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From: Kristen C Accardi <kristen@linux.intel.com>
To: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] x86: entry: flush the cache if syscall error
Date: Tue, 11 Sep 2018 09:01:02 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1536681662.3382.7.camel@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180911084148.GA23570@kroah.com>

On Tue, 2018-09-11 at 10:41 +0200, Greg KH wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 12:10:02PM -0700, Kristen Carlson Accardi
> wrote:
> > This patch aims to make it harder to perform cache timing attacks
> > on data
> > left behind by system calls. If we have an error returned from a
> > syscall,
> > flush the L1 cache.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen@linux.intel.com>
> > ---
> >  arch/x86/Kconfig        |  8 ++++++++
> >  arch/x86/entry/common.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
> >  2 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
> > 
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> > index c5ff296bc5d1..8a67642ff9fe 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> > +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> > @@ -445,6 +445,14 @@ config RETPOLINE
> >  	  code are eliminated. Since this includes the syscall
> > entry path,
> >  	  it is not entirely pointless.
> >  
> > +config SYSCALL_FLUSH
> > +	bool "Clear L1 Cache on syscall errors"
> > +	default y
> 
> "y" normally is only for "your machine will not boot without this
> option", and I don't think that's the case here :)

true. :). I wish there was a way to indicate that this option provided
enhanced security so that people could just select all of these
features at once and I could make it select based on that option.

> 
> > +	help
> > +	  Select to allow the L1 cache to be cleared upon return
> > of
> > +	  an error code from a syscall. This will reduce the
> > likelyhood of
> > +	  speculative execution style attacks on syscalls.
> 
> Shouldn't this help text refer to the fact that this needs CPU
> support
> for this type of functionality?

OK, I will change it.

> 
> I like the idea, as a "gadget" normally only is used when an
> out-of-bands check happens, which implies someone could be trying to
> do
> something "bad", nice job.
> 
> thanks,
> 
> greg k-h

Thanks!

  reply	other threads:[~2018-09-11 16:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-09-10 19:10 [RFC PATCH] x86: entry: flush the cache if syscall error Kristen Carlson Accardi
2018-09-10 20:32 ` Jann Horn
2018-09-11 15:58   ` Kristen C Accardi
2018-09-11 16:12     ` Jann Horn
2018-09-11  8:41 ` Greg KH
2018-09-11 16:01   ` Kristen C Accardi [this message]
2018-09-11 16:06 ` Eric Biggers
2018-09-12 17:29   ` Kristen C Accardi
2018-09-12 17:45     ` Eric Biggers
2018-09-12 18:19       ` Rik van Riel
2018-09-11 18:02 ` Jann Horn
2018-09-12 17:34   ` Kristen C Accardi

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