From: Khalid Aziz <khalid@gonehiking.org>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
horms@verge.net.au, Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>,
kexec@lists.infradead.org,
linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: Kdump with signed images
Date: Thu, 01 Nov 2012 09:10:56 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1351782656.3782.58.camel@rhapsody> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20121101145731.GB10662@srcf.ucam.org>
On Thu, 2012-11-01 at 14:57 +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 01, 2012 at 10:51:49AM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
>
> > And if one wants only /sbin/kexec to call it, then just sign that
> > one so no other executable will be able to call kexec_load(). Though
> > I don't think that's the requirement here. Requirement is that only
> > trusted executables should be able to call kexec_load().
>
> Where "trusted executables" means "signed by a key that's present in the
> system firmware or in the kernel that's signed with a key that's present
> in the system firmware", sure.
>
This is starting to sound too restrictive (even though I understand the
rationale behind the restrictions). Does this allow for a custom
userspace application that among other things also can kexec_load() a
new kernel and boot it, for example a customer unique health monitoring
app that reboots the system if things are not looking right on the
running system? How would a customer go about getting that userspace
binary signed and re-signed every time they update their app? There is
the option of turning the whole SecureBoot thing off for a system like
that but let us assume customer wants to leave that on or does not have
the option to turn it off?
--
Khalid
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Khalid Aziz <khalid@gonehiking.org>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
kexec@lists.infradead.org,
linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
horms@verge.net.au, "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>,
Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: Kdump with signed images
Date: Thu, 01 Nov 2012 09:10:56 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1351782656.3782.58.camel@rhapsody> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20121101145731.GB10662@srcf.ucam.org>
On Thu, 2012-11-01 at 14:57 +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 01, 2012 at 10:51:49AM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
>
> > And if one wants only /sbin/kexec to call it, then just sign that
> > one so no other executable will be able to call kexec_load(). Though
> > I don't think that's the requirement here. Requirement is that only
> > trusted executables should be able to call kexec_load().
>
> Where "trusted executables" means "signed by a key that's present in the
> system firmware or in the kernel that's signed with a key that's present
> in the system firmware", sure.
>
This is starting to sound too restrictive (even though I understand the
rationale behind the restrictions). Does this allow for a custom
userspace application that among other things also can kexec_load() a
new kernel and boot it, for example a customer unique health monitoring
app that reboots the system if things are not looking right on the
running system? How would a customer go about getting that userspace
binary signed and re-signed every time they update their app? There is
the option of turning the whole SecureBoot thing off for a system like
that but let us assume customer wants to leave that on or does not have
the option to turn it off?
--
Khalid
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-11-01 15:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 133+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-10-18 3:10 [PATCH v2] kdump: pass acpi_rsdp= to 2nd kernel for efi booting Dave Young
2012-10-18 14:56 ` Khalid Aziz
2012-10-18 19:11 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-10-18 19:22 ` Khalid Aziz
2012-10-18 19:38 ` [RFC] Kdump with UEFI secure boot (Re: [PATCH v2] kdump: pass acpi_rsdp= to 2nd kernel for efi booting) Vivek Goyal
2012-10-18 19:55 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-10-18 22:25 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-10-19 2:06 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-10-19 3:36 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-10-19 14:31 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-10-22 20:43 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-10-22 21:11 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-10-23 2:04 ` Simon Horman
2012-10-23 13:24 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-10-23 16:26 ` [RFC] Kdump with signed images Eric W. Biederman
2012-10-23 17:39 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-10-23 19:11 ` Maxim Uvarov
2012-10-23 19:16 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-10-22 21:07 ` [RFC] Kdump with UEFI secure boot (Re: [PATCH v2] kdump: pass acpi_rsdp= to 2nd kernel for efi booting) Eric W. Biederman
2012-10-23 13:18 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-10-23 14:59 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-10-23 15:41 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-10-23 16:44 ` [RFC] Kdump with signed images Eric W. Biederman
2012-10-23 16:52 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-10-24 17:19 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-10-24 17:19 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-10-25 5:43 ` Mimi Zohar
2012-10-25 5:43 ` Mimi Zohar
2012-10-25 6:44 ` Kees Cook
2012-10-25 6:44 ` Kees Cook
2012-10-25 7:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2012-10-25 7:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2012-10-25 13:54 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-10-25 13:54 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-10-25 19:06 ` Mimi Zohar
2012-10-25 19:06 ` Mimi Zohar
2012-10-25 15:39 ` [RFC] Kdump with UEFI secure boot (Re: [PATCH v2] kdump: pass acpi_rsdp= to 2nd kernel for efi booting) Vivek Goyal
2012-10-25 15:39 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-10-23 16:19 ` Kdump with signed images Eric W. Biederman
2012-10-23 16:31 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-10-23 17:03 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-10-23 17:09 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-10-24 17:36 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-10-24 17:36 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-10-25 6:10 ` Mimi Zohar
2012-10-25 6:10 ` Mimi Zohar
2012-10-25 14:10 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-10-25 14:10 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-10-25 18:40 ` Mimi Zohar
2012-10-25 18:40 ` Mimi Zohar
2012-10-25 18:55 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-10-25 18:55 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-10-26 1:15 ` Mimi Zohar
2012-10-26 1:15 ` Mimi Zohar
2012-10-26 2:39 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-10-26 2:39 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-10-26 3:30 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-10-26 3:30 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-10-26 17:06 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-10-26 17:06 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-10-26 18:37 ` Mimi Zohar
2012-10-26 18:37 ` Mimi Zohar
2012-11-01 13:10 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-11-01 13:10 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-11-01 13:53 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-11-01 13:53 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-11-01 14:29 ` Mimi Zohar
2012-11-01 14:29 ` Mimi Zohar
2012-11-01 14:43 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-11-01 14:43 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-11-01 14:52 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-01 14:52 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-02 13:23 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-11-02 13:23 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-11-02 14:29 ` Balbir Singh
2012-11-02 14:29 ` Balbir Singh
2012-11-02 14:36 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-11-02 14:36 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-11-03 3:02 ` Balbir Singh
2012-11-03 3:02 ` Balbir Singh
2012-11-02 21:34 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-11-02 21:34 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-11-02 21:32 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-02 21:32 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-05 18:03 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-11-05 18:03 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-11-05 19:44 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-05 19:44 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-05 20:42 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-11-05 20:42 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-11-05 23:01 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-11-05 23:01 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-11-06 19:34 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-11-06 19:34 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-11-06 23:51 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-06 23:51 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-08 19:40 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-11-08 19:40 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-11-08 19:45 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-11-08 19:45 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-11-08 21:03 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-08 21:03 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-09 14:39 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-11-09 14:39 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-11-15 5:09 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-15 5:09 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-15 12:56 ` Mimi Zohar
2012-11-15 12:56 ` Mimi Zohar
2012-11-08 20:46 ` Mimi Zohar
2012-11-08 20:46 ` Mimi Zohar
2012-11-01 14:51 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-11-01 14:51 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-11-01 14:57 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-01 14:57 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-01 15:10 ` Khalid Aziz [this message]
2012-11-01 15:10 ` Khalid Aziz
2012-11-01 16:23 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-01 16:23 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-02 16:57 ` Khalid Aziz
2012-11-02 16:57 ` Khalid Aziz
2012-10-26 17:59 ` Mimi Zohar
2012-10-26 17:59 ` Mimi Zohar
2012-10-26 18:19 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-10-26 18:19 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-10-26 18:25 ` Mimi Zohar
2012-10-26 18:25 ` Mimi Zohar
2012-10-23 15:51 ` [RFC] Kdump with UEFI secure boot (Re: [PATCH v2] kdump: pass acpi_rsdp= to 2nd kernel for efi booting) Eric W. Biederman
2012-10-23 17:18 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-10-19 17:53 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-10-22 21:15 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-02 21:36 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-11-05 18:11 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-11-05 19:54 ` Eric W. Biederman
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