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From: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
To: "Philippe Mathieu-Daudé" <philmd@oss.qualcomm.com>
Cc: qemu-devel@nongnu.org, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org,
	qemu-riscv@nongnu.org, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org,
	qemu-block@nongnu.org, qemu-s390x@nongnu.org,
	qemu-arm@nongnu.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 14/28] hw/ide: mark ICH9 and ide-hd/ide-cd as secure
Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2026 14:35:28 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <asOnoKDrx_wwOIn2@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <63427797-e8ed-4345-b8c7-469d20865165@oss.qualcomm.com>

On Mon, Oct 05, 2026 at 03:30:09PM +0200, Philippe Mathieu-Daudé wrote:
> On 11/9/26 16:36, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
> > These have a long history of usage in virtualization scenarios on
> > x86, for OS which lack modern virtio drivers for storage, and thus
> > must be considered secure.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
> > ---
> >   hw/ide/ich.c     | 1 +
> >   hw/ide/ide-dev.c | 3 +++
> >   hw/ide/piix.c    | 2 ++
> >   3 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
> 
> 
> > @@ -252,6 +254,7 @@ static const TypeInfo ide_device_type_info = {
> >       .parent = TYPE_DEVICE,
> >       .instance_size = sizeof(IDEDevice),
> >       .abstract = true,
> > +    .secure = true,
> 
> We shouldn't accept abstract secure device class IMO because it
> will be to easy to merge new devices that ended secure and we do
> not want to consider them. I'd go a step further and assert both
> can not be set together.

Setting 'secure' in a parent device does NOT imply that all children
have the same, only the reverse. ie, if a leaf device is secure, then
by definition all its parents must be secure.

This series only intended to mark leaf devices as secure, but a
followup series will explicitly mark the whole parent chain as
secure too, and also validate that chain in tests.

Another followup is to require non-user creatable implied devices
as secure. ie if a machine creates devices X, Y & Z, then if that
machine is secure, then X, Y & Z must be considered secure too.

Note, this would be just for those implied when "-nodefaults" is
given.

> 
> >       .class_size = sizeof(IDEDeviceClass),
> >       .class_init = ide_device_class_init,
> >       .instance_init = ide_dev_instance_init,
> 

With regards,
Daniel
-- 
|: https://berrange.com       ~~        https://hachyderm.io/@berrange :|
|: https://libvirt.org          ~~          https://entangle-photo.org :|
|: https://pixelfed.art/berrange   ~~    https://fstop138.berrange.com :|



  reply	other threads:[~2026-10-05 13:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 78+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-09-11 14:35 [PATCH 00/28] Mark user creatable devices for secure for virt use case Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 01/28] hw: mark secure machines for x86, s390, ppc, arm, loonarch, riscv Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-02 17:21   ` marcandre.lureau
2026-10-05 13:06   ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2026-10-05 13:23     ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-05 13:34       ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2026-10-05 13:39         ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-05 16:41   ` Cornelia Huck
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 02/28] accel: mark kvm and xen accelerators as secure Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-02 17:21   ` marcandre.lureau
2026-10-05 13:26   ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 03/28] hw: mark all virtio PCI devices " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-02 17:21   ` marcandre.lureau
2026-10-05  9:29     ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 04/28] hw: mark all virtio CCW " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-02 17:21   ` marcandre.lureau
2026-10-05 13:15   ` Eric Farman
2026-10-05 16:43   ` Cornelia Huck
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 05/28] hw: mark all vhost devices a secure Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-02 17:21   ` marcandre.lureau
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 06/28] hw: mark all remaining virtio object types as secure Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-02 17:21   ` marcandre.lureau
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 07/28] hw/vfio: mark all VFIO object classes " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-02 17:21   ` marcandre.lureau
2026-10-05 16:44   ` Cornelia Huck
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 08/28] hw/xen: mark all Xen related object types as being secure Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-02 17:21   ` marcandre.lureau
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 09/28] hw/net: mark e1000, e1000e, IGB, rtl8139 & sPAPR VLAN as secure Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-02 17:21   ` marcandre.lureau
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 10/28] hw/usb: mark commonly used USB devices/hosts " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-02 17:21   ` marcandre.lureau
2026-10-05  9:39     ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 11/28] hw/watchdog: mark some watchdog devices " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-02 17:21   ` marcandre.lureau
2026-10-05 16:45   ` Cornelia Huck
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 12/28] hw/scsi: mark spapr and vmware SCSI controllers " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-02 17:21   ` marcandre.lureau
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 13/28] hw/scsi: mark SCSI disk endpoint devices " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-02 17:21   ` marcandre.lureau
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 14/28] hw/ide: mark ICH9 and ide-hd/ide-cd " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-02 17:21   ` marcandre.lureau
2026-10-05 13:30   ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2026-10-05 13:35     ` Daniel P. Berrangé [this message]
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 15/28] hw: define most common PCI types " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 16:50   ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-02 17:21   ` marcandre.lureau
2026-10-05  9:26     ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 16/28] hw/pci-host: mark common x86, ppc, arm and s390 PCI hosts " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-02 17:21   ` marcandre.lureau
2026-10-05 16:49   ` Cornelia Huck
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 17/28] hw/display: mark bochs, cirrus, qxl, VGA, ramfb " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-02 17:21   ` marcandre.lureau
2026-10-05  9:36     ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 18/28] hw/tpm: mark all TPM implementations " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-02 17:21   ` marcandre.lureau
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 19/28] hw/misc: mark pvpanic, vmcoreinfo " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-02 17:21   ` marcandre.lureau
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 20/28] hw/audio: mark Intel HDA devices & codecs " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-02 17:21   ` marcandre.lureau
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 21/28] hw/char: mark common serial / console devicess a secure Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-02 17:21   ` marcandre.lureau
2026-10-05 16:50   ` Cornelia Huck
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 22/28] hw/mem: mark nvdimm, pc-dimm & spapr-nvdimm devices as secure Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-02 17:21   ` marcandre.lureau
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 23/28] hw/uefi: mark the EFI vars service " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-02 17:21   ` marcandre.lureau
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 24/28] hw/acpi: mark erst, vmclock and vmgenid devices " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-02 17:21   ` marcandre.lureau
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 25/28] hw: mark KVM clock and RTC " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-02 17:21   ` marcandre.lureau
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 26/28] hw: device AMD, Intel and ARM IOMMUs " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-02 17:21   ` marcandre.lureau
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 27/28] hw/input: mark PS/2 and PC Keyboard devices " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-02 17:21   ` marcandre.lureau
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 28/28] hw/i386: mark vmmouse / vmport " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-02 17:21   ` marcandre.lureau
2026-09-28 10:37 ` [PATCH 00/28] Mark user creatable devices for secure for virt use case Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-02 17:21 ` marcandre.lureau

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