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From: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
To: Yu Chen <yu.c.chen@intel.com>
Cc: Ryan Chen <yu.chen.surf@gmail.com>,
	jlee@suse.com, oneukum@suse.com,
	"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>,
	ebiggers@google.com, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>,
	smueller@chronox.de, denkenz@gmail.com,
	Linux PM list <linux-pm@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	kookoo.gu@intel.com, Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4][RFC v2] Introduce the in-kernel hibernation encryption
Date: Wed, 8 Aug 2018 19:50:36 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180808175036.GA16217@amd> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180806084534.GB12124@chenyu-desktop>

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Hi!

> > > > User space doesn't need to involve. The EFI root key is generated by
> > > > EFI boot stub and be transfer to kernel. It's stored in EFI boot service
> > > > variable that it can only be accessed by trusted EFI binary when
> > > > secure boot is enabled.
> > > >
> > > Okay, this apply to the 'suspend' phase, right?
> > > I'm still a little confused about the 'resume' phase.
> > > Taking encryption as example(not signature),
> > > the purpose of doing hibernation encryption is to prevent other users
> > > from stealing ram content. Say, user A uses a  passphrase to generate the
> > 
> > No, I don't think that's purpose here.
> > 
> > Purpose here is to prevent user from reading/modifying kernel memory
> > content on machine he owns.
> >
> Say, A puts his laptop into hibernation and walks away,
> and B walks by, and opens A's laptop and wakes up the system and he
> can do what he wants. Although EFI key/TPM trusted key is enabled,
> currently there's no certification during resume, which sounds
> unsafe to me. Afterall, the original requirement is to probe

Define unsafe.

If you want security against bad people resuming your machines, please
take a look at existing uswsusp solutions. It defends against that.

If you want security against bad people tampering with your machines
physically, sorry, there's no way to defend against that.

But I thought you were trying to do something for secure boot, and "bad
person resumes your machine" is out of scope there.

So please always explain security against _what kind of attack_ you
are trying to improve; intelligent communication is not possible
without that.

								Pavel

-- 
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-08-08 17:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 54+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-07-18 16:38 [PATCH 0/4][RFC v2] Introduce the in-kernel hibernation encryption Chen Yu
2018-07-18 16:39 ` [PATCH 1/4][RFC v2] PM / Hibernate: Add helper functions for " Chen Yu
2018-07-18 16:39 ` [PATCH 2/4][RFC v2] PM / hibernate: Install crypto hooks " Chen Yu
2018-07-18 16:40 ` [PATCH 4/4][RFC v2] tools: create power/crypto utility Chen Yu
2018-07-18 20:22 ` [PATCH 0/4][RFC v2] Introduce the in-kernel hibernation encryption Pavel Machek
2018-07-18 23:58   ` Yu Chen
2018-07-19 11:01     ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-19 13:20       ` Yu Chen
2018-07-20 10:25         ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-23 11:42           ` Oliver Neukum
2018-07-23 12:22             ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-23 16:38               ` Yu Chen
2018-07-23 16:38                 ` Yu Chen
2018-07-24 12:05                 ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-24 11:49               ` Oliver Neukum
2018-07-24 13:04                 ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-23 16:23             ` Yu Chen
2018-07-24 11:40               ` Oliver Neukum
2018-07-24 12:01               ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-24 12:47                 ` Oliver Neukum
2018-07-24 13:03                   ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-24 13:01                     ` Oliver Neukum
2018-07-26  7:30               ` Oliver Neukum
2018-07-26  8:14                 ` joeyli
2018-07-30 17:04                   ` joeyli
2018-08-03  3:37                     ` Yu Chen
2018-08-03  5:34                       ` joeyli
2018-08-03 13:14                         ` Ryan Chen
2018-08-03 14:05                           ` joeyli
2018-08-03 16:09                             ` Ryan Chen
2018-08-03 18:06                               ` joeyli
2018-08-05 10:02                           ` Pavel Machek
2018-08-06  8:45                             ` Yu Chen
2018-08-06 10:39                               ` joeyli
2018-08-07  7:43                                 ` Yu Chen
2018-08-07 16:27                                   ` joeyli
2018-08-08 17:58                                 ` Pavel Machek
2018-08-09  3:43                                   ` Yu Chen
2018-08-09  8:12                                     ` joeyli
2018-08-08 17:50                               ` Pavel Machek [this message]
2018-08-09  3:01                                 ` Yu Chen
2018-08-09  6:53                                   ` Pavel Machek
2018-08-09  9:03                                   ` Oliver Neukum
2018-08-09 15:55                                   ` joeyli
2018-08-06  7:57                 ` Yu Chen
2018-08-06  9:48                   ` joeyli
2018-08-06 10:07                     ` Yu Chen
2018-08-06 10:20                   ` Oliver Neukum
2018-08-07  7:38                     ` Yu Chen
2018-08-07  7:49                       ` Ryan Chen
2018-08-07 10:04                       ` Oliver Neukum
2018-07-24 14:47             ` joeyli
2018-07-19 14:58       ` joeyli
     [not found] ` <edf92acf665b928f02104bb1835fd50723ab9980.1531924968.git.yu.c.chen@intel.com>
2018-07-19  5:32   ` [PATCH 3/4][RFC v2] PM / Hibernate: Encrypt the snapshot pages before submitted to the block device Yu Chen

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