From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Keir Fraser Subject: Re: [PATCH] HVM guests are allowed to use the entire virtual address space for Date: Tue, 25 May 2010 16:11:52 +0100 Message-ID: References: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: In-Reply-To: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xensource.com Errors-To: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xensource.com To: Tim Deegan , "xen-devel@lists.xensource.com" List-Id: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Put another way, I'd rather ASSERT(!is_hvm_vcpu(current)) than further reinforce the current confusion around these macros by supporting an obsolete usage. -- Keir On 25/05/2010 16:04, "Keir Fraser" wrote: > I think this is already handled correctly by guest_access.h, which is what > really matters. Nowadays copy_{to,from}_user (but not __copy_{to,from}_user) > are mainly for private usage only by the guest-access macros, and just a few > other arch-dependent PV_specific bits of code. Of course the __ versions are > still generally useful as 'copy but catch any fault' functions. > > -- Keir > > On 25/05/2010 15:49, "Tim Deegan" wrote: > >> whatever they want, without any Xen hole. __addr_ok() is therefore >> always true for such guests. >> >> Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan >> >> > > > > _______________________________________________ > Xen-devel mailing list > Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com > http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel