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From: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
To: "Eric Paris" <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: "Stephen Smalley" <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v4 1/3] [SELinux] Add a capabilities bitmap to SELinux policy version 22
Date: Wed, 10 Oct 2007 17:41:20 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <200710101741.20238.paul.moore@hp.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <7e0fb38c0710101402l1ea0a269m16ed42f4e33712c8@mail.gmail.com>

On Wednesday 10 October 2007 5:02:15 pm Eric Paris wrote:
> On 10/10/07, Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> wrote:
> > On Wednesday 10 October 2007 2:16:34 pm Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > > On Fri, 2007-10-05 at 15:32 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > > @@ -1304,6 +1307,9 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t
> > > > len) return -EINVAL;
> > > >             }
> > > >             policydb_loaded_version = policydb.policyvers;
> > > > +           selinux_policycap_netpeer =
> > > > +             ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
> > > > +                             POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER);
> > > >             ss_initialized = 1;
> > > >             seqno = ++latest_granting;
> > > >             LOAD_UNLOCK;
> > >
> > > Only handles the initial policy load case, not reloads.
> >
> > So it does, thanks.  I just added the same assignment further down in the
> > security_load_policy() function to handle the reload case.
>
> Do we expect to have more of these?  are we going to keep making
> load_policy larger and larger or should this type of assignment just
> be made in its own function to start with?

My crystal ball is a bit hazy, but I think it's reasonable to expect that we 
will get more of these variables in the future.  I'll move it out to a 
separate function unless I hear any strong objections.

-- 
paul moore
linux security @ hp

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  reply	other threads:[~2007-10-10 21:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2007-10-05 19:32 [RFC PATCH v4 0/3] Added new checks for labeled IPsec & SECMARK [en|dis]able Paul Moore
2007-10-05 19:32 ` [RFC PATCH v4 1/3] [SELinux] Add a capabilities bitmap to SELinux policy version 22 Paul Moore
2007-10-10 18:16   ` Stephen Smalley
2007-10-10 18:31     ` Paul Moore
2007-10-10 21:02       ` Eric Paris
2007-10-10 21:41         ` Paul Moore [this message]
2007-10-05 19:32 ` [RFC PATCH v4 2/3] [SELinux] Better integration between peer labeling subsystems Paul Moore
2007-10-05 19:33 ` [RFC PATCH v4 3/3] [SELinux] Enable dynamic enable/disable of the network access checks Paul Moore
2007-10-07 21:53 ` [RFC PATCH v4 0/3] Added new checks for labeled IPsec & SECMARK [en|dis]able James Morris
2007-10-07 23:55   ` Paul Moore
2007-10-08 12:06     ` Paul Moore

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