* [uml-devel] 2.6.12-rc6-mm1 patches testing
@ 2005-06-09 1:25 antoine
2005-06-09 15:24 ` Blaisorblade
0 siblings, 1 reply; 16+ messages in thread
From: antoine @ 2005-06-09 1:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: user-mode-linux-devel; +Cc: Blaisorblade
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 3011 bytes --]
I noticed a new set of patches were out, so I gave it usual bashing.
Maybe this will be useful to someone else:
1) as before fp-state does not apply.
2) os-main gave me a reject on arch/um/kernel/main.c
fixed by simply removing the file.
Built ok (no tweaks needed this time!).
Runs ok, but it is still loosing memory fast.
Then I tried adding some more experimental features...
Attached is a stacktrace I encountered (pcap related):
Seems like the pcap patch is causing some problems when running in a
chroot which does not have the libraries required by pcap (nss?)
Some processes were still running when I got back to the shell.
Btw, how do I figure out which libs I need to copy to the chroot?
But apart from that slight problem, when running outside the chroot it
works exactly as expected. I vote for including it in the next release
with appropriate warnings about runtime libraries issues.
Now, if someone could have a look at hppfs I could resurect my
honeypots.
Also, is anyone interested in some SELinux policies for UML? They need a
little bit of tidying up but seem to work. See below (I extracted the
generic part - unfortunately some parts are specific to my setup).
Antoine
type um_t, domain, privowner;
type um_kernel_t, domain, privowner;
type um_admin_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
type um_exec_t, file_type, exec_type;
type um_kernel_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
type um_home_t, file_type;
type um_fs_t, file_type;
type um_tmp_t, file_type, tmpfile;
type um_proc_t, file_type;
type um_tundev_t, device_type, dev_fs;
file_type_auto_trans(um_t, tmp_t, um_tmp_t)
file_type_auto_trans(um_kernel_t, tmp_t, um_tmp_t)
domain_auto_trans(initrc_t, um_exec_t, um_t)
domain_auto_trans(sysadm_t, um_exec_t, um_t)
domain_auto_trans(um_t, um_kernel_exec_t, um_kernel_t)
# network
allow um_kernel_t netif_t:netif { tcp_recv tcp_send };
allow um_kernel_t node_t:node { tcp_recv tcp_send };
allow um_kernel_t port_t:socket { recv_msg send_msg };
# sockets
allow um_kernel_t self:packet_socket create;
allow um_kernel_t self:unix_dgram_socket { bind create ioctl };
allow um_kernel_t self:unix_stream_socket { create ioctl read write };
# process
allow um_kernel_t self:process { execmem fork ptrace sigchld sigkill signal sigstop };
# devices
allow um_kernel_t device_t:dir search;
allow um_kernel_t null_device_t:chr_file { ioctl read write };
allow um_kernel_t um_tundev_t:chr_file { ioctl read write };
allow um_kernel_t random_device_t:chr_file read;
# files
allow um_kernel_t um_tmp_t:file execute;
allow um_kernel_t um_fs_t:file { getattr lock read write };
allow um_kernel_t um_fs_t:lnk_file read;
# proc
allow um_kernel_t um_proc_t:file read;
allow um_kernel_t um_proc_t:dir search;
# home
allow um_kernel_t um_home_t:dir { add_name create getattr read remove_name rmdir write search};
allow um_kernel_t um_home_t:file { create getattr lock read unlink write };
allow um_kernel_t um_home_t:sock_file { create unlink };
# all other dirs:
allow um_kernel_t um_admin_t:dir search;
[-- Attachment #2: Type: text/plain, Size: 69209 bytes --]
[42949587.660000] 67d9fb48: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9fb78: [<6002078e>] pcap_remove+0x1e/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9fb98: [<6002f6e5>] close_devices+0x55/0x60
[42949587.660000] 67d9fbb8: [<60013292>] do_uml_exitcalls+0x22/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9fbd8: [<60014079>] machine_power_off+0x9/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9fbe8: [<60056864>] sys_reboot+0x234/0x240
[42949587.660000] 67d9fc08: [<60052f27>] kill_proc_info+0x37/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9fc28: [<60052f7c>] kill_something_info+0x3c/0x140
[42949587.660000] 67d9fcc8: [<6008a29b>] filp_close+0x4b/0x90
[42949587.660000] 67d9fd18: [<6001aed6>] execute_syscall_skas+0xc6/0xd0
[42949587.660000] 67d9fd38: [<6001aefb>] handle_syscall+0x1b/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9fd58: [<6003d1fb>] userspace+0x15b/0x2f0
[42949587.660000] 67d9fdb8: [<6001b0a4>] fix_range+0x34/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9fdf8: [<6001aac2>] fork_handler+0xc2/0xd0
[42949587.660000] 67d9fe38: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9fee8: [<602160c9>] __kill+0x9/0x20
[42949587.660000]
[42949587.660000] <0>Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel mode fault at addr 0x100, ip 0x401c69d7
[42949587.660000]
[42949587.660000] Pid: 3288, comm: halt Not tainted 2.6.12-rc6-mm1
[42949587.660000] RIP: 0033:[<00000000401c69d7>]
[42949587.660000] RSP: 0000007fbfc37bb0 EFLAGS: 00000202
[42949587.660000] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000007fbfc37c68 RCX: ffffffffffffffff
[42949587.660000] RDX: 000000004321fedc RSI: 0000000028121969 RDI: fffffffffee1dead
[42949587.660000] RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 000000000000004c R09: 0000000000000000
[42949587.660000] R10: 00000000401159a8 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000
[42949587.660000] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
[42949587.660000] Call Trace:
[42949587.660000] 67d9d9d8: [<6001755f>] panic_exit+0x2f/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9d9f8: [<6005602b>] notifier_call_chain+0x2b/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9da28: [<600423c4>] panic+0xe4/0x180
[42949587.660000] 67d9da68: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9da98: [<600165f8>] handle_page_fault+0xf8/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9dac8: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9dad8: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9db18: [<6001699a>] segv+0x1ea/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9db28: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9db38: [<60039021>] change_sig+0x61/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9db88: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9dba8: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9dbb8: [<60039091>] change_signals+0x51/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9dc28: [<60016da8>] segv_handler+0x148/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9dc58: [<60016c60>] segv_handler+0x0/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9dc68: [<6003dbae>] sig_handler_common_skas+0xee/0x140
[42949587.660000] 67d9dca8: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9dcb8: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9dd50: [<60020770>] pcap_remove+0x0/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9dd58: [<6022d709>] __libc_waitpid+0x39/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9dd68: [<60022654>] pcap_close+0x4/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ddd8: [<600434ac>] release_console_sem+0x7c/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ddf8: [<6004326c>] vprintk+0x15c/0x260
[42949587.660000] 67d9de88: [<60043100>] printk+0xa0/0xb0
[42949587.660000] 67d9dea8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9dec8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9dee8: [<6022d765>] __libc_waitpid+0x95/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9df08: [<6002078e>] pcap_remove+0x1e/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9df28: [<6002f6e5>] close_devices+0x55/0x60
[42949587.660000] 67d9df48: [<60013292>] do_uml_exitcalls+0x22/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9df68: [<60014079>] machine_power_off+0x9/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9df78: [<600140a9>] machine_halt+0x9/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9df88: [<60017575>] panic_exit+0x45/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9dfa8: [<6005602b>] notifier_call_chain+0x2b/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9dfd8: [<600423c4>] panic+0xe4/0x180
[42949587.660000] 67d9e018: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e048: [<600165f8>] handle_page_fault+0xf8/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e078: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9e088: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9e0c8: [<6001699a>] segv+0x1ea/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e0d8: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e0e8: [<60039021>] change_sig+0x61/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9e138: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e158: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e168: [<60039091>] change_signals+0x51/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9e1d8: [<60016da8>] segv_handler+0x148/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e208: [<60016c60>] segv_handler+0x0/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e218: [<6003dbae>] sig_handler_common_skas+0xee/0x140
[42949587.660000] 67d9e258: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9e268: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9e300: [<60020770>] pcap_remove+0x0/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e308: [<6022d709>] __libc_waitpid+0x39/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e318: [<60022654>] pcap_close+0x4/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e388: [<600434ac>] release_console_sem+0x7c/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e3a8: [<6004326c>] vprintk+0x15c/0x260
[42949587.660000] 67d9e438: [<60043100>] printk+0xa0/0xb0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e458: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e478: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e498: [<6022d765>] __libc_waitpid+0x95/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e4b8: [<6002078e>] pcap_remove+0x1e/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e4d8: [<6002f6e5>] close_devices+0x55/0x60
[42949587.660000] 67d9e4f8: [<60013292>] do_uml_exitcalls+0x22/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e518: [<60014079>] machine_power_off+0x9/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9e528: [<600140a9>] machine_halt+0x9/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9e538: [<60017575>] panic_exit+0x45/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9e558: [<6005602b>] notifier_call_chain+0x2b/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9e588: [<600423c4>] panic+0xe4/0x180
[42949587.660000] 67d9e5c8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e5f8: [<600165f8>] handle_page_fault+0xf8/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e628: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9e638: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9e678: [<6001699a>] segv+0x1ea/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e688: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e698: [<60039021>] change_sig+0x61/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9e6e8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e708: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e718: [<60039091>] change_signals+0x51/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9e788: [<60016da8>] segv_handler+0x148/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e7b8: [<60016c60>] segv_handler+0x0/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e7c8: [<6003dbae>] sig_handler_common_skas+0xee/0x140
[42949587.660000] 67d9e808: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9e818: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9e8b0: [<60020770>] pcap_remove+0x0/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e8b8: [<6022d709>] __libc_waitpid+0x39/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e8c8: [<60022654>] pcap_close+0x4/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e938: [<600434ac>] release_console_sem+0x7c/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e958: [<6004326c>] vprintk+0x15c/0x260
[42949587.660000] 67d9e9e8: [<60043100>] printk+0xa0/0xb0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ea08: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ea28: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ea48: [<6022d765>] __libc_waitpid+0x95/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ea68: [<6002078e>] pcap_remove+0x1e/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ea88: [<6002f6e5>] close_devices+0x55/0x60
[42949587.660000] 67d9eaa8: [<60013292>] do_uml_exitcalls+0x22/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9eac8: [<60014079>] machine_power_off+0x9/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9ead8: [<600140a9>] machine_halt+0x9/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9eae8: [<60017575>] panic_exit+0x45/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9eb08: [<6005602b>] notifier_call_chain+0x2b/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9eb38: [<600423c4>] panic+0xe4/0x180
[42949587.660000] 67d9eb78: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9eba8: [<600165f8>] handle_page_fault+0xf8/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ebd8: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9ebe8: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9ec28: [<6001699a>] segv+0x1ea/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ec38: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ec48: [<60039021>] change_sig+0x61/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9ec98: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ecb8: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ecc8: [<60039091>] change_signals+0x51/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9ed38: [<60016da8>] segv_handler+0x148/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ed68: [<60016c60>] segv_handler+0x0/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ed78: [<6003dbae>] sig_handler_common_skas+0xee/0x140
[42949587.660000] 67d9edb8: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9edc8: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9ee60: [<60020770>] pcap_remove+0x0/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ee68: [<6022d709>] __libc_waitpid+0x39/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ee78: [<60022654>] pcap_close+0x4/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9eee8: [<600434ac>] release_console_sem+0x7c/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ef08: [<6004326c>] vprintk+0x15c/0x260
[42949587.660000] 67d9ef98: [<60043100>] printk+0xa0/0xb0
[42949587.660000] 67d9efb8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9efd8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9eff8: [<6022d765>] __libc_waitpid+0x95/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f018: [<6002078e>] pcap_remove+0x1e/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f038: [<6002f6e5>] close_devices+0x55/0x60
[42949587.660000] 67d9f058: [<60013292>] do_uml_exitcalls+0x22/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f078: [<60014079>] machine_power_off+0x9/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9f088: [<600140a9>] machine_halt+0x9/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9f098: [<60017575>] panic_exit+0x45/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9f0b8: [<6005602b>] notifier_call_chain+0x2b/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9f0e8: [<600423c4>] panic+0xe4/0x180
[42949587.660000] 67d9f128: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f158: [<600165f8>] handle_page_fault+0xf8/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f188: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9f198: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9f1d8: [<6001699a>] segv+0x1ea/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f1e8: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f1f8: [<60039021>] change_sig+0x61/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9f248: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f268: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f278: [<60039091>] change_signals+0x51/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9f2e8: [<60016da8>] segv_handler+0x148/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f318: [<60016c60>] segv_handler+0x0/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f328: [<6003dbae>] sig_handler_common_skas+0xee/0x140
[42949587.660000] 67d9f368: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9f378: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9f410: [<60020770>] pcap_remove+0x0/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f418: [<6022d709>] __libc_waitpid+0x39/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f428: [<60022654>] pcap_close+0x4/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f498: [<600434ac>] release_console_sem+0x7c/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f4b8: [<6004326c>] vprintk+0x15c/0x260
[42949587.660000] 67d9f548: [<60043100>] printk+0xa0/0xb0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f568: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f588: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f5a8: [<6022d765>] __libc_waitpid+0x95/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f5c8: [<6002078e>] pcap_remove+0x1e/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f5e8: [<6002f6e5>] close_devices+0x55/0x60
[42949587.660000] 67d9f608: [<60013292>] do_uml_exitcalls+0x22/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f628: [<60014079>] machine_power_off+0x9/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9f638: [<600140a9>] machine_halt+0x9/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9f648: [<60017575>] panic_exit+0x45/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9f668: [<6005602b>] notifier_call_chain+0x2b/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9f698: [<600423c4>] panic+0xe4/0x180
[42949587.660000] 67d9f6d8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f708: [<600165f8>] handle_page_fault+0xf8/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f748: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9f788: [<6001699a>] segv+0x1ea/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f798: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f7a8: [<60039021>] change_sig+0x61/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9f808: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f818: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f828: [<60039091>] change_signals+0x51/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9f898: [<60016da8>] segv_handler+0x148/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f8c8: [<60016c60>] segv_handler+0x0/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f8d8: [<6003dbae>] sig_handler_common_skas+0xee/0x140
[42949587.660000] 67d9f918: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9f928: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9f9c0: [<60020770>] pcap_remove+0x0/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f9c8: [<6022d709>] __libc_waitpid+0x39/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f9d8: [<60022654>] pcap_close+0x4/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9fa78: [<6004326c>] vprintk+0x15c/0x260
[42949587.660000] 67d9fab8: [<60039123>] enable_mask+0x43/0x60
[42949587.660000] 67d9fac8: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9fb08: [<60043100>] printk+0xa0/0xb0
[42949587.660000] 67d9fb48: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9fb78: [<6002078e>] pcap_remove+0x1e/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9fb98: [<6002f6e5>] close_devices+0x55/0x60
[42949587.660000] 67d9fbb8: [<60013292>] do_uml_exitcalls+0x22/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9fbd8: [<60014079>] machine_power_off+0x9/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9fbe8: [<60056864>] sys_reboot+0x234/0x240
[42949587.660000] 67d9fc08: [<60052f27>] kill_proc_info+0x37/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9fc28: [<60052f7c>] kill_something_info+0x3c/0x140
[42949587.660000] 67d9fcc8: [<6008a29b>] filp_close+0x4b/0x90
[42949587.660000] 67d9fd18: [<6001aed6>] execute_syscall_skas+0xc6/0xd0
[42949587.660000] 67d9fd38: [<6001aefb>] handle_syscall+0x1b/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9fd58: [<6003d1fb>] userspace+0x15b/0x2f0
[42949587.660000] 67d9fdb8: [<6001b0a4>] fix_range+0x34/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9fdf8: [<6001aac2>] fork_handler+0xc2/0xd0
[42949587.660000] 67d9fe38: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9fee8: [<602160c9>] __kill+0x9/0x20
[42949587.660000]
[42949587.660000] <0>Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel mode fault at addr 0x100, ip 0x401c69d7
[42949587.660000]
[42949587.660000] Pid: 3288, comm: halt Not tainted 2.6.12-rc6-mm1
[42949587.660000] RIP: 0033:[<00000000401c69d7>]
[42949587.660000] RSP: 0000007fbfc37bb0 EFLAGS: 00000202
[42949587.660000] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000007fbfc37c68 RCX: ffffffffffffffff
[42949587.660000] RDX: 000000004321fedc RSI: 0000000028121969 RDI: fffffffffee1dead
[42949587.660000] RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 000000000000004c R09: 0000000000000000
[42949587.660000] R10: 00000000401159a8 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000
[42949587.660000] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
[42949587.660000] Call Trace:
[42949587.660000] 67d9d428: [<6001755f>] panic_exit+0x2f/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9d448: [<6005602b>] notifier_call_chain+0x2b/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9d478: [<600423c4>] panic+0xe4/0x180
[42949587.660000] 67d9d4b8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d4e8: [<600165f8>] handle_page_fault+0xf8/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9d518: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9d528: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9d568: [<6001699a>] segv+0x1ea/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9d578: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d588: [<60039021>] change_sig+0x61/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9d5d8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d5f8: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d608: [<60039091>] change_signals+0x51/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9d678: [<60016da8>] segv_handler+0x148/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9d6a8: [<60016c60>] segv_handler+0x0/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9d6b8: [<6003dbae>] sig_handler_common_skas+0xee/0x140
[42949587.660000] 67d9d6f8: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9d708: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9d7a0: [<60020770>] pcap_remove+0x0/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d7a8: [<6022d709>] __libc_waitpid+0x39/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9d7b8: [<60022654>] pcap_close+0x4/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d828: [<600434ac>] release_console_sem+0x7c/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9d848: [<6004326c>] vprintk+0x15c/0x260
[42949587.660000] 67d9d8d8: [<60043100>] printk+0xa0/0xb0
[42949587.660000] 67d9d8f8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d918: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d938: [<6022d765>] __libc_waitpid+0x95/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9d958: [<6002078e>] pcap_remove+0x1e/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d978: [<6002f6e5>] close_devices+0x55/0x60
[42949587.660000] 67d9d998: [<60013292>] do_uml_exitcalls+0x22/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d9b8: [<60014079>] machine_power_off+0x9/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9d9c8: [<600140a9>] machine_halt+0x9/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9d9d8: [<60017575>] panic_exit+0x45/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9d9f8: [<6005602b>] notifier_call_chain+0x2b/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9da28: [<600423c4>] panic+0xe4/0x180
[42949587.660000] 67d9da68: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9da98: [<600165f8>] handle_page_fault+0xf8/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9dac8: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9dad8: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9db18: [<6001699a>] segv+0x1ea/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9db28: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9db38: [<60039021>] change_sig+0x61/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9db88: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9dba8: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9dbb8: [<60039091>] change_signals+0x51/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9dc28: [<60016da8>] segv_handler+0x148/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9dc58: [<60016c60>] segv_handler+0x0/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9dc68: [<6003dbae>] sig_handler_common_skas+0xee/0x140
[42949587.660000] 67d9dca8: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9dcb8: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9dd50: [<60020770>] pcap_remove+0x0/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9dd58: [<6022d709>] __libc_waitpid+0x39/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9dd68: [<60022654>] pcap_close+0x4/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ddd8: [<600434ac>] release_console_sem+0x7c/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ddf8: [<6004326c>] vprintk+0x15c/0x260
[42949587.660000] 67d9de88: [<60043100>] printk+0xa0/0xb0
[42949587.660000] 67d9dea8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9dec8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9dee8: [<6022d765>] __libc_waitpid+0x95/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9df08: [<6002078e>] pcap_remove+0x1e/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9df28: [<6002f6e5>] close_devices+0x55/0x60
[42949587.660000] 67d9df48: [<60013292>] do_uml_exitcalls+0x22/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9df68: [<60014079>] machine_power_off+0x9/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9df78: [<600140a9>] machine_halt+0x9/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9df88: [<60017575>] panic_exit+0x45/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9dfa8: [<6005602b>] notifier_call_chain+0x2b/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9dfd8: [<600423c4>] panic+0xe4/0x180
[42949587.660000] 67d9e018: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e048: [<600165f8>] handle_page_fault+0xf8/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e078: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9e088: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9e0c8: [<6001699a>] segv+0x1ea/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e0d8: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e0e8: [<60039021>] change_sig+0x61/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9e138: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e158: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e168: [<60039091>] change_signals+0x51/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9e1d8: [<60016da8>] segv_handler+0x148/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e208: [<60016c60>] segv_handler+0x0/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e218: [<6003dbae>] sig_handler_common_skas+0xee/0x140
[42949587.660000] 67d9e258: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9e268: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9e300: [<60020770>] pcap_remove+0x0/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e308: [<6022d709>] __libc_waitpid+0x39/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e318: [<60022654>] pcap_close+0x4/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e388: [<600434ac>] release_console_sem+0x7c/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e3a8: [<6004326c>] vprintk+0x15c/0x260
[42949587.660000] 67d9e438: [<60043100>] printk+0xa0/0xb0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e458: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e478: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e498: [<6022d765>] __libc_waitpid+0x95/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e4b8: [<6002078e>] pcap_remove+0x1e/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e4d8: [<6002f6e5>] close_devices+0x55/0x60
[42949587.660000] 67d9e4f8: [<60013292>] do_uml_exitcalls+0x22/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e518: [<60014079>] machine_power_off+0x9/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9e528: [<600140a9>] machine_halt+0x9/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9e538: [<60017575>] panic_exit+0x45/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9e558: [<6005602b>] notifier_call_chain+0x2b/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9e588: [<600423c4>] panic+0xe4/0x180
[42949587.660000] 67d9e5c8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e5f8: [<600165f8>] handle_page_fault+0xf8/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e628: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9e638: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9e678: [<6001699a>] segv+0x1ea/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e688: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e698: [<60039021>] change_sig+0x61/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9e6e8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e708: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e718: [<60039091>] change_signals+0x51/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9e788: [<60016da8>] segv_handler+0x148/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e7b8: [<60016c60>] segv_handler+0x0/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e7c8: [<6003dbae>] sig_handler_common_skas+0xee/0x140
[42949587.660000] 67d9e808: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9e818: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9e8b0: [<60020770>] pcap_remove+0x0/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e8b8: [<6022d709>] __libc_waitpid+0x39/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e8c8: [<60022654>] pcap_close+0x4/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e938: [<600434ac>] release_console_sem+0x7c/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e958: [<6004326c>] vprintk+0x15c/0x260
[42949587.660000] 67d9e9e8: [<60043100>] printk+0xa0/0xb0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ea08: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ea28: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ea48: [<6022d765>] __libc_waitpid+0x95/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ea68: [<6002078e>] pcap_remove+0x1e/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ea88: [<6002f6e5>] close_devices+0x55/0x60
[42949587.660000] 67d9eaa8: [<60013292>] do_uml_exitcalls+0x22/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9eac8: [<60014079>] machine_power_off+0x9/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9ead8: [<600140a9>] machine_halt+0x9/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9eae8: [<60017575>] panic_exit+0x45/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9eb08: [<6005602b>] notifier_call_chain+0x2b/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9eb38: [<600423c4>] panic+0xe4/0x180
[42949587.660000] 67d9eb78: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9eba8: [<600165f8>] handle_page_fault+0xf8/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ebd8: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9ebe8: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9ec28: [<6001699a>] segv+0x1ea/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ec38: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ec48: [<60039021>] change_sig+0x61/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9ec98: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ecb8: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ecc8: [<60039091>] change_signals+0x51/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9ed38: [<60016da8>] segv_handler+0x148/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ed68: [<60016c60>] segv_handler+0x0/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ed78: [<6003dbae>] sig_handler_common_skas+0xee/0x140
[42949587.660000] 67d9edb8: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9edc8: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9ee60: [<60020770>] pcap_remove+0x0/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ee68: [<6022d709>] __libc_waitpid+0x39/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ee78: [<60022654>] pcap_close+0x4/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9eee8: [<600434ac>] release_console_sem+0x7c/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ef08: [<6004326c>] vprintk+0x15c/0x260
[42949587.660000] 67d9ef98: [<60043100>] printk+0xa0/0xb0
[42949587.660000] 67d9efb8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9efd8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9eff8: [<6022d765>] __libc_waitpid+0x95/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f018: [<6002078e>] pcap_remove+0x1e/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f038: [<6002f6e5>] close_devices+0x55/0x60
[42949587.660000] 67d9f058: [<60013292>] do_uml_exitcalls+0x22/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f078: [<60014079>] machine_power_off+0x9/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9f088: [<600140a9>] machine_halt+0x9/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9f098: [<60017575>] panic_exit+0x45/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9f0b8: [<6005602b>] notifier_call_chain+0x2b/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9f0e8: [<600423c4>] panic+0xe4/0x180
[42949587.660000] 67d9f128: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f158: [<600165f8>] handle_page_fault+0xf8/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f188: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9f198: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9f1d8: [<6001699a>] segv+0x1ea/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f1e8: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f1f8: [<60039021>] change_sig+0x61/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9f248: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f268: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f278: [<60039091>] change_signals+0x51/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9f2e8: [<60016da8>] segv_handler+0x148/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f318: [<60016c60>] segv_handler+0x0/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f328: [<6003dbae>] sig_handler_common_skas+0xee/0x140
[42949587.660000] 67d9f368: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9f378: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9f410: [<60020770>] pcap_remove+0x0/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f418: [<6022d709>] __libc_waitpid+0x39/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f428: [<60022654>] pcap_close+0x4/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f498: [<600434ac>] release_console_sem+0x7c/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f4b8: [<6004326c>] vprintk+0x15c/0x260
[42949587.660000] 67d9f548: [<60043100>] printk+0xa0/0xb0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f568: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f588: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f5a8: [<6022d765>] __libc_waitpid+0x95/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f5c8: [<6002078e>] pcap_remove+0x1e/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f5e8: [<6002f6e5>] close_devices+0x55/0x60
[42949587.660000] 67d9f608: [<60013292>] do_uml_exitcalls+0x22/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f628: [<60014079>] machine_power_off+0x9/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9f638: [<600140a9>] machine_halt+0x9/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9f648: [<60017575>] panic_exit+0x45/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9f668: [<6005602b>] notifier_call_chain+0x2b/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9f698: [<600423c4>] panic+0xe4/0x180
[42949587.660000] 67d9f6d8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f708: [<600165f8>] handle_page_fault+0xf8/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f748: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9f788: [<6001699a>] segv+0x1ea/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f798: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f7a8: [<60039021>] change_sig+0x61/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9f808: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f818: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f828: [<60039091>] change_signals+0x51/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9f898: [<60016da8>] segv_handler+0x148/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f8c8: [<60016c60>] segv_handler+0x0/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f8d8: [<6003dbae>] sig_handler_common_skas+0xee/0x140
[42949587.660000] 67d9f918: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9f928: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9f9c0: [<60020770>] pcap_remove+0x0/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f9c8: [<6022d709>] __libc_waitpid+0x39/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f9d8: [<60022654>] pcap_close+0x4/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9fa78: [<6004326c>] vprintk+0x15c/0x260
[42949587.660000] 67d9fab8: [<60039123>] enable_mask+0x43/0x60
[42949587.660000] 67d9fac8: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9fb08: [<60043100>] printk+0xa0/0xb0
[42949587.660000] 67d9fb48: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9fb78: [<6002078e>] pcap_remove+0x1e/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9fb98: [<6002f6e5>] close_devices+0x55/0x60
[42949587.660000] 67d9fbb8: [<60013292>] do_uml_exitcalls+0x22/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9fbd8: [<60014079>] machine_power_off+0x9/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9fbe8: [<60056864>] sys_reboot+0x234/0x240
[42949587.660000] 67d9fc08: [<60052f27>] kill_proc_info+0x37/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9fc28: [<60052f7c>] kill_something_info+0x3c/0x140
[42949587.660000] 67d9fcc8: [<6008a29b>] filp_close+0x4b/0x90
[42949587.660000] 67d9fd18: [<6001aed6>] execute_syscall_skas+0xc6/0xd0
[42949587.660000] 67d9fd38: [<6001aefb>] handle_syscall+0x1b/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9fd58: [<6003d1fb>] userspace+0x15b/0x2f0
[42949587.660000] 67d9fdb8: [<6001b0a4>] fix_range+0x34/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9fdf8: [<6001aac2>] fork_handler+0xc2/0xd0
[42949587.660000] 67d9fe38: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9fee8: [<602160c9>] __kill+0x9/0x20
[42949587.660000]
[42949587.660000] <0>Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel mode fault at addr 0x100, ip 0x401c69d7
[42949587.660000]
[42949587.660000] Pid: 3288, comm: halt Not tainted 2.6.12-rc6-mm1
[42949587.660000] RIP: 0033:[<00000000401c69d7>]
[42949587.660000] RSP: 0000007fbfc37bb0 EFLAGS: 00000202
[42949587.660000] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000007fbfc37c68 RCX: ffffffffffffffff
[42949587.660000] RDX: 000000004321fedc RSI: 0000000028121969 RDI: fffffffffee1dead
[42949587.660000] RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 000000000000004c R09: 0000000000000000
[42949587.660000] R10: 00000000401159a8 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000
[42949587.660000] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
[42949587.660000] Call Trace:
[42949587.660000] 67d9ce78: [<6001755f>] panic_exit+0x2f/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9ce98: [<6005602b>] notifier_call_chain+0x2b/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9cec8: [<600423c4>] panic+0xe4/0x180
[42949587.660000] 67d9cf08: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9cf38: [<600165f8>] handle_page_fault+0xf8/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9cf68: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9cf78: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9cfb8: [<6001699a>] segv+0x1ea/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9cfc8: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9cfd8: [<60039021>] change_sig+0x61/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9d028: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d048: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d058: [<60039091>] change_signals+0x51/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9d0c8: [<60016da8>] segv_handler+0x148/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9d0f8: [<60016c60>] segv_handler+0x0/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9d108: [<6003dbae>] sig_handler_common_skas+0xee/0x140
[42949587.660000] 67d9d148: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9d158: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9d1f0: [<60020770>] pcap_remove+0x0/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d1f8: [<6022d709>] __libc_waitpid+0x39/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9d208: [<60022654>] pcap_close+0x4/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d278: [<600434ac>] release_console_sem+0x7c/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9d298: [<6004326c>] vprintk+0x15c/0x260
[42949587.660000] 67d9d328: [<60043100>] printk+0xa0/0xb0
[42949587.660000] 67d9d348: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d368: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d388: [<6022d765>] __libc_waitpid+0x95/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9d3a8: [<6002078e>] pcap_remove+0x1e/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d3c8: [<6002f6e5>] close_devices+0x55/0x60
[42949587.660000] 67d9d3e8: [<60013292>] do_uml_exitcalls+0x22/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d408: [<60014079>] machine_power_off+0x9/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9d418: [<600140a9>] machine_halt+0x9/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9d428: [<60017575>] panic_exit+0x45/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9d448: [<6005602b>] notifier_call_chain+0x2b/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9d478: [<600423c4>] panic+0xe4/0x180
[42949587.660000] 67d9d4b8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d4e8: [<600165f8>] handle_page_fault+0xf8/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9d518: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9d528: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9d568: [<6001699a>] segv+0x1ea/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9d578: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d588: [<60039021>] change_sig+0x61/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9d5d8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d5f8: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d608: [<60039091>] change_signals+0x51/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9d678: [<60016da8>] segv_handler+0x148/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9d6a8: [<60016c60>] segv_handler+0x0/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9d6b8: [<6003dbae>] sig_handler_common_skas+0xee/0x140
[42949587.660000] 67d9d6f8: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9d708: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9d7a0: [<60020770>] pcap_remove+0x0/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d7a8: [<6022d709>] __libc_waitpid+0x39/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9d7b8: [<60022654>] pcap_close+0x4/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d828: [<600434ac>] release_console_sem+0x7c/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9d848: [<6004326c>] vprintk+0x15c/0x260
[42949587.660000] 67d9d8d8: [<60043100>] printk+0xa0/0xb0
[42949587.660000] 67d9d8f8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d918: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d938: [<6022d765>] __libc_waitpid+0x95/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9d958: [<6002078e>] pcap_remove+0x1e/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d978: [<6002f6e5>] close_devices+0x55/0x60
[42949587.660000] 67d9d998: [<60013292>] do_uml_exitcalls+0x22/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d9b8: [<60014079>] machine_power_off+0x9/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9d9c8: [<600140a9>] machine_halt+0x9/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9d9d8: [<60017575>] panic_exit+0x45/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9d9f8: [<6005602b>] notifier_call_chain+0x2b/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9da28: [<600423c4>] panic+0xe4/0x180
[42949587.660000] 67d9da68: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9da98: [<600165f8>] handle_page_fault+0xf8/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9dac8: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9dad8: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9db18: [<6001699a>] segv+0x1ea/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9db28: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9db38: [<60039021>] change_sig+0x61/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9db88: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9dba8: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9dbb8: [<60039091>] change_signals+0x51/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9dc28: [<60016da8>] segv_handler+0x148/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9dc58: [<60016c60>] segv_handler+0x0/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9dc68: [<6003dbae>] sig_handler_common_skas+0xee/0x140
[42949587.660000] 67d9dca8: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9dcb8: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9dd50: [<60020770>] pcap_remove+0x0/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9dd58: [<6022d709>] __libc_waitpid+0x39/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9dd68: [<60022654>] pcap_close+0x4/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ddd8: [<600434ac>] release_console_sem+0x7c/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ddf8: [<6004326c>] vprintk+0x15c/0x260
[42949587.660000] 67d9de88: [<60043100>] printk+0xa0/0xb0
[42949587.660000] 67d9dea8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9dec8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9dee8: [<6022d765>] __libc_waitpid+0x95/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9df08: [<6002078e>] pcap_remove+0x1e/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9df28: [<6002f6e5>] close_devices+0x55/0x60
[42949587.660000] 67d9df48: [<60013292>] do_uml_exitcalls+0x22/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9df68: [<60014079>] machine_power_off+0x9/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9df78: [<600140a9>] machine_halt+0x9/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9df88: [<60017575>] panic_exit+0x45/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9dfa8: [<6005602b>] notifier_call_chain+0x2b/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9dfd8: [<600423c4>] panic+0xe4/0x180
[42949587.660000] 67d9e018: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e048: [<600165f8>] handle_page_fault+0xf8/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e078: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9e088: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9e0c8: [<6001699a>] segv+0x1ea/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e0d8: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e0e8: [<60039021>] change_sig+0x61/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9e138: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e158: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e168: [<60039091>] change_signals+0x51/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9e1d8: [<60016da8>] segv_handler+0x148/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e208: [<60016c60>] segv_handler+0x0/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e218: [<6003dbae>] sig_handler_common_skas+0xee/0x140
[42949587.660000] 67d9e258: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9e268: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9e300: [<60020770>] pcap_remove+0x0/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e308: [<6022d709>] __libc_waitpid+0x39/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e318: [<60022654>] pcap_close+0x4/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e388: [<600434ac>] release_console_sem+0x7c/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e3a8: [<6004326c>] vprintk+0x15c/0x260
[42949587.660000] 67d9e438: [<60043100>] printk+0xa0/0xb0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e458: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e478: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e498: [<6022d765>] __libc_waitpid+0x95/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e4b8: [<6002078e>] pcap_remove+0x1e/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e4d8: [<6002f6e5>] close_devices+0x55/0x60
[42949587.660000] 67d9e4f8: [<60013292>] do_uml_exitcalls+0x22/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e518: [<60014079>] machine_power_off+0x9/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9e528: [<600140a9>] machine_halt+0x9/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9e538: [<60017575>] panic_exit+0x45/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9e558: [<6005602b>] notifier_call_chain+0x2b/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9e588: [<600423c4>] panic+0xe4/0x180
[42949587.660000] 67d9e5c8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e5f8: [<600165f8>] handle_page_fault+0xf8/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e628: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9e638: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9e678: [<6001699a>] segv+0x1ea/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e688: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e698: [<60039021>] change_sig+0x61/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9e6e8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e708: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e718: [<60039091>] change_signals+0x51/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9e788: [<60016da8>] segv_handler+0x148/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e7b8: [<60016c60>] segv_handler+0x0/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e7c8: [<6003dbae>] sig_handler_common_skas+0xee/0x140
[42949587.660000] 67d9e808: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9e818: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9e8b0: [<60020770>] pcap_remove+0x0/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e8b8: [<6022d709>] __libc_waitpid+0x39/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e8c8: [<60022654>] pcap_close+0x4/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e938: [<600434ac>] release_console_sem+0x7c/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e958: [<6004326c>] vprintk+0x15c/0x260
[42949587.660000] 67d9e9e8: [<60043100>] printk+0xa0/0xb0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ea08: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ea28: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ea48: [<6022d765>] __libc_waitpid+0x95/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ea68: [<6002078e>] pcap_remove+0x1e/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ea88: [<6002f6e5>] close_devices+0x55/0x60
[42949587.660000] 67d9eaa8: [<60013292>] do_uml_exitcalls+0x22/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9eac8: [<60014079>] machine_power_off+0x9/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9ead8: [<600140a9>] machine_halt+0x9/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9eae8: [<60017575>] panic_exit+0x45/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9eb08: [<6005602b>] notifier_call_chain+0x2b/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9eb38: [<600423c4>] panic+0xe4/0x180
[42949587.660000] 67d9eb78: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9eba8: [<600165f8>] handle_page_fault+0xf8/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ebd8: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9ebe8: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9ec28: [<6001699a>] segv+0x1ea/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ec38: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ec48: [<60039021>] change_sig+0x61/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9ec98: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ecb8: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ecc8: [<60039091>] change_signals+0x51/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9ed38: [<60016da8>] segv_handler+0x148/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ed68: [<60016c60>] segv_handler+0x0/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ed78: [<6003dbae>] sig_handler_common_skas+0xee/0x140
[42949587.660000] 67d9edb8: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9edc8: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9ee60: [<60020770>] pcap_remove+0x0/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ee68: [<6022d709>] __libc_waitpid+0x39/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ee78: [<60022654>] pcap_close+0x4/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9eee8: [<600434ac>] release_console_sem+0x7c/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ef08: [<6004326c>] vprintk+0x15c/0x260
[42949587.660000] 67d9ef98: [<60043100>] printk+0xa0/0xb0
[42949587.660000] 67d9efb8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9efd8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9eff8: [<6022d765>] __libc_waitpid+0x95/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f018: [<6002078e>] pcap_remove+0x1e/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f038: [<6002f6e5>] close_devices+0x55/0x60
[42949587.660000] 67d9f058: [<60013292>] do_uml_exitcalls+0x22/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f078: [<60014079>] machine_power_off+0x9/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9f088: [<600140a9>] machine_halt+0x9/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9f098: [<60017575>] panic_exit+0x45/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9f0b8: [<6005602b>] notifier_call_chain+0x2b/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9f0e8: [<600423c4>] panic+0xe4/0x180
[42949587.660000] 67d9f128: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f158: [<600165f8>] handle_page_fault+0xf8/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f188: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9f198: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9f1d8: [<6001699a>] segv+0x1ea/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f1e8: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f1f8: [<60039021>] change_sig+0x61/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9f248: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f268: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f278: [<60039091>] change_signals+0x51/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9f2e8: [<60016da8>] segv_handler+0x148/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f318: [<60016c60>] segv_handler+0x0/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f328: [<6003dbae>] sig_handler_common_skas+0xee/0x140
[42949587.660000] 67d9f368: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9f378: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9f410: [<60020770>] pcap_remove+0x0/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f418: [<6022d709>] __libc_waitpid+0x39/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f428: [<60022654>] pcap_close+0x4/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f498: [<600434ac>] release_console_sem+0x7c/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f4b8: [<6004326c>] vprintk+0x15c/0x260
[42949587.660000] 67d9f548: [<60043100>] printk+0xa0/0xb0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f568: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f588: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f5a8: [<6022d765>] __libc_waitpid+0x95/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f5c8: [<6002078e>] pcap_remove+0x1e/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f5e8: [<6002f6e5>] close_devices+0x55/0x60
[42949587.660000] 67d9f608: [<60013292>] do_uml_exitcalls+0x22/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f628: [<60014079>] machine_power_off+0x9/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9f638: [<600140a9>] machine_halt+0x9/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9f648: [<60017575>] panic_exit+0x45/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9f668: [<6005602b>] notifier_call_chain+0x2b/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9f698: [<600423c4>] panic+0xe4/0x180
[42949587.660000] 67d9f6d8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f708: [<600165f8>] handle_page_fault+0xf8/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f748: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9f788: [<6001699a>] segv+0x1ea/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f798: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f7a8: [<60039021>] change_sig+0x61/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9f808: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f818: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f828: [<60039091>] change_signals+0x51/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9f898: [<60016da8>] segv_handler+0x148/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f8c8: [<60016c60>] segv_handler+0x0/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f8d8: [<6003dbae>] sig_handler_common_skas+0xee/0x140
[42949587.660000] 67d9f918: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9f928: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9f9c0: [<60020770>] pcap_remove+0x0/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f9c8: [<6022d709>] __libc_waitpid+0x39/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f9d8: [<60022654>] pcap_close+0x4/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9fa78: [<6004326c>] vprintk+0x15c/0x260
[42949587.660000] 67d9fab8: [<60039123>] enable_mask+0x43/0x60
[42949587.660000] 67d9fac8: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9fb08: [<60043100>] printk+0xa0/0xb0
[42949587.660000] 67d9fb48: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9fb78: [<6002078e>] pcap_remove+0x1e/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9fb98: [<6002f6e5>] close_devices+0x55/0x60
[42949587.660000] 67d9fbb8: [<60013292>] do_uml_exitcalls+0x22/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9fbd8: [<60014079>] machine_power_off+0x9/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9fbe8: [<60056864>] sys_reboot+0x234/0x240
[42949587.660000] 67d9fc08: [<60052f27>] kill_proc_info+0x37/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9fc28: [<60052f7c>] kill_something_info+0x3c/0x140
[42949587.660000] 67d9fcc8: [<6008a29b>] filp_close+0x4b/0x90
[42949587.660000] 67d9fd18: [<6001aed6>] execute_syscall_skas+0xc6/0xd0
[42949587.660000] 67d9fd38: [<6001aefb>] handle_syscall+0x1b/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9fd58: [<6003d1fb>] userspace+0x15b/0x2f0
[42949587.660000] 67d9fdb8: [<6001b0a4>] fix_range+0x34/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9fdf8: [<6001aac2>] fork_handler+0xc2/0xd0
[42949587.660000] 67d9fe38: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9fee8: [<602160c9>] __kill+0x9/0x20
[42949587.660000]
[42949587.660000] <0>Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel mode fault at addr 0x100, ip 0x401c69d7
[42949587.660000]
[42949587.660000] Pid: 3288, comm: halt Not tainted 2.6.12-rc6-mm1
[42949587.660000] RIP: 0033:[<00000000401c69d7>]
[42949587.660000] RSP: 0000007fbfc37bb0 EFLAGS: 00000202
[42949587.660000] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000007fbfc37c68 RCX: ffffffffffffffff
[42949587.660000] RDX: 000000004321fedc RSI: 0000000028121969 RDI: fffffffffee1dead
[42949587.660000] RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 000000000000004c R09: 0000000000000000
[42949587.660000] R10: 00000000401159a8 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000
[42949587.660000] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
[42949587.660000] Call Trace:
[42949587.660000] 67d9c8c8: [<6001755f>] panic_exit+0x2f/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9c8e8: [<6005602b>] notifier_call_chain+0x2b/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9c918: [<600423c4>] panic+0xe4/0x180
[42949587.660000] 67d9c958: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9c988: [<600165f8>] handle_page_fault+0xf8/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9c9b8: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9c9c8: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9ca08: [<6001699a>] segv+0x1ea/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ca18: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ca28: [<60039021>] change_sig+0x61/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9ca78: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ca98: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9caa8: [<60039091>] change_signals+0x51/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9cb18: [<60016da8>] segv_handler+0x148/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9cb48: [<60016c60>] segv_handler+0x0/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9cb58: [<6003dbae>] sig_handler_common_skas+0xee/0x140
[42949587.660000] 67d9cb98: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9cba8: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9cc40: [<60020770>] pcap_remove+0x0/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9cc48: [<6022d709>] __libc_waitpid+0x39/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9cc58: [<60022654>] pcap_close+0x4/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ccc8: [<600434ac>] release_console_sem+0x7c/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9cce8: [<6004326c>] vprintk+0x15c/0x260
[42949587.660000] 67d9cd78: [<60043100>] printk+0xa0/0xb0
[42949587.660000] 67d9cd98: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9cdb8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9cdd8: [<6022d765>] __libc_waitpid+0x95/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9cdf8: [<6002078e>] pcap_remove+0x1e/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ce18: [<6002f6e5>] close_devices+0x55/0x60
[42949587.660000] 67d9ce38: [<60013292>] do_uml_exitcalls+0x22/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ce58: [<60014079>] machine_power_off+0x9/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9ce68: [<600140a9>] machine_halt+0x9/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9ce78: [<60017575>] panic_exit+0x45/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9ce98: [<6005602b>] notifier_call_chain+0x2b/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9cec8: [<600423c4>] panic+0xe4/0x180
[42949587.660000] 67d9cf08: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9cf38: [<600165f8>] handle_page_fault+0xf8/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9cf68: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9cf78: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9cfb8: [<6001699a>] segv+0x1ea/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9cfc8: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9cfd8: [<60039021>] change_sig+0x61/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9d028: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d048: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d058: [<60039091>] change_signals+0x51/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9d0c8: [<60016da8>] segv_handler+0x148/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9d0f8: [<60016c60>] segv_handler+0x0/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9d108: [<6003dbae>] sig_handler_common_skas+0xee/0x140
[42949587.660000] 67d9d148: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9d158: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9d1f0: [<60020770>] pcap_remove+0x0/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d1f8: [<6022d709>] __libc_waitpid+0x39/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9d208: [<60022654>] pcap_close+0x4/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d278: [<600434ac>] release_console_sem+0x7c/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9d298: [<6004326c>] vprintk+0x15c/0x260
[42949587.660000] 67d9d328: [<60043100>] printk+0xa0/0xb0
[42949587.660000] 67d9d348: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d368: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d388: [<6022d765>] __libc_waitpid+0x95/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9d3a8: [<6002078e>] pcap_remove+0x1e/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d3c8: [<6002f6e5>] close_devices+0x55/0x60
[42949587.660000] 67d9d3e8: [<60013292>] do_uml_exitcalls+0x22/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d408: [<60014079>] machine_power_off+0x9/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9d418: [<600140a9>] machine_halt+0x9/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9d428: [<60017575>] panic_exit+0x45/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9d448: [<6005602b>] notifier_call_chain+0x2b/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9d478: [<600423c4>] panic+0xe4/0x180
[42949587.660000] 67d9d4b8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d4e8: [<600165f8>] handle_page_fault+0xf8/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9d518: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9d528: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9d568: [<6001699a>] segv+0x1ea/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9d578: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d588: [<60039021>] change_sig+0x61/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9d5d8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d5f8: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d608: [<60039091>] change_signals+0x51/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9d678: [<60016da8>] segv_handler+0x148/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9d6a8: [<60016c60>] segv_handler+0x0/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9d6b8: [<6003dbae>] sig_handler_common_skas+0xee/0x140
[42949587.660000] 67d9d6f8: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9d708: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9d7a0: [<60020770>] pcap_remove+0x0/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d7a8: [<6022d709>] __libc_waitpid+0x39/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9d7b8: [<60022654>] pcap_close+0x4/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d828: [<600434ac>] release_console_sem+0x7c/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9d848: [<6004326c>] vprintk+0x15c/0x260
[42949587.660000] 67d9d8d8: [<60043100>] printk+0xa0/0xb0
[42949587.660000] 67d9d8f8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d918: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d938: [<6022d765>] __libc_waitpid+0x95/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9d958: [<6002078e>] pcap_remove+0x1e/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d978: [<6002f6e5>] close_devices+0x55/0x60
[42949587.660000] 67d9d998: [<60013292>] do_uml_exitcalls+0x22/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9d9b8: [<60014079>] machine_power_off+0x9/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9d9c8: [<600140a9>] machine_halt+0x9/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9d9d8: [<60017575>] panic_exit+0x45/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9d9f8: [<6005602b>] notifier_call_chain+0x2b/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9da28: [<600423c4>] panic+0xe4/0x180
[42949587.660000] 67d9da68: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9da98: [<600165f8>] handle_page_fault+0xf8/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9dac8: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9dad8: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9db18: [<6001699a>] segv+0x1ea/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9db28: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9db38: [<60039021>] change_sig+0x61/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9db88: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9dba8: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9dbb8: [<60039091>] change_signals+0x51/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9dc28: [<60016da8>] segv_handler+0x148/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9dc58: [<60016c60>] segv_handler+0x0/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9dc68: [<6003dbae>] sig_handler_common_skas+0xee/0x140
[42949587.660000] 67d9dca8: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9dcb8: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9dd50: [<60020770>] pcap_remove+0x0/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9dd58: [<6022d709>] __libc_waitpid+0x39/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9dd68: [<60022654>] pcap_close+0x4/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ddd8: [<600434ac>] release_console_sem+0x7c/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ddf8: [<6004326c>] vprintk+0x15c/0x260
[42949587.660000] 67d9de88: [<60043100>] printk+0xa0/0xb0
[42949587.660000] 67d9dea8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9dec8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9dee8: [<6022d765>] __libc_waitpid+0x95/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9df08: [<6002078e>] pcap_remove+0x1e/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9df28: [<6002f6e5>] close_devices+0x55/0x60
[42949587.660000] 67d9df48: [<60013292>] do_uml_exitcalls+0x22/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9df68: [<60014079>] machine_power_off+0x9/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9df78: [<600140a9>] machine_halt+0x9/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9df88: [<60017575>] panic_exit+0x45/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9dfa8: [<6005602b>] notifier_call_chain+0x2b/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9dfd8: [<600423c4>] panic+0xe4/0x180
[42949587.660000] 67d9e018: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e048: [<600165f8>] handle_page_fault+0xf8/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e078: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9e088: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9e0c8: [<6001699a>] segv+0x1ea/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e0d8: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e0e8: [<60039021>] change_sig+0x61/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9e138: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e158: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e168: [<60039091>] change_signals+0x51/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9e1d8: [<60016da8>] segv_handler+0x148/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e208: [<60016c60>] segv_handler+0x0/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e218: [<6003dbae>] sig_handler_common_skas+0xee/0x140
[42949587.660000] 67d9e258: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9e268: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9e300: [<60020770>] pcap_remove+0x0/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e308: [<6022d709>] __libc_waitpid+0x39/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e318: [<60022654>] pcap_close+0x4/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e388: [<600434ac>] release_console_sem+0x7c/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e3a8: [<6004326c>] vprintk+0x15c/0x260
[42949587.660000] 67d9e438: [<60043100>] printk+0xa0/0xb0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e458: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e478: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e498: [<6022d765>] __libc_waitpid+0x95/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e4b8: [<6002078e>] pcap_remove+0x1e/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e4d8: [<6002f6e5>] close_devices+0x55/0x60
[42949587.660000] 67d9e4f8: [<60013292>] do_uml_exitcalls+0x22/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e518: [<60014079>] machine_power_off+0x9/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9e528: [<600140a9>] machine_halt+0x9/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9e538: [<60017575>] panic_exit+0x45/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9e558: [<6005602b>] notifier_call_chain+0x2b/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9e588: [<600423c4>] panic+0xe4/0x180
[42949587.660000] 67d9e5c8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e5f8: [<600165f8>] handle_page_fault+0xf8/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e628: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9e638: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9e678: [<6001699a>] segv+0x1ea/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e688: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e698: [<60039021>] change_sig+0x61/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9e6e8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e708: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e718: [<60039091>] change_signals+0x51/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9e788: [<60016da8>] segv_handler+0x148/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e7b8: [<60016c60>] segv_handler+0x0/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e7c8: [<6003dbae>] sig_handler_common_skas+0xee/0x140
[42949587.660000] 67d9e808: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9e818: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9e8b0: [<60020770>] pcap_remove+0x0/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e8b8: [<6022d709>] __libc_waitpid+0x39/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e8c8: [<60022654>] pcap_close+0x4/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9e938: [<600434ac>] release_console_sem+0x7c/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9e958: [<6004326c>] vprintk+0x15c/0x260
[42949587.660000] 67d9e9e8: [<60043100>] printk+0xa0/0xb0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ea08: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ea28: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ea48: [<6022d765>] __libc_waitpid+0x95/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ea68: [<6002078e>] pcap_remove+0x1e/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ea88: [<6002f6e5>] close_devices+0x55/0x60
[42949587.660000] 67d9eaa8: [<60013292>] do_uml_exitcalls+0x22/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9eac8: [<60014079>] machine_power_off+0x9/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9ead8: [<600140a9>] machine_halt+0x9/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9eae8: [<60017575>] panic_exit+0x45/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9eb08: [<6005602b>] notifier_call_chain+0x2b/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9eb38: [<600423c4>] panic+0xe4/0x180
[42949587.660000] 67d9eb78: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9eba8: [<600165f8>] handle_page_fault+0xf8/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ebd8: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9ebe8: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9ec28: [<6001699a>] segv+0x1ea/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ec38: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ec48: [<60039021>] change_sig+0x61/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9ec98: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ecb8: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ecc8: [<60039091>] change_signals+0x51/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9ed38: [<60016da8>] segv_handler+0x148/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ed68: [<60016c60>] segv_handler+0x0/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ed78: [<6003dbae>] sig_handler_common_skas+0xee/0x140
[42949587.660000] 67d9edb8: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9edc8: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9ee60: [<60020770>] pcap_remove+0x0/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9ee68: [<6022d709>] __libc_waitpid+0x39/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ee78: [<60022654>] pcap_close+0x4/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9eee8: [<600434ac>] release_console_sem+0x7c/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9ef08: [<6004326c>] vprintk+0x15c/0x260
[42949587.660000] 67d9ef98: [<60043100>] printk+0xa0/0xb0
[42949587.660000] 67d9efb8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9efd8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9eff8: [<6022d765>] __libc_waitpid+0x95/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f018: [<6002078e>] pcap_remove+0x1e/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f038: [<6002f6e5>] close_devices+0x55/0x60
[42949587.660000] 67d9f058: [<60013292>] do_uml_exitcalls+0x22/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f078: [<60014079>] machine_power_off+0x9/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9f088: [<600140a9>] machine_halt+0x9/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9f098: [<60017575>] panic_exit+0x45/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9f0b8: [<6005602b>] notifier_call_chain+0x2b/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9f0e8: [<600423c4>] panic+0xe4/0x180
[42949587.660000] 67d9f128: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f158: [<600165f8>] handle_page_fault+0xf8/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f188: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9f198: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9f1d8: [<6001699a>] segv+0x1ea/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f1e8: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f1f8: [<60039021>] change_sig+0x61/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9f248: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f268: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f278: [<60039091>] change_signals+0x51/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9f2e8: [<60016da8>] segv_handler+0x148/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f318: [<60016c60>] segv_handler+0x0/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f328: [<6003dbae>] sig_handler_common_skas+0xee/0x140
[42949587.660000] 67d9f368: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9f378: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9f410: [<60020770>] pcap_remove+0x0/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f418: [<6022d709>] __libc_waitpid+0x39/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f428: [<60022654>] pcap_close+0x4/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f498: [<600434ac>] release_console_sem+0x7c/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f4b8: [<6004326c>] vprintk+0x15c/0x260
[42949587.660000] 67d9f548: [<60043100>] printk+0xa0/0xb0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f568: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f588: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f5a8: [<6022d765>] __libc_waitpid+0x95/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f5c8: [<6002078e>] pcap_remove+0x1e/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f5e8: [<6002f6e5>] close_devices+0x55/0x60
[42949587.660000] 67d9f608: [<60013292>] do_uml_exitcalls+0x22/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f628: [<60014079>] machine_power_off+0x9/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9f638: [<600140a9>] machine_halt+0x9/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9f648: [<60017575>] panic_exit+0x45/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9f668: [<6005602b>] notifier_call_chain+0x2b/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9f698: [<600423c4>] panic+0xe4/0x180
[42949587.660000] 67d9f6d8: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f708: [<600165f8>] handle_page_fault+0xf8/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f748: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9f788: [<6001699a>] segv+0x1ea/0x2b0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f798: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f7a8: [<60039021>] change_sig+0x61/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9f808: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f818: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f828: [<60039091>] change_signals+0x51/0x80
[42949587.660000] 67d9f898: [<60016da8>] segv_handler+0x148/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f8c8: [<60016c60>] segv_handler+0x0/0x1c0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f8d8: [<6003dbae>] sig_handler_common_skas+0xee/0x140
[42949587.660000] 67d9f918: [<60038cb5>] sig_handler+0x25/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9f928: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9f9c0: [<60020770>] pcap_remove+0x0/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9f9c8: [<6022d709>] __libc_waitpid+0x39/0xc0
[42949587.660000] 67d9f9d8: [<60022654>] pcap_close+0x4/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9fa78: [<6004326c>] vprintk+0x15c/0x260
[42949587.660000] 67d9fab8: [<60039123>] enable_mask+0x43/0x60
[42949587.660000] 67d9fac8: [<60216155>] sigemptyset+0x15/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9fb08: [<60043100>] printk+0xa0/0xb0
[42949587.660000] 67d9fb48: [<60216091>] __sigprocmask+0x11/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9fb78: [<6002078e>] pcap_remove+0x1e/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9fb98: [<6002f6e5>] close_devices+0x55/0x60
[42949587.660000] 67d9fbb8: [<60013292>] do_uml_exitcalls+0x22/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9fbd8: [<60014079>] machine_power_off+0x9/0x30
[42949587.660000] 67d9fbe8: [<60056864>] sys_reboot+0x234/0x240
[42949587.660000] 67d9fc08: [<60052f27>] kill_proc_info+0x37/0x50
[42949587.660000] 67d9fc28: [<60052f7c>] kill_something_info+0x3c/0x140
[42949587.660000] 67d9fcc8: [<6008a29b>] filp_close+0x4b/0x90
[42949587.660000] 67d9fd18: [<6001aed6>] execute_syscall_skas+0xc6/0xd0
[42949587.660000] 67d9fd38: [<6001aefb>] handle_syscall+0x1b/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9fd58: [<6003d1fb>] userspace+0x15b/0x2f0
[42949587.660000] 67d9fdb8: [<6001b0a4>] fix_range+0x34/0x40
[42949587.660000] 67d9fdf8: [<6001aac2>] fork_handler+0xc2/0xd0
[42949587.660000] 67d9fe38: [<60215e10>] __restore_rt+0x0/0x10
[42949587.660000] 67d9fee8: [<602160c9>] __kill+0x9/0x20
[42949587.660000]
[42949587.660000] <0>Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel mode fault at addr 0x100, ip 0x401c69d7
/uml/start.sh: line 1: 3487 Segmentation fault /kernel-4 umid=4 mem=128M ubd0=/uml/root_fs
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread* Re: [uml-devel] 2.6.12-rc6-mm1 patches testing 2005-06-09 1:25 [uml-devel] 2.6.12-rc6-mm1 patches testing antoine @ 2005-06-09 15:24 ` Blaisorblade 2005-06-09 15:56 ` antoine 2005-06-09 16:31 ` antoine 0 siblings, 2 replies; 16+ messages in thread From: Blaisorblade @ 2005-06-09 15:24 UTC (permalink / raw) To: user-mode-linux-devel; +Cc: antoine [-- Attachment #1.1: Type: text/plain, Size: 6224 bytes --] On Thursday 09 June 2005 03:25, antoine wrote: > I noticed a new set of patches were out, so I gave it usual bashing. > Maybe this will be useful to someone else: > 1) as before fp-state does not apply. > 2) os-main gave me a reject on arch/um/kernel/main.c > fixed by simply removing the file. > > Built ok (no tweaks needed this time!). > Runs ok, but it is still loosing memory fast. > > Then I tried adding some more experimental features... > Attached is a stacktrace I encountered (pcap related): It happens only when inside the chroot, right? > Seems like the pcap patch ? You applied it on your own, or have I merged it somewhere without noticing? See my signature about that. > is causing some problems when running in a > chroot which does not have the libraries required by pcap (nss?) Yes, it's related to the compilation-time warning somebody (either you or Nix) got... > Some processes were still running when I got back to the shell. Well, it was segfaulting on exit, so it's a bit normal. Well, it shouldn't segfault in that case but simply handle the error gracefully. > Btw, how do I figure out which libs I need to copy to the chroot? Hmm, look at /etc/nsswitch.conf (to copy inside) and /lib/libnss_* (to copy too, you can limit what you copy by looking at the configuration). > But apart from that slight problem, when running outside the chroot it > works exactly as expected. > I vote for including it in the next release > with appropriate warnings about runtime libraries issues. > Now, if someone could have a look at hppfs I could resurect my > honeypots. I've not the time, however test the attached patches. The first one fixes the basical bugs; the second one could be needed to fix a fd leak... but I don't think it's needed at all, so test with only the first and let me know if the 2nd is needed, or if there are any problems (in that case, a ready-to-use hppfs configuration + explaination would be happily accepted, I've really little time now). I had marked it as CONFIG_BROKEN because it was giving some bad compilation warnings, which showed its almost non-existant usage (because those warnings showed that it would not work *absolutely*). Actually I'm now seeing that they were caused by this patch: http://linux.bkbits.net:8080/linux-2.5/cset%40412b86aaOElFX7HLh6UrLu-E1hQJSA?nav=index.html| src/.|src/fs|src/fs/hppfs|related/fs/hppfs/hppfs_kern.c which forgots some cleanups... so I guess it worked before and will work with this mini-patch. SPLIT include/linux/autoconf.h -> include/config/* CC fs/hppfs/hppfs_kern.o fs/hppfs/hppfs_kern.c: In function `hppfs_open': fs/hppfs/hppfs_kern.c:495: warning: passing arg 3 of `hppfs_get_data' from incompatible pointer type fs/hppfs/hppfs_kern.c: In function `hppfs_llseek': fs/hppfs/hppfs_kern.c:546: warning: initialization from incompatible pointer type fs/hppfs/hppfs_kern.c: In function `hppfs_readdir': fs/hppfs/hppfs_kern.c:589: warning: initialization from incompatible pointer type > Also, is anyone interested in some SELinux policies for UML? I guess yes, it would be very useful.... but against which distro policy are they prepared? Fedora, I guess, correct? IIRC, in fact, policies "link" together, for instance your one below refers to tmp_t... Also, I guess this policy needs some security label settings on files, right? Would you put it on the Wiki, please? Thanks > They need a > little bit of tidying up but seem to work. See below (I extracted the > generic part - unfortunately some parts are specific to my setup). Wow! Is this the "assembler-like language" that lwn.net mentioned? > Antoine > type um_t, domain, privowner; > type um_kernel_t, domain, privowner; > type um_admin_t, file_type, sysadmfile; > type um_exec_t, file_type, exec_type; > type um_kernel_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type; > type um_home_t, file_type; > type um_fs_t, file_type; This should be restricted somewhere to UML root_fs's, right (or maybe that is done with Security labels...)? > type um_tmp_t, file_type, tmpfile; "tmpfile" is already assigned to files in /tmp... > type um_proc_t, file_type; > type um_tundev_t, device_type, dev_fs; > file_type_auto_trans(um_t, tmp_t, um_tmp_t) > file_type_auto_trans(um_kernel_t, tmp_t, um_tmp_t) > domain_auto_trans(initrc_t, um_exec_t, um_t) > domain_auto_trans(sysadm_t, um_exec_t, um_t) > domain_auto_trans(um_t, um_kernel_exec_t, um_kernel_t) > # network > allow um_kernel_t netif_t:netif { tcp_recv tcp_send }; > allow um_kernel_t node_t:node { tcp_recv tcp_send }; > allow um_kernel_t port_t:socket { recv_msg send_msg }; > # sockets > allow um_kernel_t self:packet_socket create; > allow um_kernel_t self:unix_dgram_socket { bind create ioctl }; > allow um_kernel_t self:unix_stream_socket { create ioctl read write }; > # process > allow um_kernel_t self:process { execmem fork ptrace sigchld sigkill signal > sigstop }; # devices > allow um_kernel_t device_t:dir search; > allow um_kernel_t null_device_t:chr_file { ioctl read write }; > allow um_kernel_t um_tundev_t:chr_file { ioctl read write }; > allow um_kernel_t random_device_t:chr_file read; > # files > allow um_kernel_t um_tmp_t:file execute; Allow execution of temporary files? Guess this is needed to avoid /tmp being like noexec, but does this allow to exec a random process on the host being put inside tmp? > allow um_kernel_t um_fs_t:file { getattr lock read write }; > allow um_kernel_t um_fs_t:lnk_file read; > # proc > allow um_kernel_t um_proc_t:file read; > allow um_kernel_t um_proc_t:dir search; > # home > allow um_kernel_t um_home_t:dir { add_name create getattr read remove_name > rmdir write search}; allow um_kernel_t um_home_t:file { create getattr lock > read unlink write }; allow um_kernel_t um_home_t:sock_file { create unlink > }; > # all other dirs: > allow um_kernel_t um_admin_t:dir search; -- Inform me of my mistakes, so I can keep imitating Homer Simpson's "Doh!". Paolo Giarrusso, aka Blaisorblade (Skype ID "PaoloGiarrusso", ICQ 215621894) http://www.user-mode-linux.org/~blaisorblade [-- Attachment #1.2: uml-hppfs-fd-leak.patch --] [-- Type: text/x-diff, Size: 1174 bytes --] Don't think it's needed... We also delete hppfs_delete_inode since it just implements the default behaviour. Signed-off-by: Paolo 'Blaisorblade' Giarrusso <blaisorblade@yahoo.it> --- clean-linux-2.6.11-paolo/fs/hppfs/hppfs_kern.c | 7 +------ 1 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 6 deletions(-) diff -puN fs/hppfs/hppfs_kern.c~uml-hppfs-fd-leak fs/hppfs/hppfs_kern.c --- clean-linux-2.6.11/fs/hppfs/hppfs_kern.c~uml-hppfs-fd-leak 2005-06-09 16:54:56.000000000 +0200 +++ clean-linux-2.6.11-paolo/fs/hppfs/hppfs_kern.c 2005-06-09 17:01:09.000000000 +0200 @@ -640,11 +640,6 @@ static struct inode *hppfs_alloc_inode(s return(&hi->vfs_inode); } -void hppfs_delete_inode(struct inode *ino) -{ - clear_inode(ino); -} - static void hppfs_destroy_inode(struct inode *inode) { kfree(HPPFS_I(inode)); @@ -652,9 +647,9 @@ static void hppfs_destroy_inode(struct i static struct super_operations hppfs_sbops = { .alloc_inode = hppfs_alloc_inode, + .drop_inode = generic_delete_inode, .destroy_inode = hppfs_destroy_inode, .read_inode = hppfs_read_inode, - .delete_inode = hppfs_delete_inode, .statfs = hppfs_statfs, }; _ [-- Attachment #1.3: uml-hppfs.patch --] [-- Type: text/x-diff, Size: 2732 bytes --] Signed-off-by: Paolo 'Blaisorblade' Giarrusso <blaisorblade@yahoo.it> --- clean-linux-2.6.11-paolo/arch/um/Kconfig | 6 +++--- clean-linux-2.6.11-paolo/fs/hppfs/hppfs_kern.c | 7 ++++--- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff -puN arch/um/Kconfig~uml-hppfs arch/um/Kconfig --- clean-linux-2.6.11/arch/um/Kconfig~uml-hppfs 2005-06-09 16:37:42.000000000 +0200 +++ clean-linux-2.6.11-paolo/arch/um/Kconfig 2005-06-09 16:38:22.000000000 +0200 @@ -122,7 +122,6 @@ config HOSTFS config HPPFS tristate "HoneyPot ProcFS (EXPERIMENTAL)" - depends on BROKEN help hppfs (HoneyPot ProcFS) is a filesystem which allows UML /proc entries to be overridden, removed, or fabricated from the host. @@ -135,8 +134,9 @@ config HPPFS You only need this if you are setting up a UML honeypot. Otherwise, it is safe to say 'N' here. - If you are actively using it, please ask for it to be fixed. In this - moment, it does not work on 2.6 (it works somehow on 2.4). + If you are actively using it, please report any problems, since it's + getting fixed. In this moment, it does not work on 2.6 (it works somehow + on 2.4). config MCONSOLE bool "Management console" diff -puN fs/hppfs/hppfs_kern.c~uml-hppfs fs/hppfs/hppfs_kern.c --- clean-linux-2.6.11/fs/hppfs/hppfs_kern.c~uml-hppfs 2005-06-09 16:37:42.000000000 +0200 +++ clean-linux-2.6.11-paolo/fs/hppfs/hppfs_kern.c 2005-06-09 16:54:20.000000000 +0200 @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ */ #include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/file.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/slab.h> @@ -491,7 +492,7 @@ static int hppfs_open(struct inode *inod fd = open_host_sock(host_file, &filter); if(fd > 0){ data->contents = hppfs_get_data(fd, filter, - &data->proc_file, + data->proc_file, file, &data->len); if(!IS_ERR(data->contents)) data->host_fd = fd; @@ -543,7 +544,7 @@ static int hppfs_dir_open(struct inode * static loff_t hppfs_llseek(struct file *file, loff_t off, int where) { struct hppfs_private *data = file->private_data; - struct file *proc_file = &data->proc_file; + struct file *proc_file = data->proc_file; loff_t (*llseek)(struct file *, loff_t, int); loff_t ret; @@ -586,7 +587,7 @@ static int hppfs_filldir(void *d, const static int hppfs_readdir(struct file *file, void *ent, filldir_t filldir) { struct hppfs_private *data = file->private_data; - struct file *proc_file = &data->proc_file; + struct file *proc_file = data->proc_file; int (*readdir)(struct file *, void *, filldir_t); struct hppfs_dirent dirent = ((struct hppfs_dirent) { .vfs_dirent = ent, _ [-- Attachment #2: Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 189 bytes --] ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread
* Re: [uml-devel] 2.6.12-rc6-mm1 patches testing 2005-06-09 15:24 ` Blaisorblade @ 2005-06-09 15:56 ` antoine 2005-06-09 17:20 ` Blaisorblade 2005-06-09 16:31 ` antoine 1 sibling, 1 reply; 16+ messages in thread From: antoine @ 2005-06-09 15:56 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Blaisorblade; +Cc: user-mode-linux-devel > > Then I tried adding some more experimental features... > > Attached is a stacktrace I encountered (pcap related): > It happens only when inside the chroot, right? Yes. > > Seems like the pcap patch > ? You applied it on your own, or have I merged it somewhere without noticing? > See my signature about that. I applied it separately. > > is causing some problems when running in a > > chroot which does not have the libraries required by pcap (nss?) > Yes, it's related to the compilation-time warning somebody (either you or Nix) > got... Yep, I saw them. > > Some processes were still running when I got back to the shell. > Well, it was segfaulting on exit, so it's a bit normal. Well, it shouldn't > segfault in that case but simply handle the error gracefully. > > Btw, how do I figure out which libs I need to copy to the chroot? > Hmm, look at /etc/nsswitch.conf (to copy inside) and /lib/libnss_* (to copy > too, you can limit what you copy by looking at the configuration). Thanks, I'll try that. > > Now, if someone could have a look at hppfs I could resurect my > > honeypots. > I've not the time, however test the attached patches. The first one fixes the > basical bugs; the second one could be needed to fix a fd leak... but I don't > think it's needed at all, so test with only the first and let me know if the > 2nd is needed, or if there are any problems (in that case, a ready-to-use > hppfs configuration + explaination would be happily accepted, I've really > little time now). Will do. (..) > > Also, is anyone interested in some SELinux policies for UML? > I guess yes, it would be very useful.... but against which distro policy are > they prepared? Fedora, I guess, correct? They are designed on gentoo but should work on most selinux systems. > > IIRC, in fact, policies "link" together, for instance your one below refers to > tmp_t... All policies are based on the core policies, all of them have tmp_t, bin_t, etc_t, usr_t, var_t and much more. > Also, I guess this policy needs some security label settings on files, right? Yep, that part is much more specific to my setup: the place where you install the UML instances is not part of the LSB, so I didn't include the file labels in the previous email. What is the consensus on where UML should be installed on a production system? (assuming multiple instances + possibility of a chroot) > > Would you put it on the Wiki, please? Thanks Will do. > > > They need a > > little bit of tidying up but seem to work. See below (I extracted the > > generic part - unfortunately some parts are specific to my setup). > > Wow! Is this the "assembler-like language" that lwn.net mentioned? Not sure what you mean. > > > Antoine > > > type um_t, domain, privowner; > > type um_kernel_t, domain, privowner; > > > type um_admin_t, file_type, sysadmfile; > > type um_exec_t, file_type, exec_type; > > type um_kernel_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type; > > type um_home_t, file_type; > > type um_fs_t, file_type; > This should be restricted somewhere to UML root_fs's, right (or maybe that is > done with Security labels...)? Yes, something like: /chroot/uml/1/root_fs -- system_u:object_r:um_fs_t > > type um_tmp_t, file_type, tmpfile; > "tmpfile" is already assigned to files in /tmp... That's because my um_tmp_t is not in /tmp (it is in chroot somewhere else) > > allow um_kernel_t um_tmp_t:file execute; > Allow execution of temporary files? Guess this is needed to avoid /tmp being > like noexec, but does this allow to exec a random process on the host being > put inside tmp? AFAIK, it would allow a file with this label to be executed. I was hoping that allowing just the directory to be "execute"-able would be enough but it is not. Is this due to the uml tmp-exec check? How is it done? Antoine ------------------------------------------------------- This SF.Net email is sponsored by: NEC IT Guy Games. How far can you shotput a projector? How fast can you ride your desk chair down the office luge track? If you want to score the big prize, get to know the little guy. Play to win an NEC 61" plasma display: http://www.necitguy.com/?r=20 _______________________________________________ User-mode-linux-devel mailing list User-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/user-mode-linux-devel ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread
* Re: [uml-devel] 2.6.12-rc6-mm1 patches testing 2005-06-09 15:56 ` antoine @ 2005-06-09 17:20 ` Blaisorblade 2005-06-09 17:52 ` antoine 2005-06-09 18:04 ` [uml-devel] 2.6.12-rc6-mm1 patches testing antoine 0 siblings, 2 replies; 16+ messages in thread From: Blaisorblade @ 2005-06-09 17:20 UTC (permalink / raw) To: antoine; +Cc: user-mode-linux-devel On Thursday 09 June 2005 17:56, antoine wrote: > > > Then I tried adding some more experimental features... > > > Attached is a stacktrace I encountered (pcap related): > > > > It happens only when inside the chroot, right? > Yes. > > > Seems like the pcap patch > > > > ? You applied it on your own, or have I merged it somewhere without > > noticing? See my signature about that. > > I applied it separately. Forgot to add a smilie to mark the pun ;-) (Always remind me of my errors.....) > > > Also, is anyone interested in some SELinux policies for UML? > > > > I guess yes, it would be very useful.... but against which distro policy > > are they prepared? Fedora, I guess, correct? > They are designed on gentoo but should work on most selinux systems. > > IIRC, in fact, policies "link" together, for instance your one below > > refers to tmp_t... > All policies are based on the core policies, all of them have tmp_t, > bin_t, etc_t, usr_t, var_t and much more. Ok, good thing. > > Also, I guess this policy needs some security label settings on files, > > right? > Yep, that part is much more specific to my setup: the place where you > install the UML instances is not part of the LSB, so I didn't include > the file labels in the previous email. What is the consensus on where > UML should be installed on a production system? (assuming multiple > instances + possibility of a chroot) There is no consensus, so that should be parametrized somehow (if policies don't have a builtin preprocessor, then sed is a good last resort - put the parameters inside %%, like %UML_ROOT_FS_PATH%, and use sed on that to produce the policy). > > > They need a > > > little bit of tidying up but seem to work. See below (I extracted the > > > generic part - unfortunately some parts are specific to my setup). > > Wow! Is this the "assembler-like language" that lwn.net mentioned? > Not sure what you mean. lwn.net said that writing a SELinux policy was a terrible and complicate task... > > > type um_tmp_t, file_type, tmpfile; > > > > "tmpfile" is already assigned to files in /tmp... Sorry, this was a question.... > That's because my um_tmp_t is not in /tmp (it is in chroot somewhere > else) > > > > allow um_kernel_t um_tmp_t:file execute; > > Allow execution of temporary files? Guess this is needed to avoid /tmp > > being like noexec, but does this allow to exec a random process on the > > host being put inside tmp? > AFAIK, it would allow a file with this label to be executed. This label is auto-given by some of the above file_type_auto_trans(um_t, tmp_t, um_tmp_t) or something like that, right? Is a normal user restricted from assigning this label another way or anybody can give this label and cross the check? > I was > hoping that allowing just the directory to be "execute"-able would be > enough but it is not. Is this due to the uml tmp-exec check? How is it > done? UML needs simply to mmap (PROT_EXEC) datas from the /tmp/vm_XXXXXX file to work, and so it tries doing this very early, to give the user a hint on what happens. On a fs mounted noexec this is forbidden, so possibly it's forbidden also by SELinux; however, it would be nicer if SELinux could simply allow mmap()ing with PROT_EXEC without allowing file execution...; allowing mmap() does not put a big hole inside protections while allowing file execution does...means that if the user can supply a program to execute, that program can be written to mmap() and execute code from /tmp, but at that point the intruder could simply execute his code. -- Inform me of my mistakes, so I can keep imitating Homer Simpson's "Doh!". Paolo Giarrusso, aka Blaisorblade (Skype ID "PaoloGiarrusso", ICQ 215621894) http://www.user-mode-linux.org/~blaisorblade ___________________________________ Yahoo! Mail: gratis 1GB per i messaggi e allegati da 10MB http://mail.yahoo.it ------------------------------------------------------- This SF.Net email is sponsored by: NEC IT Guy Games. How far can you shotput a projector? How fast can you ride your desk chair down the office luge track? If you want to score the big prize, get to know the little guy. Play to win an NEC 61" plasma display: http://www.necitguy.com/?r=20 _______________________________________________ User-mode-linux-devel mailing list User-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/user-mode-linux-devel ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread
* Re: [uml-devel] 2.6.12-rc6-mm1 patches testing 2005-06-09 17:20 ` Blaisorblade @ 2005-06-09 17:52 ` antoine 2005-06-09 18:26 ` SELinux for UML (was: Re: [uml-devel] 2.6.12-rc6-mm1 patches testing) Blaisorblade 2005-06-09 18:04 ` [uml-devel] 2.6.12-rc6-mm1 patches testing antoine 1 sibling, 1 reply; 16+ messages in thread From: antoine @ 2005-06-09 17:52 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Blaisorblade; +Cc: user-mode-linux-devel [OT: Mostly SELinux discussion] > > Yep, that part is much more specific to my setup: the place where you > > install the UML instances is not part of the LSB, so I didn't include > > the file labels in the previous email. What is the consensus on where > > UML should be installed on a production system? (assuming multiple > > instances + possibility of a chroot) > There is no consensus, so that should be parametrized somehow (if policies > don't have a builtin preprocessor, then sed is a good last resort - put the > parameters inside %%, like %UML_ROOT_FS_PATH%, and use sed on that to produce > the policy). It allows basic regular expressions with '.','*','?','+' and grouping '()'. I'm not too keen on sed because this would prevent the policy from being merged upstream. Maybe now is a good time to choose a directory by default and users who deviate can use softlinks or tweak their policy. > > > > They need a > > > > little bit of tidying up but seem to work. See below (I extracted the > > > > generic part - unfortunately some parts are specific to my setup). > > > > Wow! Is this the "assembler-like language" that lwn.net mentioned? > > > Not sure what you mean. > lwn.net said that writing a SELinux policy was a terrible and complicate > task... Indeed, the learning curve is quite steep. From what I remember of assembly language (1980s), it is on par. It uses lots of macros to try to simplify configuration, I'm not sure it really helps. It is hard to work them backwards. > > > Allow execution of temporary files? Guess this is needed to avoid /tmp > > > being like noexec, but does this allow to exec a random process on the > > > host being put inside tmp? > > AFAIK, it would allow a file with this label to be executed. > This label is auto-given by some of the above > file_type_auto_trans(um_t, tmp_t, um_tmp_t) exactly! see it isn't that hard! (that's one of the macros) Anyone in the um_t domain creating files in tmp_t will have these files automatically labelled as um_tmp_t. > or something like that, right? Is a normal user restricted from assigning this > label another way or anybody can give this label and cross the check? No user can assign a label unless explicitly given the access rights (least-privilege principle) > > I was > > hoping that allowing just the directory to be "execute"-able would be > > enough but it is not. Is this due to the uml tmp-exec check? How is it > > done? > > UML needs simply to mmap (PROT_EXEC) datas from the /tmp/vm_XXXXXX file to > work, and so it tries doing this very early, to give the user a hint on what > happens. On a fs mounted noexec this is forbidden, so possibly it's forbidden > also by SELinux; however, it would be nicer if SELinux could simply allow > mmap()ing with PROT_EXEC without allowing file execution...; allowing mmap() > does not put a big hole inside protections while allowing file execution > does...means that if the user can supply a program to execute, that program > can be written to mmap() and execute code from /tmp, but at that point the > intruder could simply execute his code. This one's beyond me! I can just about read selinux policies...but not selinux internals. I'll write another email for the selinux ML. Antoine ------------------------------------------------------- This SF.Net email is sponsored by: NEC IT Guy Games. How far can you shotput a projector? How fast can you ride your desk chair down the office luge track? If you want to score the big prize, get to know the little guy. Play to win an NEC 61" plasma display: http://www.necitguy.com/?r=20 _______________________________________________ User-mode-linux-devel mailing list User-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/user-mode-linux-devel ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread
* SELinux for UML (was: Re: [uml-devel] 2.6.12-rc6-mm1 patches testing) 2005-06-09 17:52 ` antoine @ 2005-06-09 18:26 ` Blaisorblade 2005-06-09 19:19 ` antoine 0 siblings, 1 reply; 16+ messages in thread From: Blaisorblade @ 2005-06-09 18:26 UTC (permalink / raw) To: user-mode-linux-devel; +Cc: antoine On Thursday 09 June 2005 19:52, antoine wrote: > [OT: Mostly SELinux discussion] Updated the title too. > > > Yep, that part is much more specific to my setup: the place where you > > > install the UML instances is not part of the LSB, so I didn't include > > > the file labels in the previous email. What is the consensus on where > > > UML should be installed on a production system? (assuming multiple > > > instances + possibility of a chroot) > > > > There is no consensus, so that should be parametrized somehow (if > > policies don't have a builtin preprocessor, then sed is a good last > > resort - put the parameters inside %%, like %UML_ROOT_FS_PATH%, and use > > sed on that to produce the policy). > It allows basic regular expressions with '.','*','?','+' and grouping > '()'. > I'm not too keen on sed because this would prevent the policy from being > merged upstream. Hmm, so there is a central repository of policies... > Maybe now is a good time to choose a directory by default and users who > deviate can use softlinks or tweak their policy. Hmm, well, who uses SELinux will have to setup things anyway, so they can even move their files around. Assuming there will be a chroot too, using /chroot (which is mandated by Who Knows Who, but is used on Gentoo for the dhcp daemon) or better /chroot/uml would be good. However, would a chroot work with SELinux or do you need to put the "chrooting" also in the policy? Btw, I really need to allow UML to chroot on its own, btw... and options for changing UID/GID after setup... From what I remember of assembly language (1980s), it is on par. > It uses lots of macros to try to simplify configuration, I'm not sure it > really helps. It is hard to work them backwards. > > > > Allow execution of temporary files? Guess this is needed to avoid > > > > /tmp being like noexec, but does this allow to exec a random process > > > > on the host being put inside tmp? > > > AFAIK, it would allow a file with this label to be executed. > > This label is auto-given by some of the above > > file_type_auto_trans(um_t, tmp_t, um_tmp_t) > exactly! see it isn't that hard! (that's one of the macros) Well, I'm good at guessing about unknown languages... > Anyone in the um_t domain creating files in tmp_t will have these files > automatically labelled as um_tmp_t. > > or something like that, right? Is a normal user restricted from assigning > > this label another way or anybody can give this label and cross the > > check? > No user can assign a label unless explicitly given the access rights > (least-privilege principle) Good. > > > I was > > > hoping that allowing just the directory to be "execute"-able would be > > > enough but it is not. Is this due to the uml tmp-exec check? How is it > > > done? > > UML needs simply to mmap (PROT_EXEC) datas from the /tmp/vm_XXXXXX file > > to work, and so it tries doing this very early, to give the user a hint > > on what happens. > > On a fs mounted noexec this is forbidden, so possibly > > it's forbidden also by SELinux; however, it would be nicer if SELinux > > could simply allow mmap()ing with PROT_EXEC without allowing file > > execution...; allowing mmap() does not put a big hole inside protections > > while allowing file execution does...means that if the user can supply a > > program to execute, that program can be written to mmap() and execute > > code from /tmp, but at that point the intruder could simply execute his > > code. > This one's beyond me! I can just about read selinux policies...but not > selinux internals. > I'll write another email for the selinux ML. Sadly, by looking at the code, it seems that this is not possible... execution controls are implemented through mmap() controls. > Antoine -- Inform me of my mistakes, so I can keep imitating Homer Simpson's "Doh!". Paolo Giarrusso, aka Blaisorblade (Skype ID "PaoloGiarrusso", ICQ 215621894) http://www.user-mode-linux.org/~blaisorblade ___________________________________ Yahoo! Mail: gratis 1GB per i messaggi e allegati da 10MB http://mail.yahoo.it ------------------------------------------------------- This SF.Net email is sponsored by: NEC IT Guy Games. How far can you shotput a projector? How fast can you ride your desk chair down the office luge track? If you want to score the big prize, get to know the little guy. Play to win an NEC 61" plasma display: http://www.necitguy.com/?r=20 _______________________________________________ User-mode-linux-devel mailing list User-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/user-mode-linux-devel ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread
* Re: SELinux for UML (was: Re: [uml-devel] 2.6.12-rc6-mm1 patches testing) 2005-06-09 18:26 ` SELinux for UML (was: Re: [uml-devel] 2.6.12-rc6-mm1 patches testing) Blaisorblade @ 2005-06-09 19:19 ` antoine 0 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread From: antoine @ 2005-06-09 19:19 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Blaisorblade; +Cc: user-mode-linux-devel > > > > Yep, that part is much more specific to my setup: the place where you > > > > install the UML instances is not part of the LSB, so I didn't include > > > > the file labels in the previous email. What is the consensus on where > > > > UML should be installed on a production system? (assuming multiple > > > > instances + possibility of a chroot) > > > > > > There is no consensus, so that should be parametrized somehow (if > > > policies don't have a builtin preprocessor, then sed is a good last > > > resort - put the parameters inside %%, like %UML_ROOT_FS_PATH%, and use > > > sed on that to produce the policy). > > > It allows basic regular expressions with '.','*','?','+' and grouping > > '()'. > > I'm not too keen on sed because this would prevent the policy from being > > merged upstream. > Hmm, so there is a central repository of policies... http://selinux.sourceforge.net/ Here is an interesting email I just received: (it is about type enforcements .te but I expect the same principle to apply to file contexts .fc) ******CUT > > Generally > > speaking, how do you maintain local customisations of the core policies? > > No good answer yet. There is presently support for local customization > of boolean settings, file contexts, and users (at least in Fedora) > without needing to touch policy sources. For tweaks to .te rules, a > common convention is to create domains/misc/local.te or > domains/misc/custom.te. The loadable module support that is in the > process of being upstreamed will allow for well-defined policy modules > with explicitly declared dependencies so you can define your own module > without disturbing the base one provided by your distributor, but I > think that support still only addresses the RBAC and TE rules, not > things like network contexts. The MLS work will require the ability to > do site customization of netif contexts, so we'll likely have to add > similar support to libsepol for local customizations there as we have > already done for booleans and users. That works by loading in the > binary policy file into memory, loading in the local customization > config files, mutating the in-memory policy image accordingly, and then > loading the resulting policy image into the kernel. ******CUT > > Maybe now is a good time to choose a directory by default and users who > > deviate can use softlinks or tweak their policy. > Hmm, well, who uses SELinux will have to setup things anyway, so they can even > move their files around. Assuming there will be a chroot too, using /chroot > (which is mandated by Who Knows Who, but is used on Gentoo for the dhcp > daemon) or better /chroot/uml would be good. > > However, would a chroot work with SELinux or do you need to put the > "chrooting" also in the policy? Well, I tried to define generic policies for my chrooted services when I migrated them to selinux, but there are issues. I'm looking into it. > Btw, I really need to allow UML to chroot on its own, btw... and options for > changing UID/GID after setup... That would be very nice. I'll keep you posted as I learn more about SELinux and how to make UML run smoothly in a chrooted/selinux environment. Antoine ------------------------------------------------------- This SF.Net email is sponsored by: NEC IT Guy Games. How far can you shotput a projector? How fast can you ride your desk chair down the office luge track? If you want to score the big prize, get to know the little guy. Play to win an NEC 61" plasma display: http://www.necitguy.com/?r=20 _______________________________________________ User-mode-linux-devel mailing list User-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/user-mode-linux-devel ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread
* Re: [uml-devel] 2.6.12-rc6-mm1 patches testing 2005-06-09 17:20 ` Blaisorblade 2005-06-09 17:52 ` antoine @ 2005-06-09 18:04 ` antoine 2005-06-09 19:45 ` Stephen Smalley 1 sibling, 1 reply; 16+ messages in thread From: antoine @ 2005-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw) To: SELinux; +Cc: Blaisorblade > UML needs simply to mmap (PROT_EXEC) datas from the /tmp/vm_XXXXXX file to > work, and so it tries doing this very early, to give the user a hint on what > happens. On a fs mounted noexec this is forbidden, so possibly it's forbidden > also by SELinux; however, it would be nicer if SELinux could simply allow > mmap()ing with PROT_EXEC without allowing file execution...; allowing mmap() > does not put a big hole inside protections while allowing file execution > does...means that if the user can supply a program to execute, that program > can be written to mmap() and execute code from /tmp, but at that point the > intruder could simply execute his code. Can anyone answer this for us please? I am trying to workaround this: audit(1117846877.640:0): avc: denied { execute } for pid=29031 comm=um-kernel path=/tmp/vm_file-NnIm5X (deleted) dev=md7 ino=3965039 scontext=root:sysadm_r:um_kernel_t tcontext=root:object_r:um_tmp_t tclass=file Without giving uml execute access to its tmp directory. Antoine -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread
* Re: [uml-devel] 2.6.12-rc6-mm1 patches testing 2005-06-09 18:04 ` [uml-devel] 2.6.12-rc6-mm1 patches testing antoine @ 2005-06-09 19:45 ` Stephen Smalley 2005-06-09 22:57 ` Blaisorblade 0 siblings, 1 reply; 16+ messages in thread From: Stephen Smalley @ 2005-06-09 19:45 UTC (permalink / raw) To: antoine; +Cc: SELinux, Blaisorblade On Thu, 2005-06-09 at 19:04 +0100, antoine wrote: > > UML needs simply to mmap (PROT_EXEC) datas from the /tmp/vm_XXXXXX file to > > work, and so it tries doing this very early, to give the user a hint on what > > happens. On a fs mounted noexec this is forbidden, so possibly it's forbidden > > also by SELinux; however, it would be nicer if SELinux could simply allow > > mmap()ing with PROT_EXEC without allowing file execution...; allowing mmap() > > does not put a big hole inside protections while allowing file execution > > does...means that if the user can supply a program to execute, that program > > can be written to mmap() and execute code from /tmp, but at that point the > > intruder could simply execute his code. > > Can anyone answer this for us please? > I am trying to workaround this: > audit(1117846877.640:0): avc: denied { execute } for pid=29031 comm=um-kernel path=/tmp/vm_file-NnIm5X (deleted) dev=md7 ino=3965039 scontext=root:sysadm_r:um_kernel_t tcontext=root:object_r:um_tmp_t tclass=file > Without giving uml execute access to its tmp directory. Possibly the UML folks could elaborate on what UML is trying to do here? In the long term, I'd advise changing its behavior if possible, as allowing execution of arbitrary code is obviously undesirable and use of /tmp will break noexec /tmp mounts as noted above regardless of what SELinux does. In the short term, you naturally have the option of adding: allow um_kernel_t um_tmp_t:file execute; to your policy as a workaround. This shouldn't actually allow direct execve() of such files, as that would also trigger another check (execute_no_trans if staying in the same domain or entrypoint otherwise), but would allow indirect execution via ld.so (if staying in the same domain). -- Stephen Smalley National Security Agency -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread
* Re: [uml-devel] 2.6.12-rc6-mm1 patches testing 2005-06-09 19:45 ` Stephen Smalley @ 2005-06-09 22:57 ` Blaisorblade 2005-06-10 13:35 ` Stephen Smalley 0 siblings, 1 reply; 16+ messages in thread From: Blaisorblade @ 2005-06-09 22:57 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Stephen Smalley; +Cc: antoine, SELinux On Thursday 09 June 2005 21:45, Stephen Smalley wrote: > On Thu, 2005-06-09 at 19:04 +0100, antoine wrote: > > > UML needs simply to mmap (PROT_EXEC) datas from the /tmp/vm_XXXXXX file > > > to work, and so it tries doing this very early, to give the user a hint > > > on what happens. On a fs mounted noexec this is forbidden, so possibly > > > it's forbidden also by SELinux; however, it would be nicer if SELinux > > > could simply allow mmap()ing with PROT_EXEC without allowing file > > > execution...; allowing mmap() does not put a big hole inside > > > protections while allowing file execution does...means that if the user > > > can supply a program to execute, that program can be written to mmap() > > > and execute code from /tmp, but at that point the intruder could simply > > > execute his code. > > > > Can anyone answer this for us please? > > I am trying to workaround this: > > audit(1117846877.640:0): avc: denied { execute } for pid=29031 > > comm=um-kernel path=/tmp/vm_file-NnIm5X (deleted) dev=md7 ino=3965039 > > scontext=root:sysadm_r:um_kernel_t tcontext=root:object_r:um_tmp_t > > tclass=file Without giving uml execute access to its tmp directory. > Possibly the UML folks could elaborate on what UML is trying to do here? > In the long term, I'd advise changing its behavior if possible, > as > allowing execution of arbitrary code is obviously undesirable and use > of /tmp will break noexec /tmp mounts as noted above regardless of what > SELinux does. Yes, I know, we must have a test *against* noexec /tmp, sadly. However, since UML is a virtual kernel, between its task there is executing programs, in the memory of the virtual guest; this memory is represented by a host file, because it must be shareable by different threads (each of them matches one process/thread executed inside UML; actually there are complications but this is the base idea). A note: this file is later deleted to avoid it being touched by the host; what I was thinking was if this could be extended to deleting the directory it's in (it could, and this would work); then, maybe the execute permission could be given only to the directory, and the creation of such directories could be restricted to UML (well, given that you make UML put his files not in /tmp but in a reserved place). I.e.: only the UML "role" (I don't know SELinux so please correct me) can create a folder under /chroot/mem; those folders become of a different role with auto_trans, inside those folders you get execute permission with "allow um_kernel_t um_tmp_t:file execute;", and those folders get deleted as soon as the file has been created, opened and deleted, so only UML can create an mmap'able file; race condition to check here if the attacker creates a file while the directory exists but not difficult to solve; I guess this is possible with SELinux. Obviously this requires a bit of hacking to the UML kernel, but is possible; the right question is if this is requested. > In the short term, you naturally have the option of adding: > allow um_kernel_t um_tmp_t:file execute; > to your policy as a workaround. Yes, Antoine did something such but he was searching a better solution. > This shouldn't actually allow direct > execve() of such files, as that would also trigger another check > (execute_no_trans if staying in the same domain or entrypoint > otherwise), Good... > but would allow indirect execution via ld.so (if staying in > the same domain). I don't understand the domain concept... however, by "indirect execution" you mean simply running /lib/ld.so <fileName>, don't you? In this case, since the kernel must just mmap() ld.so and not execve() it, couldn't we deny execve("/lib/ld-linux.so") via the checks you mentioned above? -- Inform me of my mistakes, so I can keep imitating Homer Simpson's "Doh!". Paolo Giarrusso, aka Blaisorblade (Skype ID "PaoloGiarrusso", ICQ 215621894) http://www.user-mode-linux.org/~blaisorblade ___________________________________ Yahoo! Mail: gratis 1GB per i messaggi e allegati da 10MB http://mail.yahoo.it -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread
* Re: [uml-devel] 2.6.12-rc6-mm1 patches testing 2005-06-09 22:57 ` Blaisorblade @ 2005-06-10 13:35 ` Stephen Smalley 0 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread From: Stephen Smalley @ 2005-06-10 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Blaisorblade; +Cc: antoine, SELinux On Fri, 2005-06-10 at 00:57 +0200, Blaisorblade wrote: > However, since UML is a virtual kernel, between its task there is executing > programs, in the memory of the virtual guest; this memory is represented by a > host file, because it must be shareable by different threads (each of them > matches one process/thread executed inside UML; actually there are > complications but this is the base idea). Shared anon mapping? > A note: this file is later deleted to avoid it being touched by the host; what > I was thinking was if this could be extended to deleting the directory it's > in (it could, and this would work); then, maybe the execute permission could > be given only to the directory, and the creation of such directories could be > restricted to UML (well, given that you make UML put his files not in /tmp > but in a reserved place). I.e.: It is already the case that a separate type (um_tmp_t) is being applied to the file, and I presume that the policy only allows um_kernel_t to create/modify files with this type, so policy should ensure that no other process can touch the file and that no other process can trick uml into using a different file (because um_kernel_t will lack execute permission to any other xxx_tmp_t type, and thus the mmap would fail). > only the UML "role" (I don't know SELinux so please correct me) can create a > folder under /chroot/mem; those folders become of a different role > with auto_trans, inside those folders you get execute permission with "allow > um_kernel_t um_tmp_t:file execute;", and those folders get deleted as soon as > the file has been created, opened and deleted, so only UML can create an > mmap'able file; race condition to check here if the attacker creates a file > while the directory exists but not difficult to solve; I guess this is > possible with SELinux. Moving from /tmp to a dedicated location with its own type or using a shared anon mapping would make it clear that we are dealing with something other than a normal /tmp file, as well as fixing the noexec /tmp problem. As far as an attacker creating a file, policy should prevent them from being able to create a file in the necessary type to allow execution, so that shouldn't be a problem. Naturally, if uml itself is subverted, it may be induced to execute arbitrary code from the memory. > I don't understand the domain concept... however, by "indirect execution" you > mean simply running /lib/ld.so <fileName>, don't you? In this case, since the > kernel must just mmap() ld.so and not execve() it, couldn't we deny > execve("/lib/ld-linux.so") via the checks you mentioned above? Yes, execute_no_trans would also apply there. -- Stephen Smalley National Security Agency -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread
* Re: [uml-devel] 2.6.12-rc6-mm1 patches testing 2005-06-09 15:24 ` Blaisorblade 2005-06-09 15:56 ` antoine @ 2005-06-09 16:31 ` antoine 2005-06-09 16:53 ` antoine 1 sibling, 1 reply; 16+ messages in thread From: antoine @ 2005-06-09 16:31 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Blaisorblade; +Cc: user-mode-linux-devel > > Now, if someone could have a look at hppfs I could resurect my > > honeypots. > I've not the time, however test the attached patches. The first one fixes the > basical bugs; the second one could be needed to fix a fd leak... but I don't > think it's needed at all, so test with only the first and let me know if the > 2nd is needed, or if there are any problems (in that case, a ready-to-use > hppfs configuration + explaination would be happily accepted, I've really > little time now). Works fine with just the first patch. Thank you very much! (how can I detect this fd leak you mentioned?) Antoine Now time to grab a copy of ssh v<=3.0 and see what happens ;-) ------------------------------------------------------- This SF.Net email is sponsored by: NEC IT Guy Games. How far can you shotput a projector? How fast can you ride your desk chair down the office luge track? If you want to score the big prize, get to know the little guy. Play to win an NEC 61" plasma display: http://www.necitguy.com/?r=20 _______________________________________________ User-mode-linux-devel mailing list User-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/user-mode-linux-devel ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread
* Re: [uml-devel] 2.6.12-rc6-mm1 patches testing 2005-06-09 16:31 ` antoine @ 2005-06-09 16:53 ` antoine 2005-06-09 17:17 ` Blaisorblade 0 siblings, 1 reply; 16+ messages in thread From: antoine @ 2005-06-09 16:53 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Blaisorblade; +Cc: user-mode-linux-devel On Thu, 2005-06-09 at 17:31 +0100, antoine wrote: > > > Now, if someone could have a look at hppfs I could resurect my > > > honeypots. > > I've not the time, however test the attached patches. The first one fixes the > > basical bugs; the second one could be needed to fix a fd leak... but I don't > > think it's needed at all, so test with only the first and let me know if the > > 2nd is needed, or if there are any problems (in that case, a ready-to-use > > hppfs configuration + explaination would be happily accepted, I've really > > little time now). > Works fine with just the first patch. Thank you very much! Small correction: local file override works fine (files in the host's fake proc appear in the guest's /proc) but I can't get the honeypot.pl script to interact with it. So for now, I'll have to hardcode all the values I want to hide and hope that no software is going to rely on them. I've used the one that was previously working: # # Copyright (C) 2002, 2003 Jeff Dike (jdike@karaya.com) # Licensed under the GPL # use hppfs; use hppfslib; use strict; my $dir; @ARGV and $dir = $ARGV[0]; my $hppfs = hppfs->new($dir); my $remove_filesystems = remove_lines("hppfs", "hostfs"); my $remove_mtd_nbd_ubd = remove_lines("mtd", "nbd", "ubd"); # Need to be able to add directories, i.e. driver, bus/pci # partitions needs work # slabinfo if UML ever uses the slab cache for anything $hppfs->add("dma" => proc("dma"), "devices" => remove_lines("ubd"), "exitcode" => "remove", "diskstats" => "remove", "devices" => $remove_mtd_nbd_ubd, "filesystems" => $remove_filesystems, "interrupts" => "remove", "iomem" => proc("iomem"), "mm" => "remove", "ioports" => proc("ioports"), "kcore" => "remove", "mounts" => $remove_filesystems, "misc" => "remove", "pid/mounts" => $remove_filesystems, "partitions" => "remove", "stat" => proc("stat"), "uptime" => proc("uptime"), dup_proc_dir("bus", $dir) ); $hppfs->handler(); ------------------------------------------------------- This SF.Net email is sponsored by: NEC IT Guy Games. How far can you shotput a projector? How fast can you ride your desk chair down the office luge track? If you want to score the big prize, get to know the little guy. Play to win an NEC 61" plasma display: http://www.necitguy.com/?r=20 _______________________________________________ User-mode-linux-devel mailing list User-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/user-mode-linux-devel ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread
* Re: [uml-devel] 2.6.12-rc6-mm1 patches testing 2005-06-09 16:53 ` antoine @ 2005-06-09 17:17 ` Blaisorblade 2005-06-09 19:23 ` antoine 0 siblings, 1 reply; 16+ messages in thread From: Blaisorblade @ 2005-06-09 17:17 UTC (permalink / raw) To: user-mode-linux-devel; +Cc: antoine On Thursday 09 June 2005 18:53, antoine wrote: > On Thu, 2005-06-09 at 17:31 +0100, antoine wrote: > > > > Now, if someone could have a look at hppfs I could resurect my > > > > honeypots. > > > > > > I've not the time, however test the attached patches. The first one > > > fixes the basical bugs; the second one could be needed to fix a fd > > > leak... but I don't think it's needed at all, so test with only the > > > first and let me know if the 2nd is needed, or if there are any > > > problems (in that case, a ready-to-use hppfs configuration + > > > explaination would be happily accepted, I've really little time now). > > > > Works fine with just the first patch. Thank you very much! > > Small correction: local file override works fine (files in the host's > fake proc appear in the guest's /proc) That is allowed, too? The daemon uses normal files only to forcibly "remove" entries, while it uses sockets for the rest. > but I can't get the honeypot.pl > script to interact with it. Ok, let's see... that script supplies the needed values and uses the libraries in separate perl modules... > So for now, I'll have to hardcode all the values I want to hide and hope > that no software is going to rely on them. > I've used the one that was previously working: This is based on the one from the uml_utilities tarball. Have you tested that his libraries are found / that the script works with a 2.4 UML, first? Also, have you tested if it's the chroot and/or SELinux interacting? The daemon communicates through a Unix domain socket when host contents are supplied ... the base path is $ARGV[0], i.e. the first parameter... > # > # Copyright (C) 2002, 2003 Jeff Dike (jdike@karaya.com) > # Licensed under the GPL > # > > use hppfs; > use hppfslib; > use strict; > > my $dir; > > @ARGV and $dir = $ARGV[0]; > > my $hppfs = hppfs->new($dir); > > my $remove_filesystems = remove_lines("hppfs", "hostfs"); > my $remove_mtd_nbd_ubd = remove_lines("mtd", "nbd", "ubd"); > > # Need to be able to add directories, i.e. driver, bus/pci > # partitions needs work > # slabinfo if UML ever uses the slab cache for anything > > $hppfs->add("dma" => proc("dma"), > "devices" => remove_lines("ubd"), > "exitcode" => "remove", > "diskstats" => "remove", > "devices" => $remove_mtd_nbd_ubd, > "filesystems" => $remove_filesystems, > "interrupts" => "remove", > "iomem" => proc("iomem"), > "mm" => "remove", > "ioports" => proc("ioports"), > "kcore" => "remove", > "mounts" => $remove_filesystems, > "misc" => "remove", > "pid/mounts" => $remove_filesystems, > "partitions" => "remove", > "stat" => proc("stat"), > "uptime" => proc("uptime"), > dup_proc_dir("bus", $dir) ); > > $hppfs->handler(); -- Inform me of my mistakes, so I can keep imitating Homer Simpson's "Doh!". Paolo Giarrusso, aka Blaisorblade (Skype ID "PaoloGiarrusso", ICQ 215621894) http://www.user-mode-linux.org/~blaisorblade ___________________________________ Yahoo! Mail: gratis 1GB per i messaggi e allegati da 10MB http://mail.yahoo.it ------------------------------------------------------- This SF.Net email is sponsored by: NEC IT Guy Games. How far can you shotput a projector? How fast can you ride your desk chair down the office luge track? If you want to score the big prize, get to know the little guy. Play to win an NEC 61" plasma display: http://www.necitguy.com/?r=20 _______________________________________________ User-mode-linux-devel mailing list User-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/user-mode-linux-devel ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread
* Re: [uml-devel] 2.6.12-rc6-mm1 patches testing 2005-06-09 17:17 ` Blaisorblade @ 2005-06-09 19:23 ` antoine 2005-06-09 23:28 ` Blaisorblade 0 siblings, 1 reply; 16+ messages in thread From: antoine @ 2005-06-09 19:23 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Blaisorblade; +Cc: user-mode-linux-devel On Thu, 2005-06-09 at 19:17 +0200, Blaisorblade wrote: > On Thursday 09 June 2005 18:53, antoine wrote: > > On Thu, 2005-06-09 at 17:31 +0100, antoine wrote: > > > > > Now, if someone could have a look at hppfs I could resurect my > > > > > honeypots. > > > > > > > > I've not the time, however test the attached patches. The first one > > > > fixes the basical bugs; the second one could be needed to fix a fd > > > > leak... but I don't think it's needed at all, so test with only the > > > > first and let me know if the 2nd is needed, or if there are any > > > > problems (in that case, a ready-to-use hppfs configuration + > > > > explaination would be happily accepted, I've really little time now). > > > > > > Works fine with just the first patch. Thank you very much! > > > > Small correction: local file override works fine (files in the host's > > fake proc appear in the guest's /proc) > That is allowed, too? The daemon uses normal files only to forcibly "remove" > entries, while it uses sockets for the rest. AFAIK That has always been the case. I was using it to hardcode the cpuinfo and cmdline shown in honeypots. > Also, have you tested if it's the chroot and/or SELinux interacting? The > daemon communicates through a Unix domain socket when host contents are > supplied ... the base path is $ARGV[0], i.e. the first parameter... Yep, I was running this instance outside of the chroot for now (because of the libcap lib dependency) and not where the honeypot.pl expected it. Also, the path was wrong chroot/proc/proc, 'lsof' showed me what I was doing wrong, but it still isn't working as expected - more on this later. BTW, I copied /lib/libnss* to the chroot but the pcap interface does not come up: ifconfig eth1 0.0.0.0 promisc up SIOCSIFFLAGS: No such device SIOCSIFFLAGS: No such device So something else must be missing... Any ideas? Antoine ------------------------------------------------------- This SF.Net email is sponsored by: NEC IT Guy Games. How far can you shotput a projector? How fast can you ride your desk chair down the office luge track? If you want to score the big prize, get to know the little guy. Play to win an NEC 61" plasma display: http://www.necitguy.com/?r=20 _______________________________________________ User-mode-linux-devel mailing list User-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/user-mode-linux-devel ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread
* Re: [uml-devel] 2.6.12-rc6-mm1 patches testing 2005-06-09 19:23 ` antoine @ 2005-06-09 23:28 ` Blaisorblade 0 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread From: Blaisorblade @ 2005-06-09 23:28 UTC (permalink / raw) To: antoine; +Cc: user-mode-linux-devel On Thursday 09 June 2005 21:23, antoine wrote: > On Thu, 2005-06-09 at 19:17 +0200, Blaisorblade wrote: > > On Thursday 09 June 2005 18:53, antoine wrote: > > > On Thu, 2005-06-09 at 17:31 +0100, antoine wrote: > > > > > > Now, if someone could have a look at hppfs I could resurect my > > > > > > honeypots. > > > > > > > > > > I've not the time, however test the attached patches. The first one > > > > > fixes the basical bugs; the second one could be needed to fix a fd > > > > > leak... but I don't think it's needed at all, so test with only the > > > > > first and let me know if the 2nd is needed, or if there are any > > > > > problems (in that case, a ready-to-use hppfs configuration + > > > > > explaination would be happily accepted, I've really little time > > > > > now). > > > > > > > > Works fine with just the first patch. Thank you very much! > > > > > > Small correction: local file override works fine (files in the host's > > > fake proc appear in the guest's /proc) > > > > That is allowed, too? The daemon uses normal files only to forcibly > > "remove" entries, while it uses sockets for the rest. > > AFAIK That has always been the case. I was using it to hardcode the > cpuinfo and cmdline shown in honeypots. > > > Also, have you tested if it's the chroot and/or SELinux interacting? The > > daemon communicates through a Unix domain socket when host contents are > > supplied ... the base path is $ARGV[0], i.e. the first parameter... > > Yep, I was running this instance outside of the chroot for now (because > of the libcap lib dependency) and not where the honeypot.pl expected it. > Also, the path was wrong chroot/proc/proc, 'lsof' showed me what I was > doing wrong, but it still isn't working as expected - more on this > later. > > BTW, I copied /lib/libnss* to the chroot but the pcap interface does not > come up: Try also /lib/libresolv.so.2... > ifconfig eth1 0.0.0.0 promisc up > SIOCSIFFLAGS: No such device > SIOCSIFFLAGS: No such device > So something else must be missing... Any ideas? In general, post what appears on dmesg (if anything appears), then strace / ltrace the UML process to see what's going on, + boot log and command line as normally. Strace could suffice, however... > Antoine -- Inform me of my mistakes, so I can keep imitating Homer Simpson's "Doh!". Paolo Giarrusso, aka Blaisorblade (Skype ID "PaoloGiarrusso", ICQ 215621894) http://www.user-mode-linux.org/~blaisorblade ___________________________________ Yahoo! Messenger: chiamate gratuite in tutto il mondo http://it.beta.messenger.yahoo.com ------------------------------------------------------- This SF.Net email is sponsored by: NEC IT Guy Games. How far can you shotput a projector? How fast can you ride your desk chair down the office luge track? If you want to score the big prize, get to know the little guy. Play to win an NEC 61" plasma display: http://www.necitguy.com/?r=20 _______________________________________________ User-mode-linux-devel mailing list User-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/user-mode-linux-devel ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2005-06-10 13:54 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 16+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2005-06-09 1:25 [uml-devel] 2.6.12-rc6-mm1 patches testing antoine 2005-06-09 15:24 ` Blaisorblade 2005-06-09 15:56 ` antoine 2005-06-09 17:20 ` Blaisorblade 2005-06-09 17:52 ` antoine 2005-06-09 18:26 ` SELinux for UML (was: Re: [uml-devel] 2.6.12-rc6-mm1 patches testing) Blaisorblade 2005-06-09 19:19 ` antoine 2005-06-09 18:04 ` [uml-devel] 2.6.12-rc6-mm1 patches testing antoine 2005-06-09 19:45 ` Stephen Smalley 2005-06-09 22:57 ` Blaisorblade 2005-06-10 13:35 ` Stephen Smalley 2005-06-09 16:31 ` antoine 2005-06-09 16:53 ` antoine 2005-06-09 17:17 ` Blaisorblade 2005-06-09 19:23 ` antoine 2005-06-09 23:28 ` Blaisorblade
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