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From: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>,
	Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>, Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
Subject: [PATCH v2 resend 10/12] proc: hold cred_guard_mutex in check_mem_permission()
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2011 10:43:59 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1300891441-16280-11-git-send-email-wilsons@start.ca> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1300891441-16280-1-git-send-email-wilsons@start.ca>

Avoid a potential race when task exec's and we get a new ->mm but check against
the old credentials in ptrace_may_access().

Holding of the mutex is implemented by factoring out the body of the code into a
helper function __check_mem_permission().  Performing this factorization now
simplifies upcoming changes and minimizes churn in the diff's.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
---
 fs/proc/base.c |   26 ++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 13c5e8c..084d046 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -191,10 +191,7 @@ static int proc_root_link(struct inode *inode, struct path *path)
 	return result;
 }
 
-/*
- * Return zero if current may access user memory in @task, -error if not.
- */
-static int check_mem_permission(struct task_struct *task)
+static int __check_mem_permission(struct task_struct *task)
 {
 	/*
 	 * A task can always look at itself, in case it chooses
@@ -222,6 +219,27 @@ static int check_mem_permission(struct task_struct *task)
 	return -EPERM;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Return zero if current may access user memory in @task, -error if not.
+ */
+static int check_mem_permission(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	/*
+	 * Avoid racing if task exec's as we might get a new mm but validate
+	 * against old credentials.
+	 */
+	err = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	err = __check_mem_permission(task);
+	mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
 struct mm_struct *mm_for_maps(struct task_struct *task)
 {
 	struct mm_struct *mm;
-- 
1.7.3.5


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>,
	Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>, Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
Subject: [PATCH v2 resend 10/12] proc: hold cred_guard_mutex in check_mem_permission()
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2011 10:43:59 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1300891441-16280-11-git-send-email-wilsons@start.ca> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1300891441-16280-1-git-send-email-wilsons@start.ca>

Avoid a potential race when task exec's and we get a new ->mm but check against
the old credentials in ptrace_may_access().

Holding of the mutex is implemented by factoring out the body of the code into a
helper function __check_mem_permission().  Performing this factorization now
simplifies upcoming changes and minimizes churn in the diff's.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
---
 fs/proc/base.c |   26 ++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 13c5e8c..084d046 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -191,10 +191,7 @@ static int proc_root_link(struct inode *inode, struct path *path)
 	return result;
 }
 
-/*
- * Return zero if current may access user memory in @task, -error if not.
- */
-static int check_mem_permission(struct task_struct *task)
+static int __check_mem_permission(struct task_struct *task)
 {
 	/*
 	 * A task can always look at itself, in case it chooses
@@ -222,6 +219,27 @@ static int check_mem_permission(struct task_struct *task)
 	return -EPERM;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Return zero if current may access user memory in @task, -error if not.
+ */
+static int check_mem_permission(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	/*
+	 * Avoid racing if task exec's as we might get a new mm but validate
+	 * against old credentials.
+	 */
+	err = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	err = __check_mem_permission(task);
+	mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
 struct mm_struct *mm_for_maps(struct task_struct *task)
 {
 	struct mm_struct *mm;
-- 
1.7.3.5

--
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  parent reply	other threads:[~2011-03-23 14:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2011-03-23 14:43 [PATCH v2 resend 0/12] enable writing to /proc/pid/mem Stephen Wilson
2011-03-23 14:43 ` Stephen Wilson
2011-03-23 14:43 ` [PATCH v2 resend 01/12] x86: add context tag to mark mm when running a task in 32-bit compatibility mode Stephen Wilson
2011-03-23 14:43   ` Stephen Wilson
2011-03-23 14:43 ` [PATCH v2 resend 02/12] x86: mark associated mm when running a task in 32 bit " Stephen Wilson
2011-03-23 14:43   ` Stephen Wilson
2011-03-23 14:43 ` [PATCH v2 resend 03/12] mm: arch: make get_gate_vma take an mm_struct instead of a task_struct Stephen Wilson
2011-03-23 14:43   ` Stephen Wilson
2011-03-23 14:43 ` [PATCH v2 resend 04/12] mm: arch: make in_gate_area " Stephen Wilson
2011-03-23 14:43   ` Stephen Wilson
2011-03-23 14:43 ` [PATCH v2 resend 05/12] mm: arch: rename in_gate_area_no_task to in_gate_area_no_mm Stephen Wilson
2011-03-23 14:43   ` Stephen Wilson
2011-03-23 14:43 ` [PATCH v2 resend 06/12] mm: use mm_struct to resolve gate vma's in __get_user_pages Stephen Wilson
2011-03-23 14:43   ` Stephen Wilson
2011-03-23 14:43 ` [PATCH v2 resend 07/12] mm: factor out main logic of access_process_vm Stephen Wilson
2011-03-23 14:43   ` Stephen Wilson
2011-03-23 14:43 ` [PATCH v2 resend 08/12] mm: implement access_remote_vm Stephen Wilson
2011-03-23 14:43   ` Stephen Wilson
2011-03-23 14:43 ` [PATCH v2 resend 09/12] proc: disable mem_write after exec Stephen Wilson
2011-03-23 14:43   ` Stephen Wilson
2011-03-23 14:43 ` Stephen Wilson [this message]
2011-03-23 14:43   ` [PATCH v2 resend 10/12] proc: hold cred_guard_mutex in check_mem_permission() Stephen Wilson
2011-03-23 14:44 ` [PATCH v2 resend 11/12] proc: make check_mem_permission() return an mm_struct on success Stephen Wilson
2011-03-23 14:44   ` Stephen Wilson
2011-03-23 14:44 ` [PATCH v2 resend 12/12] proc: enable writing to /proc/pid/mem Stephen Wilson
2011-03-23 14:44   ` Stephen Wilson
2011-03-23 14:57 ` [PATCH v2 resend 0/12] " Al Viro
2011-03-23 14:57   ` Al Viro
2011-03-23 15:04   ` Stephen Wilson
2011-03-23 15:04     ` Stephen Wilson

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