From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
esandeen@redhat.com, tytso@mit.edu, dwalsh@redhat.com,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: ext4_has_free_blocks always checks cap_sys_resource and makes SELinux unhappy
Date: Fri, 24 Oct 2008 13:28:32 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1224869312.3404.80.camel@localhost.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1224860899.9353.6.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil>
On Fri, 2008-10-24 at 11:08 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Fri, 2008-10-24 at 11:05 -0400, Eric Paris wrote:
> > Do others have thoughts?
>
> Seems similar to the vm_enough_memory() case, where we likewise
> introduced a separate security hook that internally checks without
> auditing.
>
> The OOM killer likewise ought to be using a non-auditing form of
> capability checks.
So would you suggest a generic non-auditing capability checking
mechanism or a specific hook for "things to use"
* capable_noaudit(current, cap)
* security_capable_noaudit(current, cap)
* security_cap_sys_resource(current)
Looks like oom also checks CAP_SYS_ADMIN so maybe a generic cap
interface would be best.
esandeen: I still think it would be a good idea to simplify
ext4_claim_free_blocks() and ext4_has_free_blocks() which seems to have
a lot of code duplication and both have the unconditional capable
calls...
-Eric
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
esandeen@redhat.com, tytso@mit.edu, dwalsh@redhat.com,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: ext4_has_free_blocks always checks cap_sys_resource and makes SELinux unhappy
Date: Fri, 24 Oct 2008 13:28:32 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1224869312.3404.80.camel@localhost.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1224860899.9353.6.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil>
On Fri, 2008-10-24 at 11:08 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Fri, 2008-10-24 at 11:05 -0400, Eric Paris wrote:
> > Do others have thoughts?
>
> Seems similar to the vm_enough_memory() case, where we likewise
> introduced a separate security hook that internally checks without
> auditing.
>
> The OOM killer likewise ought to be using a non-auditing form of
> capability checks.
So would you suggest a generic non-auditing capability checking
mechanism or a specific hook for "things to use"
* capable_noaudit(current, cap)
* security_capable_noaudit(current, cap)
* security_cap_sys_resource(current)
Looks like oom also checks CAP_SYS_ADMIN so maybe a generic cap
interface would be best.
esandeen: I still think it would be a good idea to simplify
ext4_claim_free_blocks() and ext4_has_free_blocks() which seems to have
a lot of code duplication and both have the unconditional capable
calls...
-Eric
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2008-10-24 17:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2008-10-24 15:05 ext4_has_free_blocks always checks cap_sys_resource and makes SELinux unhappy Eric Paris
2008-10-24 15:05 ` Eric Paris
2008-10-24 15:08 ` Stephen Smalley
2008-10-24 15:08 ` Stephen Smalley
2008-10-24 17:28 ` Eric Paris [this message]
2008-10-24 17:28 ` Eric Paris
2008-10-24 17:38 ` Stephen Smalley
2008-10-24 17:38 ` Stephen Smalley
2008-10-24 16:56 ` Eric Sandeen
2008-10-24 19:00 ` Mingming Cao
2008-10-24 19:02 ` Eric Sandeen
2008-10-27 1:39 ` Eric Sandeen
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