From: syzbot <syzbot+062317ea1d0a6d5e29e7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
To: chao@kernel.org, jaegeuk@kernel.org,
linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
reiserfs-devel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com,
terrelln@fb.com
Subject: Re: [f2fs-dev] [syzbot] [reiserfs?] possible deadlock in super_lock
Date: Wed, 20 Sep 2023 02:13:53 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <0000000000005e0f2b0605c6cb3e@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <0000000000001825ce06047bf2a6@google.com>
syzbot has found a reproducer for the following issue on:
HEAD commit: 2cf0f7156238 Merge tag 'nfs-for-6.6-2' of git://git.linux-..
git tree: upstream
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=12780282680000
kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=710dc49bece494df
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=062317ea1d0a6d5e29e7
compiler: gcc (Debian 12.2.0-14) 12.2.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.40
syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=107e9518680000
Downloadable assets:
disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/f48f4ed701b8/disk-2cf0f715.raw.xz
vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/5b8491e29a2d/vmlinux-2cf0f715.xz
kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/90faa04d6558/bzImage-2cf0f715.xz
mounted in repro: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/c98194587df7/mount_0.gz
IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: syzbot+062317ea1d0a6d5e29e7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.6.0-rc2-syzkaller-00018-g2cf0f7156238 #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor.0/8792 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88807993a0e0 (&type->s_umount_key#25){++++}-{3:3}, at: __super_lock fs/super.c:58 [inline]
ffff88807993a0e0 (&type->s_umount_key#25){++++}-{3:3}, at: super_lock+0x23c/0x380 fs/super.c:117
but task is already holding lock:
ffff888148439388 (&bdev->bd_holder_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: blkdev_flushbuf block/ioctl.c:370 [inline]
ffff888148439388 (&bdev->bd_holder_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: blkdev_common_ioctl+0x14e9/0x1ce0 block/ioctl.c:502
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #2 (&bdev->bd_holder_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:603 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x181/0x1340 kernel/locking/mutex.c:747
bdev_mark_dead+0x25/0x230 block/bdev.c:961
disk_force_media_change+0x51/0x80 block/disk-events.c:303
__loop_clr_fd+0x3ab/0x8f0 drivers/block/loop.c:1174
lo_release+0x188/0x1c0 drivers/block/loop.c:1743
blkdev_put_whole+0xa5/0xe0 block/bdev.c:663
blkdev_put+0x40f/0x8e0 block/bdev.c:898
kill_block_super+0x58/0x70 fs/super.c:1649
deactivate_locked_super+0x9a/0x170 fs/super.c:481
deactivate_super+0xde/0x100 fs/super.c:514
cleanup_mnt+0x222/0x3d0 fs/namespace.c:1254
task_work_run+0x14d/0x240 kernel/task_work.c:179
resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:49 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:171 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x210/0x240 kernel/entry/common.c:204
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:285 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x60 kernel/entry/common.c:296
do_syscall_64+0x44/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
-> #1 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:603 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x181/0x1340 kernel/locking/mutex.c:747
blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0x4f0/0xb20 block/bdev.c:786
blkdev_get_by_dev+0x75/0x80 block/bdev.c:829
journal_init_dev fs/reiserfs/journal.c:2626 [inline]
journal_init+0xbb8/0x64b0 fs/reiserfs/journal.c:2786
reiserfs_fill_super+0xcc6/0x3150 fs/reiserfs/super.c:2022
mount_bdev+0x1f3/0x2e0 fs/super.c:1629
legacy_get_tree+0x109/0x220 fs/fs_context.c:638
vfs_get_tree+0x8c/0x370 fs/super.c:1750
do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3335 [inline]
path_mount+0x1492/0x1ed0 fs/namespace.c:3662
do_mount fs/namespace.c:3675 [inline]
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3884 [inline]
__se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3861 [inline]
__x64_sys_mount+0x293/0x310 fs/namespace.c:3861
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
-> #0 (&type->s_umount_key#25){++++}-{3:3}:
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3868 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x2e3d/0x5de0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5136
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5753 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1ae/0x510 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5718
down_read+0x9c/0x470 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1520
__super_lock fs/super.c:58 [inline]
super_lock+0x23c/0x380 fs/super.c:117
super_lock_shared fs/super.c:146 [inline]
super_lock_shared_active fs/super.c:1431 [inline]
fs_bdev_sync+0x94/0x1b0 fs/super.c:1466
blkdev_flushbuf block/ioctl.c:372 [inline]
blkdev_common_ioctl+0x1550/0x1ce0 block/ioctl.c:502
blkdev_ioctl+0x249/0x770 block/ioctl.c:624
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:871 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:857 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x18f/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:857
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
&type->s_umount_key#25 --> &disk->open_mutex --> &bdev->bd_holder_lock
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&bdev->bd_holder_lock);
lock(&disk->open_mutex);
lock(&bdev->bd_holder_lock);
rlock(&type->s_umount_key#25);
*** DEADLOCK ***
1 lock held by syz-executor.0/8792:
#0: ffff888148439388 (&bdev->bd_holder_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: blkdev_flushbuf block/ioctl.c:370 [inline]
#0: ffff888148439388 (&bdev->bd_holder_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: blkdev_common_ioctl+0x14e9/0x1ce0 block/ioctl.c:502
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 8792 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc2-syzkaller-00018-g2cf0f7156238 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/04/2023
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x1b0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
check_noncircular+0x311/0x3f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2187
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3868 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x2e3d/0x5de0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5136
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5753 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1ae/0x510 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5718
down_read+0x9c/0x470 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1520
__super_lock fs/super.c:58 [inline]
super_lock+0x23c/0x380 fs/super.c:117
super_lock_shared fs/super.c:146 [inline]
super_lock_shared_active fs/super.c:1431 [inline]
fs_bdev_sync+0x94/0x1b0 fs/super.c:1466
blkdev_flushbuf block/ioctl.c:372 [inline]
blkdev_common_ioctl+0x1550/0x1ce0 block/ioctl.c:502
blkdev_ioctl+0x249/0x770 block/ioctl.c:624
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:871 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:857 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x18f/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:857
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f18ae67cae9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f18af4830c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f18ae79bf80 RCX: 00007f18ae67cae9
RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000001261 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f18ae6c847a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f18ae79bf80 R15: 00007ffc4185a478
</TASK>
---
If you want syzbot to run the reproducer, reply with:
#syz test: git://repo/address.git branch-or-commit-hash
If you attach or paste a git patch, syzbot will apply it before testing.
_______________________________________________
Linux-f2fs-devel mailing list
Linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/linux-f2fs-devel
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: syzbot <syzbot+062317ea1d0a6d5e29e7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
To: chao@kernel.org, jaegeuk@kernel.org,
linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
reiserfs-devel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com,
terrelln@fb.com
Subject: Re: [syzbot] [reiserfs?] possible deadlock in super_lock
Date: Wed, 20 Sep 2023 02:13:53 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <0000000000005e0f2b0605c6cb3e@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <0000000000001825ce06047bf2a6@google.com>
syzbot has found a reproducer for the following issue on:
HEAD commit: 2cf0f7156238 Merge tag 'nfs-for-6.6-2' of git://git.linux-..
git tree: upstream
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=12780282680000
kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=710dc49bece494df
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=062317ea1d0a6d5e29e7
compiler: gcc (Debian 12.2.0-14) 12.2.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.40
syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=107e9518680000
Downloadable assets:
disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/f48f4ed701b8/disk-2cf0f715.raw.xz
vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/5b8491e29a2d/vmlinux-2cf0f715.xz
kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/90faa04d6558/bzImage-2cf0f715.xz
mounted in repro: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/c98194587df7/mount_0.gz
IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: syzbot+062317ea1d0a6d5e29e7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.6.0-rc2-syzkaller-00018-g2cf0f7156238 #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor.0/8792 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88807993a0e0 (&type->s_umount_key#25){++++}-{3:3}, at: __super_lock fs/super.c:58 [inline]
ffff88807993a0e0 (&type->s_umount_key#25){++++}-{3:3}, at: super_lock+0x23c/0x380 fs/super.c:117
but task is already holding lock:
ffff888148439388 (&bdev->bd_holder_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: blkdev_flushbuf block/ioctl.c:370 [inline]
ffff888148439388 (&bdev->bd_holder_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: blkdev_common_ioctl+0x14e9/0x1ce0 block/ioctl.c:502
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #2 (&bdev->bd_holder_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:603 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x181/0x1340 kernel/locking/mutex.c:747
bdev_mark_dead+0x25/0x230 block/bdev.c:961
disk_force_media_change+0x51/0x80 block/disk-events.c:303
__loop_clr_fd+0x3ab/0x8f0 drivers/block/loop.c:1174
lo_release+0x188/0x1c0 drivers/block/loop.c:1743
blkdev_put_whole+0xa5/0xe0 block/bdev.c:663
blkdev_put+0x40f/0x8e0 block/bdev.c:898
kill_block_super+0x58/0x70 fs/super.c:1649
deactivate_locked_super+0x9a/0x170 fs/super.c:481
deactivate_super+0xde/0x100 fs/super.c:514
cleanup_mnt+0x222/0x3d0 fs/namespace.c:1254
task_work_run+0x14d/0x240 kernel/task_work.c:179
resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:49 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:171 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x210/0x240 kernel/entry/common.c:204
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:285 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x60 kernel/entry/common.c:296
do_syscall_64+0x44/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
-> #1 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:603 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x181/0x1340 kernel/locking/mutex.c:747
blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0x4f0/0xb20 block/bdev.c:786
blkdev_get_by_dev+0x75/0x80 block/bdev.c:829
journal_init_dev fs/reiserfs/journal.c:2626 [inline]
journal_init+0xbb8/0x64b0 fs/reiserfs/journal.c:2786
reiserfs_fill_super+0xcc6/0x3150 fs/reiserfs/super.c:2022
mount_bdev+0x1f3/0x2e0 fs/super.c:1629
legacy_get_tree+0x109/0x220 fs/fs_context.c:638
vfs_get_tree+0x8c/0x370 fs/super.c:1750
do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3335 [inline]
path_mount+0x1492/0x1ed0 fs/namespace.c:3662
do_mount fs/namespace.c:3675 [inline]
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3884 [inline]
__se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3861 [inline]
__x64_sys_mount+0x293/0x310 fs/namespace.c:3861
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
-> #0 (&type->s_umount_key#25){++++}-{3:3}:
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3868 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x2e3d/0x5de0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5136
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5753 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1ae/0x510 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5718
down_read+0x9c/0x470 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1520
__super_lock fs/super.c:58 [inline]
super_lock+0x23c/0x380 fs/super.c:117
super_lock_shared fs/super.c:146 [inline]
super_lock_shared_active fs/super.c:1431 [inline]
fs_bdev_sync+0x94/0x1b0 fs/super.c:1466
blkdev_flushbuf block/ioctl.c:372 [inline]
blkdev_common_ioctl+0x1550/0x1ce0 block/ioctl.c:502
blkdev_ioctl+0x249/0x770 block/ioctl.c:624
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:871 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:857 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x18f/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:857
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
&type->s_umount_key#25 --> &disk->open_mutex --> &bdev->bd_holder_lock
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&bdev->bd_holder_lock);
lock(&disk->open_mutex);
lock(&bdev->bd_holder_lock);
rlock(&type->s_umount_key#25);
*** DEADLOCK ***
1 lock held by syz-executor.0/8792:
#0: ffff888148439388 (&bdev->bd_holder_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: blkdev_flushbuf block/ioctl.c:370 [inline]
#0: ffff888148439388 (&bdev->bd_holder_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: blkdev_common_ioctl+0x14e9/0x1ce0 block/ioctl.c:502
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 8792 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc2-syzkaller-00018-g2cf0f7156238 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/04/2023
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x1b0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
check_noncircular+0x311/0x3f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2187
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3868 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x2e3d/0x5de0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5136
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5753 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1ae/0x510 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5718
down_read+0x9c/0x470 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1520
__super_lock fs/super.c:58 [inline]
super_lock+0x23c/0x380 fs/super.c:117
super_lock_shared fs/super.c:146 [inline]
super_lock_shared_active fs/super.c:1431 [inline]
fs_bdev_sync+0x94/0x1b0 fs/super.c:1466
blkdev_flushbuf block/ioctl.c:372 [inline]
blkdev_common_ioctl+0x1550/0x1ce0 block/ioctl.c:502
blkdev_ioctl+0x249/0x770 block/ioctl.c:624
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:871 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:857 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x18f/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:857
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f18ae67cae9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f18af4830c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f18ae79bf80 RCX: 00007f18ae67cae9
RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000001261 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f18ae6c847a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f18ae79bf80 R15: 00007ffc4185a478
</TASK>
---
If you want syzbot to run the reproducer, reply with:
#syz test: git://repo/address.git branch-or-commit-hash
If you attach or paste a git patch, syzbot will apply it before testing.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-09-20 10:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-09-03 22:30 [f2fs-dev] [syzbot] [f2fs?] possible deadlock in super_lock syzbot
2023-09-03 22:30 ` syzbot
2023-09-20 9:13 ` syzbot [this message]
2023-09-20 9:13 ` [syzbot] [reiserfs?] " syzbot
2023-10-08 15:14 ` [f2fs-dev] " syzbot
2023-10-08 15:14 ` syzbot
2023-10-09 2:05 ` [f2fs-dev] " syzbot
2023-10-09 2:05 ` syzbot
2023-10-09 12:37 ` [f2fs-dev] " Christian Brauner
2023-10-09 12:37 ` Christian Brauner
2023-10-09 14:19 ` [f2fs-dev] " syzbot
2023-10-09 14:19 ` syzbot
2023-12-24 16:40 ` [f2fs-dev] " syzbot
2023-12-24 16:40 ` syzbot
2023-12-28 10:50 ` [f2fs-dev] " Christian Brauner
2023-12-28 10:50 ` Christian Brauner
2024-01-02 12:14 ` [f2fs-dev] " Jan Kara
2024-01-02 12:14 ` Jan Kara
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=0000000000005e0f2b0605c6cb3e@google.com \
--to=syzbot+062317ea1d0a6d5e29e7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com \
--cc=chao@kernel.org \
--cc=jaegeuk@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=reiserfs-devel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com \
--cc=terrelln@fb.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.