second sentence. It's the missing addition
> of a matching xfree() that my comment was about.

All "goto fails;" are visible in this context.  As the code currently
stands, there is not a failure path where the allocation isn't freed.

The point of my second sentence is that this would be a latent bug if
someone introduced another failure path, which is why I will fix it.

~Andrew

  reply	other threads:[~2016-01-22 14:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 123+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-12-16 21:24 [PATCH RFC 00/31] x86: Improvements to cpuid handling for guests Andrew Cooper
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 01/31] xen/public: Export featureset information in the public API Andrew Cooper
2015-12-22 16:28   ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-22 16:42     ` Andrew Cooper
2015-12-22 16:59       ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-23 10:05         ` Andrew Cooper
2015-12-23 10:24           ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-23 11:26             ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-06  7:43               ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 02/31] tools/libxc: Use public/featureset.h for cpuid policy generation Andrew Cooper
2015-12-22 16:29   ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-05 14:13     ` Ian Campbell
2016-01-05 14:17       ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-05 14:18         ` Ian Campbell
2016-01-05 14:23           ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-05 15:02             ` Ian Campbell
2016-01-05 15:42               ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-05 16:09                 ` Ian Campbell
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 03/31] xen/x86: Store antifeatures inverted in a featureset Andrew Cooper
2015-12-22 16:32   ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-22 17:03     ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-05 14:19       ` Ian Campbell
2016-01-05 14:24         ` Andrew Cooper
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 04/31] xen/x86: Mask out unknown features from Xen's capabilities Andrew Cooper
2015-12-22 16:42   ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-22 17:01     ` Andrew Cooper
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 05/31] xen/x86: Collect more CPUID feature words Andrew Cooper
2015-12-22 16:46   ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-22 17:17     ` Andrew Cooper
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 06/31] xen/x86: Infrastructure to calculate guest featuresets Andrew Cooper
2015-12-22 16:50   ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 07/31] xen/x86: Export host featureset via SYSCTL Andrew Cooper
2015-12-22 16:57   ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 08/31] tools/stubs: Expose host featureset to userspace Andrew Cooper
2016-01-05 15:36   ` Ian Campbell
2016-01-05 15:59     ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-05 16:09       ` Ian Campbell
2016-01-05 16:19         ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-05 16:38           ` Ian Campbell
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 09/31] xen/x86: Calculate PV featureset Andrew Cooper
2015-12-22 17:07   ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-22 17:13     ` Andrew Cooper
2015-12-22 17:18       ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 10/31] xen/x86: Calculate HVM featureset Andrew Cooper
2015-12-22 17:11   ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-22 17:21     ` Andrew Cooper
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 11/31] xen/x86: Calculate Raw featureset Andrew Cooper
2015-12-22 17:14   ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-22 17:27     ` Andrew Cooper
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 12/31] tools: Utility for dealing with featuresets Andrew Cooper
2016-01-05 15:17   ` Ian Campbell
2016-01-05 16:14     ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-05 16:34       ` Ian Campbell
2016-01-05 17:13         ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-05 17:37           ` Ian Campbell
2016-01-05 18:04             ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-06 10:38               ` Ian Campbell
2016-01-06 10:40   ` Ian Campbell
2016-01-06 10:42     ` Ian Campbell
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 13/31] tools/libxc: Wire a featureset through to cpuid policy logic Andrew Cooper
2016-01-05 15:42   ` Ian Campbell
2016-01-05 16:20     ` Andrew Cooper
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 14/31] tools/libxc: Use featureset rather than guesswork Andrew Cooper
2016-01-05 15:54   ` Ian Campbell
2016-01-05 16:22     ` Andrew Cooper
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 15/31] x86: Generate deep dependencies of x86 features Andrew Cooper
2016-01-05 16:03   ` Ian Campbell
2016-01-05 16:42     ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-05 16:54       ` Ian Campbell
2016-01-05 17:09         ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-05 17:19           ` Ian Campbell
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 16/31] x86: Automatically generate known_features Andrew Cooper
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 17/31] xen/x86: Clear dependent features when clearing a cpu cap Andrew Cooper
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 18/31] xen/x86: Improve disabling of features which have dependencies Andrew Cooper
2016-01-21 16:48   ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 19/31] tools/libxc: Sanitise guest featuresets Andrew Cooper
2016-01-05 16:05   ` Ian Campbell
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 20/31] x86: Improvements to in-hypervisor cpuid sanity checks Andrew Cooper
2016-01-21 17:02   ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-21 17:21     ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-21 18:15       ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-22  7:47         ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-22  7:45       ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 21/31] x86/domctl: Break out logic to update domain state from cpuid information Andrew Cooper
2016-01-21 17:05   ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-21 17:08     ` Andrew Cooper
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 22/31] x86/cpu: Move set_cpumask() calls into c_early_init() Andrew Cooper
2016-01-21 17:08   ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 23/31] xen/x86: Export cpuid levelling capabilities via SYSCTL Andrew Cooper
2016-01-21 17:23   ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 24/31] tools/stubs: Expose host levelling capabilities to userspace Andrew Cooper
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 25/31] xen/x86: Common infrastructure for levelling context switching Andrew Cooper
2016-01-22  8:56   ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-22 10:05     ` Andrew Cooper
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 26/31] xen/x86: Rework AMD masking MSR setup Andrew Cooper
2016-01-22  9:27   ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-22 11:01     ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-22 11:13       ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-22 13:59         ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-22 14:12           ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-22 17:03             ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-25 11:25               ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 27/31] xen/x86: Rework Intel masking/faulting setup Andrew Cooper
2016-01-22  9:40   ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-22 14:09     ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-22 14:29       ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-22 14:46         ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-22 14:53           ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 28/31] xen/x86: Context switch all levelling state in context_switch() Andrew Cooper
2016-01-22  9:52   ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-22 14:19     ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-22 14:31       ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-22 14:39         ` Andrew Cooper
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 29/31] x86/pv: Provide custom cpumasks for PV domains Andrew Cooper
2016-01-22  9:56   ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-22 14:24     ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-22 14:33       ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-22 14:42         ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2016-01-22 14:48           ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-22 14:56             ` Andrew Cooper
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 30/31] x86/domctl: Update PV domain cpumasks when setting cpuid policy Andrew Cooper
2016-01-22 10:02   ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 31/31] tools/libxc: Calculate xstate cpuid leaf from guest information Andrew Cooper

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