From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>, Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
davem@davemloft.net, hpa@zytor.com, mingo@redhat.com,
oleg@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org, rdunlap@xenotime.net,
mcgrathr@chromium.org, tglx@linutronix.de, luto@mit.edu,
serge.hallyn@canonical.com, djm@mindrot.org,
scarybeasts@gmail.com, indan@nul.nu, pmoore@redhat.com,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, corbet@lwn.net,
eric.dumazet@gmail.com, markus@chromium.org,
coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v11 06/12] seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF
Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2012 14:25:33 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1330370733.2542.18.camel@localhost> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jKJ7pYeULM=CvifpQ8jUoyH6Ska2Znx9tGjhz0tn5kZmQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, 2012-02-27 at 10:55 -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 27, 2012 at 8:49 AM, Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> wrote:
> You mean as used in audit_log_exit() ? It looks like that depends on a
> lot of state cached in __audit_syscall_entry() and finally triggered
> in __audit_syscall_exit() (and ..._free()). I don't think this is
> really want seccomp wants to be involved in.
>
> By CONFIG_AUDITSC, you mean CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL? Without that set,
> audit_seccomp is a no-op.
>
> The reason compat needs to be reported (or rather, arch) is because
> just reporting syscall is ambiguous. It either needs arch or compat to
> distinguish it.
Yes, that is what I mean and you are right. You shouldn't push the
syscall in this record either. If !audit_dummy_context() you are
already going to get arch, syscall, and a0-a4 in the associated audit
record. Please do not duplicate that info.
It might make sense to have a separate audit_seccomp() path when
audit_dummy_context() which includes arch, syscall, and a0-a4.
It is my fault (85e7bac3) that we have syscall at all, but I'm on a new
crusade to remove audit record duplication. So I'd happily see a patch
in this series that removes that instead of adds to it.
-Eric
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>, Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
davem@davemloft.net, hpa@zytor.com, mingo@redhat.com,
oleg@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org, rdunlap@xenotime.net,
mcgrathr@chromium.org, tglx@linutronix.de, luto@mit.edu,
serge.hallyn@canonical.com, djm@mindrot.org,
scarybeasts@gmail.com, indan@nul.nu, pmoore@redhat.com,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, corbet@lwn.net,
eric.dumazet@gmail.com, markus@chromium.org,
coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 06/12] seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF
Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2012 14:25:33 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1330370733.2542.18.camel@localhost> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jKJ7pYeULM=CvifpQ8jUoyH6Ska2Znx9tGjhz0tn5kZmQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, 2012-02-27 at 10:55 -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 27, 2012 at 8:49 AM, Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> wrote:
> You mean as used in audit_log_exit() ? It looks like that depends on a
> lot of state cached in __audit_syscall_entry() and finally triggered
> in __audit_syscall_exit() (and ..._free()). I don't think this is
> really want seccomp wants to be involved in.
>
> By CONFIG_AUDITSC, you mean CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL? Without that set,
> audit_seccomp is a no-op.
>
> The reason compat needs to be reported (or rather, arch) is because
> just reporting syscall is ambiguous. It either needs arch or compat to
> distinguish it.
Yes, that is what I mean and you are right. You shouldn't push the
syscall in this record either. If !audit_dummy_context() you are
already going to get arch, syscall, and a0-a4 in the associated audit
record. Please do not duplicate that info.
It might make sense to have a separate audit_seccomp() path when
audit_dummy_context() which includes arch, syscall, and a0-a4.
It is my fault (85e7bac3) that we have syscall at all, but I'm on a new
crusade to remove audit record duplication. So I'd happily see a patch
in this series that removes that instead of adds to it.
-Eric
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-02-27 19:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 108+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-02-25 3:21 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v11 01/12] sk_run_filter: add support for custom load_pointer Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v11 02/12] net/compat.c,linux/filter.h: share compat_sock_fprog Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v11 03/12] seccomp: kill the seccomp_t typedef Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v11 04/12] asm/syscall.h: add syscall_get_arch Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v11 05/12] arch/x86: add syscall_get_arch to syscall.h Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v11 06/12] seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-26 20:28 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-02-26 20:28 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-27 16:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-02-27 16:23 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-27 16:49 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric Paris
2012-02-27 16:49 ` Eric Paris
2012-02-27 18:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-02-27 18:55 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-27 19:25 ` Eric Paris [this message]
2012-02-27 19:25 ` Eric Paris
2012-02-27 20:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-02-27 20:00 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-27 20:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric Paris
2012-02-27 20:34 ` Eric Paris
2012-02-27 20:49 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-02-27 20:49 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-27 17:09 ` [kernel-hardening] " Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-27 17:09 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-27 19:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-02-27 19:54 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-27 20:15 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-02-27 20:15 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-28 15:13 ` [kernel-hardening] " Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-28 15:13 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-28 17:18 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-02-28 17:18 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-28 6:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Indan Zupancic
2012-02-28 6:51 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-28 6:51 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-28 6:51 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-28 7:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-02-28 7:52 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-28 17:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-02-28 17:17 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-28 17:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Markus Gutschke
2012-02-28 17:47 ` Markus Gutschke
2012-02-25 3:21 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v11 07/12] seccomp: add SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-25 20:20 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-02-25 20:20 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-27 16:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-02-27 16:22 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-27 17:11 ` [kernel-hardening] " Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-27 17:11 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-27 18:09 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-02-27 18:09 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-27 18:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-27 18:14 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-27 18:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Lutomirski
2012-02-27 18:35 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-02-27 19:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-02-27 19:14 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-27 19:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-02-27 19:54 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v11 08/12] signal, x86: add SIGSYS info and make it synchronous Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-27 17:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-27 17:22 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-27 17:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Roland McGrath
2012-02-27 17:34 ` Roland McGrath
2012-02-27 18:08 ` [kernel-hardening] " Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-27 18:08 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-27 20:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-02-27 20:24 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-28 16:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-28 16:02 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-28 17:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-02-28 17:06 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v11 09/12] seccomp: Add SECCOMP_RET_TRAP Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v11 10/12] ptrace,seccomp: Add PTRACE_SECCOMP support Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-27 17:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-27 17:54 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-27 19:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-02-27 19:47 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-28 16:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-28 16:43 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-28 17:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-02-28 17:04 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-28 18:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-02-28 18:34 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-29 16:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-29 16:14 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-29 16:33 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-02-29 16:33 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-29 17:09 ` [kernel-hardening] " Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-29 17:09 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-29 17:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Roland McGrath
2012-02-29 17:41 ` Roland McGrath
2012-02-29 17:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-02-29 17:51 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v11 11/12] x86: Enable HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v11 12/12] Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` Will Drewry
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