From: "Antonin Godard" <antonin.godard@bootlin.com>
To: "Richard Purdie" <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>,
<docs@lists.yoctoproject.org>
Subject: Re: [docs] [PATCH] security-manual: Add information about how security is handled in builds
Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2026 10:29:55 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <DKLZ2A06Y7H5.1UDITK0RTXIS0@bootlin.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ea4f44a7400e193bf4cd9b65d59e50b0593cf4b7.camel@linuxfoundation.org>
Hi,
On Tue Aug 11, 2026 at 10:20 AM CEST, Richard Purdie wrote:
> On Tue, 2026-08-11 at 10:01 +0200, Antonin Godard wrote:
>> On Fri Aug 7, 2026 at 6:43 PM CEST, Richard Purdie via lists.yoctoproject.org wrote:
>> > We have no information about how security is handled within the builds
>> > themselves. Start to document this.
>> >
>> > Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
>> > ---
>> > .../security-manual/build-security.rst | 41 +++++++++++++++++++
>> > documentation/security-manual/index.rst | 1 +
>> > 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+)
>> > create mode 100644 documentation/security-manual/build-security.rst
>> >
>> > diff --git a/documentation/security-manual/build-security.rst b/documentation/security-manual/build-security.rst
>> > new file mode 100644
>> > index 000000000..5f15d5f64
>> > --- /dev/null
>> > +++ b/documentation/security-manual/build-security.rst
>> > @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
>> > +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: CC-BY-SA-2.0-UK
>> > +
>> > +**************
>> > +Build Security
>>
>> I suggest renaming it to "OpenEmbedded Build System Security", as "Build" alone
>> could be interpreted in many different ways, including builds for specific
>> software components, etc.
>
> Perhaps "Build Process Security"? I think build system isn't quit the
> right thing here.
Works for me :)
>>
>> > +**************
>> > +
>> > +OpenEmbedded is used to run the builds and careful consideration has gone into
>>
>> When you say "OpenEmbedded" I guess you mean the community? Or the build system?
>>
>> We have a :term:`OpenEmbedded Build System` that could be used here if relevant.
>
> That seems like the right thing to use.
>
>> > +how it does this with the aim of being both secure and reproducible. Like any
>> > +system, it does need to be used carefully and in keeping with the design for
>> > +that to be true. Users of the system should consider that:
>> > +
>> > +- The builds generally aim for any input into the build process being verified in
>> > + some form. For source code tarballs, these would have a checksum. Git source
>> > + trees would have a specific git revision. Metadata would also usually be
>> > + under source control and also have revisions.
>>
>> Add a link to our fetching documentation here?
>>
>> """
>> See the :doc:`bitbake:bitbake-user-manual/bitbake-user-manual-fetching` section
>> of the BitBake User Manual for more information.
>> """
>
> Sure, I intended this as a first pass and figured it might need some
> markup/tweaking. Sorry for the spelling :/.
No problem :)
>>
>> > +
>> > +- Some elements that can influence the build are not verified. It is assumed
>> > + that the operating system running the system is secure and of a known setup and
>> > + version. The system goes to signififant lengths to isolate against host
>> > + contamination of the output but it is certainly possible, especially malicously.
>>
>> typo: maliciously
>>
>> Link to our supported distros here?
>>
>> """
>> See the :ref:`system-requirements-supported-distros` section of the Yocto
>> Project Reference Manual for more information on supported host distributions.
>> """
>>
>> > +
>> > +- The builds assume DL_DIR is a safe location. Once things enter that location
>>
>> s/DL_DIR/:term:`DL_DIR`/
>>
>> > + there are not repeatedly re-verified. A user could edit the git trees or
>> > + tarballs there in ways the build might not detect.
>>
>> I guess this will be better detailed with
>> https://bugzilla.yoctoproject.org/show_bug.cgi?id=16102. Maybe the documentation
>> coming from this bug should be linked here then.
>
> This text was intended to help close 16102 :/. We've not managed to get
> anyone else to provide such information. Certainly if any more is
> forthcoming, this would be the place to add it. I did want to document
> something before we close that bug though.
Ah I see, ok, I guess that's already something and if someone comes up with more
information about the subject then there's already a place in the docs where
that can be added.
Thanks,
Antonin
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-11 8:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-07 16:43 [PATCH] security-manual: Add information about how security is handled in builds Richard Purdie
2026-08-11 8:01 ` [docs] " Antonin Godard
2026-08-11 8:20 ` Richard Purdie
2026-08-11 8:29 ` Antonin Godard [this message]
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