From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromiun.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>Peter
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 16/27] mm: Modify can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack
Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2018 10:06:03 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1532019963.16711.61.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <f4c90626-51d8-5551-5b77-baaff81f16bb@linux.intel.com>
On Wed, 2018-07-18 at 17:06 -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> >
> > >
> > > >
> > > > -static inline bool can_follow_write_pte(pte_t pte, unsigned
> > > > int flags)
> > > > +static inline bool can_follow_write(pte_t pte, unsigned int
> > > > flags,
> > > > + struct vm_area_struct
> > > > *vma)
> > > > {
> > > > - return pte_write(pte) ||
> > > > - ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW)
> > > > && pte_dirty(pte));
> > > > + if (!is_shstk_mapping(vma->vm_flags)) {
> > > > + if (pte_write(pte))
> > > > + return true;
> > > Let me see if I can say this another way.
> > >
> > > The bigger issue is that these patches change the semantics of
> > > pte_write(). Before these patches, it meant that you *MUST*
> > > have this
> > > bit set to write to the page controlled by the PTE. Now, it
> > > means: you
> > > can write if this bit is set *OR* the shadowstack bit
> > > combination is set.
> > Here, we only figure out (1) if the page is pointed by a writable
> > PTE; or
> > (2) if the page is pointed by a RO PTE (data or SHSTK) and it has
> > been
> > copied and it still exists. We are not trying to
> > determine if the
> > SHSTK PTE is writable (we know it is not).
> Please think about the big picture. I'm not just talking about this
> patch, but about every use of pte_write() in the kernel.
>
> >
> > >
> > > That's the fundamental problem. We need some code in the kernel
> > > that
> > > logically represents the concept of "is this PTE a shadowstack
> > > PTE or a
> > > PTE with the write bit set", and we will call that pte_write(),
> > > or maybe
> > > pte_writable().
> > >
> > > You *have* to somehow rectify this situation. We can absolutely
> > > no
> > > leave pte_write() in its current, ambiguous state where it has
> > > no real
> > > meaning or where it is used to mean _both_ things depending on
> > > context.
> > True, the processor can always write to a page through a shadow
> > stack
> > PTE, but it must do that with a CALL instruction. Can we define
> > a
> > write operation as: MOV r1, *(r2). Then we don't have any doubt
> > on
> > pte_write() any more.
> No, we can't just move the target. :)
>
> You can define it this way, but then you also need to go to every
> spot
> in the kernel that calls pte_write() (and _PAGE_RW in fact) and
> audit it
> to ensure it means "mov ..." and not push.
Which pte_write() do you think is right?
bool is_shstk_pte(pte) {
return (_PAGE_RW not set) &&
(_PAGE_DIRTY_HW set);
}
int pte_write_1(pte) {
return (_PAGE_RW set) && !is_shstk_pte(pte);
}
int pte_write_2(pte) {
return (_PAGE_RW set) || is_shstk_pte(pte);
}
Yu-cheng
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromiun.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 16/27] mm: Modify can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack
Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2018 10:06:03 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1532019963.16711.61.camel@intel.com> (raw)
Message-ID: <20180719170603.andaMpY7JUbxwIg1PrknmDQTlDOz7D_NT3VUPLbKnoc@z> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <f4c90626-51d8-5551-5b77-baaff81f16bb@linux.intel.com>
On Wed, 2018-07-18 at 17:06 -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> >
> > >
> > > >
> > > > -static inline bool can_follow_write_pte(pte_t pte, unsigned
> > > > int flags)
> > > > +static inline bool can_follow_write(pte_t pte, unsigned int
> > > > flags,
> > > > + struct vm_area_struct
> > > > *vma)
> > > > {
> > > > - return pte_write(pte) ||
> > > > - ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW)
> > > > && pte_dirty(pte));
> > > > + if (!is_shstk_mapping(vma->vm_flags)) {
> > > > + if (pte_write(pte))
> > > > + return true;
> > > Let me see if I can say this another way.
> > >
> > > The bigger issue is that these patches change the semantics of
> > > pte_write(). Before these patches, it meant that you *MUST*
> > > have this
> > > bit set to write to the page controlled by the PTE. Now, it
> > > means: you
> > > can write if this bit is set *OR* the shadowstack bit
> > > combination is set.
> > Here, we only figure out (1) if the page is pointed by a writable
> > PTE; or
> > (2) if the page is pointed by a RO PTE (data or SHSTK) and it has
> > been
> > copied and it still exists. We are not trying to
> > determine if the
> > SHSTK PTE is writable (we know it is not).
> Please think about the big picture. I'm not just talking about this
> patch, but about every use of pte_write() in the kernel.
>
> >
> > >
> > > That's the fundamental problem. We need some code in the kernel
> > > that
> > > logically represents the concept of "is this PTE a shadowstack
> > > PTE or a
> > > PTE with the write bit set", and we will call that pte_write(),
> > > or maybe
> > > pte_writable().
> > >
> > > You *have* to somehow rectify this situation. We can absolutely
> > > no
> > > leave pte_write() in its current, ambiguous state where it has
> > > no real
> > > meaning or where it is used to mean _both_ things depending on
> > > context.
> > True, the processor can always write to a page through a shadow
> > stack
> > PTE, but it must do that with a CALL instruction. Can we define
> > a
> > write operation as: MOV r1, *(r2). Then we don't have any doubt
> > on
> > pte_write() any more.
> No, we can't just move the target. :)
>
> You can define it this way, but then you also need to go to every
> spot
> in the kernel that calls pte_write() (and _PAGE_RW in fact) and
> audit it
> to ensure it means "mov ..." and not push.
Which pte_write() do you think is right?
bool is_shstk_pte(pte) {
return (_PAGE_RW not set) &&
(_PAGE_DIRTY_HW set);
}
int pte_write_1(pte) {
return (_PAGE_RW set) && !is_shstk_pte(pte);
}
int pte_write_2(pte) {
return (_PAGE_RW set) || is_shstk_pte(pte);
}
Yu-cheng
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromiun.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 16/27] mm: Modify can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack
Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2018 10:06:03 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1532019963.16711.61.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <f4c90626-51d8-5551-5b77-baaff81f16bb@linux.intel.com>
On Wed, 2018-07-18 at 17:06 -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> >
> > >
> > > >
> > > > -static inline bool can_follow_write_pte(pte_t pte, unsigned
> > > > int flags)
> > > > +static inline bool can_follow_write(pte_t pte, unsigned int
> > > > flags,
> > > > + struct vm_area_struct
> > > > *vma)
> > > > {
> > > > - return pte_write(pte) ||
> > > > - ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW)
> > > > && pte_dirty(pte));
> > > > + if (!is_shstk_mapping(vma->vm_flags)) {
> > > > + if (pte_write(pte))
> > > > + return true;
> > > Let me see if I can say this another way.
> > >
> > > The bigger issue is that these patches change the semantics of
> > > pte_write(). Before these patches, it meant that you *MUST*
> > > have this
> > > bit set to write to the page controlled by the PTE. Now, it
> > > means: you
> > > can write if this bit is set *OR* the shadowstack bit
> > > combination is set.
> > Here, we only figure out (1) if the page is pointed by a writable
> > PTE; or
> > (2) if the page is pointed by a RO PTE (data or SHSTK) and it has
> > been
> > copied and it still exists. We are not trying to
> > determine if the
> > SHSTK PTE is writable (we know it is not).
> Please think about the big picture. I'm not just talking about this
> patch, but about every use of pte_write() in the kernel.
>
> >
> > >
> > > That's the fundamental problem. We need some code in the kernel
> > > that
> > > logically represents the concept of "is this PTE a shadowstack
> > > PTE or a
> > > PTE with the write bit set", and we will call that pte_write(),
> > > or maybe
> > > pte_writable().
> > >
> > > You *have* to somehow rectify this situation. We can absolutely
> > > no
> > > leave pte_write() in its current, ambiguous state where it has
> > > no real
> > > meaning or where it is used to mean _both_ things depending on
> > > context.
> > True, the processor can always write to a page through a shadow
> > stack
> > PTE, but it must do that with a CALL instruction. Can we define
> > a
> > write operation as: MOV r1, *(r2). Then we don't have any doubt
> > on
> > pte_write() any more.
> No, we can't just move the target. :)
>
> You can define it this way, but then you also need to go to every
> spot
> in the kernel that calls pte_write() (and _PAGE_RW in fact) and
> audit it
> to ensure it means "mov ..." and not push.
Which pte_write() do you think is right?
bool is_shstk_pte(pte) {
return (_PAGE_RW not set) &&
(_PAGE_DIRTY_HW set);
}
int pte_write_1(pte) {
return (_PAGE_RW set) && !is_shstk_pte(pte);
}
int pte_write_2(pte) {
return (_PAGE_RW set) || is_shstk_pte(pte);
}
Yu-cheng
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-doc" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromiun.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 16/27] mm: Modify can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack
Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2018 10:06:03 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1532019963.16711.61.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <f4c90626-51d8-5551-5b77-baaff81f16bb@linux.intel.com>
On Wed, 2018-07-18 at 17:06 -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> >
> > >
> > > >
> > > > -static inline bool can_follow_write_pte(pte_t pte, unsigned
> > > > int flags)
> > > > +static inline bool can_follow_write(pte_t pte, unsigned int
> > > > flags,
> > > > + A A A A struct vm_area_struct
> > > > *vma)
> > > > A {
> > > > - return pte_write(pte) ||
> > > > - ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW)
> > > > && pte_dirty(pte));
> > > > + if (!is_shstk_mapping(vma->vm_flags)) {
> > > > + if (pte_write(pte))
> > > > + return true;
> > > Let me see if I can say this another way.
> > >
> > > The bigger issue is that these patches change the semantics of
> > > pte_write().A A Before these patches, it meant that you *MUST*
> > > have this
> > > bit set to write to the page controlled by the PTE.A A Now, it
> > > means: you
> > > can write if this bit is set *OR* the shadowstack bit
> > > combination is set.
> > Here, we only figure out (1) if the page is pointed by a writable
> > PTE; or
> > (2) if the page is pointed by a RO PTE (data or SHSTK) and it has
> > been
> > copied and it still exists. A We are not trying to
> > determine if the
> > SHSTK PTE is writable (we know it is not).
> Please think about the big picture.A A I'm not just talking about this
> patch, but about every use of pte_write() in the kernel.
>
> >
> > >
> > > That's the fundamental problem.A A We need some code in the kernel
> > > that
> > > logically represents the concept of "is this PTE a shadowstack
> > > PTE or a
> > > PTE with the write bit set", and we will call that pte_write(),
> > > or maybe
> > > pte_writable().
> > >
> > > You *have* to somehow rectify this situation.A A We can absolutely
> > > no
> > > leave pte_write() in its current, ambiguous state where it has
> > > no real
> > > meaning or where it is used to mean _both_ things depending on
> > > context.
> > True, the processor can always write to a page through a shadow
> > stack
> > PTE, but it must do that with a CALL instruction. A Can we define
> > aA
> > write operation as: MOV r1, *(r2). A Then we don't have any doubt
> > on
> > pte_write() any more.
> No, we can't just move the target. :)
>
> You can define it this way, but then you also need to go to every
> spot
> in the kernel that calls pte_write() (and _PAGE_RW in fact) and
> audit it
> to ensure it means "mov ..." and not push.
Which pte_write() do you think is right?
bool is_shstk_pte(pte) {
return (_PAGE_RW not set) &&
(_PAGE_DIRTY_HW set);
}
int pte_write_1(pte) {
return (_PAGE_RW set) && !is_shstk_pte(pte);
}
int pte_write_2(pte) {
return (_PAGE_RW set) || is_shstk_pte(pte);
}
Yu-cheng
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-07-19 17:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 413+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-07-10 22:26 [RFC PATCH v2 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUIDs for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Change some names to separate XSAVES system and user states Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Enable XSAVES system states Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 8:27 ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-11 8:27 ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-11 15:25 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 15:25 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 15:25 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 15:25 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 9:57 ` Florian Weimer
2018-07-11 9:57 ` Florian Weimer
2018-07-11 9:57 ` Florian Weimer
2018-07-11 13:47 ` H.J. Lu
2018-07-11 13:47 ` H.J. Lu
2018-07-11 13:47 ` H.J. Lu
2018-07-11 14:53 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 14:53 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 14:53 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 14:53 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/27] x86/cet: Control protection exception handler Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/27] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 8:34 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 8:34 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 8:34 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 16:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 16:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 16:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 16:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/27] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/27] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 8:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 8:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 8:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 9:21 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 9:21 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 9:21 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/27] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:44 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 22:44 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 22:44 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 23:23 ` Nadav Amit
2018-07-10 23:23 ` Nadav Amit
2018-07-10 23:23 ` Nadav Amit
2018-07-10 23:23 ` Nadav Amit
2018-07-10 23:52 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 23:52 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 23:52 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 8:48 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 8:48 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 8:48 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/27] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:52 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 22:52 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 22:52 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 17:28 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 17:28 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 17:28 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 17:28 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:24 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 23:24 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 23:24 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/27] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:06 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 23:06 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 23:06 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 9:06 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 9:06 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 9:06 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-08-14 21:28 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-14 21:28 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-14 21:28 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/27] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:08 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 23:08 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 23:08 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 9:10 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 9:10 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 9:10 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 16:11 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 16:11 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 16:11 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 16:11 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-20 14:20 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-20 14:20 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-20 14:20 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-20 14:58 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-20 14:58 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-20 14:58 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-20 14:58 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/27] mm/mprotect: Prevent mprotect from changing shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:10 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 23:10 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 23:10 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 9:12 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 9:12 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 9:12 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 16:07 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 16:07 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 16:07 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 16:07 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 16:22 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 16:22 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 16:22 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 16:22 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/27] mm: Modify can_follow_write_pte/pmd for " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:37 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 23:37 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 23:37 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 17:05 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 17:05 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 17:05 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 17:05 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 18:26 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 18:26 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 18:26 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 18:26 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 23:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-17 23:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-17 23:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-17 23:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-17 23:11 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 23:11 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 23:11 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 23:11 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 23:15 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 23:15 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 23:15 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-18 20:14 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-18 20:14 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-18 20:14 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-18 20:14 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-18 21:45 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-18 21:45 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-18 21:45 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-18 21:45 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-18 23:10 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-18 23:10 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-18 23:10 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-18 23:10 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-19 0:06 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-19 0:06 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-19 0:06 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-19 0:06 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-19 17:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2018-07-19 17:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-19 17:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-19 17:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-19 19:31 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-19 19:31 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-19 19:31 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 9:29 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 9:29 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 9:29 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-17 23:00 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-17 23:00 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-17 23:00 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-17 23:00 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/27] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:40 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 23:40 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 23:40 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 9:34 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 9:34 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 9:34 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 15:45 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 15:45 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 15:45 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 9:36 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 9:36 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 9:36 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 21:10 ` Jann Horn
2018-07-11 21:10 ` Jann Horn
2018-07-11 21:10 ` Jann Horn
2018-07-11 21:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-07-11 21:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-07-11 21:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-07-11 21:51 ` Jann Horn
2018-07-11 21:51 ` Jann Horn
2018-07-11 21:51 ` Jann Horn
2018-07-11 22:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-07-11 22:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-07-11 22:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-07-13 18:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 18:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 18:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 18:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 18/27] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:48 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 23:48 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 23:48 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-12 22:59 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-12 22:59 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-12 22:59 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-12 22:59 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-12 23:49 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-12 23:49 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-12 23:49 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-12 23:49 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 1:50 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 1:50 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 1:50 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 1:50 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 2:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-07-13 2:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-07-13 2:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-07-13 4:16 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 4:16 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 4:16 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 4:16 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 4:18 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 4:18 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 4:18 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 4:18 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 17:39 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 17:39 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 17:39 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 17:39 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 5:55 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-07-13 5:55 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-07-13 5:55 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-07-11 9:44 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 9:44 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 9:44 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 15:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 15:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 15:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 15:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 15:30 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 15:30 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 15:30 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 15:30 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 9:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 9:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 9:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 14:58 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 14:58 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 14:58 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 14:58 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 15:27 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 15:27 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 15:27 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 15:27 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 15:41 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 15:41 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 15:41 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 15:41 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 12:12 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 12:12 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 12:12 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 17:37 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 17:37 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 17:37 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 17:37 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 19/27] x86/cet/shstk: Signal handling for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 20/27] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing of CET Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 11:12 ` Florian Weimer
2018-07-11 11:12 ` Florian Weimer
2018-07-11 11:12 ` Florian Weimer
2018-07-11 19:37 ` Jann Horn
2018-07-11 19:37 ` Jann Horn
2018-07-11 19:37 ` Jann Horn
2018-07-11 20:53 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 20:53 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 20:53 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 20:53 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 21/27] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 22/27] x86/cet/ibt: User-mode indirect branch tracking support Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 0:11 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 0:11 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 0:11 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 22:10 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 22:10 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 22:10 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 22:10 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 22:40 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 22:40 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 22:40 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 22:40 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 23:00 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 23:00 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 23:00 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 23:00 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 23:16 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 23:16 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 23:16 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 23:16 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 17:56 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 17:56 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 17:56 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 17:56 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 18:05 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 18:05 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 18:05 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 18:05 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 21:07 ` Jann Horn
2018-07-11 21:07 ` Jann Horn
2018-07-11 21:07 ` Jann Horn
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 23/27] mm/mmap: Add IBT bitmap size to address space limit check Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:57 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 23:57 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 23:57 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 16:56 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 16:56 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 16:56 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 16:56 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 24/27] x86: Insert endbr32/endbr64 to vDSO Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 25/27] x86/cet: Add PTRACE interface for CET Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 10:20 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-07-11 10:20 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-07-11 10:20 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-07-11 15:40 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 15:40 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 15:40 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 15:40 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-12 14:03 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-07-12 14:03 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-07-12 14:03 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-07-12 14:03 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-07-12 22:37 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-12 22:37 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-12 22:37 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-12 22:37 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-12 23:08 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-07-12 23:08 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-07-12 23:08 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-07-13 16:07 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 16:07 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 16:07 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 16:07 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 6:28 ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-13 6:28 ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-13 13:33 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-07-13 13:33 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-07-13 13:33 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-07-14 6:27 ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-14 6:27 ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 26/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 27/27] x86/cet: Add arch_prctl functions for CET Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 12:19 ` Florian Weimer
2018-07-11 12:19 ` Florian Weimer
2018-07-11 12:19 ` Florian Weimer
2018-07-11 12:19 ` Florian Weimer
2018-07-11 21:02 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 21:02 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 21:02 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 21:02 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 19:45 ` Jann Horn
2018-07-11 19:45 ` Jann Horn
2018-07-11 19:45 ` Jann Horn
2018-07-11 20:55 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 20:55 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 20:55 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 20:55 ` Yu-cheng Yu
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=1532019963.16711.61.camel@intel.com \
--to=yu-cheng.yu@intel.com \
--cc=arnd@arndb.de \
--cc=bsingharora@gmail.com \
--cc=corbet@lwn.net \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=fweimer@redhat.com \
--cc=gorcunov@gmail.com \
--cc=hjl.tools@gmail.com \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=jannh@google.com \
--cc=keescook@chromiun.org \
--cc=linux-api@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=luto@amacapital.net \
--cc=mike.kravetz@oracle.com \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=nadav.amit@gmail.com \
--cc=oleg@redhat.com \
--cc=pavel@ucw.cz \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.