From: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
To: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org,
serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org,
axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org,
eparis@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org,
dm-devel@redhat.com, audit@vger.kernel.org,
roberto.sassu@huawei.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>,
Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v10 01/17] security: add ipe lsm
Date: Wed, 28 Jun 2023 14:09:15 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1687986571-16823-2-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1687986571-16823-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
From: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) is an LSM that provides an
complimentary approach to Mandatory Access Control than existing LSMs
today.
Existing LSMs have centered around the concept of access to a resource
should be controlled by the current user's credentials. IPE's approach,
is that access to a resource should be controlled by the system's trust
of a current resource.
The basis of this approach is defining a global policy to specify which
resource can be trusted.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
---
v2:
+ Split evaluation loop, access control hooks,
and evaluation loop from policy parser and userspace
interface to pass mailing list character limit
v3:
+ Move ipe_load_properties to patch 04.
+ Remove useless 0-initializations
+ Prefix extern variables with ipe_
+ Remove kernel module parameters, as these are
exposed through sysctls.
+ Add more prose to the IPE base config option
help text.
+ Use GFP_KERNEL for audit_log_start.
+ Remove unnecessary caching system.
+ Remove comments from headers
+ Use rcu_access_pointer for rcu-pointer null check
+ Remove usage of reqprot; use prot only.
+ Move policy load and activation audit event to 03/12
v4:
+ Remove sysctls in favor of securityfs nodes
+ Re-add kernel module parameters, as these are now
exposed through securityfs.
+ Refactor property audit loop to a separate function.
v5:
+ fix minor grammatical errors
+ do not group rule by curly-brace in audit record,
reconstruct the exact rule.
v6:
+ No changes
v7:
+ Further split lsm creation into a separate commit from the
evaluation loop and audit system, for easier review.
+ Introduce the concept of an ipe_context, a scoped way to
introduce execution policies, used initially for allowing for
kunit tests in isolation.
v8:
+ Follow lsmname_hook_name convention for lsm hooks.
+ Move LSM blob accessors to ipe.c and mark LSM blobs as static.
v9:
+ Remove ipe_context for simplification
v10:
+ Add github url
---
MAINTAINERS | 7 +++++++
security/Kconfig | 11 ++++++-----
security/Makefile | 1 +
security/ipe/Kconfig | 17 +++++++++++++++++
security/ipe/Makefile | 10 ++++++++++
security/ipe/ipe.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/ipe/ipe.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++
7 files changed, 94 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/ipe/Kconfig
create mode 100644 security/ipe/Makefile
create mode 100644 security/ipe/ipe.c
create mode 100644 security/ipe/ipe.h
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index a82795114ad4..ad00887d38ea 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -10278,6 +10278,13 @@ T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git
F: security/integrity/
F: security/integrity/ima/
+INTEGRITY POLICY ENFORCEMENT (IPE)
+M: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
+L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
+S: Supported
+T: git git://github.com/microsoft/ipe.git
+F: security/ipe/
+
INTEL 810/815 FRAMEBUFFER DRIVER
M: Antonino Daplas <adaplas@gmail.com>
L: linux-fbdev@vger.kernel.org
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 97abeb9b9a19..daa4626ea99c 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -202,6 +202,7 @@ source "security/yama/Kconfig"
source "security/safesetid/Kconfig"
source "security/lockdown/Kconfig"
source "security/landlock/Kconfig"
+source "security/ipe/Kconfig"
source "security/integrity/Kconfig"
@@ -241,11 +242,11 @@ endchoice
config LSM
string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs"
- default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
- default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
- default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
- default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
- default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf"
+ default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf,ipe" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
+ default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,bpf,ipe" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
+ default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,tomoyo,bpf,ipe" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
+ default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,bpf,ipe" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
+ default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf,ipe"
help
A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order.
Any LSMs left off this list, except for those with order
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index 18121f8f85cd..527b1864d96c 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown/
obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUPS) += device_cgroup.o
obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) += bpf/
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) += landlock/
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += ipe/
# Object integrity file lists
obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity/
diff --git a/security/ipe/Kconfig b/security/ipe/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e4875fb04883
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/ipe/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#
+# Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) configuration
+#
+
+menuconfig SECURITY_IPE
+ bool "Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE)"
+ depends on SECURITY && SECURITYFS
+ select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
+ select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+ help
+ This option enables the Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM
+ allowing users to define a policy to enforce a trust-based access
+ control. A key feature of IPE is a customizable policy to allow
+ admins to reconfigure trust requirements on the fly.
+
+ If unsure, answer N.
diff --git a/security/ipe/Makefile b/security/ipe/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..571648579991
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/ipe/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
+#
+# Makefile for building the IPE module as part of the kernel tree.
+#
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += \
+ hooks.o \
+ ipe.o \
diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.c b/security/ipe/ipe.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2ee0f5de29d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/ipe/ipe.c
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+#include "ipe.h"
+
+static struct lsm_blob_sizes ipe_blobs __ro_after_init = {
+};
+
+static struct security_hook_list ipe_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+};
+
+/**
+ * ipe_init - Entry point of IPE.
+ *
+ * This is called at LSM init, which happens occurs early during kernel
+ * start up. During this phase, IPE registers its hooks and loads the
+ * builtin boot policy.
+ * Return:
+ * * 0 - OK
+ * * -ENOMEM - Out of memory
+ */
+static int __init ipe_init(void)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ security_add_hooks(ipe_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ipe_hooks), "ipe");
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+DEFINE_LSM(ipe) = {
+ .name = "ipe",
+ .init = ipe_init,
+ .blobs = &ipe_blobs,
+};
diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.h b/security/ipe/ipe.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a1c68d0fc2e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/ipe/ipe.h
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _IPE_H
+#define _IPE_H
+
+#ifdef pr_fmt
+#undef pr_fmt
+#endif
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "IPE: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+
+#endif /* _IPE_H */
--
2.25.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
To: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org,
serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org,
axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org,
eparis@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com
Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>,
roberto.sassu@huawei.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org,
audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org,
Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [dm-devel] [RFC PATCH v10 01/17] security: add ipe lsm
Date: Wed, 28 Jun 2023 14:09:15 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1687986571-16823-2-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1687986571-16823-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
From: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) is an LSM that provides an
complimentary approach to Mandatory Access Control than existing LSMs
today.
Existing LSMs have centered around the concept of access to a resource
should be controlled by the current user's credentials. IPE's approach,
is that access to a resource should be controlled by the system's trust
of a current resource.
The basis of this approach is defining a global policy to specify which
resource can be trusted.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
---
v2:
+ Split evaluation loop, access control hooks,
and evaluation loop from policy parser and userspace
interface to pass mailing list character limit
v3:
+ Move ipe_load_properties to patch 04.
+ Remove useless 0-initializations
+ Prefix extern variables with ipe_
+ Remove kernel module parameters, as these are
exposed through sysctls.
+ Add more prose to the IPE base config option
help text.
+ Use GFP_KERNEL for audit_log_start.
+ Remove unnecessary caching system.
+ Remove comments from headers
+ Use rcu_access_pointer for rcu-pointer null check
+ Remove usage of reqprot; use prot only.
+ Move policy load and activation audit event to 03/12
v4:
+ Remove sysctls in favor of securityfs nodes
+ Re-add kernel module parameters, as these are now
exposed through securityfs.
+ Refactor property audit loop to a separate function.
v5:
+ fix minor grammatical errors
+ do not group rule by curly-brace in audit record,
reconstruct the exact rule.
v6:
+ No changes
v7:
+ Further split lsm creation into a separate commit from the
evaluation loop and audit system, for easier review.
+ Introduce the concept of an ipe_context, a scoped way to
introduce execution policies, used initially for allowing for
kunit tests in isolation.
v8:
+ Follow lsmname_hook_name convention for lsm hooks.
+ Move LSM blob accessors to ipe.c and mark LSM blobs as static.
v9:
+ Remove ipe_context for simplification
v10:
+ Add github url
---
MAINTAINERS | 7 +++++++
security/Kconfig | 11 ++++++-----
security/Makefile | 1 +
security/ipe/Kconfig | 17 +++++++++++++++++
security/ipe/Makefile | 10 ++++++++++
security/ipe/ipe.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/ipe/ipe.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++
7 files changed, 94 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/ipe/Kconfig
create mode 100644 security/ipe/Makefile
create mode 100644 security/ipe/ipe.c
create mode 100644 security/ipe/ipe.h
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index a82795114ad4..ad00887d38ea 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -10278,6 +10278,13 @@ T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git
F: security/integrity/
F: security/integrity/ima/
+INTEGRITY POLICY ENFORCEMENT (IPE)
+M: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
+L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
+S: Supported
+T: git git://github.com/microsoft/ipe.git
+F: security/ipe/
+
INTEL 810/815 FRAMEBUFFER DRIVER
M: Antonino Daplas <adaplas@gmail.com>
L: linux-fbdev@vger.kernel.org
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 97abeb9b9a19..daa4626ea99c 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -202,6 +202,7 @@ source "security/yama/Kconfig"
source "security/safesetid/Kconfig"
source "security/lockdown/Kconfig"
source "security/landlock/Kconfig"
+source "security/ipe/Kconfig"
source "security/integrity/Kconfig"
@@ -241,11 +242,11 @@ endchoice
config LSM
string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs"
- default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
- default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
- default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
- default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
- default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf"
+ default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf,ipe" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
+ default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,bpf,ipe" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
+ default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,tomoyo,bpf,ipe" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
+ default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,bpf,ipe" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
+ default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf,ipe"
help
A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order.
Any LSMs left off this list, except for those with order
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index 18121f8f85cd..527b1864d96c 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown/
obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUPS) += device_cgroup.o
obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) += bpf/
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) += landlock/
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += ipe/
# Object integrity file lists
obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity/
diff --git a/security/ipe/Kconfig b/security/ipe/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e4875fb04883
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/ipe/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#
+# Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) configuration
+#
+
+menuconfig SECURITY_IPE
+ bool "Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE)"
+ depends on SECURITY && SECURITYFS
+ select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
+ select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+ help
+ This option enables the Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM
+ allowing users to define a policy to enforce a trust-based access
+ control. A key feature of IPE is a customizable policy to allow
+ admins to reconfigure trust requirements on the fly.
+
+ If unsure, answer N.
diff --git a/security/ipe/Makefile b/security/ipe/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..571648579991
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/ipe/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
+#
+# Makefile for building the IPE module as part of the kernel tree.
+#
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += \
+ hooks.o \
+ ipe.o \
diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.c b/security/ipe/ipe.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2ee0f5de29d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/ipe/ipe.c
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+#include "ipe.h"
+
+static struct lsm_blob_sizes ipe_blobs __ro_after_init = {
+};
+
+static struct security_hook_list ipe_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+};
+
+/**
+ * ipe_init - Entry point of IPE.
+ *
+ * This is called at LSM init, which happens occurs early during kernel
+ * start up. During this phase, IPE registers its hooks and loads the
+ * builtin boot policy.
+ * Return:
+ * * 0 - OK
+ * * -ENOMEM - Out of memory
+ */
+static int __init ipe_init(void)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ security_add_hooks(ipe_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ipe_hooks), "ipe");
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+DEFINE_LSM(ipe) = {
+ .name = "ipe",
+ .init = ipe_init,
+ .blobs = &ipe_blobs,
+};
diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.h b/security/ipe/ipe.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a1c68d0fc2e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/ipe/ipe.h
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _IPE_H
+#define _IPE_H
+
+#ifdef pr_fmt
+#undef pr_fmt
+#endif
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "IPE: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+
+#endif /* _IPE_H */
--
2.25.1
--
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-06-28 21:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 100+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-06-28 21:09 [RFC PATCH v10 00/17] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` Fan Wu [this message]
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [dm-devel] [RFC PATCH v10 01/17] security: add ipe lsm Fan Wu
2023-07-08 4:22 ` [dm-devel] [PATCH RFC v10 1/17] " Paul Moore
2023-07-13 23:31 ` Fan Wu
2023-07-13 23:31 ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-07-08 5:36 ` Paul Moore
2023-07-08 5:36 ` [dm-devel] " Paul Moore
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 02/17] ipe: add policy parser Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-07-08 4:23 ` [dm-devel] [PATCH RFC v10 2/17] " Paul Moore
2023-07-14 4:18 ` Fan Wu
2023-07-14 4:18 ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-07-08 5:36 ` Paul Moore
2023-07-08 5:36 ` [dm-devel] " Paul Moore
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 03/17] ipe: add evaluation loop Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-07-08 4:23 ` [dm-devel] [PATCH RFC v10 3/17] " Paul Moore
2023-07-14 20:28 ` Fan Wu
2023-07-14 20:28 ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-07-08 5:36 ` Paul Moore
2023-07-08 5:36 ` [dm-devel] " Paul Moore
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 04/17] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel read Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-07-08 4:23 ` [dm-devel] [PATCH RFC v10 4/17] " Paul Moore
2023-07-14 21:47 ` Fan Wu
2023-07-14 21:47 ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-07-08 5:36 ` Paul Moore
2023-07-08 5:36 ` [dm-devel] " Paul Moore
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 05/17] ipe: introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-07-08 4:23 ` [dm-devel] [PATCH RFC v10 5/17] " Paul Moore
2023-07-14 23:56 ` Fan Wu
2023-07-14 23:56 ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-07-08 5:36 ` Paul Moore
2023-07-08 5:36 ` [dm-devel] " Paul Moore
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 06/17] security: add new securityfs delete function Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-07-08 4:23 ` [dm-devel] [PATCH RFC v10 6/17] " Paul Moore
2023-07-14 23:59 ` Fan Wu
2023-07-14 23:59 ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-07-08 5:36 ` Paul Moore
2023-07-08 5:36 ` [dm-devel] " Paul Moore
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 07/17] ipe: add userspace interface Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-07-08 4:23 ` [dm-devel] [PATCH RFC v10 7/17] " Paul Moore
2023-07-15 3:26 ` Fan Wu
2023-07-15 3:26 ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-08-01 19:29 ` Paul Moore
2023-08-01 19:29 ` [dm-devel] " Paul Moore
2023-07-08 5:36 ` Paul Moore
2023-07-08 5:36 ` [dm-devel] " Paul Moore
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 08/17] uapi|audit|ipe: add ipe auditing support Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-07-08 4:23 ` [dm-devel] [PATCH RFC v10 8/17] " Paul Moore
2023-07-15 3:57 ` Fan Wu
2023-07-15 3:57 ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-08-01 19:24 ` Paul Moore
2023-08-01 19:24 ` [dm-devel] " Paul Moore
2023-07-08 5:37 ` Paul Moore
2023-07-08 5:37 ` [dm-devel] " Paul Moore
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 09/17] ipe: add permissive toggle Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-07-08 4:23 ` [dm-devel] [PATCH RFC v10 9/17] " Paul Moore
2023-07-15 4:00 ` Fan Wu
2023-07-15 4:00 ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-07-08 5:37 ` Paul Moore
2023-07-08 5:37 ` [dm-devel] " Paul Moore
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 10/17] block|security: add LSM blob to block_device Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 11/17] dm-verity: consume root hash digest and signature data via LSM hook Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-07-07 14:53 ` Mike Snitzer
2023-07-07 14:53 ` [dm-devel] " Mike Snitzer
2023-07-12 3:43 ` Fan Wu
2023-07-12 3:43 ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-07-25 20:43 ` Paul Moore
2023-07-25 20:43 ` [dm-devel] " Paul Moore
2023-08-08 22:45 ` Fan Wu
2023-08-08 22:45 ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-08-08 23:40 ` Alasdair G Kergon
2023-08-08 23:40 ` [dm-devel] " Alasdair G Kergon
2023-08-09 18:02 ` Fan Wu
2023-08-09 18:02 ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 12/17] ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-07-08 4:23 ` [dm-devel] [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-07-08 5:37 ` Paul Moore
2023-07-08 5:37 ` [dm-devel] " Paul Moore
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 13/17] fsverity: consume builtin signature via LSM hook Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 14/17] ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 15/17] scripts: add boot policy generation program Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 16/17] ipe: kunit test for parser Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 17/17] documentation: add ipe documentation Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
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