From: "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>
To: "kirill@shutemov.name" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
"Sakkinen, Jarkko" <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>
Cc: "kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com"
<kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
"peterz@infradead.org" <peterz@infradead.org>,
"jmorris@namei.org" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"keyrings@vger.kernel.org" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
"willy@infradead.org" <willy@infradead.org>,
"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
"dhowells@redhat.com" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"Williams, Dan J" <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
"hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"luto@kernel.org" <luto@kernel.org>,
"bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>,
Hansen, Alison <alison.schofield@intel.com>,
"Nakajima, Jun" <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 00/13] Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption API (MKTME)
Date: Sat, 08 Dec 2018 01:33:39 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1544232812.28511.39.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <19c539f8c6c9b34974e4cb4f268eb64fe7ba4297.camel@intel.com>
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>
To: "kirill@shutemov.name" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
"Sakkinen, Jarkko" <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>
Cc: "kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com"
<kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
"peterz@infradead.org" <peterz@infradead.org>,
"jmorris@namei.org" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"keyrings@vger.kernel.org" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
"willy@infradead.org" <willy@infradead.org>,
"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
"dhowells@redhat.com" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"Williams, Dan J" <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
"hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"luto@kernel.org" <luto@kernel.org>,
"bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>,
"Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
"Schofield, Alison" <alison.schofield@intel.com>,
"Nakajima, Jun" <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 00/13] Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption API (MKTME)
Date: Sat, 8 Dec 2018 01:33:39 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1544232812.28511.39.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <19c539f8c6c9b34974e4cb4f268eb64fe7ba4297.camel@intel.com>
On Fri, 2018-12-07 at 23:45 +0000, Sakkinen, Jarkko wrote:
> On Fri, 2018-12-07 at 13:59 -0800, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Fri, 2018-12-07 at 14:57 +0300, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > > > What is the threat model anyway for AMD and Intel technologies?
> > > >
> > > > For me it looks like that you can read, write and even replay
> > > > encrypted pages both in SME and TME.
> > >
> > > What replay attack are you talking about? MKTME uses AES-XTS with physical
> > > address tweak. So the data is tied to the place in physical address space
> > > and
> > > replacing one encrypted page with another encrypted page from different
> > > address will produce garbage on decryption.
> >
> > Just trying to understand how this works.
> >
> > So you use physical address like a nonce/version for the page and
> > thus prevent replay? Was not aware of this.
>
> The brutal fact is that a physical address is an astronomical stretch
> from a random value or increasing counter. Thus, it is fair to say that
> MKTME provides only naive measures against replay attacks...
>
> /Jarkko
Currently there's no nonce to protect cache line so TME/MKTME is not able to prevent replay attack
you mentioned. Currently MKTME only involves AES-XTS-128 encryption but nothing else. But like I
said if I understand correctly even SEV doesn't have integrity protection so not able to prevent
reply attack as well.
Thanks,
-Kai
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>
To: "kirill@shutemov.name" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
"Sakkinen, Jarkko" <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>
Cc: "kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com"
<kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
"peterz@infradead.org" <peterz@infradead.org>,
"jmorris@namei.org" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"keyrings@vger.kernel.org" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
"willy@infradead.org" <willy@infradead.org>,
"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
"dhowells@redhat.com" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"Williams, Dan J" <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
"hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"luto@kernel.org" <luto@kernel.org>,
"bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>, Hansen,,
Alison <alison.schofield@intel.com>,
"Nakajima, Jun" <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 00/13] Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption API (MKTME)
Date: Sat, 8 Dec 2018 01:33:39 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1544232812.28511.39.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <19c539f8c6c9b34974e4cb4f268eb64fe7ba4297.camel@intel.com>
On Fri, 2018-12-07 at 23:45 +0000, Sakkinen, Jarkko wrote:
> On Fri, 2018-12-07 at 13:59 -0800, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Fri, 2018-12-07 at 14:57 +0300, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > > > What is the threat model anyway for AMD and Intel technologies?
> > > >
> > > > For me it looks like that you can read, write and even replay
> > > > encrypted pages both in SME and TME.
> > >
> > > What replay attack are you talking about? MKTME uses AES-XTS with physical
> > > address tweak. So the data is tied to the place in physical address space
> > > and
> > > replacing one encrypted page with another encrypted page from different
> > > address will produce garbage on decryption.
> >
> > Just trying to understand how this works.
> >
> > So you use physical address like a nonce/version for the page and
> > thus prevent replay? Was not aware of this.
>
> The brutal fact is that a physical address is an astronomical stretch
> from a random value or increasing counter. Thus, it is fair to say that
> MKTME provides only naive measures against replay attacks...
>
> /Jarkko
Currently there's no nonce to protect cache line so TME/MKTME is not able to prevent replay attack
you mentioned. Currently MKTME only involves AES-XTS-128 encryption but nothing else. But like I
said if I understand correctly even SEV doesn't have integrity protection so not able to prevent
reply attack as well.
Thanks,
-Kai
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-12-08 1:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 198+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-12-04 7:39 [RFC v2 00/13] Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption API (MKTME) Alison Schofield
2018-12-04 7:39 ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-04 7:39 ` [RFC v2 01/13] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME APIs Alison Schofield
2018-12-04 7:39 ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-05 18:11 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-05 18:11 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-05 19:22 ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-05 19:22 ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-05 23:35 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-05 23:35 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-06 8:04 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-06 8:04 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-06 8:04 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-04 7:39 ` [RFC v2 02/13] mm: Generalize the mprotect implementation to support extensions Alison Schofield
2018-12-04 7:39 ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-06 8:08 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-06 8:08 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-06 8:08 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-04 7:39 ` [RFC v2 03/13] syscall/x86: Wire up a new system call for memory encryption keys Alison Schofield
2018-12-04 7:39 ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-04 7:39 ` [RFC v2 04/13] x86/mm: Add helper functions for MKTME " Alison Schofield
2018-12-04 7:39 ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-04 9:14 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-12-04 9:14 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-12-05 5:49 ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-05 5:49 ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-04 15:35 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-04 15:35 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-05 5:52 ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-05 5:52 ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-06 8:31 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-06 8:31 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-06 8:31 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-04 7:39 ` [RFC v2 05/13] x86/mm: Set KeyIDs in encrypted VMAs Alison Schofield
2018-12-04 7:39 ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-06 8:37 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-06 8:37 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-06 8:37 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-04 7:39 ` [RFC v2 06/13] mm: Add the encrypt_mprotect() system call Alison Schofield
2018-12-04 7:39 ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-06 8:38 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-06 8:38 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-06 8:38 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-04 7:39 ` [RFC v2 07/13] x86/mm: Add helpers for reference counting encrypted VMAs Alison Schofield
2018-12-04 7:39 ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-04 8:58 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-12-04 8:58 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-12-05 5:28 ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-05 5:28 ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-04 7:39 ` [RFC v2 08/13] mm: Use reference counting for " Alison Schofield
2018-12-04 7:39 ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-04 7:39 ` [RFC v2 09/13] mm: Restrict memory encryption to anonymous VMA's Alison Schofield
2018-12-04 7:39 ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-04 9:10 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-12-04 9:10 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-12-05 5:30 ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-05 5:30 ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-05 9:07 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-12-05 9:07 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-12-04 7:39 ` [RFC v2 10/13] keys/mktme: Add the MKTME Key Service type for memory encryption Alison Schofield
2018-12-04 7:39 ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-06 8:51 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-06 8:51 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-06 8:51 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-06 8:54 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-06 8:54 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-06 8:54 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-06 15:11 ` Dave Hansen
2018-12-06 15:11 ` Dave Hansen
2018-12-06 22:56 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-06 22:56 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-04 7:39 ` [RFC v2 11/13] keys/mktme: Program memory encryption keys on a system wide basis Alison Schofield
2018-12-04 7:39 ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-04 9:21 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-12-04 9:21 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-12-04 9:50 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-12-04 9:50 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-12-05 5:44 ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-05 5:44 ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-05 5:43 ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-05 5:43 ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-05 9:10 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-12-05 9:10 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-12-05 17:26 ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-05 17:26 ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-04 7:39 ` [RFC v2 12/13] keys/mktme: Save MKTME data if kernel cmdline parameter allows Alison Schofield
2018-12-04 7:39 ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-04 9:22 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-12-04 9:22 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-12-07 2:14 ` Huang, Kai
2018-12-07 2:14 ` Huang, Kai
2018-12-07 3:42 ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-07 3:42 ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-07 6:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-07 6:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-07 6:45 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-07 6:45 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-07 11:47 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-12-07 11:47 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-12-04 7:40 ` [RFC v2 13/13] keys/mktme: Support CPU Hotplug for MKTME keys Alison Schofield
2018-12-04 7:40 ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-04 9:28 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-12-04 9:28 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-12-05 5:32 ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-05 5:32 ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-04 9:31 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-12-04 9:31 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-12-05 5:36 ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-05 5:36 ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-04 9:25 ` [RFC v2 00/13] Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption API (MKTME) Peter Zijlstra
2018-12-04 9:25 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-12-04 9:46 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-12-04 9:46 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-12-05 20:32 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-05 20:32 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-05 20:32 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-06 11:22 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-12-06 11:22 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-12-06 14:59 ` Dave Hansen
2018-12-06 14:59 ` Dave Hansen
2018-12-07 10:12 ` Huang, Kai
2018-12-07 10:12 ` Huang, Kai
2018-12-06 21:23 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-06 21:23 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-06 21:23 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-07 11:54 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-12-07 11:54 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-12-04 19:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-04 19:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-04 20:00 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-04 20:00 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-04 20:32 ` Dave Hansen
2018-12-04 20:32 ` Dave Hansen
2018-12-05 22:19 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-05 22:19 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-07 2:05 ` Huang, Kai
2018-12-07 2:05 ` Huang, Kai
2018-12-07 6:48 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-07 6:48 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-07 11:57 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-12-07 11:57 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-12-07 21:59 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-07 21:59 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-07 21:59 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-07 23:45 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-07 23:45 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-07 23:45 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-07 23:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-07 23:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-08 1:33 ` Huang, Kai [this message]
2018-12-08 1:33 ` Huang, Kai
2018-12-08 1:33 ` Huang, Kai
2018-12-08 3:53 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-08 3:53 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-08 3:53 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-12 15:31 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-12 15:31 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-12 15:31 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-12 16:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-12 16:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-12 16:43 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-12 16:43 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-12 23:27 ` Huang, Kai
2018-12-12 23:27 ` Huang, Kai
2018-12-13 5:49 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-13 5:49 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-13 5:52 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-13 5:52 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-12 23:24 ` Huang, Kai
2018-12-12 23:24 ` Huang, Kai
2018-12-07 23:35 ` Eric Rannaud
2018-12-07 23:35 ` Eric Rannaud
2018-12-05 23:49 ` Dave Hansen
2018-12-05 23:49 ` Dave Hansen
2018-12-06 1:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-06 1:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-06 1:25 ` Dan Williams
2018-12-06 1:25 ` Dan Williams
2018-12-06 15:39 ` Dave Hansen
2018-12-06 15:39 ` Dave Hansen
2018-12-06 19:10 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-06 19:10 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-06 19:31 ` Dave Hansen
2018-12-06 19:31 ` Dave Hansen
2018-12-07 1:55 ` Huang, Kai
2018-12-07 1:55 ` Huang, Kai
2018-12-07 1:55 ` Huang, Kai
2018-12-07 4:23 ` Dave Hansen
2018-12-07 4:23 ` Dave Hansen
2018-12-07 23:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-07 23:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-08 1:11 ` Dave Hansen
2018-12-08 1:11 ` Dave Hansen
2018-12-08 2:07 ` Huang, Kai
2018-12-08 2:07 ` Huang, Kai
2018-12-05 20:30 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-05 20:30 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-05 20:30 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
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