Re: [PATCH 0/2] Fix mmap_base entropy for >31 bits.

[Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com>]

On 02/04/2016 02:29 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 4, 2016 at 2:06 PM, Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com> wrote:
>> Upstream commit: d07e22597d1d355829b7b18ac19afa912cf758d1 added the
>> ability to choose from a range of values to use for entropy count in
>> generating the random offset to the mmap_base address.  The
>> maximum value on this range was set to 32 bits for 64-bit x86 systems,
>> but this value could be increased further, requiring more than the 32
>> bits of randomness provided by get_random_int(), as is already possible
>> for arm64. Add a new function: get_random_long() which more naturally
>> fits with the mmap usage of get_random_int() but operates exactly the
>> same as get_random_int().
>>
>> Also, fix the shifting constant in mmap_rnd() to be an unsigned long so
>> that values greater than 31 bits generate an appropriate mask without
>> overflow.  This is especially important on x86, as its shift instruction
>> uses a 5-bit mask for the shift operand, which meant that any value for
>> mmap_rnd_bits over 31 acts as a no-op and effectively disables mmap_base
>> randomization.
>>
>> Finally, replace calls to get_random_int() with get_random_long() where
>> appropriate.
>>
>> Daniel Cashman (2):
>>   drivers: char: random: Add get_random_long().
>>   use get_random_long().
>>
>>  arch/arm/mm/mmap.c               |  2 +-
>>  arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c             |  4 ++--
>>  arch/mips/mm/mmap.c              |  4 ++--
>>  arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c    |  4 ++--
>>  arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c           |  4 ++--
>>  arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc_64.c |  2 +-
>>  arch/x86/mm/mmap.c               |  6 +++---
>>  drivers/char/random.c            | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
>>  fs/binfmt_elf.c                  |  2 +-
>>  include/linux/random.h           |  1 +
>>  10 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
> 
> Thanks for fixing this!
> 
> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> 
> -Kees
> 

This has now been in linux-next for awhile. Could we please submit this
for the 4.5 rc window so that it fixes the issue in the final 4.5
release?  Sorry if this is a protocol breach, but I'm not sure what the
best way is for me to indicate that this is a "fix" that should go out
in the same release as the original feature.

Thank You,
Dan