All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: "Thiébaud Weksteen" <tweek@google.com>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>,
	Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] selinux: add basic filtering for audit trace events
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2020 08:05:44 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <02c193e4-008a-5c3d-75e8-9be7bbcb941c@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200813144914.737306-2-tweek@google.com>

On 8/13/2020 7:48 AM, Thiébaud Weksteen wrote:
> From: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
>
> This patch adds further attributes to the event. These attributes are
> helpful to understand the context of the message and can be used
> to filter the events.
>
> There are three common items. Source context, target context and tclass.
> There are also items from the outcome of operation performed.
>
> An event is similar to:
>            <...>-1309  [002] ....  6346.691689: selinux_audited:
>        requested=0x4000000 denied=0x4000000 audited=0x4000000
>        result=-13 ssid=315 tsid=61

It may not be my place to ask, but *please please please* don't
externalize secids. I understand that it's easier to type "42"
than "system_r:cupsd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023", and that it's easier for
your tools to parse and store the number. Once you start training
people that system_r:cupsd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 is secid 42 you'll
never be able to change it. The secid will start showing up in
scripts. Bad  Things  Will  Happen.

>        scontext=system_u:system_r:cupsd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
>        tcontext=system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 tclass=file
>
> With systems where many denials are occurring, it is useful to apply a
> filter. The filtering is a set of logic that is inserted with
> the filter file. Example:
>  echo "tclass==\"file\" && ssid!=42" > events/avc/selinux_audited/filter
>
> This adds that we only get tclass=file but not for ssid 42.
>
> The trace can also have extra properties. Adding the user stack
> can be done with
>    echo 1 > options/userstacktrace
>
> Now the output will be
>          runcon-1365  [003] ....  6960.955530: selinux_audited:
>      requested=0x4000000 denied=0x4000000 audited=0x4000000
>      result=-13 ssid=315 tsid=61
>      scontext=system_u:system_r:cupsd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
>      tcontext=system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 tclass=file
>           runcon-1365  [003] ....  6960.955560: <user stack trace>
>  =>  <00007f325b4ce45b>
>  =>  <00005607093efa57>
>
> Note that the ssid is the internal numeric representation of scontext
> and tsid is numeric for tcontext. They are useful for filtering.
>
> Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
> Reviewed-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
> ---
> v2 changes:
> - update changelog to include usage examples
>
>  include/trace/events/avc.h | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
>  security/selinux/avc.c     | 22 +++++++++++---------
>  2 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/trace/events/avc.h b/include/trace/events/avc.h
> index 07c058a9bbcd..ac5ef2e1c2c5 100644
> --- a/include/trace/events/avc.h
> +++ b/include/trace/events/avc.h
> @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
>  /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
>  /*
> - * Author: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
> + * Authors:	Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
> + *		Peter Enderborg <Peter.Enderborg@sony.com>
>   */
>  #undef TRACE_SYSTEM
>  #define TRACE_SYSTEM avc
> @@ -12,23 +13,43 @@
>  
>  TRACE_EVENT(selinux_audited,
>  
> -	TP_PROTO(struct selinux_audit_data *sad),
> +	TP_PROTO(struct selinux_audit_data *sad,
> +		char *scontext,
> +		char *tcontext,
> +		const char *tclass
> +	),
>  
> -	TP_ARGS(sad),
> +	TP_ARGS(sad, scontext, tcontext, tclass),
>  
>  	TP_STRUCT__entry(
> -		__field(unsigned int, tclass)
> -		__field(unsigned int, audited)
> +		__field(u32, requested)
> +		__field(u32, denied)
> +		__field(u32, audited)
> +		__field(int, result)
> +		__string(scontext, scontext)
> +		__string(tcontext, tcontext)
> +		__string(tclass, tclass)
> +		__field(u32, ssid)
> +		__field(u32, tsid)
>  	),
>  
>  	TP_fast_assign(
> -		__entry->tclass = sad->tclass;
> -		__entry->audited = sad->audited;
> +		__entry->requested	= sad->requested;
> +		__entry->denied		= sad->denied;
> +		__entry->audited	= sad->audited;
> +		__entry->result		= sad->result;
> +		__entry->ssid		= sad->ssid;
> +		__entry->tsid		= sad->tsid;
> +		__assign_str(tcontext, tcontext);
> +		__assign_str(scontext, scontext);
> +		__assign_str(tclass, tclass);
>  	),
>  
> -	TP_printk("tclass=%u audited=%x",
> -		__entry->tclass,
> -		__entry->audited)
> +	TP_printk("requested=0x%x denied=0x%x audited=0x%x result=%d ssid=%u tsid=%u scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s",
> +		__entry->requested, __entry->denied, __entry->audited, __entry->result,
> +		__entry->ssid, __entry->tsid, __get_str(scontext), __get_str(tcontext),
> +		__get_str(tclass)
> +	)
>  );
>  
>  #endif
> diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
> index b0a0af778b70..7de5cc5169af 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/avc.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
> @@ -705,35 +705,39 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
>  {
>  	struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
>  	struct selinux_audit_data *sad = ad->selinux_audit_data;
> -	char *scontext;
> +	char *scontext = NULL;
> +	char *tcontext = NULL;
> +	const char *tclass = NULL;
>  	u32 scontext_len;
> +	u32 tcontext_len;
>  	int rc;
>  
> -	trace_selinux_audited(sad);
> -
>  	rc = security_sid_to_context(sad->state, sad->ssid, &scontext,
>  				     &scontext_len);
>  	if (rc)
>  		audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%d", sad->ssid);
>  	else {
>  		audit_log_format(ab, " scontext=%s", scontext);
> -		kfree(scontext);
>  	}
>  
> -	rc = security_sid_to_context(sad->state, sad->tsid, &scontext,
> -				     &scontext_len);
> +	rc = security_sid_to_context(sad->state, sad->tsid, &tcontext,
> +				     &tcontext_len);
>  	if (rc)
>  		audit_log_format(ab, " tsid=%d", sad->tsid);
>  	else {
> -		audit_log_format(ab, " tcontext=%s", scontext);
> -		kfree(scontext);
> +		audit_log_format(ab, " tcontext=%s", tcontext);
>  	}
>  
> -	audit_log_format(ab, " tclass=%s", secclass_map[sad->tclass-1].name);
> +	tclass = secclass_map[sad->tclass-1].name;
> +	audit_log_format(ab, " tclass=%s", tclass);
>  
>  	if (sad->denied)
>  		audit_log_format(ab, " permissive=%u", sad->result ? 0 : 1);
>  
> +	trace_selinux_audited(sad, scontext, tcontext, tclass);
> +	kfree(tcontext);
> +	kfree(scontext);
> +
>  	/* in case of invalid context report also the actual context string */
>  	rc = security_sid_to_context_inval(sad->state, sad->ssid, &scontext,
>  					   &scontext_len);

  reply	other threads:[~2020-08-13 15:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-08-13 14:48 [PATCH v2 1/2] selinux: add tracepoint on denials Thiébaud Weksteen
2020-08-13 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] selinux: add basic filtering for audit trace events Thiébaud Weksteen
2020-08-13 15:05   ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2020-08-13 15:35     ` peter enderborg
2020-08-13 15:49       ` Stephen Smalley
2020-08-13 16:10         ` peter enderborg
2020-08-13 17:14         ` peter enderborg
2020-08-13 17:38           ` Steven Rostedt
2020-08-13 18:18             ` peter enderborg
2020-08-13 19:16               ` Steven Rostedt
2020-08-13 15:41 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] selinux: add tracepoint on denials Stephen Smalley
2020-08-14 13:05   ` Thiébaud Weksteen
2020-08-14 16:51     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-08-14 17:07       ` peter enderborg
2020-08-14 17:08         ` Stephen Smalley
2020-08-14 17:22           ` peter enderborg
2020-08-14 17:46             ` Steven Rostedt
2020-08-14 18:06               ` peter enderborg
2020-08-14 18:30                 ` Steven Rostedt
2020-08-14 18:50                   ` peter enderborg
2020-08-14 18:56                     ` Steven Rostedt
2020-08-15  7:17               ` peter enderborg
2020-08-15  8:45               ` peter enderborg

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=02c193e4-008a-5c3d-75e8-9be7bbcb941c@schaufler-ca.com \
    --to=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
    --cc=arnd@arndb.de \
    --cc=davem@davemloft.net \
    --cc=eparis@parisplace.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mchehab+huawei@kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=nnk@google.com \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=peter.enderborg@sony.com \
    --cc=robh@kernel.org \
    --cc=rostedt@goodmis.org \
    --cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com \
    --cc=tweek@google.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.