Re: infelicity in context_user_set; new syscalls: setfileconat, etc.?

[Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>]

On Monday 31 July 2006 18:39, Jim Meyering <jim@meyering.net> wrote:
> > And I suspect that nobody's running an SELinux system with no /proc
> > mounted (except on some *really* Martian-logic design for a Really Secure
> > embedded system or something...)
>
> Let's assume that all properly-configured environments do mount /proc.

Let's not, think of chroot environments.

> Are the required features[*] of /proc usable even in the most restrictive
> environments?

I doubt it at the moment.  But it wouldn't be difficult to enable these things 
for the rare cases where they are needed.

> If so, then the only remaining argument for adding syscalls 
> is one of efficiency -- not very compelling.
>
> [*] The ability to access any FILE via /proc/self/fd/N/FILE,
> where the directory containing FILE is open on file descriptor N.

I believe that the real question is whether processes in restrictive 
environments such as chroot's need to do chcon -R operations anyway, and if 
they do whether they need to go to great depth.

I have set up many chroot environments, many of which were so restrictive that 
they would not permit what you desire.  But I can't think of any of them 
having a need for deep chcon -R operations.

Would it be possible to use the current functionality and only skip to the 
other type when the path depth is exceeded?

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