From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 01/11] x86/boot: enumerate documentation for the x86 hardware_subarch
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2016 17:29:28 -0800
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To: "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>, David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, Xen Devel <xen-devel@lists.xensource.com>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>, Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>, lguest@lists.ozlabs.org, Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>, "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
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On Wed, Feb 24, 2016 at 5:18 PM, Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> On Feb 24, 2016 8:40 AM, "Andy Lutomirski" <luto@amacapital.net> wrote:
>>
>> On Feb 24, 2016 12:33 AM, "Ingo Molnar" <mingo@kernel.org> wrote:
>> >
>> > For hard coded platform quirks I'd suggest we add x86_platform.quirks
>> > flags. For
>> > example the F00F hack for Xen could be done via:
>> >
>> >         x86_platform.quirks.idt_remap = 0;
>> >
>>
>> Don't we unconditionally remap the IDT?  I think Kees did it for
>> general purpose hardening due to our complete inability to hide the
>> IDT address. I.e. I think we can remove the f00f condition entirely.
>>
>
> Kees can you confirm ?
>

No need.

        /*
         * Set the IDT descriptor to a fixed read-only location, so that the
         * "sidt" instruction will not leak the location of the kernel, and
         * to defend the IDT against arbitrary memory write vulnerabilities.
         * It will be reloaded in cpu_init() */
        __set_fixmap(FIX_RO_IDT, __pa_symbol(idt_table), PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
        idt_descr.address = fix_to_virt(FIX_RO_IDT);

IIUI this works around f00f as a side effect.  The only other thing
needed is the code that X86_BUG_F00F guards, which is responsible for
fixing up the error generated on attempted F00F exploitation from an
OOPS to a SIGILL.  I see no reason why that code couldn't be allowed
to run on even a PV guest on a F00F-affected CPU -- it would never
trigger anyway.