From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mdb@juniper.net
Subject: Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring
Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2016 13:56:39 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1452711399.2683.43.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160113183519.GC7826@localhost>
On Wed, 2016-01-13 at 20:35 +0200, Petko Manolov wrote:
> On 16-01-13 18:19:10, David Howells wrote:
> > Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> >
> > > I beg to differ. The IMA model is not broken with the current patches
> > > being upstreamed. The basic concepts developed will continue to be
> > > used, perhaps not directly by IMA.
> >
> > I still object to the change to x509_key_preparse() and still want it
> > reverting or removing. It affects module signing too.
>
> The only problem i see with the code is that in case .ima_mok is not configured
> x509_validate_trust() returns NULL, which falsely set the key as trusted. This
> could easily be fixed.
When IMA_MOK_KEYRING is not enabled, get_ima_mok_keyring() will return
NULL. x509_validate_trust() will return -EOPNOTSUPP.
The code is fine.
Mimi
> Some users do want to be able to load kernel modules signed by other trusted
> parties. Think of .ima_mok as system wide keyring in this case. It is
> semantically broken, but it does the right thing.
>
>
> Petko
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-01-13 18:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-01-06 13:45 [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring David Howells
2016-01-07 0:04 ` James Morris
2016-01-07 0:34 ` David Howells
2016-01-07 2:13 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-01-07 3:28 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-01-07 15:31 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-01-10 10:36 ` James Morris
2016-01-10 13:26 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-01-10 17:46 ` David Howells
2016-01-10 20:33 ` David Howells
2016-01-10 23:55 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-01-12 0:44 ` David Howells
2016-01-12 1:28 ` Mark D. Baushke
2016-01-12 2:03 ` David Howells
2016-01-12 2:25 ` Mark D. Baushke
2016-01-12 3:35 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-01-12 10:08 ` David Howells
2016-01-12 13:21 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-01-12 13:55 ` David Howells
2016-01-12 15:17 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-01-12 15:56 ` David Howells
2016-01-12 16:02 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-01-12 14:11 ` Petko Manolov
2016-01-10 20:33 ` Petko Manolov
2016-01-12 1:38 ` David Howells
2016-01-12 16:14 ` Petko Manolov
2016-01-12 17:08 ` David Howells
2016-01-13 16:31 ` Petko Manolov
2016-01-13 17:51 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-01-13 18:01 ` Petko Manolov
2016-01-13 18:19 ` David Howells
2016-01-13 18:35 ` Petko Manolov
2016-01-13 18:56 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2016-01-13 19:19 ` Petko Manolov
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