From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: matthew.garrett@nebula.com,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/9] KEYS: Blacklisting & UEFI database load
Date: Wed, 07 Mar 2018 15:28:37 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1520436517.5558.2.camel@HansenPartnership.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1520428682.10396.445.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
On Wed, 2018-03-07 at 08:18 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Tue, 2018-03-06 at 15:05 +0100, Jiri Slaby wrote:
> > what's the status of this please? Distributors (I checked SUSE,
> > RedHat and Ubuntu) have to carry these patches and every of them
> > have to forward-port the patches to new kernels. So are you going
> > to resend the PR to have this merged?
[...]
> Just because I trust the platform keys prior to booting the kernel,
> doesn't mean that I *want* to trust those keys once booted. There
> are, however, places where we need access to those keys to verify a
> signature (eg. kexec kernel image).
Which is essentially the reason I always give when these patches come
back
> Nayna Jain's "certs: define a trusted platform keyring" patch set
> introduces a new, separate keyring for these platform keys.
Perhaps, to break the deadlock, we should ask Jiří what the reason is
the distros want these keys to be trusted. Apart from the Microsoft
key, it will also give you an OEM key in your trusted keyring. Is it
something to do with OEM supplied modules?
James
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: matthew.garrett@nebula.com,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/9] KEYS: Blacklisting & UEFI database load
Date: Wed, 07 Mar 2018 07:28:37 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1520436517.5558.2.camel@HansenPartnership.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1520428682.10396.445.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
On Wed, 2018-03-07 at 08:18 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Tue, 2018-03-06 at 15:05 +0100, Jiri Slaby wrote:
> > what's the status of this please? Distributors (I checked SUSE,
> > RedHat and Ubuntu) have to carry these patches and every of them
> > have to forward-port the patches to new kernels. So are you going
> > to resend the PR to have this merged?
[...]
> Just because I trust the platform keys prior to booting the kernel,
> doesn't mean that I *want* to trust those keys once booted. There
> are, however, places where we need access to those keys to verify a
> signature (eg. kexec kernel image).
Which is essentially the reason I always give when these patches come
back
> Nayna Jain's "certs: define a trusted platform keyring" patch set
> introduces a new, separate keyring for these platform keys.
Perhaps, to break the deadlock, we should ask Jiří what the reason is
the distros want these keys to be trusted. Apart from the Microsoft
key, it will also give you an OEM key in your trusted keyring. Is it
something to do with OEM supplied modules?
James
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com (James Bottomley)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 0/9] KEYS: Blacklisting & UEFI database load
Date: Wed, 07 Mar 2018 07:28:37 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1520436517.5558.2.camel@HansenPartnership.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1520428682.10396.445.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
On Wed, 2018-03-07 at 08:18 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Tue, 2018-03-06 at 15:05 +0100, Jiri Slaby wrote:
> > what's the status of this please? Distributors (I checked SUSE,
> > RedHat and Ubuntu) have to carry these patches and every of them
> > have to forward-port the patches to new kernels. So are you going
> > to resend the PR to have this merged?
[...]
> Just because I trust the platform keys prior to booting the kernel,
> doesn't mean that I *want* to trust those keys once booted. ?There
> are, however, places where we need access to those keys to verify a
> signature (eg. kexec kernel image).
Which is essentially the reason I always give when these patches come
back
> Nayna Jain's "certs: define a trusted platform keyring" patch set
> introduces a new, separate keyring for these platform keys.
Perhaps, to break the deadlock, we should ask Ji?? what the reason is
the distros want these keys to be trusted. ?Apart from the Microsoft
key, it will also give you an OEM key in your trusted keyring. ?Is it
something to do with OEM supplied modules?
James
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-03-07 15:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 65+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-11-16 18:10 [PATCH 0/9] KEYS: Blacklisting & UEFI database load David Howells
2016-11-16 18:10 ` David Howells
2016-11-16 18:10 ` [PATCH 1/9] KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring David Howells
2016-11-16 18:10 ` [PATCH 2/9] X.509: Allow X.509 certs to be blacklisted David Howells
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 3/9] PKCS#7: Handle blacklisted certificates David Howells
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 4/9] KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to secondary keyring David Howells
2016-11-17 6:41 ` Petko Manolov
2016-11-17 9:56 ` David Howells
[not found] ` <26349.1479376560-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-17 10:22 ` Petko Manolov
2016-11-17 10:22 ` Petko Manolov
2016-11-17 11:18 ` David Howells
2016-11-17 11:18 ` David Howells
2016-11-21 14:04 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-11-21 14:04 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-11-21 15:17 ` David Howells
2016-11-21 16:24 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 5/9] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions David Howells
2016-11-21 16:07 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 6/9] efi: Add EFI signature data types David Howells
2016-11-16 23:43 ` Mat Martineau
[not found] ` <alpine.OSX.2.20.1611161535590.67352-zaFMaa3cLiZe6KzckbbZvYT4S9po1h25@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-17 9:44 ` David Howells
2016-11-17 9:44 ` David Howells
[not found] ` <26198.1479375840-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-21 16:08 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 16:08 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 7/9] efi: Add an EFI signature blob parser David Howells
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 8/9] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot David Howells
2016-11-21 16:16 ` Ard Biesheuvel
[not found] ` <CAKv+Gu_QVyd1Jx7ZdnBzYmZzUnH4ZuhQgiGO-zx-JPViWosjXQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-21 16:25 ` Josh Boyer
2016-11-21 16:25 ` Josh Boyer
[not found] ` <CA+5PVA6dWw-p3q9SBmJwQvuru4k7JZAraRZeb2=VDf8E=c=SmA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-24 19:22 ` James Bottomley
2016-11-24 19:22 ` James Bottomley
2016-11-24 19:17 ` James Bottomley
2016-11-24 19:17 ` James Bottomley
2016-12-02 18:57 ` James Bottomley
2016-12-02 20:18 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 9/9] MODSIGN: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed David Howells
[not found] ` <147931990959.16460.3038875071067540418.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-21 16:18 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 16:18 ` Ard Biesheuvel
[not found] ` <CAKv+Gu96ihE7pHrCCeCpy78man-r821b3Vs4Tn_RsYyzY4HV2Q-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-21 16:26 ` Josh Boyer
2016-11-21 16:26 ` Josh Boyer
[not found] ` <CA+5PVA7SivAegwxdxuiAFL41Apie4JLK5KbtGGHLr1fP0p3MsQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-21 16:42 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 16:42 ` Ard Biesheuvel
[not found] ` <CAKv+Gu__wAnOawWZWVF6NF3En0suuFTBrFwwZ5KosqBU8LVHMA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-21 19:05 ` Peter Jones
2016-11-21 19:05 ` Peter Jones
2016-11-21 19:06 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 19:18 ` Peter Jones
2016-11-21 19:33 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-03-06 14:05 ` [PATCH 0/9] KEYS: Blacklisting & UEFI database load Jiri Slaby
2018-03-06 14:05 ` Jiri Slaby
2018-03-06 14:05 ` Jiri Slaby
2018-03-07 13:18 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-03-07 13:18 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-03-07 13:18 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-03-07 15:28 ` James Bottomley [this message]
2018-03-07 15:28 ` James Bottomley
2018-03-07 15:28 ` James Bottomley
2018-03-11 3:20 ` joeyli
2018-03-11 3:20 ` joeyli
2018-03-11 3:20 ` joeyli
2018-03-19 14:12 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-03-19 14:12 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-03-19 14:12 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-03-27 11:08 ` joeyli
2018-03-27 11:08 ` joeyli
2018-03-27 11:08 ` joeyli
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