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From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: "Tian, Kevin" <kevin.tian@intel.com>,
	Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Cc: "Wei Liu" <wei.liu2@citrix.com>,
	"Nakajima, Jun" <jun.nakajima@intel.com>,
	"Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@suse.com>,
	"Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/9] x86/vmx: Support remote access to the MSR lists
Date: Mon, 28 May 2018 16:15:18 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <a5066bab-94c4-4db8-f4d6-9ef178dae2cb@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <AADFC41AFE54684AB9EE6CBC0274A5D1911930D4@SHSMSX101.ccr.corp.intel.com>

On 27/05/18 04:47, Tian, Kevin wrote:
>> From: Andrew Cooper [mailto:andrew.cooper3@citrix.com]
>> Sent: Tuesday, May 22, 2018 7:21 PM
>>
>> At the moment, all modifications of the MSR lists are in current context.
>> However, future changes may need to put MSR_EFER into the lists from
>> domctl
>> hypercall context.
>>
>> Plumb a struct vcpu parameter down through the infrastructure, and use
>> vmx_vmcs_{enter,exit}() for safe access to the VMCS in vmx_add_msr().
>> Use
>> assertions to ensure that access is either in current context, or while the
>> vcpu is paused.
>>
>> For now it is safe to require that remote accesses are under the domctl lock.
>> This will remain safe if/when the global domctl lock becomes per-domain.
>>
>> Note these expectations beside the fields in arch_vmx_struct, and reorder
>> the
>> fields to avoid unnecessary padding.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
>> ---
>> CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
>> CC: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
>> CC: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
>> CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
>> CC: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
>>
>> To preempt any questions about spinlocks, the use of the MSR lists in the
>> return-to-guest path causes checklock failures for plain spinlocks (despite it
>> technically being safe to live here), and the call to alloc_xenheap_page()
>> makes it impossible to use irqsave/restore variants, due to the nested
>> acquisition of the heap lock.
> I don't understand above words. How does it relate to the patch here?

It explains why I haven't/can't introduce a spinlock to protect access,
in case someone reviewing the code asks "why not introduce a spinlock".

>> @@ -1333,12 +1335,14 @@ struct vmx_msr_entry
>> *vmx_find_msr(uint32_t msr, enum vmx_msr_list_type type)
>>      return ((ent < end) && (ent->index == msr)) ? ent : NULL;
>>  }
>>
>> -int vmx_add_msr(uint32_t msr, enum vmx_msr_list_type type)
>> +int vmx_add_msr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, enum vmx_msr_list_type
>> type)
>>  {
>> -    struct vcpu *curr = current;
>> -    struct arch_vmx_struct *arch_vmx = &curr->arch.hvm_vmx;
>> +    struct arch_vmx_struct *arch_vmx = &v->arch.hvm_vmx;
>>      struct vmx_msr_entry **ptr, *start = NULL, *ent, *end;
>>      unsigned int total;
>> +    int rc;
>> +
>> +    ASSERT(v == current || !vcpu_runnable(v));
>>
>>      switch ( type )
>>      {
>> @@ -1357,13 +1361,18 @@ int vmx_add_msr(uint32_t msr, enum
>> vmx_msr_list_type type)
>>          return -EINVAL;
>>      }
>>
>> +    vmx_vmcs_enter(v);
>> +
> why entering vmcs so early even before possible page allocation?

Because the next thing the allocation path does is write to the MSR
load/save list fields.

The alternative would be to have an else on this if(), and a second
vmcs_enter() after the memory allocation, but as these are two one-time
allocations in uncontended paths, I didn't consider the added complexity
worth it.

~Andrew

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  reply	other threads:[~2018-05-28 15:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-05-22 11:20 [PATCH 0/9] x86/vmx: Don't leak EFER.NXE into guest context Andrew Cooper
2018-05-22 11:20 ` [PATCH 1/9] x86/vmx: API improvements for MSR load/save infrastructure Andrew Cooper
2018-05-23 16:01   ` Roger Pau Monné
2018-05-23 17:02     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-05-27  3:26   ` Tian, Kevin
2018-05-22 11:20 ` [PATCH 2/9] x86/vmx: Internal cleanup " Andrew Cooper
2018-05-23 16:28   ` Roger Pau Monné
2018-05-23 16:54     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-05-24 14:45   ` Jan Beulich
2018-05-27  3:30   ` Tian, Kevin
2018-05-22 11:20 ` [PATCH 3/9] x86/vmx: Factor locate_msr_entry() out of vmx_find_msr() and vmx_add_msr() Andrew Cooper
2018-05-23 16:39   ` Roger Pau Monné
2018-05-23 16:55     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-05-24 10:53       ` Roger Pau Monné
2018-05-24 10:59         ` Andrew Cooper
2018-05-24 12:16           ` Roger Pau Monné
2018-05-27  3:38   ` Tian, Kevin
2018-05-22 11:20 ` [PATCH 4/9] x86/vmx: Support remote access to the MSR lists Andrew Cooper
2018-05-24 11:50   ` Roger Pau Monné
2018-05-24 12:03     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-05-24 14:53   ` Jan Beulich
2018-05-27  3:47   ` Tian, Kevin
2018-05-28 15:15     ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2018-05-22 11:20 ` [PATCH 5/9] x86/vmx: Fix handing of MSR_DEBUGCTL on VMExit Andrew Cooper
2018-05-22 12:53   ` Andrew Cooper
2018-05-24 12:14   ` Roger Pau Monné
2018-05-24 12:39     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-05-24 13:53       ` Jan Beulich
2018-05-24 15:08   ` Jan Beulich
2018-05-24 15:51     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-05-27  3:56   ` Tian, Kevin
2018-05-28 15:30     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-05-22 11:20 ` [PATCH 6/9] x86/vmx: Pass an MSR value into vmx_msr_add() Andrew Cooper
2018-05-24 15:12   ` Jan Beulich
2018-05-30 18:09     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-05-22 11:20 ` [PATCH 7/9] x86/vmx: Support load-only guest MSR list entries Andrew Cooper
2018-05-24 15:19   ` Jan Beulich
2018-05-24 15:37   ` Roger Pau Monné
2018-05-22 11:20 ` [PATCH 8/9] x86/vmx: Support removing MSRs from the host/guest load/save lists Andrew Cooper
2018-05-24 15:42   ` Roger Pau Monné
2018-05-24 15:45     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-05-22 11:20 ` [PATCH 9/9] x86/vmx: Don't leak EFER.NXE into guest context Andrew Cooper
2018-05-24 16:01   ` Roger Pau Monné
2018-05-24 16:48     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-05-25  7:27       ` Jan Beulich
2018-05-25  8:03         ` Andrew Cooper
2018-05-25  6:23   ` Tim Deegan
2018-05-25  7:49   ` Jan Beulich
2018-05-25  8:36     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-05-25 11:36       ` Jan Beulich
2018-05-25 11:48         ` Andrew Cooper

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