From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policy
Date: Tue, 17 Oct 2017 15:07:03 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1508267223.4513.23.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171016203709.11199-2-mjg59@google.com>
On Mon, 2017-10-16 at 13:37 -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> static int __init init_ima(void)
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index 95209a5f8595..c9d5735711eb 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -247,10 +247,9 @@ static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
> * Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
> */
> static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
> - enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
> + const struct cred *cred, enum ima_hooks func,
> + int mask)
> {
> - struct task_struct *tsk = current;
> - const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
> int i;
>
> if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
> @@ -305,7 +304,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
> case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
> case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
> case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
> - security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
> + security_cred_getsecid(cred, &sid);
> rc = security_filter_rule_match(sid,
> rule->lsm[i].type,
> Audit_equal,
By replacing the call from security_task_getsec() to
security_cred_getsecid(), I assume you're expecting different results.
Will this change break existing IMA policies?
Mimi
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com (Mimi Zohar)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policy
Date: Tue, 17 Oct 2017 15:07:03 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1508267223.4513.23.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171016203709.11199-2-mjg59@google.com>
On Mon, 2017-10-16 at 13:37 -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> static int __init init_ima(void)
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index 95209a5f8595..c9d5735711eb 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -247,10 +247,9 @@ static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
> * Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
> */
> static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
> - enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
> + const struct cred *cred, enum ima_hooks func,
> + int mask)
> {
> - struct task_struct *tsk = current;
> - const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
> int i;
>
> if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
> @@ -305,7 +304,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
> case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
> case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
> case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
> - security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
> + security_cred_getsecid(cred, &sid);
> rc = security_filter_rule_match(sid,
> rule->lsm[i].type,
> Audit_equal,
By replacing the call from security_task_getsec() to
security_cred_getsecid(), I assume you're expecting different results.
?Will this change break existing IMA policies?
Mimi
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policy
Date: Tue, 17 Oct 2017 15:07:03 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1508267223.4513.23.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171016203709.11199-2-mjg59@google.com>
On Mon, 2017-10-16 at 13:37 -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> static int __init init_ima(void)
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index 95209a5f8595..c9d5735711eb 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -247,10 +247,9 @@ static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
> * Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
> */
> static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
> - enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
> + const struct cred *cred, enum ima_hooks func,
> + int mask)
> {
> - struct task_struct *tsk = current;
> - const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
> int i;
>
> if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
> @@ -305,7 +304,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
> case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
> case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
> case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
> - security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
> + security_cred_getsecid(cred, &sid);
> rc = security_filter_rule_match(sid,
> rule->lsm[i].type,
> Audit_equal,
By replacing the call from security_task_getsec() to
security_cred_getsecid(), I assume you're expecting different results.
Will this change break existing IMA policies?
Mimi
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-10-17 19:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-10-16 20:37 [PATCH 1/2] security: Add a cred_getsecid hook Matthew Garrett
2017-10-16 20:37 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-10-16 20:37 ` [PATCH 2/2] IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policy Matthew Garrett
2017-10-16 20:37 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-10-16 21:03 ` Mikhail Kurinnoi
2017-10-16 21:03 ` Mikhail Kurinnoi
2017-10-16 21:03 ` Mikhail Kurinnoi
2017-10-16 21:20 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-10-16 21:20 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-10-16 21:20 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-10-17 19:07 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2017-10-17 19:07 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-17 19:07 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-18 20:59 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-10-18 20:59 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-10-16 21:58 ` [PATCH 1/2] security: Add a cred_getsecid hook Casey Schaufler
2017-10-16 21:58 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-10-18 21:01 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-10-18 21:01 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-10-23 23:20 ` Paul Moore
2017-10-23 23:20 ` Paul Moore
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2017-10-19 23:14 Matthew Garrett
2017-10-19 23:14 ` [PATCH 2/2] IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policy Matthew Garrett
2017-10-19 23:14 ` Matthew Garrett
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