* XFS: Assertion failed [not found] <1599642077.64707510.1610619249861.JavaMail.zimbra@redhat.com> @ 2021-01-14 10:20 ` Yumei Huang 2021-01-14 17:29 ` Brian Foster 0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread From: Yumei Huang @ 2021-01-14 10:20 UTC (permalink / raw) To: linux-xfs [-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 5499 bytes --] Hit the issue when doing syzkaller test with kernel 5.11.0-rc3(65f0d241). The C reproducer is attached. Steps to Reproduce: 1. # gcc -pthread -o reproducer reproducer.c 2. # ./reproducer Test results: [ 131.726790] XFS: Assertion failed: (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_UID|ATTR_GID|ATTR_ATIME|ATTR_ATIME_SET| ATTR_MTIME_SET|ATTR_KILL_PRIV|ATTR_TIMES_SET)) == 0, file: fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c, line: 849 [ 131.743687] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 131.748350] WARNING: CPU: 18 PID: 1786 at fs/xfs/xfs_message.c:97 asswarn+0x1a/0x1d [xfs] [ 131.756764] Modules linked in: intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common edac_mce_amd kvm_amd rfkill kvm irqbypass mgag200 crct10dif_pclmul i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops crc32_pclmul ccp sp5100_tco drm ipmi_ssif ses ghash_clmulni_intel pcspkr hpilo acpi_ipmi enclosure hpwdt i2c_piix4 k10temp rapl ipmi_si ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler acpi_tad acpi_cpufreq ip_tables xfs libcrc32c sd_mod t10_pi sg uas crc32c_intel serio_raw usb_storage smartpqi scsi_transport_sas tg3 wmi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [ 131.805054] CPU: 18 PID: 1786 Comm: reproducer Tainted: G B 5.11.0-rc3upstream65f0d241+ #2 [ 131.814702] Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL385 Gen10/ProLiant DL385 Gen10, BIOS A40 10/14/2017 [ 131.823299] RIP: 0010:asswarn+0x1a/0x1d [xfs] [ 131.827868] Code: c4 d0 00 00 00 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 89 c8 48 89 d1 48 89 f2 48 c7 c6 40 d6 ad c0 e8 08 fa ff ff <0f> 0b c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 53 41 89 c8 48 89 d1 48 89 f2 48 c7 c6 40 [ 131.846777] RSP: 0018:ffff88812128f828 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 131.852059] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 1ffff11024251f0b RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 131.859256] RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 000000000000000a RDI: ffffed1024251ef7 [ 131.866458] RBP: ffff88812128f920 R08: ffffed110dcfe24d R09: ffffed110dcfe24d [ 131.873663] R10: ffff88886e7f1267 R11: ffffed110dcfe24c R12: ffff88812128fa68 [ 131.880862] R13: ffff88819bf08280 R14: ffff88819bf08280 R15: ffff88819bf08000 [ 131.888062] FS: 00007f18cb349700(0000) GS:ffff88886e600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 131.896222] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 131.902026] CR2: 0000000020000100 CR3: 0000000112820000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 [ 131.909223] Call Trace: [ 131.911703] xfs_setattr_size+0x742/0xd00 [xfs] [ 131.916427] ? __vfs_removexattr+0xd1/0x130 [ 131.920673] ? xfs_setattr_nonsize+0xef0/0xef0 [xfs] [ 131.925836] ? cap_inode_killpriv+0x11/0x20 [ 131.930071] ? security_inode_killpriv+0x3f/0x70 [ 131.934740] xfs_vn_setattr+0xea/0x3a0 [xfs] [ 131.939211] ? xfs_vn_setattr_size+0x2a0/0x2a0 [xfs] [ 131.944375] notify_change+0x744/0xda0 [ 131.948173] ? do_truncate+0xe2/0x180 [ 131.951880] do_truncate+0xe2/0x180 [ 131.955412] ? __x64_sys_openat2+0x1c0/0x1c0 [ 131.959731] ? ima_file_check+0xd9/0x120 [ 131.963701] ? security_inode_permission+0x79/0xc0 [ 131.968545] path_openat+0x11df/0x21f0 [ 131.972340] ? path_lookupat.isra.48+0x440/0x440 [ 131.977012] ? quarantine_put+0xe2/0x170 [ 131.980979] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0x150 [ 131.985211] do_filp_open+0x176/0x250 [ 131.988915] ? lock_release+0x56e/0xcc0 [ 131.992797] ? may_open_dev+0xc0/0xc0 [ 131.996503] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x54/0x230 [ 132.000827] do_sys_openat2+0x2ee/0x5c0 [ 132.004710] ? rcu_read_unlock+0x50/0x50 [ 132.008676] ? file_open_root+0x210/0x210 [ 132.012732] ? ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64+0x122/0x150 [ 132.017840] do_sys_open+0x8a/0xd0 [ 132.021284] ? filp_open+0x50/0x50 [ 132.024730] ? syscall_trace_enter.isra.16+0x18e/0x250 [ 132.029923] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 [ 132.033543] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 132.038647] RIP: 0033:0x7f18cac3c51d [ 132.042266] Code: 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 3b 79 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 132.061173] RSP: 002b:00007f18cb348e98 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000055 [ 132.068817] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f18cac3c51d [ 132.076013] RDX: 0030656c69662f2e RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 0000000020000100 [ 132.083209] RBP: 00007f18cb348ec0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 132.090407] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff50ae2e4e [ 132.097607] R13: 00007fff50ae2e4f R14: 00007fff50ae2ee0 R15: 00007f18cb348fc0 [ 132.104812] irq event stamp: 0 [ 132.107902] hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 [ 132.114228] hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffff9c1ce85b>] copy_process+0x1a7b/0x6590 [ 132.122570] softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffff9c1ce89f>] copy_process+0x1abf/0x6590 [ 132.130905] softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 [ 132.137235] ---[ end trace d05db93236ee9da5 ]--- Syzkaller reproducer: # {Threaded:true Collide:true Repeat:false RepeatTimes:0 Procs:1 Slowdown:1 Sandbox: Fault:false FaultCall:-1 FaultNth:0 Leak:false NetInjection:false NetDevices:false NetReset:false Cgroups:false BinfmtMisc:false CloseFDs:false KCSAN:false DevlinkPCI:false USB:false VhciInjection:false Wifi:false Sysctl:false UseTmpDir:false HandleSegv:false Repro:false Trace:false} r0 = creat(&(0x7f0000000100)='./file0\x00', 0x8) fsetxattr$security_capability(r0, &(0x7f0000000280)='security.capability\x00', &(0x7f00000002c0)=@v3={0x3000000, [{0x1762, 0x8}, {0x2, 0xffffffff}], 0xee00}, 0x18, 0x0) Best Regards, Yumei Huang [-- Warning: decoded text below may be mangled, UTF-8 assumed --] [-- Attachment #2: reproducer.c --] [-- Type: text/x-c++src; name=reproducer.c, Size: 4137 bytes --] // autogenerated by syzkaller (https://github.com/google/syzkaller) #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <endian.h> #include <errno.h> #include <pthread.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <time.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <linux/futex.h> static void sleep_ms(uint64_t ms) { usleep(ms * 1000); } static uint64_t current_time_ms(void) { struct timespec ts; if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts)) exit(1); return (uint64_t)ts.tv_sec * 1000 + (uint64_t)ts.tv_nsec / 1000000; } static void thread_start(void* (*fn)(void*), void* arg) { pthread_t th; pthread_attr_t attr; pthread_attr_init(&attr); pthread_attr_setstacksize(&attr, 128 << 10); int i = 0; for (; i < 100; i++) { if (pthread_create(&th, &attr, fn, arg) == 0) { pthread_attr_destroy(&attr); return; } if (errno == EAGAIN) { usleep(50); continue; } break; } exit(1); } typedef struct { int state; } event_t; static void event_init(event_t* ev) { ev->state = 0; } static void event_reset(event_t* ev) { ev->state = 0; } static void event_set(event_t* ev) { if (ev->state) exit(1); __atomic_store_n(&ev->state, 1, __ATOMIC_RELEASE); syscall(SYS_futex, &ev->state, FUTEX_WAKE | FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG, 1000000); } static void event_wait(event_t* ev) { while (!__atomic_load_n(&ev->state, __ATOMIC_ACQUIRE)) syscall(SYS_futex, &ev->state, FUTEX_WAIT | FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG, 0, 0); } static int event_isset(event_t* ev) { return __atomic_load_n(&ev->state, __ATOMIC_ACQUIRE); } static int event_timedwait(event_t* ev, uint64_t timeout) { uint64_t start = current_time_ms(); uint64_t now = start; for (;;) { uint64_t remain = timeout - (now - start); struct timespec ts; ts.tv_sec = remain / 1000; ts.tv_nsec = (remain % 1000) * 1000 * 1000; syscall(SYS_futex, &ev->state, FUTEX_WAIT | FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG, 0, &ts); if (__atomic_load_n(&ev->state, __ATOMIC_ACQUIRE)) return 1; now = current_time_ms(); if (now - start > timeout) return 0; } } struct thread_t { int created, call; event_t ready, done; }; static struct thread_t threads[16]; static void execute_call(int call); static int running; static void* thr(void* arg) { struct thread_t* th = (struct thread_t*)arg; for (;;) { event_wait(&th->ready); event_reset(&th->ready); execute_call(th->call); __atomic_fetch_sub(&running, 1, __ATOMIC_RELAXED); event_set(&th->done); } return 0; } static void loop(void) { int i, call, thread; int collide = 0; again: for (call = 0; call < 2; call++) { for (thread = 0; thread < (int)(sizeof(threads) / sizeof(threads[0])); thread++) { struct thread_t* th = &threads[thread]; if (!th->created) { th->created = 1; event_init(&th->ready); event_init(&th->done); event_set(&th->done); thread_start(thr, th); } if (!event_isset(&th->done)) continue; event_reset(&th->done); th->call = call; __atomic_fetch_add(&running, 1, __ATOMIC_RELAXED); event_set(&th->ready); if (collide && (call % 2) == 0) break; event_timedwait(&th->done, 50); break; } } for (i = 0; i < 100 && __atomic_load_n(&running, __ATOMIC_RELAXED); i++) sleep_ms(1); if (!collide) { collide = 1; goto again; } } uint64_t r[1] = {0xffffffffffffffff}; void execute_call(int call) { intptr_t res = 0; switch (call) { case 0: memcpy((void*)0x20000100, "./file0\000", 8); res = syscall(__NR_creat, 0x20000100ul, 8ul); if (res != -1) r[0] = res; break; case 1: memcpy((void*)0x20000280, "security.capability\000", 20); *(uint32_t*)0x200002c0 = 0x3000000; *(uint32_t*)0x200002c4 = 0x1762; *(uint32_t*)0x200002c8 = 8; *(uint32_t*)0x200002cc = 2; *(uint32_t*)0x200002d0 = -1; *(uint32_t*)0x200002d4 = 0xee00; syscall(__NR_fsetxattr, r[0], 0x20000280ul, 0x200002c0ul, 0x18ul, 0ul); break; } } int main(void) { syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x1ffff000ul, 0x1000ul, 0ul, 0x32ul, -1, 0ul); syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x20000000ul, 0x1000000ul, 7ul, 0x32ul, -1, 0ul); syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x21000000ul, 0x1000ul, 0ul, 0x32ul, -1, 0ul); loop(); return 0; } ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: XFS: Assertion failed 2021-01-14 10:20 ` XFS: Assertion failed Yumei Huang @ 2021-01-14 17:29 ` Brian Foster 2021-01-14 18:24 ` Brian Foster 2021-01-14 21:21 ` Dave Chinner 0 siblings, 2 replies; 6+ messages in thread From: Brian Foster @ 2021-01-14 17:29 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Yumei Huang; +Cc: linux-xfs On Thu, Jan 14, 2021 at 05:20:29AM -0500, Yumei Huang wrote: > Hit the issue when doing syzkaller test with kernel 5.11.0-rc3(65f0d241). The C reproducer is attached. > > Steps to Reproduce: > 1. # gcc -pthread -o reproducer reproducer.c > 2. # ./reproducer > > > Test results: > [ 131.726790] XFS: Assertion failed: (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_UID|ATTR_GID|ATTR_ATIME|ATTR_ATIME_SET| ATTR_MTIME_SET|ATTR_KILL_PRIV|ATTR_TIMES_SET)) == 0, file: fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c, line: 849 > [ 131.743687] ------------[ cut here ]------------ Some quick initial analysis from a run of the reproducer... It looks like it calls into xfs_setattr_size() with ATTR_KILL_PRIV set in ->ia_valid. This appears to originate in the VFS via handle_truncate() -> do_truncate() -> dentry_needs_remove_privs(). An strace of the reproducer shows the following calls: ... [pid 1524] creat("./file0", 010) = 3 ... [pid 1524] fsetxattr(3, "security.capability", "\0\0\0\3b\27\0\0\10\0\0\0\2\0\0\0\377\377\377\377\0\356\0", 24, 0 <unfinished ...> ... [pid 1524] creat("./file0", 010 <unfinished ...> ... So I'm guessing there's an attempt to open this file with O_TRUNC with this particular xattr set (unexpectedly?). Indeed, after the reproducer leaves file01 around with the xattr, a subsequent xfs_io -c "open -t ..." attempt triggers the assert again, and then the xattr disappears. I'd have to dig more into the associated vfs code to grok the expected behavior and whether there's a problem here.. Brian > [ 131.748350] WARNING: CPU: 18 PID: 1786 at fs/xfs/xfs_message.c:97 asswarn+0x1a/0x1d [xfs] > [ 131.756764] Modules linked in: intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common edac_mce_amd kvm_amd rfkill kvm irqbypass mgag200 crct10dif_pclmul i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops crc32_pclmul ccp sp5100_tco drm ipmi_ssif ses ghash_clmulni_intel pcspkr hpilo acpi_ipmi enclosure hpwdt i2c_piix4 k10temp rapl ipmi_si ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler acpi_tad acpi_cpufreq ip_tables xfs libcrc32c sd_mod t10_pi sg uas crc32c_intel serio_raw usb_storage smartpqi scsi_transport_sas tg3 wmi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod > [ 131.805054] CPU: 18 PID: 1786 Comm: reproducer Tainted: G B 5.11.0-rc3upstream65f0d241+ #2 > [ 131.814702] Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL385 Gen10/ProLiant DL385 Gen10, BIOS A40 10/14/2017 > [ 131.823299] RIP: 0010:asswarn+0x1a/0x1d [xfs] > [ 131.827868] Code: c4 d0 00 00 00 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 89 c8 48 89 d1 48 89 f2 48 c7 c6 40 d6 ad c0 e8 08 fa ff ff <0f> 0b c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 53 41 89 c8 48 89 d1 48 89 f2 48 c7 c6 40 > [ 131.846777] RSP: 0018:ffff88812128f828 EFLAGS: 00010282 > [ 131.852059] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 1ffff11024251f0b RCX: 0000000000000000 > [ 131.859256] RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 000000000000000a RDI: ffffed1024251ef7 > [ 131.866458] RBP: ffff88812128f920 R08: ffffed110dcfe24d R09: ffffed110dcfe24d > [ 131.873663] R10: ffff88886e7f1267 R11: ffffed110dcfe24c R12: ffff88812128fa68 > [ 131.880862] R13: ffff88819bf08280 R14: ffff88819bf08280 R15: ffff88819bf08000 > [ 131.888062] FS: 00007f18cb349700(0000) GS:ffff88886e600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 > [ 131.896222] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > [ 131.902026] CR2: 0000000020000100 CR3: 0000000112820000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 > [ 131.909223] Call Trace: > [ 131.911703] xfs_setattr_size+0x742/0xd00 [xfs] > [ 131.916427] ? __vfs_removexattr+0xd1/0x130 > [ 131.920673] ? xfs_setattr_nonsize+0xef0/0xef0 [xfs] > [ 131.925836] ? cap_inode_killpriv+0x11/0x20 > [ 131.930071] ? security_inode_killpriv+0x3f/0x70 > [ 131.934740] xfs_vn_setattr+0xea/0x3a0 [xfs] > [ 131.939211] ? xfs_vn_setattr_size+0x2a0/0x2a0 [xfs] > [ 131.944375] notify_change+0x744/0xda0 > [ 131.948173] ? do_truncate+0xe2/0x180 > [ 131.951880] do_truncate+0xe2/0x180 > [ 131.955412] ? __x64_sys_openat2+0x1c0/0x1c0 > [ 131.959731] ? ima_file_check+0xd9/0x120 > [ 131.963701] ? security_inode_permission+0x79/0xc0 > [ 131.968545] path_openat+0x11df/0x21f0 > [ 131.972340] ? path_lookupat.isra.48+0x440/0x440 > [ 131.977012] ? quarantine_put+0xe2/0x170 > [ 131.980979] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0x150 > [ 131.985211] do_filp_open+0x176/0x250 > [ 131.988915] ? lock_release+0x56e/0xcc0 > [ 131.992797] ? may_open_dev+0xc0/0xc0 > [ 131.996503] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x54/0x230 > [ 132.000827] do_sys_openat2+0x2ee/0x5c0 > [ 132.004710] ? rcu_read_unlock+0x50/0x50 > [ 132.008676] ? file_open_root+0x210/0x210 > [ 132.012732] ? ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64+0x122/0x150 > [ 132.017840] do_sys_open+0x8a/0xd0 > [ 132.021284] ? filp_open+0x50/0x50 > [ 132.024730] ? syscall_trace_enter.isra.16+0x18e/0x250 > [ 132.029923] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 > [ 132.033543] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 > [ 132.038647] RIP: 0033:0x7f18cac3c51d > [ 132.042266] Code: 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 3b 79 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 > [ 132.061173] RSP: 002b:00007f18cb348e98 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000055 > [ 132.068817] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f18cac3c51d > [ 132.076013] RDX: 0030656c69662f2e RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 0000000020000100 > [ 132.083209] RBP: 00007f18cb348ec0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 > [ 132.090407] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff50ae2e4e > [ 132.097607] R13: 00007fff50ae2e4f R14: 00007fff50ae2ee0 R15: 00007f18cb348fc0 > [ 132.104812] irq event stamp: 0 > [ 132.107902] hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 > [ 132.114228] hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffff9c1ce85b>] copy_process+0x1a7b/0x6590 > [ 132.122570] softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffff9c1ce89f>] copy_process+0x1abf/0x6590 > [ 132.130905] softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 > [ 132.137235] ---[ end trace d05db93236ee9da5 ]--- > > > Syzkaller reproducer: > # {Threaded:true Collide:true Repeat:false RepeatTimes:0 Procs:1 Slowdown:1 Sandbox: Fault:false FaultCall:-1 FaultNth:0 Leak:false NetInjection:false NetDevices:false NetReset:false Cgroups:false BinfmtMisc:false CloseFDs:false KCSAN:false DevlinkPCI:false USB:false VhciInjection:false Wifi:false Sysctl:false UseTmpDir:false HandleSegv:false Repro:false Trace:false} > r0 = creat(&(0x7f0000000100)='./file0\x00', 0x8) > fsetxattr$security_capability(r0, &(0x7f0000000280)='security.capability\x00', &(0x7f00000002c0)=@v3={0x3000000, [{0x1762, 0x8}, {0x2, 0xffffffff}], 0xee00}, 0x18, 0x0) > > > > Best Regards, > > Yumei Huang > > // autogenerated by syzkaller (https://github.com/google/syzkaller) > > #define _GNU_SOURCE > > #include <endian.h> > #include <errno.h> > #include <pthread.h> > #include <stdint.h> > #include <stdio.h> > #include <stdlib.h> > #include <string.h> > #include <sys/syscall.h> > #include <sys/types.h> > #include <time.h> > #include <unistd.h> > > #include <linux/futex.h> > > static void sleep_ms(uint64_t ms) > { > usleep(ms * 1000); > } > > static uint64_t current_time_ms(void) > { > struct timespec ts; > if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts)) > exit(1); > return (uint64_t)ts.tv_sec * 1000 + (uint64_t)ts.tv_nsec / 1000000; > } > > static void thread_start(void* (*fn)(void*), void* arg) > { > pthread_t th; > pthread_attr_t attr; > pthread_attr_init(&attr); > pthread_attr_setstacksize(&attr, 128 << 10); > int i = 0; > for (; i < 100; i++) { > if (pthread_create(&th, &attr, fn, arg) == 0) { > pthread_attr_destroy(&attr); > return; > } > if (errno == EAGAIN) { > usleep(50); > continue; > } > break; > } > exit(1); > } > > typedef struct { > int state; > } event_t; > > static void event_init(event_t* ev) > { > ev->state = 0; > } > > static void event_reset(event_t* ev) > { > ev->state = 0; > } > > static void event_set(event_t* ev) > { > if (ev->state) > exit(1); > __atomic_store_n(&ev->state, 1, __ATOMIC_RELEASE); > syscall(SYS_futex, &ev->state, FUTEX_WAKE | FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG, 1000000); > } > > static void event_wait(event_t* ev) > { > while (!__atomic_load_n(&ev->state, __ATOMIC_ACQUIRE)) > syscall(SYS_futex, &ev->state, FUTEX_WAIT | FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG, 0, 0); > } > > static int event_isset(event_t* ev) > { > return __atomic_load_n(&ev->state, __ATOMIC_ACQUIRE); > } > > static int event_timedwait(event_t* ev, uint64_t timeout) > { > uint64_t start = current_time_ms(); > uint64_t now = start; > for (;;) { > uint64_t remain = timeout - (now - start); > struct timespec ts; > ts.tv_sec = remain / 1000; > ts.tv_nsec = (remain % 1000) * 1000 * 1000; > syscall(SYS_futex, &ev->state, FUTEX_WAIT | FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG, 0, &ts); > if (__atomic_load_n(&ev->state, __ATOMIC_ACQUIRE)) > return 1; > now = current_time_ms(); > if (now - start > timeout) > return 0; > } > } > > struct thread_t { > int created, call; > event_t ready, done; > }; > > static struct thread_t threads[16]; > static void execute_call(int call); > static int running; > > static void* thr(void* arg) > { > struct thread_t* th = (struct thread_t*)arg; > for (;;) { > event_wait(&th->ready); > event_reset(&th->ready); > execute_call(th->call); > __atomic_fetch_sub(&running, 1, __ATOMIC_RELAXED); > event_set(&th->done); > } > return 0; > } > > static void loop(void) > { > int i, call, thread; > int collide = 0; > again: > for (call = 0; call < 2; call++) { > for (thread = 0; thread < (int)(sizeof(threads) / sizeof(threads[0])); thread++) { > struct thread_t* th = &threads[thread]; > if (!th->created) { > th->created = 1; > event_init(&th->ready); > event_init(&th->done); > event_set(&th->done); > thread_start(thr, th); > } > if (!event_isset(&th->done)) > continue; > event_reset(&th->done); > th->call = call; > __atomic_fetch_add(&running, 1, __ATOMIC_RELAXED); > event_set(&th->ready); > if (collide && (call % 2) == 0) > break; > event_timedwait(&th->done, 50); > break; > } > } > for (i = 0; i < 100 && __atomic_load_n(&running, __ATOMIC_RELAXED); i++) > sleep_ms(1); > if (!collide) { > collide = 1; > goto again; > } > } > > uint64_t r[1] = {0xffffffffffffffff}; > > void execute_call(int call) > { > intptr_t res = 0; > switch (call) { > case 0: > memcpy((void*)0x20000100, "./file0\000", 8); > res = syscall(__NR_creat, 0x20000100ul, 8ul); > if (res != -1) > r[0] = res; > break; > case 1: > memcpy((void*)0x20000280, "security.capability\000", 20); > *(uint32_t*)0x200002c0 = 0x3000000; > *(uint32_t*)0x200002c4 = 0x1762; > *(uint32_t*)0x200002c8 = 8; > *(uint32_t*)0x200002cc = 2; > *(uint32_t*)0x200002d0 = -1; > *(uint32_t*)0x200002d4 = 0xee00; > syscall(__NR_fsetxattr, r[0], 0x20000280ul, 0x200002c0ul, 0x18ul, 0ul); > break; > } > > } > int main(void) > { > syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x1ffff000ul, 0x1000ul, 0ul, 0x32ul, -1, 0ul); > syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x20000000ul, 0x1000000ul, 7ul, 0x32ul, -1, 0ul); > syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x21000000ul, 0x1000ul, 0ul, 0x32ul, -1, 0ul); > loop(); > return 0; > } ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: XFS: Assertion failed 2021-01-14 17:29 ` Brian Foster @ 2021-01-14 18:24 ` Brian Foster 2021-01-14 19:33 ` Eric Sandeen 2021-01-14 21:21 ` Dave Chinner 1 sibling, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread From: Brian Foster @ 2021-01-14 18:24 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Yumei Huang; +Cc: linux-xfs On Thu, Jan 14, 2021 at 12:29:28PM -0500, Brian Foster wrote: > On Thu, Jan 14, 2021 at 05:20:29AM -0500, Yumei Huang wrote: > > Hit the issue when doing syzkaller test with kernel 5.11.0-rc3(65f0d241). The C reproducer is attached. > > > > Steps to Reproduce: > > 1. # gcc -pthread -o reproducer reproducer.c > > 2. # ./reproducer > > > > > > Test results: > > [ 131.726790] XFS: Assertion failed: (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_UID|ATTR_GID|ATTR_ATIME|ATTR_ATIME_SET| ATTR_MTIME_SET|ATTR_KILL_PRIV|ATTR_TIMES_SET)) == 0, file: fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c, line: 849 > > [ 131.743687] ------------[ cut here ]------------ > > Some quick initial analysis from a run of the reproducer... It looks > like it calls into xfs_setattr_size() with ATTR_KILL_PRIV set in > ->ia_valid. This appears to originate in the VFS via handle_truncate() > -> do_truncate() -> dentry_needs_remove_privs(). > > An strace of the reproducer shows the following calls: > > ... > [pid 1524] creat("./file0", 010) = 3 > ... > [pid 1524] fsetxattr(3, "security.capability", "\0\0\0\3b\27\0\0\10\0\0\0\2\0\0\0\377\377\377\377\0\356\0", 24, 0 <unfinished ...> > ... > [pid 1524] creat("./file0", 010 <unfinished ...> > ... > > So I'm guessing there's an attempt to open this file with O_TRUNC with > this particular xattr set (unexpectedly?). Indeed, after the reproducer > leaves file01 around with the xattr, a subsequent xfs_io -c "open -t > ..." attempt triggers the assert again, and then the xattr disappears. > I'd have to dig more into the associated vfs code to grok the expected > behavior and whether there's a problem here.. > The reproducer seems to boil down to this: touch <file> setfattr -n security.capability -v 0sAAAAA2IXAAAIAAAAAgAAAP////8A7gAA <file> xfs_io -c "open -t <file>" ... and afaict, the behavior is as expected. do_truncate() sets ATTR_KILL_PRIV via dentry_needs_remove_privs() and calls into notify_change(). That eventually gets to xfs_vn_setattr_size(), which calls xfs_vn_change_ok() -> setattr_prepare(). setattr_prepare() handles ATTR_KILL_PRIV (which remains set in ->ia_valid), and then we return, fall into xfs_setattr_size() and that triggers the assert failure. ISTM we should probably just drop ATTR_KILL_PRIV from the assert. Brian > Brian > > > [ 131.748350] WARNING: CPU: 18 PID: 1786 at fs/xfs/xfs_message.c:97 asswarn+0x1a/0x1d [xfs] > > [ 131.756764] Modules linked in: intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common edac_mce_amd kvm_amd rfkill kvm irqbypass mgag200 crct10dif_pclmul i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops crc32_pclmul ccp sp5100_tco drm ipmi_ssif ses ghash_clmulni_intel pcspkr hpilo acpi_ipmi enclosure hpwdt i2c_piix4 k10temp rapl ipmi_si ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler acpi_tad acpi_cpufreq ip_tables xfs libcrc32c sd_mod t10_pi sg uas crc32c_intel serio_raw usb_storage smartpqi scsi_transport_sas tg3 wmi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod > > [ 131.805054] CPU: 18 PID: 1786 Comm: reproducer Tainted: G B 5.11.0-rc3upstream65f0d241+ #2 > > [ 131.814702] Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL385 Gen10/ProLiant DL385 Gen10, BIOS A40 10/14/2017 > > [ 131.823299] RIP: 0010:asswarn+0x1a/0x1d [xfs] > > [ 131.827868] Code: c4 d0 00 00 00 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 89 c8 48 89 d1 48 89 f2 48 c7 c6 40 d6 ad c0 e8 08 fa ff ff <0f> 0b c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 53 41 89 c8 48 89 d1 48 89 f2 48 c7 c6 40 > > [ 131.846777] RSP: 0018:ffff88812128f828 EFLAGS: 00010282 > > [ 131.852059] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 1ffff11024251f0b RCX: 0000000000000000 > > [ 131.859256] RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 000000000000000a RDI: ffffed1024251ef7 > > [ 131.866458] RBP: ffff88812128f920 R08: ffffed110dcfe24d R09: ffffed110dcfe24d > > [ 131.873663] R10: ffff88886e7f1267 R11: ffffed110dcfe24c R12: ffff88812128fa68 > > [ 131.880862] R13: ffff88819bf08280 R14: ffff88819bf08280 R15: ffff88819bf08000 > > [ 131.888062] FS: 00007f18cb349700(0000) GS:ffff88886e600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 > > [ 131.896222] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > > [ 131.902026] CR2: 0000000020000100 CR3: 0000000112820000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 > > [ 131.909223] Call Trace: > > [ 131.911703] xfs_setattr_size+0x742/0xd00 [xfs] > > [ 131.916427] ? __vfs_removexattr+0xd1/0x130 > > [ 131.920673] ? xfs_setattr_nonsize+0xef0/0xef0 [xfs] > > [ 131.925836] ? cap_inode_killpriv+0x11/0x20 > > [ 131.930071] ? security_inode_killpriv+0x3f/0x70 > > [ 131.934740] xfs_vn_setattr+0xea/0x3a0 [xfs] > > [ 131.939211] ? xfs_vn_setattr_size+0x2a0/0x2a0 [xfs] > > [ 131.944375] notify_change+0x744/0xda0 > > [ 131.948173] ? do_truncate+0xe2/0x180 > > [ 131.951880] do_truncate+0xe2/0x180 > > [ 131.955412] ? __x64_sys_openat2+0x1c0/0x1c0 > > [ 131.959731] ? ima_file_check+0xd9/0x120 > > [ 131.963701] ? security_inode_permission+0x79/0xc0 > > [ 131.968545] path_openat+0x11df/0x21f0 > > [ 131.972340] ? path_lookupat.isra.48+0x440/0x440 > > [ 131.977012] ? quarantine_put+0xe2/0x170 > > [ 131.980979] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0x150 > > [ 131.985211] do_filp_open+0x176/0x250 > > [ 131.988915] ? lock_release+0x56e/0xcc0 > > [ 131.992797] ? may_open_dev+0xc0/0xc0 > > [ 131.996503] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x54/0x230 > > [ 132.000827] do_sys_openat2+0x2ee/0x5c0 > > [ 132.004710] ? rcu_read_unlock+0x50/0x50 > > [ 132.008676] ? file_open_root+0x210/0x210 > > [ 132.012732] ? ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64+0x122/0x150 > > [ 132.017840] do_sys_open+0x8a/0xd0 > > [ 132.021284] ? filp_open+0x50/0x50 > > [ 132.024730] ? syscall_trace_enter.isra.16+0x18e/0x250 > > [ 132.029923] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 > > [ 132.033543] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 > > [ 132.038647] RIP: 0033:0x7f18cac3c51d > > [ 132.042266] Code: 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 3b 79 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 > > [ 132.061173] RSP: 002b:00007f18cb348e98 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000055 > > [ 132.068817] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f18cac3c51d > > [ 132.076013] RDX: 0030656c69662f2e RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 0000000020000100 > > [ 132.083209] RBP: 00007f18cb348ec0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 > > [ 132.090407] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff50ae2e4e > > [ 132.097607] R13: 00007fff50ae2e4f R14: 00007fff50ae2ee0 R15: 00007f18cb348fc0 > > [ 132.104812] irq event stamp: 0 > > [ 132.107902] hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 > > [ 132.114228] hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffff9c1ce85b>] copy_process+0x1a7b/0x6590 > > [ 132.122570] softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffff9c1ce89f>] copy_process+0x1abf/0x6590 > > [ 132.130905] softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 > > [ 132.137235] ---[ end trace d05db93236ee9da5 ]--- > > > > > > Syzkaller reproducer: > > # {Threaded:true Collide:true Repeat:false RepeatTimes:0 Procs:1 Slowdown:1 Sandbox: Fault:false FaultCall:-1 FaultNth:0 Leak:false NetInjection:false NetDevices:false NetReset:false Cgroups:false BinfmtMisc:false CloseFDs:false KCSAN:false DevlinkPCI:false USB:false VhciInjection:false Wifi:false Sysctl:false UseTmpDir:false HandleSegv:false Repro:false Trace:false} > > r0 = creat(&(0x7f0000000100)='./file0\x00', 0x8) > > fsetxattr$security_capability(r0, &(0x7f0000000280)='security.capability\x00', &(0x7f00000002c0)=@v3={0x3000000, [{0x1762, 0x8}, {0x2, 0xffffffff}], 0xee00}, 0x18, 0x0) > > > > > > > > Best Regards, > > > > Yumei Huang > > > > > // autogenerated by syzkaller (https://github.com/google/syzkaller) > > > > #define _GNU_SOURCE > > > > #include <endian.h> > > #include <errno.h> > > #include <pthread.h> > > #include <stdint.h> > > #include <stdio.h> > > #include <stdlib.h> > > #include <string.h> > > #include <sys/syscall.h> > > #include <sys/types.h> > > #include <time.h> > > #include <unistd.h> > > > > #include <linux/futex.h> > > > > static void sleep_ms(uint64_t ms) > > { > > usleep(ms * 1000); > > } > > > > static uint64_t current_time_ms(void) > > { > > struct timespec ts; > > if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts)) > > exit(1); > > return (uint64_t)ts.tv_sec * 1000 + (uint64_t)ts.tv_nsec / 1000000; > > } > > > > static void thread_start(void* (*fn)(void*), void* arg) > > { > > pthread_t th; > > pthread_attr_t attr; > > pthread_attr_init(&attr); > > pthread_attr_setstacksize(&attr, 128 << 10); > > int i = 0; > > for (; i < 100; i++) { > > if (pthread_create(&th, &attr, fn, arg) == 0) { > > pthread_attr_destroy(&attr); > > return; > > } > > if (errno == EAGAIN) { > > usleep(50); > > continue; > > } > > break; > > } > > exit(1); > > } > > > > typedef struct { > > int state; > > } event_t; > > > > static void event_init(event_t* ev) > > { > > ev->state = 0; > > } > > > > static void event_reset(event_t* ev) > > { > > ev->state = 0; > > } > > > > static void event_set(event_t* ev) > > { > > if (ev->state) > > exit(1); > > __atomic_store_n(&ev->state, 1, __ATOMIC_RELEASE); > > syscall(SYS_futex, &ev->state, FUTEX_WAKE | FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG, 1000000); > > } > > > > static void event_wait(event_t* ev) > > { > > while (!__atomic_load_n(&ev->state, __ATOMIC_ACQUIRE)) > > syscall(SYS_futex, &ev->state, FUTEX_WAIT | FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG, 0, 0); > > } > > > > static int event_isset(event_t* ev) > > { > > return __atomic_load_n(&ev->state, __ATOMIC_ACQUIRE); > > } > > > > static int event_timedwait(event_t* ev, uint64_t timeout) > > { > > uint64_t start = current_time_ms(); > > uint64_t now = start; > > for (;;) { > > uint64_t remain = timeout - (now - start); > > struct timespec ts; > > ts.tv_sec = remain / 1000; > > ts.tv_nsec = (remain % 1000) * 1000 * 1000; > > syscall(SYS_futex, &ev->state, FUTEX_WAIT | FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG, 0, &ts); > > if (__atomic_load_n(&ev->state, __ATOMIC_ACQUIRE)) > > return 1; > > now = current_time_ms(); > > if (now - start > timeout) > > return 0; > > } > > } > > > > struct thread_t { > > int created, call; > > event_t ready, done; > > }; > > > > static struct thread_t threads[16]; > > static void execute_call(int call); > > static int running; > > > > static void* thr(void* arg) > > { > > struct thread_t* th = (struct thread_t*)arg; > > for (;;) { > > event_wait(&th->ready); > > event_reset(&th->ready); > > execute_call(th->call); > > __atomic_fetch_sub(&running, 1, __ATOMIC_RELAXED); > > event_set(&th->done); > > } > > return 0; > > } > > > > static void loop(void) > > { > > int i, call, thread; > > int collide = 0; > > again: > > for (call = 0; call < 2; call++) { > > for (thread = 0; thread < (int)(sizeof(threads) / sizeof(threads[0])); thread++) { > > struct thread_t* th = &threads[thread]; > > if (!th->created) { > > th->created = 1; > > event_init(&th->ready); > > event_init(&th->done); > > event_set(&th->done); > > thread_start(thr, th); > > } > > if (!event_isset(&th->done)) > > continue; > > event_reset(&th->done); > > th->call = call; > > __atomic_fetch_add(&running, 1, __ATOMIC_RELAXED); > > event_set(&th->ready); > > if (collide && (call % 2) == 0) > > break; > > event_timedwait(&th->done, 50); > > break; > > } > > } > > for (i = 0; i < 100 && __atomic_load_n(&running, __ATOMIC_RELAXED); i++) > > sleep_ms(1); > > if (!collide) { > > collide = 1; > > goto again; > > } > > } > > > > uint64_t r[1] = {0xffffffffffffffff}; > > > > void execute_call(int call) > > { > > intptr_t res = 0; > > switch (call) { > > case 0: > > memcpy((void*)0x20000100, "./file0\000", 8); > > res = syscall(__NR_creat, 0x20000100ul, 8ul); > > if (res != -1) > > r[0] = res; > > break; > > case 1: > > memcpy((void*)0x20000280, "security.capability\000", 20); > > *(uint32_t*)0x200002c0 = 0x3000000; > > *(uint32_t*)0x200002c4 = 0x1762; > > *(uint32_t*)0x200002c8 = 8; > > *(uint32_t*)0x200002cc = 2; > > *(uint32_t*)0x200002d0 = -1; > > *(uint32_t*)0x200002d4 = 0xee00; > > syscall(__NR_fsetxattr, r[0], 0x20000280ul, 0x200002c0ul, 0x18ul, 0ul); > > break; > > } > > > > } > > int main(void) > > { > > syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x1ffff000ul, 0x1000ul, 0ul, 0x32ul, -1, 0ul); > > syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x20000000ul, 0x1000000ul, 7ul, 0x32ul, -1, 0ul); > > syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x21000000ul, 0x1000ul, 0ul, 0x32ul, -1, 0ul); > > loop(); > > return 0; > > } > ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: XFS: Assertion failed 2021-01-14 18:24 ` Brian Foster @ 2021-01-14 19:33 ` Eric Sandeen 0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread From: Eric Sandeen @ 2021-01-14 19:33 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Brian Foster, Yumei Huang; +Cc: linux-xfs On 1/14/21 12:24 PM, Brian Foster wrote: > On Thu, Jan 14, 2021 at 12:29:28PM -0500, Brian Foster wrote: >> On Thu, Jan 14, 2021 at 05:20:29AM -0500, Yumei Huang wrote: >>> Hit the issue when doing syzkaller test with kernel 5.11.0-rc3(65f0d241). The C reproducer is attached. >>> >>> Steps to Reproduce: >>> 1. # gcc -pthread -o reproducer reproducer.c >>> 2. # ./reproducer >>> >>> >>> Test results: >>> [ 131.726790] XFS: Assertion failed: (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_UID|ATTR_GID|ATTR_ATIME|ATTR_ATIME_SET| ATTR_MTIME_SET|ATTR_KILL_PRIV|ATTR_TIMES_SET)) == 0, file: fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c, line: 849 >>> [ 131.743687] ------------[ cut here ]------------ >> >> Some quick initial analysis from a run of the reproducer... It looks >> like it calls into xfs_setattr_size() with ATTR_KILL_PRIV set in >> ->ia_valid. This appears to originate in the VFS via handle_truncate() >> -> do_truncate() -> dentry_needs_remove_privs(). >> >> An strace of the reproducer shows the following calls: >> >> ... >> [pid 1524] creat("./file0", 010) = 3 >> ... >> [pid 1524] fsetxattr(3, "security.capability", "\0\0\0\3b\27\0\0\10\0\0\0\2\0\0\0\377\377\377\377\0\356\0", 24, 0 <unfinished ...> >> ... >> [pid 1524] creat("./file0", 010 <unfinished ...> >> ... >> >> So I'm guessing there's an attempt to open this file with O_TRUNC with >> this particular xattr set (unexpectedly?). Indeed, after the reproducer >> leaves file01 around with the xattr, a subsequent xfs_io -c "open -t >> ..." attempt triggers the assert again, and then the xattr disappears. >> I'd have to dig more into the associated vfs code to grok the expected >> behavior and whether there's a problem here.. >> > > The reproducer seems to boil down to this: > > touch <file> > setfattr -n security.capability -v 0sAAAAA2IXAAAIAAAAAgAAAP////8A7gAA <file> > xfs_io -c "open -t <file>" > > ... and afaict, the behavior is as expected. do_truncate() sets > ATTR_KILL_PRIV via dentry_needs_remove_privs() and calls into > notify_change(). That eventually gets to xfs_vn_setattr_size(), which > calls xfs_vn_change_ok() -> setattr_prepare(). setattr_prepare() handles > ATTR_KILL_PRIV (which remains set in ->ia_valid), and then we return, > fall into xfs_setattr_size() and that triggers the assert failure. ISTM > we should probably just drop ATTR_KILL_PRIV from the assert. I dumped the ia_valid value, and it's got these bits set: 3 ATTR_SIZE 5 ATTR_MTIME 6 ATTR_CTIME 9 ATTR_FORCE 13 ATTR_FILE 14 ATTR_KILL_PRIV 15 ATTR_OPEN so you are right about ATTR_KILL_PRIV It's been in the assert forever, though, which is interesting? -Eric ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: XFS: Assertion failed 2021-01-14 17:29 ` Brian Foster 2021-01-14 18:24 ` Brian Foster @ 2021-01-14 21:21 ` Dave Chinner 2021-01-15 8:36 ` Yumei Huang 1 sibling, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread From: Dave Chinner @ 2021-01-14 21:21 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Brian Foster; +Cc: Yumei Huang, linux-xfs On Thu, Jan 14, 2021 at 12:29:28PM -0500, Brian Foster wrote: > On Thu, Jan 14, 2021 at 05:20:29AM -0500, Yumei Huang wrote: > > Hit the issue when doing syzkaller test with kernel 5.11.0-rc3(65f0d241). The C reproducer is attached. > > > > Steps to Reproduce: > > 1. # gcc -pthread -o reproducer reproducer.c > > 2. # ./reproducer > > > > > > Test results: > > [ 131.726790] XFS: Assertion failed: (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_UID|ATTR_GID|ATTR_ATIME|ATTR_ATIME_SET| ATTR_MTIME_SET|ATTR_KILL_PRIV|ATTR_TIMES_SET)) == 0, file: fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c, line: 849 > > [ 131.743687] ------------[ cut here ]------------ > > Some quick initial analysis from a run of the reproducer... It looks > like it calls into xfs_setattr_size() with ATTR_KILL_PRIV set in > ->ia_valid. This appears to originate in the VFS via handle_truncate() > -> do_truncate() -> dentry_needs_remove_privs(). > > An strace of the reproducer shows the following calls: > > ... > [pid 1524] creat("./file0", 010) = 3 > ... > [pid 1524] fsetxattr(3, "security.capability", "\0\0\0\3b\27\0\0\10\0\0\0\2\0\0\0\377\377\377\377\0\356\0", 24, 0 <unfinished ...> > ... > [pid 1524] creat("./file0", 010 <unfinished ...> > ... > > So I'm guessing there's an attempt to open this file with O_TRUNC with > this particular xattr set (unexpectedly?). Indeed, after the reproducer > leaves file01 around with the xattr, a subsequent xfs_io -c "open -t > ..." attempt triggers the assert again, and then the xattr disappears. > I'd have to dig more into the associated vfs code to grok the expected > behavior and whether there's a problem here.. Changing the size of the inode is is all that xfs_setattr_size() should be doing. Stripping capability attributes should have been already been done by the generic setattr code before we get to xfs_setattr_size(), so ATTR_KILL_PRIV should not be set at that point. notify_change() used to always strip ATTR_KILL_PRIV from ia_valid when it sets up the flags necessary to strip privileges in the ->setattr callout. But it doesn't appear to do so always anymore: if (ia_valid & ATTR_KILL_PRIV) { error = security_inode_need_killpriv(dentry); if (error < 0) return error; if (error == 0) ia_valid = attr->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_KILL_PRIV; } If ATTR_KILL_PRIV is still set, this implies security_inode_need_killpriv() returned > 0 for some reason. I'm assuming that this code ran: security_inode_need_killpriv() call_int_hook(inode_need_killpriv, 0, dentry); And the only implemented hook is this: LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_need_killpriv, cap_inode_need_killpriv), /** * cap_inode_need_killpriv - Determine if inode change affects privileges * @dentry: The inode/dentry in being changed with change marked ATTR_KILL_PRIV * * Determine if an inode having a change applied that's marked ATTR_KILL_PRIV * affects the security markings on that inode, and if it is, should * inode_killpriv() be invoked or the change rejected. * * Returns 1 if security.capability has a value, meaning inode_killpriv() * is required, 0 otherwise, meaning inode_killpriv() is not required. */ int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); int error; error = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, NULL, 0); return error > 0; } And that's the xattr that the reproducer is setting. So, smoking gun. we've done a lookup on the security.capability xattr which it found so notify_change() does not clear ATTR_KILL_PRIV. The xattr gets killed in setattr_prepare() but it does not clear ATTR_KILL_PRIV, and hence we hit the assert faili when we get into xfs_setattr_size. Looks like a regression introduced in 2016 by: commit 030b533c4fd4d2ec3402363323de4bb2983c9cee Author: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Date: Thu May 26 17:21:32 2016 +0200 fs: Avoid premature clearing of capabilities Currently, notify_change() clears capabilities or IMA attributes by calling security_inode_killpriv() before calling into ->setattr. Thus it happens before any other permission checks in inode_change_ok() and user is thus allowed to trigger clearing of capabilities or IMA attributes for any file he can look up e.g. by calling chown for that file. This is unexpected and can lead to user DoSing a system. Fix the problem by calling security_inode_killpriv() at the end of inode_change_ok() instead of from notify_change(). At that moment we are sure user has permissions to do the requested change. References: CVE-2015-1350 Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> The bug is harmless, it will only trigger the assert on debug XFS kernels, but otherwise ATTR_KILL_PRIV is not checked/used by xfs_setattr_size. Removing ATTR_KILL_PRIV from the assert is probably all that is needed. Can you write a patch for that, Yumei? Cheers, Dave. -- Dave Chinner david@fromorbit.com ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: XFS: Assertion failed 2021-01-14 21:21 ` Dave Chinner @ 2021-01-15 8:36 ` Yumei Huang 0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread From: Yumei Huang @ 2021-01-15 8:36 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Dave Chinner; +Cc: Brian Foster, linux-xfs ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Dave Chinner" <david@fromorbit.com> > To: "Brian Foster" <bfoster@redhat.com> > Cc: "Yumei Huang" <yuhuang@redhat.com>, linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org > Sent: Friday, January 15, 2021 5:21:02 AM > Subject: Re: XFS: Assertion failed > > On Thu, Jan 14, 2021 at 12:29:28PM -0500, Brian Foster wrote: > > On Thu, Jan 14, 2021 at 05:20:29AM -0500, Yumei Huang wrote: > > > Hit the issue when doing syzkaller test with kernel 5.11.0-rc3(65f0d241). > > > The C reproducer is attached. > > > > > > Steps to Reproduce: > > > 1. # gcc -pthread -o reproducer reproducer.c > > > 2. # ./reproducer > > > > > > > > > Test results: > > > [ 131.726790] XFS: Assertion failed: (iattr->ia_valid & > > > (ATTR_UID|ATTR_GID|ATTR_ATIME|ATTR_ATIME_SET| > > > ATTR_MTIME_SET|ATTR_KILL_PRIV|ATTR_TIMES_SET)) == 0, file: > > > fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c, line: 849 > > > [ 131.743687] ------------[ cut here ]------------ > > > > Some quick initial analysis from a run of the reproducer... It looks > > like it calls into xfs_setattr_size() with ATTR_KILL_PRIV set in > > ->ia_valid. This appears to originate in the VFS via handle_truncate() > > -> do_truncate() -> dentry_needs_remove_privs(). > > > > An strace of the reproducer shows the following calls: > > > > ... > > [pid 1524] creat("./file0", 010) = 3 > > ... > > [pid 1524] fsetxattr(3, "security.capability", > > "\0\0\0\3b\27\0\0\10\0\0\0\2\0\0\0\377\377\377\377\0\356\0", 24, 0 > > <unfinished ...> > > ... > > [pid 1524] creat("./file0", 010 <unfinished ...> > > ... > > > > So I'm guessing there's an attempt to open this file with O_TRUNC with > > this particular xattr set (unexpectedly?). Indeed, after the reproducer > > leaves file01 around with the xattr, a subsequent xfs_io -c "open -t > > ..." attempt triggers the assert again, and then the xattr disappears. > > I'd have to dig more into the associated vfs code to grok the expected > > behavior and whether there's a problem here.. > > Changing the size of the inode is is all that xfs_setattr_size() > should be doing. Stripping capability attributes should have been > already been done by the generic setattr code before we get to > xfs_setattr_size(), so ATTR_KILL_PRIV should not be set at that > point. > > notify_change() used to always strip ATTR_KILL_PRIV from ia_valid > when it sets up the flags necessary to strip privileges in the > ->setattr callout. But it doesn't appear to do so always anymore: > > if (ia_valid & ATTR_KILL_PRIV) { > error = security_inode_need_killpriv(dentry); > if (error < 0) > return error; > if (error == 0) > ia_valid = attr->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_KILL_PRIV; > } > > If ATTR_KILL_PRIV is still set, this implies > security_inode_need_killpriv() returned > 0 for some reason. I'm > assuming that this code ran: > > security_inode_need_killpriv() > call_int_hook(inode_need_killpriv, 0, dentry); > > And the only implemented hook is this: > > LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_need_killpriv, cap_inode_need_killpriv), > > /** > * cap_inode_need_killpriv - Determine if inode change affects privileges > * @dentry: The inode/dentry in being changed with change marked > ATTR_KILL_PRIV > * > * Determine if an inode having a change applied that's marked ATTR_KILL_PRIV > * affects the security markings on that inode, and if it is, should > * inode_killpriv() be invoked or the change rejected. > * > * Returns 1 if security.capability has a value, meaning inode_killpriv() > * is required, 0 otherwise, meaning inode_killpriv() is not required. > */ > int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) > { > struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); > int error; > > error = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, NULL, 0); > return error > 0; > } > > And that's the xattr that the reproducer is setting. So, smoking > gun. > > we've done a lookup on the security.capability xattr which it > found so notify_change() does not clear ATTR_KILL_PRIV. The xattr > gets killed in setattr_prepare() but it does not clear > ATTR_KILL_PRIV, and hence we hit the assert faili when we get into > xfs_setattr_size. > > Looks like a regression introduced in 2016 by: > > commit 030b533c4fd4d2ec3402363323de4bb2983c9cee > Author: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> > Date: Thu May 26 17:21:32 2016 +0200 > > fs: Avoid premature clearing of capabilities > > Currently, notify_change() clears capabilities or IMA attributes by > calling security_inode_killpriv() before calling into ->setattr. Thus it > happens before any other permission checks in inode_change_ok() and user > is thus allowed to trigger clearing of capabilities or IMA attributes > for any file he can look up e.g. by calling chown for that file. This is > unexpected and can lead to user DoSing a system. > > Fix the problem by calling security_inode_killpriv() at the end of > inode_change_ok() instead of from notify_change(). At that moment we are > sure user has permissions to do the requested change. > > References: CVE-2015-1350 > Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> > Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> > > The bug is harmless, it will only trigger the assert on debug XFS > kernels, but otherwise ATTR_KILL_PRIV is not checked/used by > xfs_setattr_size. > > Removing ATTR_KILL_PRIV from the assert is probably all that is > needed. Can you write a patch for that, Yumei? Sure, I will send the patch soon. Best Regards, Yumei Huang > > Cheers, > > Dave. > -- > Dave Chinner > david@fromorbit.com > > ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
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2021-01-14 10:20 ` XFS: Assertion failed Yumei Huang
2021-01-14 17:29 ` Brian Foster
2021-01-14 18:24 ` Brian Foster
2021-01-14 19:33 ` Eric Sandeen
2021-01-14 21:21 ` Dave Chinner
2021-01-15 8:36 ` Yumei Huang
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