Re: [SECURITY] CAN info leak/minor heap overflow

[Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>]

Hello Dan,

On 02.11.2010 19:28, Dan Rosenberg wrote:
> In bcm_connect() (in net/can/bcm.c), I noticed the following code:
> 
> 	sprintf(bo->procname, "%p", sock);
> 
> "procname" is a 9-byte char array.  This code is wrong on two levels.
> First, leaking a kernel address via a /proc filename is bad.

Why is this bad? Can the addresses of CAN-BCM sock structs be used for
anything from userspace?

For me they are just intented to be unique numbers ...

> Secondly,
> on 64-bit platforms, up to 17 bytes may be copied into the buffer.

Hm - that's indeed not wanted. Will send a patch at least for this issue.

> Fortunately, structure padding will most likely prevent this from being
> a problem, except for the trailing NULL byte, which may overwrite the
> first byte of the next heap object.  Please name your procfile in a way
> that doesn't leak information and fits into the desired name buffer.
> 
> -Dan
> 

Regards,
Oliver