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From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/4] ima: define new ima_sb_post_new_mount hook
Date: Thu, 07 Dec 2017 09:35:59 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1512657359.3527.49.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1512649584.1350.14.camel@redhat.com>

Hi Jeff,

[The IMA/EVM and the TPM mailing lists have been combined as a single
linux-integrity mailing list.]

On Thu, 2017-12-07 at 07:26 -0500, Jeff Layton wrote:
> Sorry for the late review. I just started dusting off my i_version
> rework, and noticed that IMA still has unaddressed problems here.

<snip>

> Personally, I'm not a huge fan of this scheme. It seems quite invasive,
> and doesn't really seem to address the stated problem well.

A cleaned up version of this patch set was meant to follow the
introduction of a new integrity_read method, but that patch set was
rejected.  At this point, I have no intentions of upstreaming a
cleaned up version this patch set either.

> The warning itself seems ok, but I don't really see what's wrong with
> performing remeasurement when the mtime changes on filesystems that
> don't have SB_I_VERSION set. Surely that's better than limiting it to an
> initial measurement?
> 
> Maybe I just don't understand what you're really trying to achieve here.

Based on discussions with Sascha Hauer, he convinced me the i_version
test is basically just a performance improvement and posted a patch
that checks the filesystem for i_version support, before relying on it
-  https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-integrity/msg00033.html.

Mimi

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com (Mimi Zohar)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH 2/4] ima: define new ima_sb_post_new_mount hook
Date: Thu, 07 Dec 2017 09:35:59 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1512657359.3527.49.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1512649584.1350.14.camel@redhat.com>

Hi Jeff,

[The IMA/EVM and the TPM mailing lists have been combined as a single
linux-integrity mailing list.]

On Thu, 2017-12-07 at 07:26 -0500, Jeff Layton wrote:
> Sorry for the late review. I just started dusting off my i_version
> rework, and noticed that IMA still has unaddressed problems here.

<snip>

> Personally, I'm not a huge fan of this scheme. It seems quite invasive,
> and doesn't really seem to address the stated problem well.

A cleaned up version of this patch set was meant to follow the
introduction of a new integrity_read method, but that patch set was
rejected. ?At this point, I have no intentions of upstreaming a
cleaned up version this patch set either.

> The warning itself seems ok, but I don't really see what's wrong with
> performing remeasurement when the mtime changes on filesystems that
> don't have SB_I_VERSION set. Surely that's better than limiting it to an
> initial measurement?
> 
> Maybe I just don't understand what you're really trying to achieve here.

Based on discussions with Sascha Hauer, he convinced me the i_version
test is basically just a performance improvement and posted a patch
that checks the filesystem for i_version support, before relying on it
- ?https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-integrity/msg00033.html.

Mimi

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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/4] ima: define new ima_sb_post_new_mount hook
Date: Thu, 07 Dec 2017 09:35:59 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1512657359.3527.49.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1512649584.1350.14.camel@redhat.com>

Hi Jeff,

[The IMA/EVM and the TPM mailing lists have been combined as a single
linux-integrity mailing list.]

On Thu, 2017-12-07 at 07:26 -0500, Jeff Layton wrote:
> Sorry for the late review. I just started dusting off my i_version
> rework, and noticed that IMA still has unaddressed problems here.

<snip>

> Personally, I'm not a huge fan of this scheme. It seems quite invasive,
> and doesn't really seem to address the stated problem well.

A cleaned up version of this patch set was meant to follow the
introduction of a new integrity_read method, but that patch set was
rejected.  At this point, I have no intentions of upstreaming a
cleaned up version this patch set either.

> The warning itself seems ok, but I don't really see what's wrong with
> performing remeasurement when the mtime changes on filesystems that
> don't have SB_I_VERSION set. Surely that's better than limiting it to an
> initial measurement?
> 
> Maybe I just don't understand what you're really trying to achieve here.

Based on discussions with Sascha Hauer, he convinced me the i_version
test is basically just a performance improvement and posted a patch
that checks the filesystem for i_version support, before relying on it
-  https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-integrity/msg00033.html.

Mimi

  reply	other threads:[~2017-12-07 14:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-08-16 17:30 [RFC PATCH 0/4] ima: filesystems not mounted with i_version Mimi Zohar
2017-08-16 17:30 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-08-16 17:30 ` [RFC PATCH 1/4] security: define new LSM sb_post_new_mount hook Mimi Zohar
2017-08-16 17:30   ` Mimi Zohar
2017-08-16 17:30 ` [RFC PATCH 2/4] ima: define new ima_sb_post_new_mount hook Mimi Zohar
2017-08-16 17:30   ` Mimi Zohar
2017-08-16 19:24   ` Casey Schaufler
2017-08-16 19:24     ` Casey Schaufler
2017-08-16 20:59     ` Mimi Zohar
2017-08-16 20:59       ` Mimi Zohar
2017-08-17  2:39       ` [Linux-ima-devel] " James Morris
2017-08-17  2:39         ` James Morris
2017-12-07 12:26   ` Jeff Layton
2017-12-07 12:26     ` Jeff Layton
2017-12-07 14:35     ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2017-12-07 14:35       ` Mimi Zohar
2017-12-07 14:35       ` Mimi Zohar
2017-12-07 14:50       ` Jeff Layton
2017-12-07 14:50         ` Jeff Layton
2017-12-07 15:08         ` Mimi Zohar
2017-12-07 15:08           ` Mimi Zohar
2017-12-07 15:08           ` Mimi Zohar
2017-12-07 15:09           ` Jeff Layton
2017-12-07 15:09             ` Jeff Layton
2017-12-15 21:13             ` Jeff Layton
2017-12-15 21:13               ` Jeff Layton
2017-08-16 17:30 ` [RFC PATCH 3/4] security: define a new LSM sb_post_remount hook Mimi Zohar
2017-08-16 17:30   ` Mimi Zohar
2017-08-16 17:30 ` [RFC PATCH 4/4] ima: define a new ima_sb_post_remount hook Mimi Zohar
2017-08-16 17:30   ` Mimi Zohar

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