From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>,
Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Kernel Self Protection Project
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 2015 22:27:17 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <563D1B35.7010603@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jJ3FgxXK9WuOLRwnEq=y4dS+CTm+WQBxWe3sYZ7e9p6Gg@mail.gmail.com>
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Excellent initiative!
FYI, you can find the grsecurity patches automatically integrated in a consistent Git repository: https://github.com/linux-scraping/linux-grsecurity . I took all patches I could find (with their signatures and changelogs!), starting from the beginning of the Linux Git history (2005: v2.6.14.2), and applying them following branches and merges. The result is quite interesting and help to dive into the Linux/grsecurity internals (with log, blame and bisect). Moreover, it show the work of Brad Spengler backporting fixes.
I did the same with PaX but it needs some more work before going public.
Regards,
Mickaël
On 11/05/15 21:59, Kees Cook wrote:
> I'm organizing a community of people to work on the various kernel
> self-protection technologies (most of which are found in PaX and
> Grsecurity). I'm building on the presentation I gave at Kernel Summit
> where I sought to convince the other upstream Linux kernel developers
> that security is more than fixing bugs, and that we need to bring in
> proactive defenses:
> http://lwn.net/Articles/662219/
>
> This is especially highlighted by the Washington Post article today:
> http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/business/2015/11/05/net-of-insecurity-the-kernel-of-the-argument/
>
> Between the companies that recognize the critical nature of this work,
> and with Linux Foundation's Core Infrastructure Initiative happy to
> start funding specific work in this area, I think we can really make a
> dent.
>
> Let's start the work. I've built some wiki pages around my slides,
> where we can take notes, list examples, and coordinate:
> http://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_Project
>
> For now, I'm going to focus on taking a look at the PAX_SIZE_OVERFLOW
> gcc plugin, which will also get us the gcc plugin infrastructure.
> Other people, please speak up on what you'd like to tackle.
>
> I recommend PAX_REFCOUNT, PAX_USERCOPY, and GRKERNSEC_KSTACKOVERFLOW
> for some non-plugin stuff to look at.
>
> Once we've got plugins, then we should look at PAX_MEMORY_STACKLEAK
> and PAX_CONSTIFY_PLUGIN.
>
> If you're feeling like disrupting people who depend on debugging, do
> GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM.
>
> If you're feeling especially bold, start on PAX_KERNEXEC and follow it
> up with PAX_MEMORY_UDEREF.
>
> Of course, there's plenty of other things, and tons I haven't listed
> in the wiki -- please add them and bring them up for discussion here.
>
> -Kees
>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-11-06 21:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-11-05 20:59 [kernel-hardening] Kernel Self Protection Project Kees Cook
2015-11-05 21:14 ` David Windsor
2015-11-06 19:37 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-06 19:42 ` Greg KH
2015-11-06 13:28 ` Yves-Alexis Perez
2015-11-06 18:11 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-06 18:32 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-08 10:39 ` Yves-Alexis Perez
2015-11-06 16:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Quentin Casasnovas
2015-11-06 18:15 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-07 9:52 ` Quentin Casasnovas
2015-11-08 6:50 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-08 10:45 ` Quentin Casasnovas
2015-11-09 21:29 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-09 21:44 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2015-11-09 21:55 ` David Windsor
2015-11-09 23:35 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-10 8:32 ` Quentin Casasnovas
2015-11-09 23:36 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-09 10:02 ` Rasmus Villemoes
2015-11-09 10:33 ` Quentin Casasnovas
2015-11-09 19:24 ` Rasmus Villemoes
2015-11-09 21:34 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-09 21:59 ` [kernel-hardening] Binary blobs HacKurx
2015-11-09 22:20 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2015-11-09 23:33 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-13 8:04 ` HacKurx
2015-11-13 8:07 ` Daniel Micay
2015-11-13 8:55 ` HacKurx
2015-11-06 21:27 ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2015-11-06 22:04 ` [kernel-hardening] Kernel Self Protection Project Kees Cook
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