Re: type transitioning script race condition?

[Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@mentalrootkit.com>]

On Thu, 2006-08-31 at 12:19 -0500, Klaus Weidner wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 31, 2006 at 12:39:10PM -0400, Karl MacMillan wrote:
> > On Thu, 2006-08-31 at 11:02 -0500, Klaus Weidner wrote:
> > > - create link to executable (the link can be one of the path components),
> > >   for example:
> > > 
> > > 	ln -s /usr/sbin /tmp/hack
> > 
> > In a strict environment the creation of the symlinks to privileged
> > applications should be controlled.
> 
> Yes, but this gets tricky in a case like this where the symlink just
> points to a directory used as a path component, and stat()ing the
> executable file won't reveal that it's accessed through a link.  You'd
> need to very restrictive about symlinks, for example not permitting links
> pointing to something you don't own or can't write.
> 

And perhaps the bigger issue is that I am totally making up the ability
to control what target a symlink has (as was pointed out by Dave Caplan
in a private mail). The only control we get is the creation of symlinks
not control over their targets.

Karl


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