From: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
To: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: Yu Chen <yu.c.chen@intel.com>,
"Rafael J . Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
"Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>, Theodore Ts o <tytso@mit.edu>,
Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>,
Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>,
linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Gu, Kookoo" <kookoo.gu@intel.com>,
"Zhang, Rui" <rui.zhang@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4][RFC v2] Introduce the in-kernel hibernation encryption
Date: Tue, 24 Jul 2018 15:01:01 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1532437261.17797.22.camel@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180724130110.GA29006@amd>
On Di, 2018-07-24 at 15:03 +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> On Tue 2018-07-24 14:47:54, Oliver Neukum wrote:
> > On Di, 2018-07-24 at 14:01 +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
Hi,
> > > Safe against what kind of attack? Please describe what kind of
> > > security you are trying to provide.
> >
> > Unsigned code must not take over the priviledge level of signed code.
> > Hence:
> >
> > 1. Unsigned code must not allowed to read sensitive parts of signed
> > code's memory space
> >
> > 2. Unsigned code must not be able to alter the memory space of
> > signed code -> snapshots that are changed must not be able to be
> > resumed
>
> Ok.
>
> > > I don't think generating key in userspace is good enough for providing
> > > guarantees for secure-boot.
> >
> > Why?
>
> Because then, userpace has both key (now) and encrypted image (after
> reboot), so it can decrypt, modify, re-encrypt...?
Right. I was dense. But if the key is generated in kernel space,
the method works, doesn't it?
Regards
Oliver
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-07-24 13:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 54+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-07-18 16:38 [PATCH 0/4][RFC v2] Introduce the in-kernel hibernation encryption Chen Yu
2018-07-18 16:39 ` [PATCH 1/4][RFC v2] PM / Hibernate: Add helper functions for " Chen Yu
2018-07-18 16:39 ` [PATCH 2/4][RFC v2] PM / hibernate: Install crypto hooks " Chen Yu
2018-07-18 16:40 ` [PATCH 4/4][RFC v2] tools: create power/crypto utility Chen Yu
2018-07-18 20:22 ` [PATCH 0/4][RFC v2] Introduce the in-kernel hibernation encryption Pavel Machek
2018-07-18 23:58 ` Yu Chen
2018-07-19 11:01 ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-19 13:20 ` Yu Chen
2018-07-20 10:25 ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-23 11:42 ` Oliver Neukum
2018-07-23 12:22 ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-23 16:38 ` Yu Chen
2018-07-23 16:38 ` Yu Chen
2018-07-24 12:05 ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-24 11:49 ` Oliver Neukum
2018-07-24 13:04 ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-23 16:23 ` Yu Chen
2018-07-24 11:40 ` Oliver Neukum
2018-07-24 12:01 ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-24 12:47 ` Oliver Neukum
2018-07-24 13:03 ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-24 13:01 ` Oliver Neukum [this message]
2018-07-26 7:30 ` Oliver Neukum
2018-07-26 8:14 ` joeyli
2018-07-30 17:04 ` joeyli
2018-08-03 3:37 ` Yu Chen
2018-08-03 5:34 ` joeyli
2018-08-03 13:14 ` Ryan Chen
2018-08-03 14:05 ` joeyli
2018-08-03 16:09 ` Ryan Chen
2018-08-03 18:06 ` joeyli
2018-08-05 10:02 ` Pavel Machek
2018-08-06 8:45 ` Yu Chen
2018-08-06 10:39 ` joeyli
2018-08-07 7:43 ` Yu Chen
2018-08-07 16:27 ` joeyli
2018-08-08 17:58 ` Pavel Machek
2018-08-09 3:43 ` Yu Chen
2018-08-09 8:12 ` joeyli
2018-08-08 17:50 ` Pavel Machek
2018-08-09 3:01 ` Yu Chen
2018-08-09 6:53 ` Pavel Machek
2018-08-09 9:03 ` Oliver Neukum
2018-08-09 15:55 ` joeyli
2018-08-06 7:57 ` Yu Chen
2018-08-06 9:48 ` joeyli
2018-08-06 10:07 ` Yu Chen
2018-08-06 10:20 ` Oliver Neukum
2018-08-07 7:38 ` Yu Chen
2018-08-07 7:49 ` Ryan Chen
2018-08-07 10:04 ` Oliver Neukum
2018-07-24 14:47 ` joeyli
2018-07-19 14:58 ` joeyli
[not found] ` <edf92acf665b928f02104bb1835fd50723ab9980.1531924968.git.yu.c.chen@intel.com>
2018-07-19 5:32 ` [PATCH 3/4][RFC v2] PM / Hibernate: Encrypt the snapshot pages before submitted to the block device Yu Chen
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