From: Yves-Alexis Perez <corsac@debian.org>
To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>,
Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Kernel Self Protection Project
Date: Sun, 08 Nov 2015 11:39:11 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1446979151.4680.5.camel@debian.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jKkF61CG_Aiv19p24XvJ7yQ-V+J_RBXbvMbw-cWmzDbmQ@mail.gmail.com>
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On ven., 2015-11-06 at 10:11 -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> I think GRKERNSEC_KERN_LOCKOUT is kind of on both sides of the
> kernel/userspace defense fence. For now, I think the granularity of
> response for KSPP-ported features will likely just be a full system
> Oops. But I suspect once more of them land, we'll want the finer
> granularity that GRKERNSEC_KERN_LOCKOUT provides.
Yes I was really mentioning GRKERNSEC_BRUTE because it looks similar
to GRKERNSEC_KERN_LOCKOUT but I was more interested by the latter in the
current context. In any case (whether we want fine-grained stuff or not), I
think we definitely need a way to prevent repeated exploit attempts.
Regards,
--
Yves-Alexis
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-11-08 10:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-11-05 20:59 [kernel-hardening] Kernel Self Protection Project Kees Cook
2015-11-05 21:14 ` David Windsor
2015-11-06 19:37 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-06 19:42 ` Greg KH
2015-11-06 13:28 ` Yves-Alexis Perez
2015-11-06 18:11 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-06 18:32 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-08 10:39 ` Yves-Alexis Perez [this message]
2015-11-06 16:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Quentin Casasnovas
2015-11-06 18:15 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-07 9:52 ` Quentin Casasnovas
2015-11-08 6:50 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-08 10:45 ` Quentin Casasnovas
2015-11-09 21:29 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-09 21:44 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2015-11-09 21:55 ` David Windsor
2015-11-09 23:35 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-10 8:32 ` Quentin Casasnovas
2015-11-09 23:36 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-09 10:02 ` Rasmus Villemoes
2015-11-09 10:33 ` Quentin Casasnovas
2015-11-09 19:24 ` Rasmus Villemoes
2015-11-09 21:34 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-09 21:59 ` [kernel-hardening] Binary blobs HacKurx
2015-11-09 22:20 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2015-11-09 23:33 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-13 8:04 ` HacKurx
2015-11-13 8:07 ` Daniel Micay
2015-11-13 8:55 ` HacKurx
2015-11-06 21:27 ` [kernel-hardening] Kernel Self Protection Project Mickaël Salaün
2015-11-06 22:04 ` Kees Cook
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