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From: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas.lengyel@zentific.com>
To: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>, Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>,
	Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>,
	"xen-devel@lists.xen.org" <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>,
	Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@citrix.com>,
	Andres Lagar-Cavilla <andres@lagarcavilla.org>,
	Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>,
	Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	Tamas K Lengyel <tklengyel@sec.in.tum.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH for-4.5 v10 15/19] xen/arm: Temporarily disable mem_access for hypervisor access
Date: Fri, 26 Sep 2014 15:29:24 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAErYnsix9gOX0DtVybkeDLKMmCDR2BA+kRoD3GL_a2giMrHNjQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <54255F7D.8070107@linaro.org>


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On Fri, Sep 26, 2014 at 2:43 PM, Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
wrote:

> Hello Tamas,
>
> On 26/09/2014 10:39, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Sep 25, 2014 at 6:19 PM, Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org
>> <mailto:julien.grall@linaro.org>> wrote:
>>     I don't think that modifying temporary the permission is the right
>>     thing to do because:
>>              - p2m_set_mem_access is called 2 times which means 2 TLB
>>     flush (and I'm not counting the table mapping), ie it's very slow
>>              - The other VCPU of the guest are still running. So you may
>>     not catch unwanted access.
>>
>>
>> That is a problem. The only way around that I see is to pause the domain
>> for the duration of this copy in case the mem_access permissions need to
>> be disabled.
>>
>
> [..]
>
>  So you mean only check the mem_access permissions when we failed to get
>> the page. I'm not sure what you propose afterwards. If there is a
>> mem_access restriction, just return an -errno? It would mean if a
>> mem_access listener is trapped that page than the guest can't execute
>> the hypercall. Since we would also want this system to be invisible to
>> the guest, that I'm affraid is not a good approach.
>>
>
> The P2M is storing the type of the mapping. With this type you can easily
> know if the previous mapping was read/write and therefore know if the guest
> can effectively copy data to the page or not.
>
> I don't see why we would need something more complicate as we want ignore
> mem_access for now.
>
>
As I said, I'm not sure what you are describing exactly. Based on the p2m
type we could already decide if the hypercall should be allowed to
read/write form the page. AFAIU the MMU here is only used as a fast-path to
determine if that's the case.

What I was getting at, its not a good idea to simply disable hypercalls
that use this path when there is a mem_access permission set because it
would reveal that there is a mem_access listener to the guest. So what I'll
do here is pausing the domain when access_in_use is set, temporary disable
the mem_access permissions, let the read/write through, then re-enable +
unpause the domain.

Tamas


> Regards,
>
> --
> Julien Grall
>

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  reply	other threads:[~2014-09-26 13:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-09-25 11:56 [PATCH for-4.5 v10 00/19] Mem_event and mem_access for ARM Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 01/19] xen: Relocate mem_access and mem_event into common Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 02/19] xen: Relocate struct npfec definition " Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 03/19] xen: Relocate p2m_access_t into common and swap the order Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 04/19] xen: Relocate p2m_mem_access_resume to mem_access common Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 18:59   ` Tim Deegan
2014-09-26 14:34   ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-26 19:54     ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 05/19] xen: Relocate set_access_required domctl into common Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 06/19] xen: Relocate mem_event_op domctl and access_op memop " Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 18:59   ` Tim Deegan
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 07/19] xen/mem_event: Clean out superfluous white-spaces Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 08/19] xen/mem_event: Relax error condition on debug builds Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 09/19] xen/mem_event: Abstract architecture specific sanity checks Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 10/19] xen/mem_access: Abstract architecture specific sanity check Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-26 14:05   ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 11/19] xen/arm: p2m changes for mem_access support Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 12/19] xen/arm: Implement domain_get_maximum_gpfn Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 13/19] xen/arm: Add p2m_set_permission and p2m_shatter_page helpers Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 14/19] xen/arm: Data abort exception (R/W) mem_events Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 15/19] xen/arm: Temporarily disable mem_access for hypervisor access Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 16:19   ` Julien Grall
2014-09-26  8:39     ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-26 12:43       ` Julien Grall
2014-09-26 13:29         ` Tamas K Lengyel [this message]
2014-09-26 13:41           ` Julien Grall
2014-09-26 13:45             ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-26 15:55   ` Ian Campbell
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 16/19] xen/arm: Instruction prefetch abort (X) mem_event handling Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 17/19] xen/arm: Enable the compilation of mem_access and mem_event on ARM Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 18/19] tools/libxc: Allocate magic page for mem access " Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 19/19] tools/tests: Enable xen-access " Tamas K Lengyel

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