From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Jia Zhang <zhang.jia@linux.alibaba.com>,
zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com, pvorel@suse.cz
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, ltp@lists.linux.it
Subject: Re: [PATCH 6/6] ima: Use ima tcb policy files for test
Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 14:32:22 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1547494342.4156.188.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1546827989-43569-7-git-send-email-zhang.jia@linux.alibaba.com>
On Mon, 2019-01-07 at 10:26 +0800, Jia Zhang wrote:
> In order to make all tests running smoothly, the policy files should
> keep up with the default ima tcb policy.
Keeping the policy rules in sync is a good idea, but some of the rules
might cause a regression with older kernels (eg. NSFS magic). Not
including the rule, also poses a problem.
The kernel headers package includes magic.h. One solution would be to check whether a magic name is included in magic.h.
> Especially ima_violations.sh
> expects to have a func=FILE_CHECK with mask=MAY_WRITE to trigger open
> writer and ToMtoU violations. Unfortunately, if ima_policy.sh
> which would change the system IMA policy ran before ima_violations.sh,
> ima_violations.sh would fail for sure because its prerequisite is broken.
We're not really interested in measuring files that are opened for
write. They're changing. The violation checking is independent of
having a measurement write rule. Look at the
kernel ima_rdwr_violation_check().
Mimi
>
> Signed-off-by: Jia Zhang <zhang.jia@linux.alibaba.com>
> ---
> .../security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy | 17 +++++++++++++++--
> .../integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy-invalid | 17 +++++++++++++++--
> 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy
> index 9976ddf..546267c 100644
> --- a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy
> +++ b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy
> @@ -11,6 +11,19 @@ dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
> dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
> # SECURITYFS_MAGIC
> dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
> -measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
> +# DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x1cd1
> +# BINFMTFS_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x42494e4d
> +# SELINUX_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
> +# CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x27e0eb
> +# NSFS_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x6e736673
> +measure func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
> measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
> -measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
> +measure func=FILE_CHECK euid=0
> +measure func=FILE_CHECK uid=0
> +measure func=MODULE_CHECK
> +measure func=FIRMWARE_CHECK
> diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy-invalid b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy-invalid
> index 04dff89..bc72d0c 100644
> --- a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy-invalid
> +++ b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy-invalid
> @@ -11,6 +11,19 @@ dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
> dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
> # SECURITYFS_MAGIC
> dnt_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
> -measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
> +# DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x1cd1
> +# BINFMTFS_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x42494e4d
> +# SELINUX_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
> +# CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x27e0eb
> +# NSFS_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x6e736673
> +measure func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
> measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
> -measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
> +measure func=FILE_CHECK euid=0
> +measure func=FILE_CHECK uid=0
> +measure func=MODULE_CHECK
> +measure func=FIRMWARE_CHECK
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: ltp@lists.linux.it
Subject: [LTP] [PATCH 6/6] ima: Use ima tcb policy files for test
Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 14:32:22 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1547494342.4156.188.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1546827989-43569-7-git-send-email-zhang.jia@linux.alibaba.com>
On Mon, 2019-01-07 at 10:26 +0800, Jia Zhang wrote:
> In order to make all tests running smoothly, the policy files should
> keep up with the default ima tcb policy.
Keeping the policy rules in sync is a good idea, but some of the rules
might cause a regression with older kernels (eg. NSFS magic). Not
including the rule, also poses a problem.
The kernel headers package includes magic.h. One solution would be to check whether a magic name is included in magic.h.
> Especially ima_violations.sh
> expects to have a func=FILE_CHECK with mask=MAY_WRITE to trigger open
> writer and ToMtoU violations. Unfortunately, if ima_policy.sh
> which would change the system IMA policy ran before ima_violations.sh,
> ima_violations.sh would fail for sure because its prerequisite is broken.
We're not really interested in measuring files that are opened for
write. They're changing. The violation checking is independent of
having a measurement write rule. Look at the
kernel ima_rdwr_violation_check().
Mimi
>
> Signed-off-by: Jia Zhang <zhang.jia@linux.alibaba.com>
> ---
> .../security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy | 17 +++++++++++++++--
> .../integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy-invalid | 17 +++++++++++++++--
> 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy
> index 9976ddf..546267c 100644
> --- a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy
> +++ b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy
> @@ -11,6 +11,19 @@ dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
> dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
> # SECURITYFS_MAGIC
> dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
> -measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
> +# DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x1cd1
> +# BINFMTFS_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x42494e4d
> +# SELINUX_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
> +# CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x27e0eb
> +# NSFS_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x6e736673
> +measure func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
> measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
> -measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
> +measure func=FILE_CHECK euid=0
> +measure func=FILE_CHECK uid=0
> +measure func=MODULE_CHECK
> +measure func=FIRMWARE_CHECK
> diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy-invalid b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy-invalid
> index 04dff89..bc72d0c 100644
> --- a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy-invalid
> +++ b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy-invalid
> @@ -11,6 +11,19 @@ dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
> dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
> # SECURITYFS_MAGIC
> dnt_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
> -measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
> +# DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x1cd1
> +# BINFMTFS_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x42494e4d
> +# SELINUX_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
> +# CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x27e0eb
> +# NSFS_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x6e736673
> +measure func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
> measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
> -measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
> +measure func=FILE_CHECK euid=0
> +measure func=FILE_CHECK uid=0
> +measure func=MODULE_CHECK
> +measure func=FIRMWARE_CHECK
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-01-14 19:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-01-07 2:26 [PATCH 0/6] LTP IMA fix bundle Jia Zhang
2019-01-07 2:26 ` [LTP] " Jia Zhang
2019-01-07 2:26 ` [PATCH 1/6] ima/ima_boot_aggregate: Fix the definition of event log Jia Zhang
2019-01-07 2:26 ` [LTP] " Jia Zhang
2019-01-07 2:26 ` [PATCH 2/6] ima/ima_boot_aggregate: Don't hard code the length of sha1 hash Jia Zhang
2019-01-07 2:26 ` [LTP] " Jia Zhang
2019-01-14 20:33 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-01-14 20:33 ` [LTP] " Mimi Zohar
2019-01-07 2:26 ` [PATCH 3/6] ima/ima_boot_aggregate: Fix extending PCRs beyond PCR 0-7 Jia Zhang
2019-01-07 2:26 ` [LTP] " Jia Zhang
2019-01-14 20:32 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-01-14 20:32 ` [LTP] " Mimi Zohar
2019-01-07 2:26 ` [PATCH 4/6] ima: Code cleanup Jia Zhang
2019-01-07 2:26 ` [LTP] " Jia Zhang
2019-01-14 21:09 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-01-14 21:09 ` [LTP] " Mimi Zohar
2019-01-07 2:26 ` [PATCH 5/6] ima: Rename the folder name for policy files to datafiles Jia Zhang
2019-01-07 2:26 ` [LTP] " Jia Zhang
2019-01-07 2:26 ` [PATCH 6/6] ima: Use ima tcb policy files for test Jia Zhang
2019-01-07 2:26 ` [LTP] " Jia Zhang
2019-01-07 15:59 ` Jia Zhang
2019-01-07 15:59 ` [LTP] " Jia Zhang
2019-01-14 19:32 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2019-01-14 19:32 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-01-15 1:12 ` Jia Zhang
2019-01-15 1:12 ` [LTP] " Jia Zhang
2019-01-15 10:50 ` Petr Vorel
2019-01-15 10:50 ` [LTP] " Petr Vorel
2019-01-13 12:14 ` [PATCH 0/6] LTP IMA fix bundle Jia Zhang
2019-01-13 12:14 ` [LTP] " Jia Zhang
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