From: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
To: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>,
'Andy Lutomirski' <luto@kernel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Samuel Neves <samuel.c.p.neves@gmail.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] x86/retpoline/entry: Disable the entire SYSCALL64 fast path with retpolines on
Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2018 14:24:07 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1516976647.5438.6.camel@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <b8ea504729db4073abf82ebd5d8a53c6@AcuMS.aculab.com>
> NetBSD (and the other BSD?) defines a structure for the arguments to
> each syscall.
Goes back to v7 or so but they put the syscall arguments into the uarea
so that no pointers were needed (uarea being a per process mapping at a
fixed address) in order to also reduce pointer dereferencing costs (not
that those matter much on modern processors)
Alan.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
To: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>,
'Andy Lutomirski' <luto@kernel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Samuel Neves <samuel.c.p.neves@gmail.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/retpoline/entry: Disable the entire SYSCALL64 fast path with retpolines on
Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2018 14:24:07 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1516976647.5438.6.camel@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <b8ea504729db4073abf82ebd5d8a53c6@AcuMS.aculab.com>
> NetBSD (and the other BSD?) defines a structure for the arguments to
> each syscall.
Goes back to v7 or so but they put the syscall arguments into the uarea
so that no pointers were needed (uarea being a per process mapping at a
fixed address) in order to also reduce pointer dereferencing costs (not
that those matter much on modern processors)
Alan.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-26 14:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-22 18:04 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] x86/retpoline/entry: Disable the entire SYSCALL64 fast path with retpolines on Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-22 18:04 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-22 18:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2018-01-22 18:55 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-23 8:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2018-01-23 8:01 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-23 18:36 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alan Cox
2018-01-23 18:36 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-25 18:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2018-01-25 18:48 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-25 19:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2018-01-25 20:04 ` Brian Gerst
2018-01-25 20:04 ` Brian Gerst
2018-01-25 20:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2018-01-25 20:54 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-25 21:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-25 21:02 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-25 21:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-25 21:05 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-25 21:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2018-01-25 21:06 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-25 21:08 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-25 21:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-25 21:20 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2018-01-25 21:20 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-25 21:31 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-25 21:31 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-25 21:39 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-25 21:39 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-25 21:53 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-25 21:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-25 21:53 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2018-01-25 21:53 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-26 11:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " David Laight
2018-01-26 11:17 ` David Laight
2018-01-26 14:24 ` Alan Cox [this message]
2018-01-26 14:24 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-26 15:57 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-26 15:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-26 17:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2018-01-26 17:40 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-26 18:07 ` [kernel-hardening] " Al Viro
2018-01-26 18:07 ` Al Viro
2018-01-26 18:13 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2018-01-26 18:13 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-26 18:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-26 18:23 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-26 18:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2018-01-26 18:54 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-26 19:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-26 19:02 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-29 13:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Deacon
2018-01-29 13:19 ` Will Deacon
2018-01-29 15:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " David Laight
2018-01-29 15:23 ` David Laight
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