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From: patchwork-bot+linux-riscv@kernel.org
To: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
Cc: linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
	mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
	x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	Liam.Howlett@oracle.com, vbabka@suse.cz,
	lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com, paul.walmsley@sifive.com,
	palmer@dabbelt.com, aou@eecs.berkeley.edu, conor@kernel.org,
	robh@kernel.org, krzk+dt@kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
	brauner@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org, oleg@redhat.com,
	ebiederm@xmission.com, kees@kernel.org, corbet@lwn.net,
	shuah@kernel.org, jannh@google.com, conor+dt@kernel.org,
	ojeda@kernel.org, alex.gaynor@gmail.com, boqun.feng@gmail.com,
	gary@garyguo.net, bjorn3_gh@protonmail.com,
	a.hindborg@kernel.org, aliceryhl@google.com, tmgross@umich.edu,
	lossin@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	alistair.francis@wdc.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org,
	jim.shu@sifive.com, andybnac@gmail.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com,
	charlie@rivosinc.com, atishp@rivosinc.com, evan@rivosinc.com,
	cleger@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com,
	samitolvanen@google.com, broonie@kernel.org,
	rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org,
	zong.li@sifive.com, david@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v19 00/27] riscv control-flow integrity for usermode
Date: Wed, 06 Aug 2025 17:15:37 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <175450053775.2863135.11568399057706626223.git-patchwork-notify@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250731-v5_user_cfi_series-v19-0-09b468d7beab@rivosinc.com>

Hello:

This series was applied to riscv/linux.git (for-next)
by Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>:

On Thu, 31 Jul 2025 16:19:10 -0700 you wrote:
> Basics and overview
> ===================
> 
> Software with larger attack surfaces (e.g. network facing apps like databases,
> browsers or apps relying on browser runtimes) suffer from memory corruption
> issues which can be utilized by attackers to bend control flow of the program
> to eventually gain control (by making their payload executable). Attackers are
> able to perform such attacks by leveraging call-sites which rely on indirect
> calls or return sites which rely on obtaining return address from stack memory.
> 
> [...]

Here is the summary with links:
  - [v19,01/27] mm: VM_SHADOW_STACK definition for riscv
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/cbac1921f599
  - [v19,02/27] dt-bindings: riscv: zicfilp and zicfiss in dt-bindings (extensions.yaml)
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/529ea23b9724
  - [v19,03/27] riscv: zicfiss / zicfilp enumeration
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/2672fcca7d45
  - [v19,04/27] riscv: zicfiss / zicfilp extension csr and bit definitions
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/9c6a894fd8b3
  - [v19,05/27] riscv: usercfi state for task and save/restore of CSR_SSP on trap entry/exit
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/b01f6537153c
  - [v19,06/27] riscv/mm : ensure PROT_WRITE leads to VM_READ | VM_WRITE
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/c13b2d7c1365
  - [v19,07/27] riscv/mm: manufacture shadow stack pte
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/68cd7334a8d2
  - [v19,08/27] riscv/mm: teach pte_mkwrite to manufacture shadow stack PTEs
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/50c9b9607c89
  - [v19,09/27] riscv/mm: write protect and shadow stack
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/cbcccac1eddc
  - [v19,10/27] riscv/mm: Implement map_shadow_stack() syscall
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/26e35e774a64
  - [v19,11/27] riscv/shstk: If needed allocate a new shadow stack on clone
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/9c72a71321a6
  - [v19,12/27] riscv: Implements arch agnostic shadow stack prctls
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/52eff0ab5f8e
  - [v19,13/27] prctl: arch-agnostic prctl for indirect branch tracking
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/157690650241
  - [v19,14/27] riscv: Implements arch agnostic indirect branch tracking prctls
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/e97ca201e919
  - [v19,15/27] riscv/traps: Introduce software check exception and uprobe handling
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/d88b76756b34
  - [v19,16/27] riscv: signal: abstract header saving for setup_sigcontext
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/63e713f29efe
  - [v19,17/27] riscv/signal: save and restore of shadow stack for signal
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/5b04bbd448a5
  - [v19,18/27] riscv/kernel: update __show_regs to print shadow stack register
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/1400341403b3
  - [v19,19/27] riscv/ptrace: riscv cfi status and state via ptrace and in core files
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/982c862820b8
  - [v19,20/27] riscv/hwprobe: zicfilp / zicfiss enumeration in hwprobe
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/07b1d75233e4
  - [v19,21/27] riscv: kernel command line option to opt out of user cfi
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/2c268d3d21f9
  - [v19,22/27] riscv: enable kernel access to shadow stack memory via FWFT sbi call
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/4ff7e8937f22
  - [v19,23/27] arch/riscv: compile vdso with landing pad and shadow stack note
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/a82422297e63
  - [v19,24/27] riscv: create a config for shadow stack and landing pad instr support
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/5bb36633ee56
  - [v19,25/27] riscv: Documentation for landing pad / indirect branch tracking
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/9868b87525d9
  - [v19,26/27] riscv: Documentation for shadow stack on riscv
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/a56a53730eb6
  - [v19,27/27] kselftest/riscv: kselftest for user mode cfi
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/fd40e4a14f45

You are awesome, thank you!
-- 
Deet-doot-dot, I am a bot.
https://korg.docs.kernel.org/patchwork/pwbot.html



WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: patchwork-bot+linux-riscv@kernel.org
To: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
Cc: linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
	mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
	x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	Liam.Howlett@oracle.com, vbabka@suse.cz,
	lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com, paul.walmsley@sifive.com,
	palmer@dabbelt.com, aou@eecs.berkeley.edu, conor@kernel.org,
	robh@kernel.org, krzk+dt@kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
	brauner@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org, oleg@redhat.com,
	ebiederm@xmission.com, kees@kernel.org, corbet@lwn.net,
	shuah@kernel.org, jannh@google.com, conor+dt@kernel.org,
	ojeda@kernel.org, alex.gaynor@gmail.com, boqun.feng@gmail.com,
	gary@garyguo.net, bjorn3_gh@protonmail.com,
	a.hindborg@kernel.org, aliceryhl@google.com, tmgross@umich.edu,
	lossin@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	alistair.francis@wdc.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org,
	jim.shu@sifive.com, andybnac@gmail.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com,
	charlie@rivosinc.com, atishp@rivosinc.com, evan@rivosinc.com,
	cleger@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com,
	samitolvanen@google.com, broonie@kernel.org,
	rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org,
	zong.li@sifive.com, david@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v19 00/27] riscv control-flow integrity for usermode
Date: Wed, 06 Aug 2025 17:15:37 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <175450053775.2863135.11568399057706626223.git-patchwork-notify@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250731-v5_user_cfi_series-v19-0-09b468d7beab@rivosinc.com>

Hello:

This series was applied to riscv/linux.git (for-next)
by Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>:

On Thu, 31 Jul 2025 16:19:10 -0700 you wrote:
> Basics and overview
> ===================
> 
> Software with larger attack surfaces (e.g. network facing apps like databases,
> browsers or apps relying on browser runtimes) suffer from memory corruption
> issues which can be utilized by attackers to bend control flow of the program
> to eventually gain control (by making their payload executable). Attackers are
> able to perform such attacks by leveraging call-sites which rely on indirect
> calls or return sites which rely on obtaining return address from stack memory.
> 
> [...]

Here is the summary with links:
  - [v19,01/27] mm: VM_SHADOW_STACK definition for riscv
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/cbac1921f599
  - [v19,02/27] dt-bindings: riscv: zicfilp and zicfiss in dt-bindings (extensions.yaml)
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/529ea23b9724
  - [v19,03/27] riscv: zicfiss / zicfilp enumeration
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/2672fcca7d45
  - [v19,04/27] riscv: zicfiss / zicfilp extension csr and bit definitions
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/9c6a894fd8b3
  - [v19,05/27] riscv: usercfi state for task and save/restore of CSR_SSP on trap entry/exit
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/b01f6537153c
  - [v19,06/27] riscv/mm : ensure PROT_WRITE leads to VM_READ | VM_WRITE
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/c13b2d7c1365
  - [v19,07/27] riscv/mm: manufacture shadow stack pte
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/68cd7334a8d2
  - [v19,08/27] riscv/mm: teach pte_mkwrite to manufacture shadow stack PTEs
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/50c9b9607c89
  - [v19,09/27] riscv/mm: write protect and shadow stack
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/cbcccac1eddc
  - [v19,10/27] riscv/mm: Implement map_shadow_stack() syscall
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/26e35e774a64
  - [v19,11/27] riscv/shstk: If needed allocate a new shadow stack on clone
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/9c72a71321a6
  - [v19,12/27] riscv: Implements arch agnostic shadow stack prctls
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/52eff0ab5f8e
  - [v19,13/27] prctl: arch-agnostic prctl for indirect branch tracking
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/157690650241
  - [v19,14/27] riscv: Implements arch agnostic indirect branch tracking prctls
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/e97ca201e919
  - [v19,15/27] riscv/traps: Introduce software check exception and uprobe handling
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/d88b76756b34
  - [v19,16/27] riscv: signal: abstract header saving for setup_sigcontext
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/63e713f29efe
  - [v19,17/27] riscv/signal: save and restore of shadow stack for signal
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/5b04bbd448a5
  - [v19,18/27] riscv/kernel: update __show_regs to print shadow stack register
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/1400341403b3
  - [v19,19/27] riscv/ptrace: riscv cfi status and state via ptrace and in core files
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/982c862820b8
  - [v19,20/27] riscv/hwprobe: zicfilp / zicfiss enumeration in hwprobe
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/07b1d75233e4
  - [v19,21/27] riscv: kernel command line option to opt out of user cfi
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/2c268d3d21f9
  - [v19,22/27] riscv: enable kernel access to shadow stack memory via FWFT sbi call
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/4ff7e8937f22
  - [v19,23/27] arch/riscv: compile vdso with landing pad and shadow stack note
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/a82422297e63
  - [v19,24/27] riscv: create a config for shadow stack and landing pad instr support
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/5bb36633ee56
  - [v19,25/27] riscv: Documentation for landing pad / indirect branch tracking
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/9868b87525d9
  - [v19,26/27] riscv: Documentation for shadow stack on riscv
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/a56a53730eb6
  - [v19,27/27] kselftest/riscv: kselftest for user mode cfi
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/fd40e4a14f45

You are awesome, thank you!
-- 
Deet-doot-dot, I am a bot.
https://korg.docs.kernel.org/patchwork/pwbot.html



_______________________________________________
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  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-08-06 17:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 103+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-07-31 23:19 [PATCH v19 00/27] riscv control-flow integrity for usermode Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19 ` Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19 ` [PATCH v19 01/27] mm: VM_SHADOW_STACK definition for riscv Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19   ` Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19 ` [PATCH v19 02/27] dt-bindings: riscv: zicfilp and zicfiss in dt-bindings (extensions.yaml) Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19   ` Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19 ` [PATCH v19 03/27] riscv: zicfiss / zicfilp enumeration Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19   ` Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19 ` [PATCH v19 04/27] riscv: zicfiss / zicfilp extension csr and bit definitions Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19   ` Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19 ` [PATCH v19 05/27] riscv: usercfi state for task and save/restore of CSR_SSP on trap entry/exit Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19   ` Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19 ` [PATCH v19 06/27] riscv/mm : ensure PROT_WRITE leads to VM_READ | VM_WRITE Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19   ` Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19 ` [PATCH v19 07/27] riscv/mm: manufacture shadow stack pte Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19   ` Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19 ` [PATCH v19 08/27] riscv/mm: teach pte_mkwrite to manufacture shadow stack PTEs Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19   ` Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19 ` [PATCH v19 09/27] riscv/mm: write protect and shadow stack Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19   ` Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19 ` [PATCH v19 10/27] riscv/mm: Implement map_shadow_stack() syscall Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19   ` Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19 ` [PATCH v19 11/27] riscv/shstk: If needed allocate a new shadow stack on clone Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19   ` Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19 ` [PATCH v19 12/27] riscv: Implements arch agnostic shadow stack prctls Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19   ` Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19 ` [PATCH v19 13/27] prctl: arch-agnostic prctl for indirect branch tracking Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19   ` Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19 ` [PATCH v19 14/27] riscv: Implements arch agnostic indirect branch tracking prctls Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19   ` Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19 ` [PATCH v19 15/27] riscv/traps: Introduce software check exception and uprobe handling Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19   ` Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19 ` [PATCH v19 16/27] riscv: signal: abstract header saving for setup_sigcontext Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19   ` Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19 ` [PATCH v19 17/27] riscv/signal: save and restore of shadow stack for signal Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19   ` Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19 ` [PATCH v19 18/27] riscv/kernel: update __show_regs to print shadow stack register Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19   ` Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19 ` [PATCH v19 19/27] riscv/ptrace: riscv cfi status and state via ptrace and in core files Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19   ` Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19 ` [PATCH v19 20/27] riscv/hwprobe: zicfilp / zicfiss enumeration in hwprobe Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19   ` Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19 ` [PATCH v19 21/27] riscv: kernel command line option to opt out of user cfi Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19   ` Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19 ` [PATCH v19 22/27] riscv: enable kernel access to shadow stack memory via FWFT sbi call Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19   ` Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19 ` [PATCH v19 23/27] arch/riscv: compile vdso with landing pad and shadow stack note Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19   ` Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19 ` [PATCH v19 24/27] riscv: create a config for shadow stack and landing pad instr support Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19   ` Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19 ` [PATCH v19 25/27] riscv: Documentation for landing pad / indirect branch tracking Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19   ` Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19 ` [PATCH v19 26/27] riscv: Documentation for shadow stack on riscv Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19   ` Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19 ` [PATCH v19 27/27] kselftest/riscv: kselftest for user mode cfi Deepak Gupta
2025-07-31 23:19   ` Deepak Gupta
2025-08-01  1:09 ` [PATCH v19 00/27] riscv control-flow integrity for usermode Benjamin LaHaise
2025-08-01  1:09   ` Benjamin LaHaise
2025-08-06 17:15 ` patchwork-bot+linux-riscv [this message]
2025-08-06 17:15   ` patchwork-bot+linux-riscv
2025-08-07 12:28   ` Mark Brown
2025-08-07 12:28     ` Mark Brown
2025-08-08  8:23     ` Deepak Gupta
2025-08-08  8:23       ` Deepak Gupta
2025-08-08 11:48       ` Mark Brown
2025-08-08 11:48         ` Mark Brown
2025-08-08 17:20         ` Deepak Gupta
2025-08-08 17:20           ` Deepak Gupta
2025-09-24 14:36 ` Paul Walmsley
2025-09-24 14:36   ` Paul Walmsley
2025-09-24 18:40   ` Deepak Gupta
2025-09-24 18:40     ` Deepak Gupta
2025-09-24 21:41     ` Heinrich Schuchardt
2025-09-25 12:30     ` Andy Chiu
2025-09-25 12:30       ` Andy Chiu
2025-09-25 14:30       ` Deepak Gupta
2025-09-25 14:30         ` Deepak Gupta
2025-09-30 11:15     ` Florian Weimer
2025-09-30 11:15       ` Florian Weimer
2025-10-01  0:13       ` Deepak Gupta
2025-10-01  0:13         ` Deepak Gupta
2025-09-26 19:29   ` Charles Mirabile
2025-09-26 19:29     ` Charles Mirabile
2025-09-26 19:52     ` Charles Mirabile
2025-09-26 19:52       ` Charles Mirabile
2025-09-26 20:03       ` Deepak Gupta
2025-09-26 20:03         ` Deepak Gupta
2025-09-26 19:57     ` Deepak Gupta
2025-09-26 19:57       ` Deepak Gupta
2025-09-26 20:28       ` Charles Mirabile
2025-09-26 20:28         ` Charles Mirabile
2025-09-26 21:07         ` Deepak Gupta
2025-09-26 21:07           ` Deepak Gupta
2025-09-30  9:20           ` Florian Weimer
2025-09-30  9:20             ` Florian Weimer
2025-09-30 23:48             ` Deepak Gupta
2025-09-30 23:48               ` Deepak Gupta
2025-10-02 11:45               ` Florian Weimer
2025-10-02 11:45                 ` Florian Weimer
2025-10-02 16:45                 ` Deepak Gupta
2025-10-02 16:45                   ` Deepak Gupta
2025-10-13 14:30                   ` Florian Weimer
2025-10-13 14:30                     ` Florian Weimer

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