Re: type transitioning script race condition?

[Joshua Brindle <method@gentoo.org>]

Russell Coker wrote:

>On Thursday 31 August 2006 08:39, Klaus Weidner <klaus@atsec.com> wrote:
>  
>
>>This sounds as if it suffers from the well known race condition that
>>makes setuid shell scripts a bad idea - is there any protection in place
>>to prevent users from exploiting the race condition to run code of their
>>own choice in the new domain?
>>    
>>
>
>Correct.  As long as the script is run in a domain that has less privileges 
>than the calling code this isn't a problem.  If running a script causes a 
>transition to a more privileged domain then that's a policy bug.
>
>  
>
this happens quite a bit, including our own selinux management script 
semanage. In addition to the race condition (that is not fixable on 
Linux AFAIK) there are other environmental contamination issues,

There are some plans to fix the environmental contamination issues using 
a wrapper that cleanses the environment ala atsecure but the race is not 
fixable as far as I know.

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