From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Cc: xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>,
Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Subject: Re: BUG_ON() vs ASSERT()
Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2016 10:11:26 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <9bb155a2-b0ae-c618-99db-3b8e9025bb4d@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAFLBxZYjrBVDvHaBv3ecs5x=JcOwNL-WGL8LoxeaB=m-rw+CzQ@mail.gmail.com>
On 14/09/16 09:35, George Dunlap wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 7:16 PM, Andrew Cooper
> <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> wrote:
>> On 12/09/16 16:23, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>> All,
>>>
>>> in
>>> https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2016-09/msg01201.html
>>> and
>>> https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2016-09/msg01210.html
>>> Andrew basically suggests that we should switch away from using
>>> ASSERT() and over to BUG_ON() in perhaps quite broad a set of
>>> cases. And honestly I'm not convinced of this: We've been adding
>>> quite a few ASSERT()s over the last years with the aim of doing
>>> sanity checking in debug builds, without adding overhead to non-
>>> debug builds. I can certainly see possible cases where using
>>> BUG_ON() to prevent further possible damage is appropriate, but
>>> I don't think we should overdo here.
>> I am not advocating switching all ASSERT()s to BUG_ON()s. That would be
>> silly.
>>
>> However, ASSERT()'s as a bounds check very definitely are dangerous. If
>> there is any uncertainty about the bounds, the check must not disappear
>> in a release build. (Better yet, code which copes cleanly with
>> insufficient bounds).
>>
>>
>> For anyone reading this email who hasn't already worked out the details
>> of XSA-186, the data corruption issue is here:
>>
>> static int hvmemul_insn_fetch(...)
>> {
>> unsigned int insn_off = offset - hvmemul_ctxt->insn_buf_eip;
>> ...
>> ASSERT(insn_off + bytes <= sizeof(hvmemul_ctxt->insn_buf));
>> memcpy(&hvmemul_ctxt->insn_buf[insn_off], p_data, bytes);
>> ...
>>
>> It is left as an exercise to the reader to work out how to exploit this
>> on a release build of Xen, but it is hopefully obvious that the ASSERT()
>> isn't helpful. A BUG_ON() in this case would have been a host DoS,
>> which is substantially better than a guest escape.
> This seems quite sensible, and I'm glad Andy clarified. (Although in
> a lot of these cases, a domain_crash() would be preferable to a
> BUG_ON() if possible.)
Absolutely. Clean error handling without a crash is certainly
preferable when possible.
~Andrew
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-09-14 9:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-09-12 15:23 BUG_ON() vs ASSERT() Jan Beulich
2016-09-13 13:10 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-09-13 13:46 ` Mihai Donțu
2016-09-13 18:25 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-09-14 17:01 ` Mihai Donțu
2016-09-13 13:24 ` Paul Durrant
2016-09-13 18:16 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-09-14 8:35 ` George Dunlap
2016-09-14 9:11 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2016-09-14 9:26 ` Sander Eikelenboom
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