From: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
To: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, security@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [SECURITY] CAN info leak/minor heap overflow
Date: Tue, 02 Nov 2010 15:53:25 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1288727605.2504.21.camel@dan> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <4CD069D4.7010801@hartkopp.net>
> Why is this bad? Can the addresses of CAN-BCM sock structs be used for
> anything from userspace?
>
> For me they are just intented to be unique numbers ...
>
This is a bad idea because it makes exploiting other kernel
vulnerabilities easier. Exposing the address of an object in a slab
cache, especially an object that unprivileged users have some level of
control of, is just an invitation to use that structure when writing
exploits, for heap overflows or otherwise.
-Dan
> > Secondly,
> > on 64-bit platforms, up to 17 bytes may be copied into the buffer.
>
> Hm - that's indeed not wanted. Will send a patch at least for this issue.
>
> > Fortunately, structure padding will most likely prevent this from being
> > a problem, except for the trailing NULL byte, which may overwrite the
> > first byte of the next heap object. Please name your procfile in a way
> > that doesn't leak information and fits into the desired name buffer.
> >
> > -Dan
> >
>
> Regards,
> Oliver
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2010-11-02 19:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2010-11-02 18:28 [SECURITY] CAN info leak/minor heap overflow Dan Rosenberg
2010-11-02 19:43 ` Oliver Hartkopp
2010-11-02 19:53 ` Dan Rosenberg [this message]
2010-11-02 19:57 ` [Security] " Linus Torvalds
2010-11-02 20:19 ` Oliver Hartkopp
2010-11-02 20:16 ` Oliver Hartkopp
2010-11-05 18:33 ` [PATCH] Fix " Urs Thuermann
2010-11-09 7:52 ` Oliver Hartkopp
2010-11-09 17:05 ` David Miller
2010-11-10 6:52 ` Oliver Hartkopp
2010-11-10 17:51 ` David Miller
2010-11-10 22:10 ` Oliver Hartkopp
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