From: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux@arm.linux.org.uk, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
keescook@chromium.org, tytso@mit.edu, arnd@arndb.de,
gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, catalin.marinas@arm.com,
will.deacon@arm.com, ralf@linux-mips.org,
benh@kernel.crashing.org, paulus@samba.org, mpe@ellerman.id.au,
davem@davemloft.net, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com,
hpa@zytor.com, x86@kernel.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
nnk@google.com, jeffv@google.com, salyzyn@android.com,
Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com>
Subject: [PATCH 0/2] Fix mmap_base entropy for >31 bits.
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2016 14:06:29 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1454623591-17951-1-git-send-email-dcashman@android.com> (raw)
Upstream commit: d07e22597d1d355829b7b18ac19afa912cf758d1 added the
ability to choose from a range of values to use for entropy count in
generating the random offset to the mmap_base address. The
maximum value on this range was set to 32 bits for 64-bit x86 systems,
but this value could be increased further, requiring more than the 32
bits of randomness provided by get_random_int(), as is already possible
for arm64. Add a new function: get_random_long() which more naturally
fits with the mmap usage of get_random_int() but operates exactly the
same as get_random_int().
Also, fix the shifting constant in mmap_rnd() to be an unsigned long so
that values greater than 31 bits generate an appropriate mask without
overflow. This is especially important on x86, as its shift instruction
uses a 5-bit mask for the shift operand, which meant that any value for
mmap_rnd_bits over 31 acts as a no-op and effectively disables mmap_base
randomization.
Finally, replace calls to get_random_int() with get_random_long() where
appropriate.
Daniel Cashman (2):
drivers: char: random: Add get_random_long().
use get_random_long().
arch/arm/mm/mmap.c | 2 +-
arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c | 4 ++--
arch/mips/mm/mmap.c | 4 ++--
arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c | 4 ++--
arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c | 4 ++--
arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc_64.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/mm/mmap.c | 6 +++---
drivers/char/random.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
fs/binfmt_elf.c | 2 +-
include/linux/random.h | 1 +
10 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
--
2.7.0.rc3.207.g0ac5344
next reply other threads:[~2016-02-04 22:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-02-04 22:06 Daniel Cashman [this message]
2016-02-04 22:06 ` [PATCH 1/2] drivers: char: random: Add get_random_long() Daniel Cashman
2016-02-04 22:06 ` [PATCH 2/2] use get_random_long() Daniel Cashman
2016-02-04 22:38 ` Kees Cook
2016-02-04 22:29 ` [PATCH 0/2] Fix mmap_base entropy for >31 bits Kees Cook
2016-02-24 20:40 ` Daniel Cashman
2016-02-24 21:50 ` Kees Cook
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