From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Keir Fraser Subject: Re: Re: [PATCH] HVM guests are allowed to use the entire virtual address space for Date: Mon, 26 Jul 2010 11:57:30 +0100 Message-ID: References: <20100726100006.GT13291@whitby.uk.xensource.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: In-Reply-To: <20100726100006.GT13291@whitby.uk.xensource.com> List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xensource.com Errors-To: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xensource.com To: Tim Deegan , Paolo Bonzini Cc: "xen-devel@lists.xensource.com" List-Id: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org On 26/07/2010 11:00, "Tim Deegan" wrote: > At 10:52 +0100 on 26 Jul (1280141550), Paolo Bonzini wrote: >> On 05/25/2010 04:49 PM, Tim Deegan wrote: >>> whatever they want, without any Xen hole. __addr_ok() is therefore >>> always true for such guests. >>> >>> Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan >> >> Sorry for picking up yet another old patch after two months. :) >> >> Do you have a testcase for this or the other patch in the thread? > > I'm afraid not - this was a very old patch that had been gathering dust > at the bottom of the XenServer code base. Calling > e.g. GNTTABOP_setup_table from inside a HVM guest with the frame_list > argument somewhere in the Xen virtual address space should trigger it, > though. The patch never got applied (to xen-unstable) by the way. We agreed on xen-unstable:21456, which was a more targeted bug fix. -- Keir > Cheers, > > Tim.