Re: Behavior of tails with respect to shred, wipe, etc

[Oleg Drokin <green@namesys.com>]

Hello!

On Tue, Oct 29, 2002 at 09:32:17PM -0500, Tom Vier wrote:
> > > I guess we should address this issue in reiser4. This is -security-
> > > feature after all. Hans? It is not clear how to intehgrate this with
> > > journalling though.
> > Zero out all freed blocks (mount option). This will kill write performance
> > though.
> you could add support for the +s attr. zero-out current contents on delete.

That won't work with editors that create temporary file, write new content into
it and then rename that temp file into new one.

> i'm the author of (one) wipe (aka ya-wipe, there's more than one "wipe") and
> i made a point to be clear in the docs and on wipe.sf.net that encryption is
> the only complete solution. my app is most useful for using on whole drives,

Another one (for deleted data to stay deleted) is to zero out all freed blocks
;)

> if you're going to sell it on ebay or something, and you want non-secret
> personal stuff off (or at least invisible to almost all).

Is that somehow better than badblocks -w /dev/hdX ? ;)

Bye,
    Oleg