Patch "x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

Patch "x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

[gregkh]

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec

to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     x86_Implement_array_index_mask_nospec.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.


Subject: x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec
From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com
Date: Mon Jan 29 17:02:28 2018 -0800

From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com

commit babdde2698d482b6c0de1eab4f697cf5856c5859

array_index_nospec() uses a mask to sanitize user controllable array
indexes, i.e. generate a 0 mask if 'index' >= 'size', and a ~0 mask
otherwise. While the default array_index_mask_nospec() handles the
carry-bit from the (index - size) result in software.

The x86 array_index_mask_nospec() does the same, but the carry-bit is
handled in the processor CF flag without conditional instructions in the
control flow.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727414808.33451.1873237130672785331.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>


---
 arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h |   24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h
@@ -24,6 +24,30 @@
 #define wmb()	asm volatile("sfence" ::: "memory")
 #endif
 
+/**
+ * array_index_mask_nospec() - generate a mask that is ~0UL when the
+ * 	bounds check succeeds and 0 otherwise
+ * @index: array element index
+ * @size: number of elements in array
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *     0 - (index < size)
+ */
+static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long index,
+		unsigned long size)
+{
+	unsigned long mask;
+
+	asm ("cmp %1,%2; sbb %0,%0;"
+			:"=r" (mask)
+			:"r"(size),"r" (index)
+			:"cc");
+	return mask;
+}
+
+/* Override the default implementation from linux/nospec.h. */
+#define array_index_mask_nospec array_index_mask_nospec
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_PPRO_FENCE
 #define dma_rmb()	rmb()
 #else


Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from torvalds@linux-foundation.org are

queue-4.14/objtool_Add_support_for_alternatives_at_the_end_of_a_section.patch
queue-4.14/x86pti_Do_not_enable_PTI_on_CPUs_which_are_not_vulnerable_to_Meltdown.patch
queue-4.14/x86_Introduce_barrier_nospec.patch
queue-4.14/x86speculation_Use_Indirect_Branch_Prediction_Barrier_in_context_switch.patch
queue-4.14/x86get_user_Use_pointer_masking_to_limit_speculation.patch
queue-4.14/x86_Introduce___uaccess_begin_nospec()_and_uaccess_try_nospec.patch
queue-4.14/x86cpufeature_Blacklist_SPEC_CTRLPRED_CMD_on_early_Spectre_v2_microcodes.patch
queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Add_Intel_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch
queue-4.14/x86paravirt_Remove_noreplace-paravirt_cmdline_option.patch
queue-4.14/KVM_VMX_Make_indirect_call_speculation_safe.patch
queue-4.14/x86msr_Add_definitions_for_new_speculation_control_MSRs.patch
queue-4.14/x86alternative_Print_unadorned_pointers.patch
queue-4.14/KVMVMX_Allow_direct_access_to_MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL.patch
queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Add_CPUID_7_EDX_CPUID_leaf.patch
queue-4.14/array_index_nospec_Sanitize_speculative_array_de-references.patch
queue-4.14/Documentation_Document_array_index_nospec.patch
queue-4.14/x86entry64_Remove_the_SYSCALL64_fast_path.patch
queue-4.14/x86retpoline_Remove_the_esprsp_thunk.patch
queue-4.14/x86bugs_Drop_one_mitigation_from_dmesg.patch
queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Add_AMD_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch
queue-4.14/scripts-faddr2line-fix-cross_compile-unset-error.patch
queue-4.14/KVMSVM_Allow_direct_access_to_MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL.patch
queue-4.14/x86asm_Move_status_from_thread_struct_to_thread_info.patch
queue-4.14/KVMx86_Add_IBPB_support.patch
queue-4.14/x86_Implement_array_index_mask_nospec.patch
queue-4.14/KVMVMX_Emulate_MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.patch
queue-4.14/nl80211_Sanitize_array_index_in_parse_txq_params.patch
queue-4.14/moduleretpoline_Warn_about_missing_retpoline_in_module.patch
queue-4.14/x86speculation_Add_basic_IBPB_(Indirect_Branch_Prediction_Barrier)_support.patch
queue-4.14/x86speculation_Simplify_indirect_branch_prediction_barrier().patch
queue-4.14/x86nospec_Fix_header_guards_names.patch
queue-4.14/KVM_x86_Make_indirect_calls_in_emulator_speculation_safe.patch
queue-4.14/x86uaccess_Use___uaccess_begin_nospec()_and_uaccess_try_nospec.patch
queue-4.14/x86entry64_Push_extra_regs_right_away.patch
queue-4.14/x86usercopy_Replace_open_coded_stacclac_with___uaccess_begin_end.patch
queue-4.14/vfs_fdtable_Prevent_bounds-check_bypass_via_speculative_execution.patch
queue-4.14/x86retpoline_Simplify_vmexit_fill_RSB().patch
queue-4.14/objtool_Warn_on_stripped_section_symbol.patch
queue-4.14/x86spectre_Report_get_user_mitigation_for_spectre_v1.patch
queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Clean_up_Spectre_v2_related_CPUID_flags.patch
queue-4.14/x86syscall_Sanitize_syscall_table_de-references_under_speculation.patch
queue-4.14/objtool_Improve_retpoline_alternative_handling.patch