From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: linux-nvdimm <linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/6] security/keys/encrypted: Clean up request_trusted_key()
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 02:35:31 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1553049331.4899.177.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAPcyv4heLwdJR+xKZfvx5TAvqsKr3sNCda_ovivguLKbiXhyYg@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, 2019-03-19 at 17:20 -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 19, 2019 at 5:07 PM Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, 2019-03-18 at 23:06 -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> >
> > < snip >
> >
> > > +/*
> > > + * request_trusted_key - request the trusted key
> > > + *
> > > + * Trusted keys are sealed to PCRs and other metadata. Although userspace
> > > + * manages both trusted/encrypted key-types, like the encrypted key type
> > > + * data, trusted key type data is not visible decrypted from userspace.
> > > + */
> > > +static struct key *request_trusted_key(const char *trusted_desc,
> > > + const u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen)
> > > +{
> > > + struct trusted_key_payload *tpayload;
> > > + struct key_type *type;
> > > + struct key *tkey;
> > > +
> > > + type = key_type_lookup("trusted");
> >
> > The associated key_type_put() will need to be called.
>
> Yes.
I don't know if defining a key_type_lookup() wrapper, perhaps named
is_key_type_available(), would help.  Both key_type_lookup() and
key_type_put() would be called.  The existing code could then remain
the same.
Mimi
>
> >
> > > + if (IS_ERR(type)) {
> > > + tkey = (struct key *)type;
> > > + goto error;
> > > + }
> > > + tkey = request_key(type, trusted_desc, NULL);
> > > + if (IS_ERR(tkey))
> > > + goto error;
> > > +
> > > + down_read(&tkey->sem);
> > > + tpayload = tkey->payload.data[0];
> > > + *master_key = tpayload->key;
> > > + *master_keylen = tpayload->key_len;
> > > +error:
> > > + return tkey;
> > > +}
> > > +
> >
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: linux-nvdimm <linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/6] security/keys/encrypted: Clean up request_trusted_key()
Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 22:35:31 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1553049331.4899.177.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAPcyv4heLwdJR+xKZfvx5TAvqsKr3sNCda_ovivguLKbiXhyYg@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, 2019-03-19 at 17:20 -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 19, 2019 at 5:07 PM Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, 2019-03-18 at 23:06 -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> >
> > < snip >
> >
> > > +/*
> > > + * request_trusted_key - request the trusted key
> > > + *
> > > + * Trusted keys are sealed to PCRs and other metadata. Although userspace
> > > + * manages both trusted/encrypted key-types, like the encrypted key type
> > > + * data, trusted key type data is not visible decrypted from userspace.
> > > + */
> > > +static struct key *request_trusted_key(const char *trusted_desc,
> > > + const u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen)
> > > +{
> > > + struct trusted_key_payload *tpayload;
> > > + struct key_type *type;
> > > + struct key *tkey;
> > > +
> > > + type = key_type_lookup("trusted");
> >
> > The associated key_type_put() will need to be called.
>
> Yes.
I don't know if defining a key_type_lookup() wrapper, perhaps named
is_key_type_available(), would help. Both key_type_lookup() and
key_type_put() would be called. The existing code could then remain
the same.
Mimi
>
> >
> > > + if (IS_ERR(type)) {
> > > + tkey = (struct key *)type;
> > > + goto error;
> > > + }
> > > + tkey = request_key(type, trusted_desc, NULL);
> > > + if (IS_ERR(tkey))
> > > + goto error;
> > > +
> > > + down_read(&tkey->sem);
> > > + tpayload = tkey->payload.data[0];
> > > + *master_key = tpayload->key;
> > > + *master_keylen = tpayload->key_len;
> > > +error:
> > > + return tkey;
> > > +}
> > > +
> >
_______________________________________________
Linux-nvdimm mailing list
Linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org
https://lists.01.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-nvdimm
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Vishal L Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>,
linux-nvdimm <linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/6] security/keys/encrypted: Clean up request_trusted_key()
Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 22:35:31 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1553049331.4899.177.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAPcyv4heLwdJR+xKZfvx5TAvqsKr3sNCda_ovivguLKbiXhyYg@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, 2019-03-19 at 17:20 -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 19, 2019 at 5:07 PM Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, 2019-03-18 at 23:06 -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> >
> > < snip >
> >
> > > +/*
> > > + * request_trusted_key - request the trusted key
> > > + *
> > > + * Trusted keys are sealed to PCRs and other metadata. Although userspace
> > > + * manages both trusted/encrypted key-types, like the encrypted key type
> > > + * data, trusted key type data is not visible decrypted from userspace.
> > > + */
> > > +static struct key *request_trusted_key(const char *trusted_desc,
> > > + const u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen)
> > > +{
> > > + struct trusted_key_payload *tpayload;
> > > + struct key_type *type;
> > > + struct key *tkey;
> > > +
> > > + type = key_type_lookup("trusted");
> >
> > The associated key_type_put() will need to be called.
>
> Yes.
I don't know if defining a key_type_lookup() wrapper, perhaps named
is_key_type_available(), would help. Both key_type_lookup() and
key_type_put() would be called. The existing code could then remain
the same.
Mimi
>
> >
> > > + if (IS_ERR(type)) {
> > > + tkey = (struct key *)type;
> > > + goto error;
> > > + }
> > > + tkey = request_key(type, trusted_desc, NULL);
> > > + if (IS_ERR(tkey))
> > > + goto error;
> > > +
> > > + down_read(&tkey->sem);
> > > + tpayload = tkey->payload.data[0];
> > > + *master_key = tpayload->key;
> > > + *master_keylen = tpayload->key_len;
> > > +error:
> > > + return tkey;
> > > +}
> > > +
> >
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-03-20 2:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 70+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-03-19 6:06 [PATCH 0/6] security/keys/encrypted: Break module dependency chain Dan Williams
2019-03-19 6:06 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-19 6:06 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-19 6:06 ` [PATCH 1/6] security/keys/encrypted: Allow operation without trusted.ko Dan Williams
2019-03-19 6:06 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-19 6:06 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-19 6:06 ` [PATCH 2/6] security/keys/encrypted: Clean up request_trusted_key() Dan Williams
2019-03-19 6:06 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-19 6:06 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-20 0:06 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-20 0:06 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-20 0:06 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-20 0:20 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-20 0:20 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-20 0:20 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-20 1:10 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-20 1:10 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-20 1:10 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-20 1:34 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-20 1:34 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-20 1:34 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-20 1:37 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-20 1:37 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-20 1:37 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-20 2:35 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2019-03-20 2:35 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-20 2:35 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-20 5:48 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-20 5:48 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-20 5:48 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-20 12:06 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-20 12:06 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-20 12:06 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-20 15:27 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-20 15:27 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-20 15:27 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-19 6:06 ` [PATCH 3/6] libnvdimm/security: Drop direct dependency on key_type_encrypted Dan Williams
2019-03-19 6:06 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-19 6:06 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-19 16:46 ` Dave Jiang
2019-03-19 16:46 ` Dave Jiang
2019-03-19 16:46 ` Dave Jiang
[not found] ` <155297557534.2276575.16264199708584900090.stgit-p8uTFz9XbKj2zm6wflaqv1nYeNYlB/vhral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2019-03-19 6:06 ` [PATCH 4/6] security/keys/ecryptfs: " Dan Williams
2019-03-19 6:06 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-19 6:06 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-19 6:06 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-19 6:06 ` [PATCH 5/6] security/integrity/evm: " Dan Williams
2019-03-19 6:06 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-19 6:06 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-19 6:06 ` [PATCH 6/6] security/keys/encrypted: Drop export of key_type_encrypted Dan Williams
2019-03-19 6:06 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-19 6:06 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-19 21:01 ` [PATCH 0/6] security/keys/encrypted: Break module dependency chain Dan Williams
2019-03-19 21:01 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-19 21:08 ` James Bottomley
2019-03-19 21:08 ` James Bottomley
2019-03-19 21:08 ` James Bottomley
2019-03-19 21:23 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-19 21:23 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-19 21:23 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-20 1:20 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-20 1:20 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-20 1:20 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-20 1:20 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-21 13:45 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-21 13:45 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-21 13:45 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-21 13:48 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-21 13:48 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-21 13:48 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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