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From: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com>
To: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: "Romain Caritey" <Romain.Caritey@microchip.com>,
	"Baptiste Le Duc" <baptiste.le-duc@vates.tech>,
	"Zheng Zhang" <zhangzheng@iscas.ac.cn>,
	"Alistair Francis" <alistair.francis@wdc.com>,
	"Connor Davis" <connojdavis@gmail.com>,
	"Andrew Cooper" <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	"Anthony PERARD" <anthony.perard@vates.tech>,
	"Michal Orzel" <michal.orzel@amd.com>,
	"Julien Grall" <julien@xen.org>,
	"Roger Pau Monné" <roger@xenproject.org>,
	"Stefano Stabellini" <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
	xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 18/39] xen/riscv: add guest page fault handling stub
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2026 13:47:37 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <f194cd83-dd52-475f-b882-3ba6d8c489ef@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e91e5b49-b6b6-429f-a1b2-b9e555e19f92@suse.com>



On 9/10/26 8:38 AM, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 09.09.2026 17:09, Oleksii Kurochko wrote:
>> On 9/8/26 4:10 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>> On 27.08.2026 17:21, Oleksii Kurochko wrote:
>>>> --- /dev/null
>>>> +++ b/xen/arch/riscv/emulate.c
>>>> @@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
>>>> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
>>>> +
>>>> +/*
>>>> + * RISC-V instruction emulation for trapped guest accesses
>>>> + */
>>>> +
>>>> +#include <xen/bug.h>
>>>> +#include <xen/errno.h>
>>>> +#include <xen/sched.h>
>>>> +#include <xen/types.h>
>>>> +
>>>> +#include <asm/csr.h>
>>>> +#include <asm/current.h>
>>>> +#include <asm/emulate.h>
>>>> +#include <asm/riscv_encoding.h>
>>>> +#include <asm/traps.h>
>>>> +
>>>> +/*
>>>> + * The hardware-reported details of a guest page fault, gathered once by
>>>> + * handle_guest_page_fault() and passed down to the emulation of the faulted
>>>> + * access.
>>>> + */
>>>> +struct guest_fault {
>>>> +    /* The guest register state as saved on entry to do_trap(). */
>>>> +    struct cpu_user_regs *regs;
>>>
>>> If the comment was true, this could be pointer-to-const.
>>
>> I think it can't be pointer-to-const as emulate_load/store functions
>> wants to change PC register after MMIO access emulation is finished to
>> not trap again.
> 
> Of course, hence how I started the sentence.
> 
>>>> +    /* scause: a fetch, a load or a store/AMO guest page fault. */
>>>> +    unsigned long cause;
>>>> +    /*
>>>> +     * htinst: the trapped instruction in its transformed form, or one of the
>>>> +     * special values (zero, or a pseudoinstruction).
>>>> +     */
>>>> +    unsigned long htinst;
>>>> +    /* htval: as written by hardware; see resolve_faulting_gpa(). */
>>>> +    unsigned long htval;
>>>> +    /* stval: the guest virtual address of the faulting access. */
>>>> +    unsigned long stval;
>>>> +    /* The faulting guest physical address, filled by resolve_faulting_gpa(). */
>>>> +    paddr_t gpa;
>>>> +};
>>>> +
>>>> +/*
>>>> + * Is @htinst one of the pseudoinstructions reported for a guest page fault
>>>> + * taken on an implicit memory access done for VS-stage address translation?
>>>> + *
>>>> + * All four values are recognized regardless of the hypervisor's XLEN: the
>>>> + * width they encode is that of a VS-stage PTE, i.e. it follows the guest's
>>>> + * paging mode (4 bytes for Sv32, 8 otherwise). On RV32 the 64-bit forms
>>>> + * simply never occur.
>>>> + */
>>>> +static bool htinst_is_pseudo(unsigned long htinst)
>>>> +{
>>>> +    switch ( htinst )
>>>> +    {
>>>> +    case INSN_PSEUDO_VS_LOAD32:
>>>> +    case INSN_PSEUDO_VS_STORE32:
>>>> +    case INSN_PSEUDO_VS_LOAD64:
>>>> +    case INSN_PSEUDO_VS_STORE64:
>>>> +        return true;
>>>> +
>>>> +    default:
>>>> +        return false;
>>>> +    }
>>>> +}
>>>
>>> This feels fragile. New pseudo-insns can appear at any time. If the value as
>>> a whole is non-zero, aiui the low two bits being zero indicate a pseudo-insn.
>>> In which case enumerating pseudo-insns we are currently aware of isn't
>>> necessary.
>>
>> I will write it simpler	 then:
>>
>> /*
>>    * Is @htinst one of the special pseudoinstruction values, reported for
>> a guest
>>    * page fault taken on an implicit memory access done for VS-stage address
>>    * translation?
>>    *
>>    * It is enough to check only bits[1:0] as according to the spec:
>>    *
>>    * The value is one of the special pseudoinstructions defined later, all of
>>    * which have bits 1:0 equal to 00.
>>    */
>> static bool htinst_is_pseudo(unsigned long htinst)
>> {
>>       return htinst && ((htinst & 3) == 0);
>> }
> 
> And preferably
> 
>       return htinst && !(htinst & 3);
> 
> to be self-consistent.
> 

Good point. I will apply your suggestion.

>>>> +    /*
>>>> +     * A guest-page fault may arise due to an implicit memory access during
>>>> +     * first-stage (VS-stage) address translation, in which case a guest
>>>> +     * physical address written to htval is that of the implicit memory
>>>> +     * access that faulted - for example, the address of a VS-level page
>>>> +     * table entry that could not be read. (The guest physical address
>>>> +     * corresponding to the original virtual address is unknown when
>>>> +     * VS-stage translation fails to complete)
>>>> +     *
>>>> +     * In such cases htinst reports one of the pseudoinstructions recognized
>>>> +     * by htinst_is_pseudo(), and the fault requires separate handling (since
>>>> +     * G-stage translation failed on an unpopulated/unmapped guest physical
>>>> +     * address during a hardware page-table walk). To match bare hardware
>>>> +     * behavior, we must inject an access fault of the ORIGINAL access type
>>>> +     * (Instruction, Load, or Store/AMO) that initiated the address
>>>> +     * translation.
>>>> +     */
>>>> +    if ( htinst_is_pseudo(gf.htinst) )
>>>> +    {
>>>> +        inject_access_fault(&gf);
>>>> +
>>>> +        return;
>>>> +    }
>>>
>>> I.e. you imply that guests won't put their page tables in MMIO? That's
>>> fragile imo; I have seen OSes to use video frame buffers for all kinds
>>> of (transient) purposes, for example.
>>
>> I think it is okay for now and if it will a real use case then an update
>> of this code will be needed.
> 
> May I then ask that you leave a remark (maybe even fixme) to this effect?

Sure, I will then add the following to the comment above if ():

      * FIXME: This assumes that guest page tables never reside in an 
emulated
      * MMIO region, i.e. that an implicit access faulting at G-stage always
      * targets an unpopulated GPA. Guests may (even transiently) place page
      * tables in MMIO-backed memory, e.g. a video frame buffer. Supporting
      * that would require walking the VS-stage page tables in software,
      * accessing the PTEs (including A/D updates) through the MMIO 
handlers,
      * and then emulating the original access, instead of injecting a 
fault.

> 
>>>> +    resolve_faulting_gpa(&gf);
>>>
>>> Since the function is only a stub right now - how is one to tell whether
>>> this indeed can never fail?
>>
>> It can't be tell. But what is wrong if it could fail? (Actually with
>> current implementation introduced in later patches you can find it can
>> fail if a necessary extension or software page walk isn't introduced).
> 
> Well, quite obviously if it can fail, its return value would need checking
> here.
> 

That what I thought about after I sent my e-mail as a possible option.

I will update the prototype to:

+static int resolve_faulting_gpa(struct guest_fault *gf)
  {
-    BUG_ON("unimplemented");
+    return -EOPNOTSUPP;
  }

And handle an error code in the following way:

@@ -136,7 +144,8 @@ void handle_guest_page_fault(struct cpu_user_regs 
*regs, unsigned long cause
)
          return;
      }

-    resolve_faulting_gpa(&gf);
+    if ( rc = resolve_faulting_gpa(&gf) )
+        goto out;

      switch ( cause )
      {
@@ -163,6 +172,7 @@ void handle_guest_page_fault(struct cpu_user_regs 
*regs, unsigned long cause
)
          break;
      }

+ out:
      if ( rc )
          domain_crash(current->domain,

and then in the next patch "[PATCH v2 21/39] xen/riscv: resolve the 
faulting guest physical address" I will do "return -EOPNOTSUPP" instead 
of panic():

  -        panic("Shtvala isn't supported by h/w; s/w VS-stage walk 
required\n");
++    {
++        printk_once(XENLOG_WARNING
++                    "Shtvala isn't supported by h/w; s/w VS-stage walk 
required\n");
++        return -EOPNOTSUPP;
++    }

~ Oleksii


  reply	other threads:[~2026-09-11 11:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 251+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-08-27 15:20 [PATCH v2 00/39] [RISC-V] virtual interrupt controller (vAPLIC/vIMSIC) support Oleksii Kurochko
2026-08-27 15:20 ` [PATCH v2 01/39] xen/riscv: drop pregs from struct cpu_user_regs Oleksii Kurochko
2026-08-31 12:48   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-01  6:58     ` Jan Beulich
2026-08-27 15:20 ` [PATCH v2 02/39] xen/riscv: drop bug.h's duplicate instruction length helpers Oleksii Kurochko
2026-08-31 12:48   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-01  7:01   ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-02 10:48     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-02 13:02       ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-02 13:45         ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-02 14:27           ` Jan Beulich
2026-08-27 15:20 ` [PATCH v2 03/39] xen/riscv: set the guest's XLEN explicitly in hstatus.VSXL Oleksii Kurochko
2026-08-31 12:48   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-01  7:03     ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-01  8:40     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-01 15:16     ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-01 15:20   ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-02 11:42     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-02 13:07       ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-02 13:29         ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-02 14:31           ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-02 15:17             ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-02 15:56               ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-02 17:45                 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-08-27 15:20 ` [PATCH v2 04/39] xen/riscv: introduce csr_read64() Oleksii Kurochko
2026-08-27 15:36   ` Andrew Cooper
2026-08-31 12:42     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-01  7:07       ` Jan Beulich
2026-08-27 15:20 ` [PATCH v2 05/39] xen/riscv: request a G-stage flush on vmenter when VMIDs are disabled Oleksii Kurochko
2026-08-31 12:48   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-01  8:43     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-08-27 15:20 ` [PATCH v2 06/39] xen/riscv: use UINT64_MAX to disable the VS-timer Oleksii Kurochko
2026-08-31 12:48   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-01  7:12   ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-01  8:47     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-08-27 15:20 ` [PATCH v2 07/39] xen/riscv: add missing APLIC register offsets, masks to asm/aplic.h Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-01 15:36   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-01 15:53     ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-02 13:22       ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-02 13:52         ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-08-27 15:20 ` [PATCH v2 08/39] xen/riscv: introduce device-agnostic MMIO emulation dispatch Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-01 15:36   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-03 10:28     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-09 13:24   ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-09 14:04     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-09 14:32       ` Jan Beulich
2026-08-27 15:20 ` [PATCH v2 09/39] xen/riscv: implement virtual APLIC MMIO emulation Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-02 11:51   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-04 11:58     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-04 12:03       ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-02 12:31   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-04 14:02     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-09 14:26   ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-10 10:37     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-10 11:14       ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-10 14:24         ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-12  8:50           ` SeungJu Cheon
2026-09-22  8:50             ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-08-27 15:20 ` [PATCH v2 10/39] xen/riscv: build the target hart index via aplic_hart_field() Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-04  8:26   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-04 14:28     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-09 14:51     ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-09 14:52   ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-10 10:59     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-10 11:23       ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-10 12:44         ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-10 12:57           ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-11  9:47             ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-10 11:23       ` Jan Beulich
2026-08-27 15:20 ` [PATCH v2 11/39] xen/riscv: add helper to check APLIC MSI mode Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-04  8:26   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-09 14:53     ` Jan Beulich
2026-08-27 15:20 ` [PATCH v2 12/39] xen/riscv: implement vCPU context switching Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-02 14:42   ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-04  8:26   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-04  8:33     ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-04  9:54       ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-04 14:55     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-07  8:17       ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-08  9:06         ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-05  7:25   ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-10 13:29   ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-11 10:43     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-08-27 15:20 ` [PATCH v2 13/39] xen/riscv: save and restore AIA state on vCPU context switch Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-04  9:52   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-04 16:40     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-08-27 15:20 ` [PATCH v2 14/39] xen/riscv: introduce vintc_ctxt_switch_{from,to}() Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-04 11:25   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-04 16:54     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-10 14:54   ` Jan Beulich
2026-08-27 15:20 ` [PATCH v2 15/39] xen/riscv: add IMSIC vCPU context switch handlers Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-04 11:33   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-04 16:56     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-10 14:57   ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-11 11:19     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-08-27 15:21 ` [PATCH v2 16/39] xen/riscv: extend exception tables with type and data fields Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-07 15:57   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-08  6:06     ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-08  8:18       ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-08  9:19     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-08 16:26       ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-08 13:44   ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-09 11:20     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-09 12:22       ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-09 12:42         ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-08-27 15:21 ` [PATCH v2 17/39] xen/riscv: decouple INSN_PSEUDO_VS_* from the hypervisor's XLEN Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-07 15:57   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-08  9:34     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-08 16:04       ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-09 12:57         ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-08-27 15:21 ` [PATCH v2 18/39] xen/riscv: add guest page fault handling stub Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-07 15:57   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-08  9:49     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-08 14:10   ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-09 15:09     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-10  6:38       ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-11 11:47         ` Oleksii Kurochko [this message]
2026-08-27 15:21 ` [PATCH v2 19/39] xen/riscv: implement trap redirection to a guest Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-07 15:57   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-08 10:01     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-08 14:58       ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-08 15:05         ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-08 15:47           ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-08 15:58             ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-08 14:16   ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-08 15:25     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-08 14:16   ` Jan Beulich
2026-08-27 15:21 ` [PATCH v2 20/39] xen/riscv: detect Shtvala Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-07 15:57   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-08 10:15     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-08 15:49       ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-08-27 15:21 ` [PATCH v2 21/39] xen/riscv: resolve the faulting guest physical address Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-09 12:04   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-11 12:56     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-10 15:06   ` Jan Beulich
2026-08-27 15:21 ` [PATCH v2 22/39] xen/riscv: add guest memory read helper Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-09 12:04   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-10 15:19     ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-11 13:06     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-11 13:41       ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-11 13:47         ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-11 13:50           ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-10 15:28   ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-11 13:57     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-11 14:00       ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-11 14:29         ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-08-27 15:21 ` [PATCH v2 23/39] xen/riscv: look up the exception table for any trap taken in Xen context Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-10 15:31   ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-18  8:44   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-22  9:31     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-08-27 15:21 ` [PATCH v2 24/39] xen/riscv: add helpers for decoding a trapped load or store Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-14 11:03   ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-14 15:57     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-15  5:18       ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-18  8:44   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-22 11:03     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-08-27 15:21 ` [PATCH v2 25/39] xen/riscv: add guest load emulation for trapped MMIO accesses Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-14 11:48   ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-16  4:16     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-18  9:16   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-22 11:22     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-08-27 15:21 ` [PATCH v2 26/39] xen/riscv: add guest store " Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-14 12:01   ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-16  4:53     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-16  5:15       ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-16  5:23         ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-18  9:16   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-22 11:38     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-08-27 15:21 ` [PATCH v2 27/39] xen/riscv: introduce arch_move_irqs() Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-14 12:07   ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-16  5:32     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-22 17:00   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-08-27 15:21 ` [PATCH v2 28/39] xen/riscv: handle the case when no vCPU migration is needed Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-14 12:12   ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-16  5:55     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-16 13:02       ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-17  5:12         ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-17  5:20           ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-17  8:40             ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-17 10:41               ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-18  9:21     ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-08-27 15:21 ` [PATCH v2 29/39] xen/riscv: introduce aplic_reconfigure_target() Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-14 12:25   ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-17  4:55     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-08-27 15:21 ` [PATCH v2 30/39] xen/riscv: prepare new IMSIC VS-file Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-14 13:13   ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-17 14:50     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-18  6:02       ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-21 16:15   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-22  6:32     ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-22 13:01     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-22 15:36       ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-08-27 15:21 ` [PATCH v2 31/39] xen/riscv: implement APLIC-hart sync barrier for vCPU migration Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-14 13:27   ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-18 11:53     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-22 17:03       ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-22 17:00   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-22 18:48     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-23 10:57       ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-23 12:15         ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-08-27 15:21 ` [PATCH v2 32/39] xen/riscv: remap interrupts to new IMSIC VS-file Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-14 15:02   ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-21  8:03     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-21  8:28       ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-21  8:50         ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-23 13:34   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-23 15:45     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-23 16:10       ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-23 15:25   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-23 15:48     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-23 16:11       ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-08-27 15:21 ` [PATCH v2 33/39] xen/riscv: dump old interrupt file to memory Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-14 15:15   ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-21  9:51     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-23 15:15   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-23 16:02     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-23 16:16       ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-23 18:30         ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-08-27 15:21 ` [PATCH v2 34/39] xen/riscv: restore register state in the new IMSIC VS-file Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-14 15:21   ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-21 10:58     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-23 15:42   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-23 16:08     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-23 16:21       ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-08-27 15:21 ` [PATCH v2 35/39] xen/riscv: add basic VGEIN management for AIA guests Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-18 12:38   ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-23 16:06   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-08-27 15:21 ` [PATCH v2 36/39] xen/riscv: wake up a descheduled vCPU on a guest external interrupt Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-18 12:52   ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-21 14:01     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-21 15:08       ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-22 13:37         ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-24 14:25   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-25 15:33     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-08-27 15:21 ` [PATCH v2 37/39] xen/riscv: map IMSIC interrupt file for vCPUs Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-21 11:36   ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-21 14:35     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-25  9:22   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-08-27 15:21 ` [PATCH v2 38/39] xen/riscv: implement continue_new_vcpu() Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-21 12:12   ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-22  8:23     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-22 10:20       ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-22 13:58         ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-25  9:22   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-25 11:26     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-08-27 15:21 ` [PATCH v2 39/39] xen/riscv: introduce IMSIC h/w interrupt file attaching to vcpu Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-21 12:32   ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-22  8:31     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-22 10:23       ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-25 13:11   ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-28 11:01     ` Oleksii Kurochko

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