From: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
gthelen@google.com, labbott@fedoraproject.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] mm: SLAB freelist randomization
Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2016 15:26:00 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1460759160.19090.50.camel@perches.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160415150026.65abbdd5b2ef741cd070c769@linux-foundation.org>
On Fri, 2016-04-15 at 15:00 -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
> On Fri, 15 Apr 2016 10:25:59 -0700 Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> wrote:
> > Provide an optional config (CONFIG_FREELIST_RANDOM) to randomize the
> > SLAB freelist. The list is randomized during initialization of a new set
> > of pages. The order on different freelist sizes is pre-computed at boot
> > for performance. This security feature reduces the predictability of the
> > kernel SLAB allocator against heap overflows rendering attacks much less
> > stable.
trivia:
> > @@ -1229,6 +1229,61 @@ static void __init set_up_node(struct kmem_cache *cachep, int index)
[]
> > + */
> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_2[2];
> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_4[4];
> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_8[8];
> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_16[16];
> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_32[32];
> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_64[64];
> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_128[128];
> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_256[256];
> > +static struct m_list {
> > + size_t count;
> > + freelist_idx_t *list;
> > +} master_lists[] = {
> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_2), master_list_2 },
> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_4), master_list_4 },
> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_8), master_list_8 },
> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_16), master_list_16 },
> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_32), master_list_32 },
> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_64), master_list_64 },
> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_128), master_list_128 },
> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_256), master_list_256 },
> > +};
static const struct m_list?
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
gthelen@google.com, labbott@fedoraproject.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm: SLAB freelist randomization
Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2016 15:26:00 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1460759160.19090.50.camel@perches.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160415150026.65abbdd5b2ef741cd070c769@linux-foundation.org>
On Fri, 2016-04-15 at 15:00 -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
> On Fri, 15 Apr 2016 10:25:59 -0700 Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> wrote:
> > Provide an optional config (CONFIG_FREELIST_RANDOM) to randomize the
> > SLAB freelist. The list is randomized during initialization of a new set
> > of pages. The order on different freelist sizes is pre-computed at boot
> > for performance. This security feature reduces the predictability of the
> > kernel SLAB allocator against heap overflows rendering attacks much less
> > stable.
trivia:
> > @@ -1229,6 +1229,61 @@ static void __init set_up_node(struct kmem_cache *cachep, int index)
[]
> > + */
> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_2[2];
> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_4[4];
> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_8[8];
> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_16[16];
> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_32[32];
> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_64[64];
> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_128[128];
> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_256[256];
> > +static struct m_list {
> > + size_t count;
> > + freelist_idx_t *list;
> > +} master_lists[] = {
> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_2), master_list_2 },
> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_4), master_list_4 },
> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_8), master_list_8 },
> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_16), master_list_16 },
> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_32), master_list_32 },
> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_64), master_list_64 },
> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_128), master_list_128 },
> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_256), master_list_256 },
> > +};
static const struct m_list?
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
gthelen@google.com, labbott@fedoraproject.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm: SLAB freelist randomization
Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2016 15:26:00 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1460759160.19090.50.camel@perches.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160415150026.65abbdd5b2ef741cd070c769@linux-foundation.org>
On Fri, 2016-04-15 at 15:00 -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
> On Fri, 15 Apr 2016 10:25:59 -0700 Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> wrote:
> > Provide an optional config (CONFIG_FREELIST_RANDOM) to randomize the
> > SLAB freelist. The list is randomized during initialization of a new set
> > of pages. The order on different freelist sizes is pre-computed at boot
> > for performance. This security feature reduces the predictability of the
> > kernel SLAB allocator against heap overflows rendering attacks much less
> > stable.
trivia:
> > @@ -1229,6 +1229,61 @@ static void __init set_up_node(struct kmem_cache *cachep, int index)
[]
> > + */
> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_2[2];
> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_4[4];
> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_8[8];
> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_16[16];
> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_32[32];
> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_64[64];
> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_128[128];
> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_256[256];
> > +static struct m_list {
> > + size_t count;
> > + freelist_idx_t *list;
> > +} master_lists[] = {
> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_2), master_list_2 },
> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_4), master_list_4 },
> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_8), master_list_8 },
> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_16), master_list_16 },
> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_32), master_list_32 },
> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_64), master_list_64 },
> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_128), master_list_128 },
> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_256), master_list_256 },
> > +};
static const struct m_list?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-04-15 22:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-04-15 17:25 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] mm: SLAB freelist randomization Thomas Garnier
2016-04-15 17:25 ` Thomas Garnier
2016-04-15 17:25 ` Thomas Garnier
2016-04-15 22:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2016-04-15 22:00 ` Andrew Morton
2016-04-15 22:00 ` Andrew Morton
2016-04-15 22:26 ` Joe Perches [this message]
2016-04-15 22:26 ` Joe Perches
2016-04-15 22:26 ` Joe Perches
2016-04-15 22:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2016-04-15 22:47 ` Thomas Garnier
2016-04-15 22:47 ` Thomas Garnier
2016-04-18 15:59 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2016-04-18 15:59 ` Thomas Garnier
2016-04-18 15:59 ` Thomas Garnier
2016-04-18 19:36 ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-04-18 19:36 ` Laura Abbott
2016-04-18 19:36 ` Laura Abbott
2016-04-18 19:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2016-04-18 19:52 ` Thomas Garnier
2016-04-18 19:52 ` Thomas Garnier
2016-04-25 21:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2016-04-25 21:04 ` Andrew Morton
2016-04-25 21:04 ` Andrew Morton
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