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@ 2002-08-08 11:28 Samarth  Sharma
  2002-08-08 13:01 ` your mail Wayne Salamon
  2002-08-08 13:48 ` Russell Coker
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Samarth  Sharma @ 2002-08-08 11:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: selinux

hi,
  A security aware application like the sshd daemon acts as an 
object manager for all its related processes..is this correct?? or 
are object managers are a part of the kernel.
  if sshd does act as an object manager who enforces the access 
decisions for the sshd daemon..
  Also if the daemon does act as an object manager does it not 
involve incorporating policy logic in the manager therby violating 
the primary principle of Flask architecture..
  Please clarify
thanks
samarth
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* Re: your mail
  2002-08-08 11:28 Samarth  Sharma
@ 2002-08-08 13:01 ` Wayne Salamon
  2002-08-08 13:48 ` Russell Coker
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Wayne Salamon @ 2002-08-08 13:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Samarth Sharma; +Cc: selinux

On 8 Aug 2002, Samarth  Sharma wrote:

> hi,
>   A security aware application like the sshd daemon acts as an
> object manager for all its related processes..is this correct?? or
> are object managers are a part of the kernel.
>   if sshd does act as an object manager who enforces the access
> decisions for the sshd daemon..
>   Also if the daemon does act as an object manager does it not
> involve incorporating policy logic in the manager therby violating
> the primary principle of Flask architecture..

  All object access by processes will be controlled by the SELinux
module.  Security aware applications can make use of extended system calls
provided with SELinux to control security IDs on objects, but only as far
as the policy allows. Therefore, there is no violation, or bypassing, of
the controls provided by the Flask architecture.

  The application can control labeling of objects, but not the enforcement
of the policy based on those labels.


-- 
Wayne Salamon
wsalamon@tislabs.com


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* Re:
  2002-08-08 11:28 Samarth  Sharma
  2002-08-08 13:01 ` your mail Wayne Salamon
@ 2002-08-08 13:48 ` Russell Coker
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Russell Coker @ 2002-08-08 13:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Samarth Sharma, selinux

On Thu, 8 Aug 2002 13:28, Samarth  Sharma wrote:
>   A security aware application like the sshd daemon acts as an
> object manager for all its related processes..is this correct?? or
> are object managers are a part of the kernel.

The kernel fully manages all accesses granted to all domains.

sshd can determine the initial Identity, Role, and Domain (which together 
comprise the context) for the process, but it's choices in this regard are 
limited by the SE policy.

In a default configuration sshd can only run processes in sshd_t or user_t 
domains and in the user_r or system_r roles.  If it runs a process in the 
sshd_t domain and the system_r role then that process can do very few things 
(basically run other copies of sshd).

The worst that sshd can do in the default configuration is to run a process 
as UID=0 in the user_t domain.

>   if sshd does act as an object manager who enforces the access
> decisions for the sshd daemon..

The only decisions that sshd can make are what domain to run the child 
process in, and they are very limited.

If you want a really locked down system then you have no files stored in type 
user_home_t and force the user to run "newrole" before executing any 
processes.  That would have saved you from most past exploits of sshd and 
hopefully from future exploits.  But it still wouldn't save you from a 
trojaned sshd that monitors your keypresses when you enter the password for 
newrole.

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2002-08-08 11:28 Samarth  Sharma
2002-08-08 13:01 ` your mail Wayne Salamon
2002-08-08 13:48 ` Russell Coker

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