[RFC PATCH v8 00/18] Update to the labeled networking patches for 2.6.25

[RFC PATCH v8 00/18] Update to the labeled networking patches for 2.6.25

[Paul Moore]

Another update to the labeled networking patchset, the lblnet-2.6_testing
git tree on infradead.org has been updated too for those of you who prefer to
get the changes that way.

With this version of the patchset I'm now considering the patches "feature
complete" for 2.6.25.  However, the push to get the features done in time has
meant that my testing has been, and continues to be, pretty light so please
don't consider this patch ready for inclusion anywhere yet.  I'm posting these
changes for people to review and test.

Since v7 there have been quite a few changes, although they have all been in
support of the big change - packet ingress/egress controls (formerly know as
"flow controls" to some SELinux folks).  This should allow SELinux (and other
LSMs) to provide packet level access control to all IP traffic entering and
leaving the system.  The two other big changes, the shift from skb->dev to
skb->iif and the SELinux network node caching mechanism, are in support of
these new controls although other aspects of the SELinux code benefit as
well (check out the patches).

Comments are always welcome and people willing to help test are even more
welcome.  I'll get some SELinux policy patches out next week to help enable
the new functionality and if everything is still looking okay I'll ping Andew
Morton to see if I can get the latest version of these patches included in the
-mm tree (previous versions are already included).

Thanks.

-- 
paul moore
linux security @ hp


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[RFC PATCH v8 01/18] NetLabel: Remove unneeded RCU read locks

[Paul Moore]

This patch removes some unneeded RCU read locks as we can treat the reads as
"safe" even without RCU.  It also converts the NetLabel configuration refcount
from a spinlock protected u32 into atomic_t to be more consistent with the rest
of the kernel.
---

 net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c  |    5 ++-
 net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c      |    3 +-
 net/netlabel/netlabel_mgmt.c      |   63 ++-----------------------------------
 net/netlabel/netlabel_mgmt.h      |    7 ++--
 net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c |   17 ++--------
 5 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 80 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c
index ba0ca8d..becf91a 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
 #include <net/genetlink.h>
 #include <net/netlabel.h>
 #include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
+#include <asm/atomic.h>
 
 #include "netlabel_user.h"
 #include "netlabel_cipso_v4.h"
@@ -421,7 +422,7 @@ static int netlbl_cipsov4_add(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 		break;
 	}
 	if (ret_val == 0)
-		netlbl_mgmt_protocount_inc();
+		atomic_inc(&netlabel_mgmt_protocount);
 
 	audit_buf = netlbl_audit_start_common(AUDIT_MAC_CIPSOV4_ADD,
 					      &audit_info);
@@ -698,7 +699,7 @@ static int netlbl_cipsov4_remove(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 				      &audit_info,
 				      netlbl_cipsov4_doi_free);
 	if (ret_val == 0)
-		netlbl_mgmt_protocount_dec();
+		atomic_dec(&netlabel_mgmt_protocount);
 
 	audit_buf = netlbl_audit_start_common(AUDIT_MAC_CIPSOV4_DEL,
 					      &audit_info);
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
index 4f50949..d3762ea 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
 #include <net/netlabel.h>
 #include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
 #include <asm/bug.h>
+#include <asm/atomic.h>
 
 #include "netlabel_domainhash.h"
 #include "netlabel_unlabeled.h"
@@ -262,7 +263,7 @@ int netlbl_enabled(void)
 	/* At some point we probably want to expose this mechanism to the user
 	 * as well so that admins can toggle NetLabel regardless of the
 	 * configuration */
-	return (netlbl_mgmt_protocount_value() > 0 ? 1 : 0);
+	return (atomic_read(&netlabel_mgmt_protocount) > 0);
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_mgmt.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_mgmt.c
index 5648337..e2258dc 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_mgmt.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_mgmt.c
@@ -37,14 +37,14 @@
 #include <net/genetlink.h>
 #include <net/netlabel.h>
 #include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
+#include <asm/atomic.h>
 
 #include "netlabel_domainhash.h"
 #include "netlabel_user.h"
 #include "netlabel_mgmt.h"
 
-/* NetLabel configured protocol count */
-static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(netlabel_mgmt_protocount_lock);
-static u32 netlabel_mgmt_protocount = 0;
+/* NetLabel configured protocol counter */
+atomic_t netlabel_mgmt_protocount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
 
 /* Argument struct for netlbl_domhsh_walk() */
 struct netlbl_domhsh_walk_arg {
@@ -71,63 +71,6 @@ static const struct nla_policy netlbl_mgmt_genl_policy[NLBL_MGMT_A_MAX + 1] = {
 };
 
 /*
- * NetLabel Misc Managment Functions
- */
-
-/**
- * netlbl_mgmt_protocount_inc - Increment the configured labeled protocol count
- *
- * Description:
- * Increment the number of labeled protocol configurations in the current
- * NetLabel configuration.  Keep track of this for use in determining if
- * NetLabel label enforcement should be active/enabled or not in the LSM.
- *
- */
-void netlbl_mgmt_protocount_inc(void)
-{
-	spin_lock(&netlabel_mgmt_protocount_lock);
-	netlabel_mgmt_protocount++;
-	spin_unlock(&netlabel_mgmt_protocount_lock);
-}
-
-/**
- * netlbl_mgmt_protocount_dec - Decrement the configured labeled protocol count
- *
- * Description:
- * Decrement the number of labeled protocol configurations in the current
- * NetLabel configuration.  Keep track of this for use in determining if
- * NetLabel label enforcement should be active/enabled or not in the LSM.
- *
- */
-void netlbl_mgmt_protocount_dec(void)
-{
-	spin_lock(&netlabel_mgmt_protocount_lock);
-	if (netlabel_mgmt_protocount > 0)
-		netlabel_mgmt_protocount--;
-	spin_unlock(&netlabel_mgmt_protocount_lock);
-}
-
-/**
- * netlbl_mgmt_protocount_value - Return the number of configured protocols
- *
- * Description:
- * Return the number of labeled protocols in the current NetLabel
- * configuration.  This value is useful in  determining if NetLabel label
- * enforcement should be active/enabled or not in the LSM.
- *
- */
-u32 netlbl_mgmt_protocount_value(void)
-{
-	u32 val;
-
-	rcu_read_lock();
-	val = netlabel_mgmt_protocount;
-	rcu_read_unlock();
-
-	return val;
-}
-
-/*
  * NetLabel Command Handlers
  */
 
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_mgmt.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_mgmt.h
index ccb2b39..a43bff1 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_mgmt.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_mgmt.h
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
 #define _NETLABEL_MGMT_H
 
 #include <net/netlabel.h>
+#include <asm/atomic.h>
 
 /*
  * The following NetLabel payloads are supported by the management interface.
@@ -168,9 +169,7 @@ enum {
 /* NetLabel protocol functions */
 int netlbl_mgmt_genl_init(void);
 
-/* NetLabel misc management functions */
-void netlbl_mgmt_protocount_inc(void);
-void netlbl_mgmt_protocount_dec(void);
-u32 netlbl_mgmt_protocount_value(void);
+/* NetLabel configured protocol reference counter */
+extern atomic_t netlabel_mgmt_protocount;
 
 #endif
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 3482924..d999d50 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -155,11 +155,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_list(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 		goto list_failure;
 	}
 
-	rcu_read_lock();
 	ret_val = nla_put_u8(ans_skb,
 			     NLBL_UNLABEL_A_ACPTFLG,
 			     netlabel_unlabel_acceptflg);
-	rcu_read_unlock();
 	if (ret_val != 0)
 		goto list_failure;
 
@@ -245,17 +243,10 @@ int netlbl_unlabel_genl_init(void)
  */
 int netlbl_unlabel_getattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
-	int ret_val;
-
-	rcu_read_lock();
-	if (netlabel_unlabel_acceptflg == 1) {
-		netlbl_secattr_init(secattr);
-		ret_val = 0;
-	} else
-		ret_val = -ENOMSG;
-	rcu_read_unlock();
-
-	return ret_val;
+	if (netlabel_unlabel_acceptflg == 0)
+		return -ENOMSG;
+	netlbl_secattr_init(secattr);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /**


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[RFC PATCH v8 02/18] NetLabel: Cleanup the LSM domain hash functions

[Paul Moore]

The NetLabel/LSM domain hash table search function used an argument to specify
if the default entry should be returned if an exact match couldn't be found in
the hash table.  This is a bit against the kernel's style so make two separate
functions to represent the separate behaviors.
---

 net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.c |   47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 1 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.c
index b3675bd..1f8f7ac 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.c
@@ -109,17 +109,14 @@ static u32 netlbl_domhsh_hash(const char *key)
 /**
  * netlbl_domhsh_search - Search for a domain entry
  * @domain: the domain
- * @def: return default if no match is found
  *
  * Description:
  * Searches the domain hash table and returns a pointer to the hash table
- * entry if found, otherwise NULL is returned.  If @def is non-zero and a
- * match is not found in the domain hash table the default mapping is returned
- * if it exists.  The caller is responsibile for the rcu hash table locks
- * (i.e. the caller much call rcu_read_[un]lock()).
+ * entry if found, otherwise NULL is returned.  The caller is responsibile for
+ * the rcu hash table locks (i.e. the caller much call rcu_read_[un]lock()).
  *
  */
-static struct netlbl_dom_map *netlbl_domhsh_search(const char *domain, u32 def)
+static struct netlbl_dom_map *netlbl_domhsh_search(const char *domain)
 {
 	u32 bkt;
 	struct netlbl_dom_map *iter;
@@ -133,10 +130,31 @@ static struct netlbl_dom_map *netlbl_domhsh_search(const char *domain, u32 def)
 				return iter;
 	}
 
-	if (def != 0) {
-		iter = rcu_dereference(netlbl_domhsh_def);
-		if (iter != NULL && iter->valid)
-			return iter;
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_domhsh_search_def - Search for a domain entry
+ * @domain: the domain
+ * @def: return default if no match is found
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Searches the domain hash table and returns a pointer to the hash table
+ * entry if an exact match is found, if an exact match is not present in the
+ * hash table then the default entry is returned if valid otherwise NULL is
+ * returned.  The caller is responsibile for the rcu hash table locks
+ * (i.e. the caller much call rcu_read_[un]lock()).
+ *
+ */
+static struct netlbl_dom_map *netlbl_domhsh_search_def(const char *domain)
+{
+	struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;
+
+	entry = netlbl_domhsh_search(domain);
+	if (entry == NULL) {
+		entry = rcu_dereference(netlbl_domhsh_def);
+		if (entry != NULL && entry->valid)
+			return entry;
 	}
 
 	return NULL;
@@ -224,7 +242,7 @@ int netlbl_domhsh_add(struct netlbl_dom_map *entry,
 	if (entry->domain != NULL) {
 		bkt = netlbl_domhsh_hash(entry->domain);
 		spin_lock(&netlbl_domhsh_lock);
-		if (netlbl_domhsh_search(entry->domain, 0) == NULL)
+		if (netlbl_domhsh_search(entry->domain) == NULL)
 			list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list,
 				    &rcu_dereference(netlbl_domhsh)->tbl[bkt]);
 		else
@@ -307,7 +325,10 @@ int netlbl_domhsh_remove(const char *domain, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
 	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	entry = netlbl_domhsh_search(domain, (domain != NULL ? 0 : 1));
+	if (domain)
+		entry = netlbl_domhsh_search(domain);
+	else
+		entry = netlbl_domhsh_search_def(domain);
 	if (entry == NULL)
 		goto remove_return;
 	switch (entry->type) {
@@ -377,7 +398,7 @@ int netlbl_domhsh_remove_default(struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
  */
 struct netlbl_dom_map *netlbl_domhsh_getentry(const char *domain)
 {
-	return netlbl_domhsh_search(domain, 1);
+	return netlbl_domhsh_search_def(domain);
 }
 
 /**


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[RFC PATCH v8 03/18] NetLabel: Consolidate the LSM domain mapping/hashing locks

[Paul Moore]

Currently we use two separate spinlocks to protect both the hash/mapping table
and the default entry.  This could be considered a bit foolish because it adds
complexity without offering any real performance advantage.  This patch
removes the dedicated default spinlock and protects the default entry with the
hash/mapping table spinlock.
---

 net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.c |   30 +++++++++---------------------
 1 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.c
index 1f8f7ac..9a8ea01 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.c
@@ -54,9 +54,6 @@ struct netlbl_domhsh_tbl {
  * hash table should be okay */
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(netlbl_domhsh_lock);
 static struct netlbl_domhsh_tbl *netlbl_domhsh = NULL;
-
-/* Default domain mapping */
-static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(netlbl_domhsh_def_lock);
 static struct netlbl_dom_map *netlbl_domhsh_def = NULL;
 
 /*
@@ -239,24 +236,22 @@ int netlbl_domhsh_add(struct netlbl_dom_map *entry,
 	INIT_RCU_HEAD(&entry->rcu);
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
+	spin_lock(&netlbl_domhsh_lock);
 	if (entry->domain != NULL) {
 		bkt = netlbl_domhsh_hash(entry->domain);
-		spin_lock(&netlbl_domhsh_lock);
 		if (netlbl_domhsh_search(entry->domain) == NULL)
 			list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list,
 				    &rcu_dereference(netlbl_domhsh)->tbl[bkt]);
 		else
 			ret_val = -EEXIST;
-		spin_unlock(&netlbl_domhsh_lock);
 	} else {
 		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
-		spin_lock(&netlbl_domhsh_def_lock);
 		if (rcu_dereference(netlbl_domhsh_def) == NULL)
 			rcu_assign_pointer(netlbl_domhsh_def, entry);
 		else
 			ret_val = -EEXIST;
-		spin_unlock(&netlbl_domhsh_def_lock);
 	}
+	spin_unlock(&netlbl_domhsh_lock);
 	audit_buf = netlbl_audit_start_common(AUDIT_MAC_MAP_ADD, audit_info);
 	if (audit_buf != NULL) {
 		audit_log_format(audit_buf,
@@ -337,23 +332,16 @@ int netlbl_domhsh_remove(const char *domain, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
 					   entry->domain);
 		break;
 	}
-	if (entry != rcu_dereference(netlbl_domhsh_def)) {
-		spin_lock(&netlbl_domhsh_lock);
-		if (entry->valid) {
-			entry->valid = 0;
+	spin_lock(&netlbl_domhsh_lock);
+	if (entry->valid) {
+		entry->valid = 0;
+		if (entry != rcu_dereference(netlbl_domhsh_def))
 			list_del_rcu(&entry->list);
-			ret_val = 0;
-		}
-		spin_unlock(&netlbl_domhsh_lock);
-	} else {
-		spin_lock(&netlbl_domhsh_def_lock);
-		if (entry->valid) {
-			entry->valid = 0;
+		else
 			rcu_assign_pointer(netlbl_domhsh_def, NULL);
-			ret_val = 0;
-		}
-		spin_unlock(&netlbl_domhsh_def_lock);
+		ret_val = 0;
 	}
+	spin_unlock(&netlbl_domhsh_lock);
 
 	audit_buf = netlbl_audit_start_common(AUDIT_MAC_MAP_DEL, audit_info);
 	if (audit_buf != NULL) {


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[RFC PATCH v8 04/18] NetLabel: Add secid token support to the NetLabel secattr struct

[Paul Moore]

This patch adds support to the NetLabel LSM secattr struct for a secid token
and a type field, paving the way for full LSM/SELinux context support and
"static" or "fallback" labels.  In addition, this patch adds a fair amount
of documentation to the core NetLabel structures used as part of the
NetLabel kernel API.
---

 include/net/netlabel.h            |   91 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c             |   59 +++++++++++++++---------
 net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c |    1 
 security/selinux/ss/mls.c         |   10 ++--
 security/selinux/ss/services.c    |    5 ++
 5 files changed, 120 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/netlabel.h b/include/net/netlabel.h
index 2e5b2f6..18b73cf 100644
--- a/include/net/netlabel.h
+++ b/include/net/netlabel.h
@@ -105,17 +105,49 @@ struct netlbl_dom_map;
 /* Domain mapping operations */
 int netlbl_domhsh_remove(const char *domain, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
 
-/* LSM security attributes */
+/*
+ * LSM security attributes
+ */
+
+/**
+ * struct netlbl_lsm_cache - NetLabel LSM security attribute cache
+ * @refcount: atomic reference counter
+ * @free: LSM supplied function to free the cache data
+ * @data: LSM supplied cache data
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This structure is provided for LSMs which wish to make use of the NetLabel
+ * caching mechanism to store LSM specific data/attributes in the NetLabel
+ * cache.  If the LSM has to perform a lot of translation from the NetLabel
+ * security attributes into it's own internal representation then the cache
+ * mechanism can provide a way to eliminate some or all of that translation
+ * overhead on a cache hit.
+ *
+ */
 struct netlbl_lsm_cache {
 	atomic_t refcount;
 	void (*free) (const void *data);
 	void *data;
 };
-/* The catmap bitmap field MUST be a power of two in length and large
+
+/**
+ * struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap - NetLabel LSM secattr category bitmap
+ * @startbit: the value of the lowest order bit in the bitmap
+ * @bitmap: the category bitmap
+ * @next: pointer to the next bitmap "node" or NULL
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This structure is used to represent category bitmaps.  Due to the large
+ * number of categories supported by most labeling protocols it is not
+ * practical to transfer a full bitmap internally so NetLabel adopts a sparse
+ * bitmap structure modeled after SELinux's ebitmap structure.
+ * The catmap bitmap field MUST be a power of two in length and large
  * enough to hold at least 240 bits.  Special care (i.e. check the code!)
  * should be used when changing these values as the LSM implementation
  * probably has functions which rely on the sizes of these types to speed
- * processing. */
+ * processing.
+ *
+ */
 #define NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPTYPE           u64
 #define NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPCNT            4
 #define NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPSIZE           (sizeof(NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPTYPE) * 8)
@@ -127,22 +159,48 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap {
 	NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPTYPE bitmap[NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPCNT];
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *next;
 };
+
+/**
+ * struct netlbl_lsm_secattr - NetLabel LSM security attributes
+ * @flags: indicate which attributes are contained in this structure
+ * @type: indicate the NLTYPE of the attributes
+ * @domain: the NetLabel LSM domain
+ * @cache: NetLabel LSM specific cache
+ * @attr.mls: MLS sensitivity label
+ * @attr.mls.cat: MLS category bitmap
+ * @attr.mls.lvl: MLS sensitivity level
+ * @attr.secid: LSM specific secid token
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This structure is used to pass security attributes between NetLabel and the
+ * LSM modules.  The flags field is used to specify which fields within the
+ * struct are valid and valid values can be created by bitwise OR'ing the
+ * NETLBL_SECATTR_* defines.  The domain field is typically set by the LSM to
+ * specify domain specific configuration settings and is not usually used by
+ * NetLabel itself when returning security attributes to the LSM.
+ *
+ */
 #define NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE             0x00000000
 #define NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN           0x00000001
 #define NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE            0x00000002
 #define NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL          0x00000004
 #define NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT          0x00000008
+#define NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID            0x00000010
 #define NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHEABLE        (NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL | \
-					 NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT)
+					 NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT | \
+					 NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID)
 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr {
 	u32 flags;
-
+	u32 type;
 	char *domain;
-
-	u32 mls_lvl;
-	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *mls_cat;
-
 	struct netlbl_lsm_cache *cache;
+	union {
+		struct {
+			struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *cat;
+			u32 lvl;
+		} mls;
+		u32 secid;
+	} attr;
 };
 
 /*
@@ -231,10 +289,7 @@ static inline void netlbl_secattr_catmap_free(
  */
 static inline void netlbl_secattr_init(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
-	secattr->flags = 0;
-	secattr->domain = NULL;
-	secattr->mls_cat = NULL;
-	secattr->cache = NULL;
+	memset(secattr, 0, sizeof(*secattr));
 }
 
 /**
@@ -248,11 +303,11 @@ static inline void netlbl_secattr_init(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
  */
 static inline void netlbl_secattr_destroy(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
-	if (secattr->cache)
-		netlbl_secattr_cache_free(secattr->cache);
 	kfree(secattr->domain);
-	if (secattr->mls_cat)
-		netlbl_secattr_catmap_free(secattr->mls_cat);
+	if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)
+		netlbl_secattr_cache_free(secattr->cache);
+	if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT)
+		netlbl_secattr_catmap_free(secattr->attr.mls.cat);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -300,7 +355,7 @@ int netlbl_secattr_catmap_setrng(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *catmap,
 				 gfp_t flags);
 
 /*
- * LSM protocol operations
+ * LSM protocol operations (NetLabel LSM/kernel API)
  */
 int netlbl_enabled(void);
 int netlbl_sock_setattr(struct sock *sk,
diff --git a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
index f18e88b..2e4e043 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
@@ -348,6 +348,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_cache_check(const unsigned char *key,
 			atomic_inc(&entry->lsm_data->refcount);
 			secattr->cache = entry->lsm_data;
 			secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE;
+			secattr->type = NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4;
 			if (prev_entry == NULL) {
 				spin_unlock_bh(&cipso_v4_cache[bkt].lock);
 				return 0;
@@ -865,7 +866,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_map_cat_rbm_hton(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
 	}
 
 	for (;;) {
-		host_spot = netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk(secattr->mls_cat,
+		host_spot = netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk(secattr->attr.mls.cat,
 						       host_spot + 1);
 		if (host_spot < 0)
 			break;
@@ -948,7 +949,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_map_cat_rbm_ntoh(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
 				return -EPERM;
 			break;
 		}
-		ret_val = netlbl_secattr_catmap_setbit(secattr->mls_cat,
+		ret_val = netlbl_secattr_catmap_setbit(secattr->attr.mls.cat,
 						       host_spot,
 						       GFP_ATOMIC);
 		if (ret_val != 0)
@@ -1014,7 +1015,8 @@ static int cipso_v4_map_cat_enum_hton(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
 	u32 cat_iter = 0;
 
 	for (;;) {
-		cat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk(secattr->mls_cat, cat + 1);
+		cat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk(secattr->attr.mls.cat,
+						 cat + 1);
 		if (cat < 0)
 			break;
 		if ((cat_iter + 2) > net_cat_len)
@@ -1049,7 +1051,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_map_cat_enum_ntoh(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
 	u32 iter;
 
 	for (iter = 0; iter < net_cat_len; iter += 2) {
-		ret_val = netlbl_secattr_catmap_setbit(secattr->mls_cat,
+		ret_val = netlbl_secattr_catmap_setbit(secattr->attr.mls.cat,
 				ntohs(get_unaligned((__be16 *)&net_cat[iter])),
 				GFP_ATOMIC);
 		if (ret_val != 0)
@@ -1130,7 +1132,8 @@ static int cipso_v4_map_cat_rng_hton(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
 		return -ENOSPC;
 
 	for (;;) {
-		iter = netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk(secattr->mls_cat, iter + 1);
+		iter = netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk(secattr->attr.mls.cat,
+						  iter + 1);
 		if (iter < 0)
 			break;
 		cat_size += (iter == 0 ? 0 : sizeof(u16));
@@ -1138,7 +1141,8 @@ static int cipso_v4_map_cat_rng_hton(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
 			return -ENOSPC;
 		array[array_cnt++] = iter;
 
-		iter = netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk_rng(secattr->mls_cat, iter);
+		iter = netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk_rng(secattr->attr.mls.cat,
+						      iter);
 		if (iter < 0)
 			return -EFAULT;
 		cat_size += sizeof(u16);
@@ -1191,7 +1195,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_map_cat_rng_ntoh(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
 		else
 			cat_low = 0;
 
-		ret_val = netlbl_secattr_catmap_setrng(secattr->mls_cat,
+		ret_val = netlbl_secattr_catmap_setrng(secattr->attr.mls.cat,
 						       cat_low,
 						       cat_high,
 						       GFP_ATOMIC);
@@ -1251,7 +1255,9 @@ static int cipso_v4_gentag_rbm(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
 	if ((secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) == 0)
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	ret_val = cipso_v4_map_lvl_hton(doi_def, secattr->mls_lvl, &level);
+	ret_val = cipso_v4_map_lvl_hton(doi_def,
+					secattr->attr.mls.lvl,
+					&level);
 	if (ret_val != 0)
 		return ret_val;
 
@@ -1303,12 +1309,13 @@ static int cipso_v4_parsetag_rbm(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
 	ret_val = cipso_v4_map_lvl_ntoh(doi_def, tag[3], &level);
 	if (ret_val != 0)
 		return ret_val;
-	secattr->mls_lvl = level;
+	secattr->attr.mls.lvl = level;
 	secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
 
 	if (tag_len > 4) {
-		secattr->mls_cat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
-		if (secattr->mls_cat == NULL)
+		secattr->attr.mls.cat =
+		                       netlbl_secattr_catmap_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
+		if (secattr->attr.mls.cat == NULL)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 
 		ret_val = cipso_v4_map_cat_rbm_ntoh(doi_def,
@@ -1316,7 +1323,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_parsetag_rbm(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
 						    tag_len - 4,
 						    secattr);
 		if (ret_val != 0) {
-			netlbl_secattr_catmap_free(secattr->mls_cat);
+			netlbl_secattr_catmap_free(secattr->attr.mls.cat);
 			return ret_val;
 		}
 
@@ -1350,7 +1357,9 @@ static int cipso_v4_gentag_enum(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
 	if (!(secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL))
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	ret_val = cipso_v4_map_lvl_hton(doi_def, secattr->mls_lvl, &level);
+	ret_val = cipso_v4_map_lvl_hton(doi_def,
+					secattr->attr.mls.lvl,
+					&level);
 	if (ret_val != 0)
 		return ret_val;
 
@@ -1396,12 +1405,13 @@ static int cipso_v4_parsetag_enum(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
 	ret_val = cipso_v4_map_lvl_ntoh(doi_def, tag[3], &level);
 	if (ret_val != 0)
 		return ret_val;
-	secattr->mls_lvl = level;
+	secattr->attr.mls.lvl = level;
 	secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
 
 	if (tag_len > 4) {
-		secattr->mls_cat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
-		if (secattr->mls_cat == NULL)
+		secattr->attr.mls.cat =
+			               netlbl_secattr_catmap_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
+		if (secattr->attr.mls.cat == NULL)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 
 		ret_val = cipso_v4_map_cat_enum_ntoh(doi_def,
@@ -1409,7 +1419,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_parsetag_enum(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
 						     tag_len - 4,
 						     secattr);
 		if (ret_val != 0) {
-			netlbl_secattr_catmap_free(secattr->mls_cat);
+			netlbl_secattr_catmap_free(secattr->attr.mls.cat);
 			return ret_val;
 		}
 
@@ -1443,7 +1453,9 @@ static int cipso_v4_gentag_rng(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
 	if (!(secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL))
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	ret_val = cipso_v4_map_lvl_hton(doi_def, secattr->mls_lvl, &level);
+	ret_val = cipso_v4_map_lvl_hton(doi_def,
+					secattr->attr.mls.lvl,
+					&level);
 	if (ret_val != 0)
 		return ret_val;
 
@@ -1488,12 +1500,13 @@ static int cipso_v4_parsetag_rng(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
 	ret_val = cipso_v4_map_lvl_ntoh(doi_def, tag[3], &level);
 	if (ret_val != 0)
 		return ret_val;
-	secattr->mls_lvl = level;
+	secattr->attr.mls.lvl = level;
 	secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
 
 	if (tag_len > 4) {
-		secattr->mls_cat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
-		if (secattr->mls_cat == NULL)
+		secattr->attr.mls.cat =
+			               netlbl_secattr_catmap_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
+		if (secattr->attr.mls.cat == NULL)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 
 		ret_val = cipso_v4_map_cat_rng_ntoh(doi_def,
@@ -1501,7 +1514,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_parsetag_rng(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
 						    tag_len - 4,
 						    secattr);
 		if (ret_val != 0) {
-			netlbl_secattr_catmap_free(secattr->mls_cat);
+			netlbl_secattr_catmap_free(secattr->attr.mls.cat);
 			return ret_val;
 		}
 
@@ -1850,6 +1863,8 @@ static int cipso_v4_getattr(const unsigned char *cipso,
 		ret_val = cipso_v4_parsetag_rng(doi_def, &cipso[6], secattr);
 		break;
 	}
+	if (ret_val == 0)
+		secattr->type = NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4;
 
 getattr_return:
 	rcu_read_unlock();
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index d999d50..5e11394 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -246,6 +246,7 @@ int netlbl_unlabel_getattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 	if (netlabel_unlabel_acceptflg == 0)
 		return -ENOMSG;
 	netlbl_secattr_init(secattr);
+	secattr->type = NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED;
 	return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index fb5d70a..5cf2429 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -569,7 +569,7 @@ void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context,
 	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
 		return;
 
-	secattr->mls_lvl = context->range.level[0].sens - 1;
+	secattr->attr.mls.lvl = context->range.level[0].sens - 1;
 	secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
 }
 
@@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context,
 	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
 		return;
 
-	context->range.level[0].sens = secattr->mls_lvl + 1;
+	context->range.level[0].sens = secattr->attr.mls.lvl + 1;
 	context->range.level[1].sens = context->range.level[0].sens;
 }
 
@@ -612,8 +612,8 @@ int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct context *context,
 		return 0;
 
 	rc = ebitmap_netlbl_export(&context->range.level[0].cat,
-				   &secattr->mls_cat);
-	if (rc == 0 && secattr->mls_cat != NULL)
+				   &secattr->attr.mls.cat);
+	if (rc == 0 && secattr->attr.mls.cat != NULL)
 		secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT;
 
 	return rc;
@@ -640,7 +640,7 @@ int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct context *context,
 		return 0;
 
 	rc = ebitmap_netlbl_import(&context->range.level[0].cat,
-				   secattr->mls_cat);
+				   secattr->attr.mls.cat);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		goto import_netlbl_cat_failure;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index d572dc9..88fcd57 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -2547,6 +2547,9 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
 		default:
 			goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return;
 		}
+	} else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) {
+		*sid = secattr->attr.secid;
+		rc = 0;
 	} else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
 		ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, base_sid);
 		if (ctx == NULL)
@@ -2558,7 +2561,7 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
 		mls_import_netlbl_lvl(&ctx_new, secattr);
 		if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) {
 			if (ebitmap_netlbl_import(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat,
-						  secattr->mls_cat) != 0)
+						  secattr->attr.mls.cat) != 0)
 				goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return;
 			ctx_new.range.level[1].cat.highbit =
 				ctx_new.range.level[0].cat.highbit;


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[RFC PATCH v8 05/18] LSM: Add secctx_to_secid() LSM hook

[Paul Moore]

Add a secctx_to_secid() LSM hook to go along with the existing
secid_to_secctx() LSM hook.  This patch also includes the SELinux
implementation for this hook.
---

 include/linux/security.h |   13 +++++++++++++
 security/dummy.c         |    6 ++++++
 security/security.c      |    6 ++++++
 security/selinux/hooks.c |    6 ++++++
 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index ac05083..db19c92 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1183,6 +1183,10 @@ struct request_sock;
  *	Convert secid to security context.
  *	@secid contains the security ID.
  *	@secdata contains the pointer that stores the converted security context.
+ * @secctx_to_secid:
+ *      Convert security context to secid.
+ *      @secid contains the pointer to the generated security ID.
+ *      @secdata contains the security context.
  *
  * @release_secctx:
  *	Release the security context.
@@ -1371,6 +1375,7 @@ struct security_operations {
  	int (*getprocattr)(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
  	int (*setprocattr)(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size);
 	int (*secid_to_secctx)(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+	int (*secctx_to_secid)(char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
 	void (*release_secctx)(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
@@ -1603,6 +1608,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t
 int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
 int security_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap);
 int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+int security_secctx_to_secid(char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
 void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
 
 #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
@@ -2280,6 +2286,13 @@ static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *secle
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
 
+static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(char *secdata,
+					   u32 seclen,
+					   u32 *secid)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
 static inline void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 {
 }
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index 3ccfbbe..0b62f95 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -928,6 +928,11 @@ static int dummy_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
 
+static int dummy_secctx_to_secid(char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
 static void dummy_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 {
 }
@@ -1086,6 +1091,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
  	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, getprocattr);
  	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, setprocattr);
  	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, secid_to_secctx);
+	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, secctx_to_secid);
  	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, release_secctx);
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, unix_stream_connect);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 0e1f1f1..3bdcada 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -816,6 +816,12 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
 
+int security_secctx_to_secid(char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+{
+	return security_ops->secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen, secid);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
+
 void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 {
 	return security_ops->release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 9f3124b..8bb673b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4710,6 +4710,11 @@ static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 	return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
 }
 
+static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+{
+	return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
+}
+
 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 {
 	kfree(secdata);
@@ -4898,6 +4903,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.setprocattr =                  selinux_setprocattr,
 
 	.secid_to_secctx =		selinux_secid_to_secctx,
+	.secctx_to_secid =		selinux_secctx_to_secid,
 	.release_secctx =		selinux_release_secctx,
 
         .unix_stream_connect =		selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,


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Re: [RFC PATCH v8 05/18] LSM: Add secctx_to_secid() LSM hook

[Stephen Smalley]

On Fri, 2007-12-14 at 16:50 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> Add a secctx_to_secid() LSM hook to go along with the existing
> secid_to_secctx() LSM hook.  This patch also includes the SELinux
> implementation for this hook.

Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

This one can go up anytime, as we have other people wanting such a hook
too.

Or alternatively we need to rationalize the entire selinux/exports
interface with these hooks as used by the networking and audit
subsystems, as that issue will be coming up anyway for other LSMs.

One thing to note is that some of these interfaces treat the context as
an opaque byte array of a given length, while other ones depend on the
context to be a NUL-terminated string (e.g. audit).

> ---
> 
>  include/linux/security.h |   13 +++++++++++++
>  security/dummy.c         |    6 ++++++
>  security/security.c      |    6 ++++++
>  security/selinux/hooks.c |    6 ++++++
>  4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index ac05083..db19c92 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -1183,6 +1183,10 @@ struct request_sock;
>   *	Convert secid to security context.
>   *	@secid contains the security ID.
>   *	@secdata contains the pointer that stores the converted security context.
> + * @secctx_to_secid:
> + *      Convert security context to secid.
> + *      @secid contains the pointer to the generated security ID.
> + *      @secdata contains the security context.
>   *
>   * @release_secctx:
>   *	Release the security context.
> @@ -1371,6 +1375,7 @@ struct security_operations {
>   	int (*getprocattr)(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
>   	int (*setprocattr)(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size);
>  	int (*secid_to_secctx)(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
> +	int (*secctx_to_secid)(char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
>  	void (*release_secctx)(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
>  
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
> @@ -1603,6 +1608,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t
>  int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
>  int security_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap);
>  int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
> +int security_secctx_to_secid(char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
>  void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
>  
>  #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
> @@ -2280,6 +2286,13 @@ static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *secle
>  	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>  }
>  
> +static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(char *secdata,
> +					   u32 seclen,
> +					   u32 *secid)
> +{
> +	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +}
> +
>  static inline void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
>  {
>  }
> diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
> index 3ccfbbe..0b62f95 100644
> --- a/security/dummy.c
> +++ b/security/dummy.c
> @@ -928,6 +928,11 @@ static int dummy_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
>  	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>  }
>  
> +static int dummy_secctx_to_secid(char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
> +{
> +	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +}
> +
>  static void dummy_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
>  {
>  }
> @@ -1086,6 +1091,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
>   	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, getprocattr);
>   	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, setprocattr);
>   	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, secid_to_secctx);
> +	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, secctx_to_secid);
>   	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, release_secctx);
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
>  	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, unix_stream_connect);
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 0e1f1f1..3bdcada 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -816,6 +816,12 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
>  
> +int security_secctx_to_secid(char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
> +{
> +	return security_ops->secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen, secid);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
> +
>  void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
>  {
>  	return security_ops->release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 9f3124b..8bb673b 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -4710,6 +4710,11 @@ static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
>  	return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
>  }
>  
> +static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
> +{
> +	return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
> +}
> +
>  static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
>  {
>  	kfree(secdata);
> @@ -4898,6 +4903,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
>  	.setprocattr =                  selinux_setprocattr,
>  
>  	.secid_to_secctx =		selinux_secid_to_secctx,
> +	.secctx_to_secid =		selinux_secctx_to_secid,
>  	.release_secctx =		selinux_release_secctx,
>  
>          .unix_stream_connect =		selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
> 
> 
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-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency


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Re: [RFC PATCH v8 05/18] LSM: Add secctx_to_secid() LSM hook

[Casey Schaufler]

--- Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote:

> On Fri, 2007-12-14 at 16:50 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> > Add a secctx_to_secid() LSM hook to go along with the existing
> > secid_to_secctx() LSM hook.  This patch also includes the SELinux
> > implementation for this hook.
> 
> Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
> 
> This one can go up anytime, as we have other people wanting such a hook
> too.

I can't provide any justifications why it shouldn't go in,
and there will no doubt be places where the continued use of
secids will require it going forward.

> Or alternatively we need to rationalize the entire selinux/exports
> interface with these hooks as used by the networking and audit
> subsystems, as that issue will be coming up anyway for other LSMs.

Yeah. Smack is taking the pragmatic path, assuming that secid and
secctx will be around at least until pigs nest in trees. You left
out the USB subsystems's use of secid's, which may be the least
savory of all.

> One thing to note is that some of these interfaces treat the context as
> an opaque byte array of a given length, while other ones depend on the
> context to be a NUL-terminated string (e.g. audit).

Smack and SELiunx always provide a NUL-terminated string. I would
be in favor of defining a secctx as the textual representation of a
security blob. If we don't, we'll need to define a third thing that
is the text representation for audit before it's possible to convert
audit from SELinux calls to LSM calls. Converting audit to use LSM
calls will be mostly straitforward if the secctx can be assumed to
be a string.


Casey Schaufler
casey@schaufler-ca.com

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Re: [RFC PATCH v8 05/18] LSM: Add secctx_to_secid() LSM hook

[James Morris]

On Fri, 14 Dec 2007, Paul Moore wrote:

> Add a secctx_to_secid() LSM hook to go along with the existing
> secid_to_secctx() LSM hook.  This patch also includes the SELinux
> implementation for this hook.

Please sign off your patches (especially this one asap, so I can push it 
upstream).


-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>

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Re: [RFC PATCH v8 05/18] LSM: Add secctx_to_secid() LSM hook

[Paul Moore]

On Tuesday 18 December 2007 3:25:54 am James Morris wrote:
> On Fri, 14 Dec 2007, Paul Moore wrote:
> > Add a secctx_to_secid() LSM hook to go along with the existing
> > secid_to_secctx() LSM hook.  This patch also includes the SELinux
> > implementation for this hook.
>
> Please sign off your patches (especially this one asap, so I can push it
> upstream).

The lack of a sign-off line is actually intentional at this point as I wanted 
to make sure they didn't go anywhere before they were ready.  For instance, 
I've got the changes that were pointed out yesterday on-list as well as a 
handful of IPv6 changes from some IPv6 folks here at HP.

Most of the new peer object class code paths haven't even been tested yet.  I 
realize we can still get fixes/corrections in after -rc1 but I'd like to try 
and minimize that if I can.

I've been operating under the assumption that I've most likely got until the 
end of next week before I need to post "final-ish" version of the patches, 
complete with a signed-off line.  If that isn't the case and you need these 
bits sooner (or now) please let me know.

-- 
paul moore
linux security @ hp

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[RFC PATCH v8 06/18] LSM: Add inet_sys_snd_skb() LSM hook

[Paul Moore]

Add an inet_sys_snd_skb() LSM hook to allow the LSM to provide packet level
access control for all outbound packets.  Using the existing postroute_last
netfilter hook turns out to be problematic as it is can be invoked multiple
times for a single packet, e.g. individual IPsec transforms, adding unwanted
overhead and complicating the security policy.
---

 include/linux/security.h |   11 +++++++++++
 net/ipv4/ip_output.c     |    7 +++++++
 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c    |    5 +++++
 security/dummy.c         |    8 +++++++-
 security/security.c      |    6 ++++++
 5 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index db19c92..1b8d332 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -876,6 +876,10 @@ struct request_sock;
  *     Sets the connection's peersid to the secmark on skb.
  * @req_classify_flow:
  *	Sets the flow's sid to the openreq sid.
+ * @inet_sys_snd_skb:
+ *	Check permissions on outgoing network packets.
+ *	@skb is the packet to check
+ *	@family is the packet's address family
  *
  * Security hooks for XFRM operations.
  *
@@ -1416,6 +1420,7 @@ struct security_operations {
 	void (*inet_csk_clone)(struct sock *newsk, const struct request_sock *req);
 	void (*inet_conn_established)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
 	void (*req_classify_flow)(const struct request_sock *req, struct flowi *fl);
+	int (*inet_sys_snd_skb)(struct sk_buff *skb, int family);
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
@@ -2328,6 +2333,7 @@ void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk);
 void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
 void security_sk_classify_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi *fl);
 void security_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, struct flowi *fl);
+int security_inet_sys_snd_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, int family);
 void security_sock_graft(struct sock*sk, struct socket *parent);
 int security_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk,
 			struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req);
@@ -2471,6 +2477,11 @@ static inline void security_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, st
 {
 }
 
+static inline int security_inet_sys_snd_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, int family)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static inline void security_sock_graft(struct sock* sk, struct socket *parent)
 {
 }
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_output.c b/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
index fd99fbd..82a7297 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
@@ -204,6 +204,8 @@ static inline int ip_skb_dst_mtu(struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 static int ip_finish_output(struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
+	int err;
+
 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) && defined(CONFIG_XFRM)
 	/* Policy lookup after SNAT yielded a new policy */
 	if (skb->dst->xfrm != NULL) {
@@ -211,6 +213,11 @@ static int ip_finish_output(struct sk_buff *skb)
 		return dst_output(skb);
 	}
 #endif
+
+	err = security_inet_sys_snd_skb(skb, AF_INET);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
 	if (skb->len > ip_skb_dst_mtu(skb) && !skb_is_gso(skb))
 		return ip_fragment(skb, ip_finish_output2);
 	else
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
index 6338a9c..44ddf32 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
@@ -72,8 +72,13 @@ static __inline__ void ipv6_select_ident(struct sk_buff *skb, struct frag_hdr *f
 
 static int ip6_output_finish(struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
+	int err;
 	struct dst_entry *dst = skb->dst;
 
+	err = security_inet_sys_snd_skb(skb, AF_INET6);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
 	if (dst->hh)
 		return neigh_hh_output(dst->hh, skb);
 	else if (dst->neighbour)
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index 0b62f95..384979a 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -848,6 +848,11 @@ static inline void dummy_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
 			struct flowi *fl)
 {
 }
+
+static inline int dummy_inet_sys_snd_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, int family)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
@@ -1122,7 +1127,8 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inet_csk_clone);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inet_conn_established);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, req_classify_flow);
- #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
+	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inet_sys_snd_skb);
+#endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 #ifdef  CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_alloc_security);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_clone_security);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 3bdcada..7f55459 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -961,6 +961,12 @@ void security_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, struct flowi *fl
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_req_classify_flow);
 
+int security_inet_sys_snd_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, int family)
+{
+	return security_ops->inet_sys_snd_skb(skb, family);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_sys_snd_skb);
+
 void security_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
 {
 	security_ops->sock_graft(sk, parent);


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Re: [RFC PATCH v8 06/18] LSM: Add inet_sys_snd_skb() LSM hook

[Stephen Smalley]

On Fri, 2007-12-14 at 16:50 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> Add an inet_sys_snd_skb() LSM hook to allow the LSM to provide packet level
> access control for all outbound packets.  Using the existing postroute_last
> netfilter hook turns out to be problematic as it is can be invoked multiple
> times for a single packet, e.g. individual IPsec transforms, adding unwanted
> overhead and complicating the security policy.

None of the netfilter hooks works for this purpose?

Obviously this one needs to get seen on netdev.

> ---
> 
>  include/linux/security.h |   11 +++++++++++
>  net/ipv4/ip_output.c     |    7 +++++++
>  net/ipv6/ip6_output.c    |    5 +++++
>  security/dummy.c         |    8 +++++++-
>  security/security.c      |    6 ++++++
>  5 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index db19c92..1b8d332 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -876,6 +876,10 @@ struct request_sock;
>   *     Sets the connection's peersid to the secmark on skb.
>   * @req_classify_flow:
>   *	Sets the flow's sid to the openreq sid.
> + * @inet_sys_snd_skb:
> + *	Check permissions on outgoing network packets.
> + *	@skb is the packet to check
> + *	@family is the packet's address family
>   *
>   * Security hooks for XFRM operations.
>   *
> @@ -1416,6 +1420,7 @@ struct security_operations {
>  	void (*inet_csk_clone)(struct sock *newsk, const struct request_sock *req);
>  	void (*inet_conn_established)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
>  	void (*req_classify_flow)(const struct request_sock *req, struct flowi *fl);
> +	int (*inet_sys_snd_skb)(struct sk_buff *skb, int family);
>  #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
>  
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
> @@ -2328,6 +2333,7 @@ void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk);
>  void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
>  void security_sk_classify_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi *fl);
>  void security_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, struct flowi *fl);
> +int security_inet_sys_snd_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, int family);
>  void security_sock_graft(struct sock*sk, struct socket *parent);
>  int security_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk,
>  			struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req);
> @@ -2471,6 +2477,11 @@ static inline void security_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, st
>  {
>  }
>  
> +static inline int security_inet_sys_snd_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, int family)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
>  static inline void security_sock_graft(struct sock* sk, struct socket *parent)
>  {
>  }
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_output.c b/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
> index fd99fbd..82a7297 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
> @@ -204,6 +204,8 @@ static inline int ip_skb_dst_mtu(struct sk_buff *skb)
>  
>  static int ip_finish_output(struct sk_buff *skb)
>  {
> +	int err;
> +
>  #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) && defined(CONFIG_XFRM)
>  	/* Policy lookup after SNAT yielded a new policy */
>  	if (skb->dst->xfrm != NULL) {
> @@ -211,6 +213,11 @@ static int ip_finish_output(struct sk_buff *skb)
>  		return dst_output(skb);
>  	}
>  #endif
> +
> +	err = security_inet_sys_snd_skb(skb, AF_INET);
> +	if (err)
> +		return err;
> +
>  	if (skb->len > ip_skb_dst_mtu(skb) && !skb_is_gso(skb))
>  		return ip_fragment(skb, ip_finish_output2);
>  	else
> diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
> index 6338a9c..44ddf32 100644
> --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
> +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
> @@ -72,8 +72,13 @@ static __inline__ void ipv6_select_ident(struct sk_buff *skb, struct frag_hdr *f
>  
>  static int ip6_output_finish(struct sk_buff *skb)
>  {
> +	int err;
>  	struct dst_entry *dst = skb->dst;
>  
> +	err = security_inet_sys_snd_skb(skb, AF_INET6);
> +	if (err)
> +		return err;
> +
>  	if (dst->hh)
>  		return neigh_hh_output(dst->hh, skb);
>  	else if (dst->neighbour)
> diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
> index 0b62f95..384979a 100644
> --- a/security/dummy.c
> +++ b/security/dummy.c
> @@ -848,6 +848,11 @@ static inline void dummy_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
>  			struct flowi *fl)
>  {
>  }
> +
> +static inline int dummy_inet_sys_snd_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, int family)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
>  #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
>  
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
> @@ -1122,7 +1127,8 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
>  	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inet_csk_clone);
>  	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inet_conn_established);
>  	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, req_classify_flow);
> - #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
> +	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inet_sys_snd_skb);
> +#endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
>  #ifdef  CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
>  	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_alloc_security);
>  	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_clone_security);
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 3bdcada..7f55459 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -961,6 +961,12 @@ void security_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, struct flowi *fl
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_req_classify_flow);
>  
> +int security_inet_sys_snd_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, int family)
> +{
> +	return security_ops->inet_sys_snd_skb(skb, family);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_sys_snd_skb);
> +
>  void security_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
>  {
>  	security_ops->sock_graft(sk, parent);
> 
> 
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National Security Agency


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Re: [RFC PATCH v8 06/18] LSM: Add inet_sys_snd_skb() LSM hook

[Paul Moore]

On Monday 17 December 2007 2:45:50 pm Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Fri, 2007-12-14 at 16:50 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> > Add an inet_sys_snd_skb() LSM hook to allow the LSM to provide packet
> > level access control for all outbound packets.  Using the existing
> > postroute_last netfilter hook turns out to be problematic as it is can be
> > invoked multiple times for a single packet, e.g. individual IPsec
> > transforms, adding unwanted overhead and complicating the security
> > policy.
>
> None of the netfilter hooks works for this purpose?

None that we have found, no.  Although if you can prove me wrong I'd be very 
happy.  The problem is that the existing netfilter hooks can get hit multiple 
times in the case of labeled IPsec which was decided to be a no-no.

> Obviously this one needs to get seen on netdev.

Yep.  I just wanted to make sure we were all in agreement on what we 
wanted/needed before I tried to make our case to the netdev folks.

-- 
paul moore
linux security @ hp

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[RFC PATCH v8 07/18] NetLabel: Add IP address family information to the netlbl_skbuff_getattr() function

[Paul Moore]

In order to do any sort of IP header inspection of incoming packets we need to
know which address family, AF_INET/AF_INET6/etc., it belongs to and since the
sk_buff structure does not store this information we need to pass along the
address family separate from the packet itself.
---

 include/net/netlabel.h              |    2 ++
 net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c        |    2 ++
 security/selinux/hooks.c            |   24 ++++++++++++++++++------
 security/selinux/include/netlabel.h |    8 +++++++-
 security/selinux/netlabel.c         |   12 +++++++++---
 5 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/netlabel.h b/include/net/netlabel.h
index 18b73cf..a3bffb4 100644
--- a/include/net/netlabel.h
+++ b/include/net/netlabel.h
@@ -363,6 +363,7 @@ int netlbl_sock_setattr(struct sock *sk,
 int netlbl_sock_getattr(struct sock *sk,
 			struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
 int netlbl_skbuff_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb,
+			  u16 family,
 			  struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
 void netlbl_skbuff_err(struct sk_buff *skb, int error);
 
@@ -415,6 +416,7 @@ static inline int netlbl_sock_getattr(struct sock *sk,
 	return -ENOSYS;
 }
 static inline int netlbl_skbuff_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb,
+					u16 family,
 					struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
 	return -ENOSYS;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
index d3762ea..4914615 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
@@ -332,6 +332,7 @@ int netlbl_sock_getattr(struct sock *sk, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 /**
  * netlbl_skbuff_getattr - Determine the security attributes of a packet
  * @skb: the packet
+ * @family: protocol family
  * @secattr: the security attributes
  *
  * Description:
@@ -342,6 +343,7 @@ int netlbl_sock_getattr(struct sock *sk, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
  *
  */
 int netlbl_skbuff_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb,
+			  u16 family,
 			  struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
 	if (CIPSO_V4_OPTEXIST(skb) &&
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 8bb673b..2188b9c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3192,6 +3192,7 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
 /**
  * selinux_skb_extlbl_sid - Determine the external label of a packet
  * @skb: the packet
+ * @family: protocol family
  * @sid: the packet's SID
  *
  * Description:
@@ -3204,13 +3205,16 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
  * selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid().
  *
  */
-static void selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
+static void selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb,
+				   u16 family,
+				   u32 *sid)
 {
 	u32 xfrm_sid;
 	u32 nlbl_sid;
 
 	selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
 	if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb,
+					 family,
 					 (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL ?
 					  SECINITSID_NETMSG : xfrm_sid),
 					 &nlbl_sid) != 0)
@@ -3703,7 +3707,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
-	err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, &ad);
+	err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -3760,11 +3764,19 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
 {
 	u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
 	int err = 0;
+	u16 family;
+
+	if (sock)
+		family = sock->sk->sk_family;
+	else if (skb->sk)
+		family = skb->sk->sk_family;
+	else
+		family = PF_UNSPEC;
 
-	if (sock && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
+	if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
 		selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
 	else if (skb)
-		selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, &peer_secid);
+		selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
 
 	if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
 		err = -EINVAL;
@@ -3825,7 +3837,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	u32 newsid;
 	u32 peersid;
 
-	selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, &peersid);
+	selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &peersid);
 	if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
 		req->secid = sksec->sid;
 		req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
@@ -3863,7 +3875,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
 {
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 
-	selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, &sksec->peer_sid);
+	selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &sksec->peer_sid);
 }
 
 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
index 218e3f7..272769a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
@@ -46,13 +46,17 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
 void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
 				      struct sk_security_struct *newssec);
 
-int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 base_sid, u32 *sid);
+int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
+				 u16 family,
+				 u32 base_sid,
+				 u32 *sid);
 
 void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock);
 int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock);
 int selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask);
 int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
 				struct sk_buff *skb,
+				u16 family,
 				struct avc_audit_data *ad);
 int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
 				     int level,
@@ -83,6 +87,7 @@ static inline void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(
 }
 
 static inline int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
+					       u16 family,
 					       u32 base_sid,
 					       u32 *sid)
 {
@@ -106,6 +111,7 @@ static inline int selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
 }
 static inline int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
 					      struct sk_buff *skb,
+					      u16 family,
 					      struct avc_audit_data *ad)
 {
 	return 0;
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index d243ddc..4073d5a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
 /**
  * selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid - Get the sid of a packet using NetLabel
  * @skb: the packet
+ * @family: protocol family
  * @base_sid: the SELinux SID to use as a context for MLS only attributes
  * @sid: the SID
  *
@@ -150,7 +151,10 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
  * assign to the packet.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
  *
  */
-int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 base_sid, u32 *sid)
+int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
+				 u16 family,
+				 u32 base_sid,
+				 u32 *sid)
 {
 	int rc;
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
@@ -161,7 +165,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 base_sid, u32 *sid)
 	}
 
 	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
-	rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, &secattr);
+	rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
 	if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE) {
 		rc = security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&secattr, base_sid, sid);
 		if (rc == 0 &&
@@ -289,6 +293,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
  * selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb - Do an inbound access check using NetLabel
  * @sksec: the sock's sk_security_struct
  * @skb: the packet
+ * @family: protocol family
  * @ad: the audit data
  *
  * Description:
@@ -299,6 +304,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
  */
 int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
 				struct sk_buff *skb,
+				u16 family,
 				struct avc_audit_data *ad)
 {
 	int rc;
@@ -310,7 +316,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
 		return 0;
 
 	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
-	rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, &secattr);
+	rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
 	if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE) {
 		rc = security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&secattr,
 						    SECINITSID_NETMSG,


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[RFC PATCH v8 08/18] SELinux: Convert the netif code to use ifindex values

[Paul Moore]

The current SELinux netif code requires the caller have a valid net_device
struct pointer to lookup network interface information.  However, we don't
always have a valid net_device pointer so convert the netif code to use
the ifindex values we always have as part of the sk_buff.  This patch also
removes the default message SID from the network interface record, it is
not being used and therefore is "dead code".
---

 security/selinux/hooks.c            |    4 -
 security/selinux/include/netif.h    |    4 -
 security/selinux/include/objsec.h   |    5 -
 security/selinux/include/security.h |    3 
 security/selinux/netif.c            |  254 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------
 security/selinux/ss/services.c      |   10 -
 6 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 125 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 2188b9c..2ca8dfb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3616,7 +3616,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	if (!skb->dev)
 		goto out;
 
-	err = sel_netif_sids(skb->dev, &if_sid, NULL);
+	err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -3942,7 +3942,7 @@ static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk, struct net_device *
 
 	isec = inode->i_security;
 	
-	err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
+	err = sel_netif_sid(dev->ifindex, &if_sid);
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netif.h b/security/selinux/include/netif.h
index 8bd6f99..ce23edd 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/netif.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netif.h
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
  * Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ *                    Paul Moore, <paul.moore@hp.com>
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
@@ -15,7 +17,7 @@
 #ifndef _SELINUX_NETIF_H_
 #define _SELINUX_NETIF_H_
 
-int sel_netif_sids(struct net_device *dev, u32 *if_sid, u32 *msg_sid);
+int sel_netif_sid(int ifindex, u32 *sid);
 
 #endif	/* _SELINUX_NETIF_H_ */
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 642a9fd..e41a2aa 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -95,9 +95,8 @@ struct bprm_security_struct {
 };
 
 struct netif_security_struct {
-	struct net_device *dev;		/* back pointer */
-	u32 if_sid;			/* SID for this interface */
-	u32 msg_sid;			/* default SID for messages received on this interface */
+	int ifindex;			/* device index */
+	u32 sid;			/* SID for this interface */
 };
 
 struct sk_security_struct {
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 39337af..a33437b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -77,8 +77,7 @@ int security_get_user_sids(u32 callsid, char *username,
 int security_port_sid(u16 domain, u16 type, u8 protocol, u16 port,
 	u32 *out_sid);
 
-int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid,
-	u32 *msg_sid);
+int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid);
 
 int security_node_sid(u16 domain, void *addr, u32 addrlen,
 	u32 *out_sid);
diff --git a/security/selinux/netif.c b/security/selinux/netif.c
index e87ab94..ee49a73 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netif.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netif.c
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
  * Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ *                    Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
@@ -29,14 +31,6 @@
 #define SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE	64
 #define SEL_NETIF_HASH_MAX	1024
 
-#undef DEBUG
-
-#ifdef DEBUG
-#define DEBUGP printk
-#else
-#define DEBUGP(format, args...)
-#endif
-
 struct sel_netif
 {
 	struct list_head list;
@@ -49,174 +43,217 @@ static LIST_HEAD(sel_netif_list);
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sel_netif_lock);
 static struct list_head sel_netif_hash[SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE];
 
-static inline u32 sel_netif_hasfn(struct net_device *dev)
+/**
+ * sel_netif_hashfn - Hashing function for the interface table
+ * @ifindex: the network interface
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This is the hashing function for the network interface table, it returns the
+ * bucket number for the given interface.
+ *
+ */
+static inline u32 sel_netif_hashfn(int ifindex)
 {
-	return (dev->ifindex & (SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE - 1));
+	return (ifindex & (SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE - 1));
 }
 
-/*
- * All of the devices should normally fit in the hash, so we optimize
- * for that case.
+/**
+ * sel_netif_find - Search for an interface record
+ * @ifindex: the network interface
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Search the network interface table and return the record matching @ifindex.
+ * If an entry can not be found in the table return NULL.
+ *
  */
-static inline struct sel_netif *sel_netif_find(struct net_device *dev)
+static inline struct sel_netif *sel_netif_find(int ifindex)
 {
-	struct list_head *pos;
-	int idx = sel_netif_hasfn(dev);
+	int idx = sel_netif_hashfn(ifindex);
+	struct sel_netif *netif;
 
-	__list_for_each_rcu(pos, &sel_netif_hash[idx]) {
-		struct sel_netif *netif = list_entry(pos,
-		                                     struct sel_netif, list);
-		if (likely(netif->nsec.dev == dev))
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(netif, &sel_netif_hash[idx], list)
+		/* all of the devices should normally fit in the hash, so we
+		 * optimize for that case */
+		if (likely(netif->nsec.ifindex == ifindex))
 			return netif;
-	}
+
 	return NULL;
 }
 
+/**
+ * sel_netif_insert - Insert a new interface into the table
+ * @netif: the new interface record
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Add a new interface record to the network interface hash table.  Returns
+ * zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
 static int sel_netif_insert(struct sel_netif *netif)
 {
-	int idx, ret = 0;
+	int idx;
 	
-	if (sel_netif_total >= SEL_NETIF_HASH_MAX) {
-		ret = -ENOSPC;
-		goto out;
-	}
+	if (sel_netif_total >= SEL_NETIF_HASH_MAX)
+		return -ENOSPC;
 	
-	idx = sel_netif_hasfn(netif->nsec.dev);
+	idx = sel_netif_hashfn(netif->nsec.ifindex);
 	list_add_rcu(&netif->list, &sel_netif_hash[idx]);
 	sel_netif_total++;
-out:
-	return ret;
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * sel_netif_free - Frees an interface entry
+ * @p: the entry's RCU field
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function is designed to be used as a callback to the call_rcu()
+ * function so that memory allocated to a hash table interface entry can be
+ * released safely.
+ *
+ */
 static void sel_netif_free(struct rcu_head *p)
 {
 	struct sel_netif *netif = container_of(p, struct sel_netif, rcu_head);
-
-	DEBUGP("%s: %s\n", __FUNCTION__, netif->nsec.dev->name);
 	kfree(netif);
 }
 
+/**
+ * sel_netif_destroy - Remove an interface record from the table
+ * @netif: the existing interface record
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Remove an existing interface record from the network interface table.
+ *
+ */
 static void sel_netif_destroy(struct sel_netif *netif)
 {
-	DEBUGP("%s: %s\n", __FUNCTION__, netif->nsec.dev->name);
-
 	list_del_rcu(&netif->list);
 	sel_netif_total--;
 	call_rcu(&netif->rcu_head, sel_netif_free);
 }
 
-static struct sel_netif *sel_netif_lookup(struct net_device *dev)
+/**
+ * sel_netif_sid_slow - Lookup the SID of a network interface using the policy
+ * @ifindex: the network interface
+ * @sid: interface SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function determines the SID of a network interface by quering the
+ * security policy.  The result is added to the network interface table to
+ * speedup future queries.  Returns zero on success, negative values on
+ * failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int sel_netif_sid_slow(int ifindex, u32 *sid)
 {
 	int ret;
-	struct sel_netif *netif, *new;
-	struct netif_security_struct *nsec;
+	struct sel_netif *netif;
+	struct sel_netif *new = NULL;
+	struct net_device *dev;
 
-	netif = sel_netif_find(dev);
-	if (likely(netif != NULL))
-		goto out;
-	
-	new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC);
-	if (!new) {
-		netif = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-		goto out;
-	}
-	
-	nsec = &new->nsec;
+	/* NOTE: we always use init's network namespace since we don't
+	 * currently support containers */
 
-	ret = security_netif_sid(dev->name, &nsec->if_sid, &nsec->msg_sid);
-	if (ret < 0) {
-		kfree(new);
-		netif = ERR_PTR(ret);
-		goto out;
-	}
+	dev = dev_get_by_index(&init_net, ifindex);
+	if (dev == NULL)
+		return -ENOENT;
 
-	nsec->dev = dev;
-	
 	spin_lock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
-	
-	netif = sel_netif_find(dev);
-	if (netif) {
-		spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
-		kfree(new);
+	netif = sel_netif_find(ifindex);
+	if (netif != NULL) {
+		*sid = netif->nsec.sid;
+		ret = 0;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	
-	ret = sel_netif_insert(new);
-	spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
-	
-	if (ret) {
-		kfree(new);
-		netif = ERR_PTR(ret);
+	new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (new == NULL) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out;
 	}
+	ret = security_netif_sid(dev->name, &new->nsec.sid);
+	if (ret != 0)
+		goto out;
+	new->nsec.ifindex = ifindex;
+	ret = sel_netif_insert(new);
+	if (ret != 0)
+		goto out;
+	*sid = new->nsec.sid;
 
-	netif = new;
-	
-	DEBUGP("new: ifindex=%u name=%s if_sid=%u msg_sid=%u\n", dev->ifindex, dev->name,
-	        nsec->if_sid, nsec->msg_sid);
 out:
-	return netif;
-}
-
-static void sel_netif_assign_sids(u32 if_sid_in, u32 msg_sid_in, u32 *if_sid_out, u32 *msg_sid_out)
-{
-	if (if_sid_out)
-		*if_sid_out = if_sid_in;
-	if (msg_sid_out)
-		*msg_sid_out = msg_sid_in;
-}
-
-static int sel_netif_sids_slow(struct net_device *dev, u32 *if_sid, u32 *msg_sid)
-{
-	int ret = 0;
-	u32 tmp_if_sid, tmp_msg_sid;
-	
-	ret = security_netif_sid(dev->name, &tmp_if_sid, &tmp_msg_sid);
-	if (!ret)
-		sel_netif_assign_sids(tmp_if_sid, tmp_msg_sid, if_sid, msg_sid);
+	spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
+	dev_put(dev);
+	if (ret != 0)
+		kfree(new);
 	return ret;
 }
 
-int sel_netif_sids(struct net_device *dev, u32 *if_sid, u32 *msg_sid)
+/**
+ * sel_netif_sid - Lookup the SID of a network interface
+ * @ifindex: the network interface
+ * @sid: interface SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function determines the SID of a network interface using the fastest
+ * method possible.  First the interface table is queried, but if an entry
+ * can't be found then the policy is queried and the result is added to the
+ * table to speedup future queries.  Returns zero on success, negative values
+ * on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int sel_netif_sid(int ifindex, u32 *sid)
 {
-	int ret = 0;
 	struct sel_netif *netif;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	netif = sel_netif_lookup(dev);
-	if (IS_ERR(netif)) {
+	netif = sel_netif_find(ifindex);
+	if (likely(netif != NULL)) {
+		*sid = netif->nsec.sid;
 		rcu_read_unlock();
-		ret = sel_netif_sids_slow(dev, if_sid, msg_sid);
-		goto out;
+		return 0;
 	}
-	sel_netif_assign_sids(netif->nsec.if_sid, netif->nsec.msg_sid, if_sid, msg_sid);
 	rcu_read_unlock();
-out:
-	return ret;
+
+	return sel_netif_sid_slow(ifindex, sid);
 }
 
-static void sel_netif_kill(struct net_device *dev)
+/**
+ * sel_netif_kill - Remove an entry from the network interface table
+ * @ifindex: the network interface
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function removes the entry matching @ifindex from the network interface
+ * table if it exists.
+ *
+ */
+static void sel_netif_kill(int ifindex)
 {
 	struct sel_netif *netif;
 
 	spin_lock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
-	netif = sel_netif_find(dev);
+	netif = sel_netif_find(ifindex);
 	if (netif)
 		sel_netif_destroy(netif);
 	spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
 }
 
+/**
+ * sel_netif_flush - Flush the entire network interface table
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Remove all entries from the network interface table.
+ *
+ */
 static void sel_netif_flush(void)
 {
 	int idx;
+	struct sel_netif *netif;
 
 	spin_lock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
-	for (idx = 0; idx < SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE; idx++) {
-		struct sel_netif *netif;
-		
+	for (idx = 0; idx < SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE; idx++)
 		list_for_each_entry(netif, &sel_netif_hash[idx], list)
 			sel_netif_destroy(netif);
-	}
 	spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
 }
 
@@ -239,7 +276,7 @@ static int sel_netif_netdev_notifier_handler(struct notifier_block *this,
 		return NOTIFY_DONE;
 
 	if (event == NETDEV_DOWN)
-		sel_netif_kill(dev);
+		sel_netif_kill(dev->ifindex);
 
 	return NOTIFY_DONE;
 }
@@ -250,10 +287,10 @@ static struct notifier_block sel_netif_netdev_notifier = {
 
 static __init int sel_netif_init(void)
 {
-	int i, err = 0;
+	int i, err;
 	
 	if (!selinux_enabled)
-		goto out;
+		return 0;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE; i++)
 		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sel_netif_hash[i]);
@@ -265,7 +302,6 @@ static __init int sel_netif_init(void)
 	if (err)
 		panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err);
 
-out:
 	return err;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 88fcd57..d4cc878 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1478,11 +1478,8 @@ out:
  * security_netif_sid - Obtain the SID for a network interface.
  * @name: interface name
  * @if_sid: interface SID
- * @msg_sid: default SID for received packets
  */
-int security_netif_sid(char *name,
-		       u32 *if_sid,
-		       u32 *msg_sid)
+int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid)
 {
 	int rc = 0;
 	struct ocontext *c;
@@ -1510,11 +1507,8 @@ int security_netif_sid(char *name,
 				goto out;
 		}
 		*if_sid = c->sid[0];
-		*msg_sid = c->sid[1];
-	} else {
+	} else
 		*if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
-		*msg_sid = SECINITSID_NETMSG;
-	}
 
 out:
 	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;


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[RFC PATCH v8 09/18] SELinux: Only store the network interface's ifindex

[Paul Moore]

Instead of storing the packet's network interface name store the ifindex.  This
allows us to defer the need to lookup the net_device structure until the audit
record is generated meaning that in the majority of cases we never need to
bother with this at all.
---

 security/selinux/avc.c         |   15 ++++++++++++---
 security/selinux/hooks.c       |    4 ++--
 security/selinux/include/avc.h |    7 +++++--
 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 81b3dff..8ecfab9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -661,9 +661,18 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 						    "daddr", "dest");
 				break;
 			}
-			if (a->u.net.netif)
-				audit_log_format(ab, " netif=%s",
-					a->u.net.netif);
+			if (a->u.net.netif >= 0) {
+				struct net_device *dev;
+
+				/* NOTE: we always use init's namespace */
+				dev = dev_get_by_index(&init_net,
+						       a->u.net.netif);
+				if (dev) {
+					audit_log_format(ab, " netif=%s",
+							 dev->name);
+					dev_put(dev);
+				}
+			}
 			break;
 		}
 	}
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 2ca8dfb..e429a8c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3691,7 +3691,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		family = PF_INET;
 
 	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
-	ad.u.net.netif = skb->dev ? skb->dev->name : "[unknown]";
+	ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
 	ad.u.net.family = family;
 
 	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1, NULL);
@@ -4023,7 +4023,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
 	sksec = sk->sk_security;
 
 	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
-	ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
+	ad.u.net.netif = dev->ifindex;
 	ad.u.net.family = family;
 
 	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 0, &proto);
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index 553607a..5185152 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ struct avc_audit_data {
 			struct inode *inode;
 		} fs;
 		struct {
-			char *netif;
+			int netif;
 			struct sock *sk;
 			u16 family;
 			__be16 dport;
@@ -77,7 +77,10 @@ struct avc_audit_data {
 
 /* Initialize an AVC audit data structure. */
 #define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(_d,_t) \
-        { memset((_d), 0, sizeof(struct avc_audit_data)); (_d)->type = AVC_AUDIT_DATA_##_t; }
+        { memset((_d), 0, sizeof(struct avc_audit_data)); \
+	  (_d)->type = AVC_AUDIT_DATA_##_t; \
+	  if ((_d)->type == AVC_AUDIT_DATA_NET) \
+		  (_d)->u.net.netif = -1; }
 
 /*
  * AVC statistics


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Re: [RFC PATCH v8 09/18] SELinux: Only store the network interface's ifindex

[Stephen Smalley]

On Fri, 2007-12-14 at 16:50 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> Instead of storing the packet's network interface name store the ifindex.  This
> allows us to defer the need to lookup the net_device structure until the audit
> record is generated meaning that in the majority of cases we never need to
> bother with this at all.
>
> ---
> 
>  security/selinux/avc.c         |   15 ++++++++++++---
>  security/selinux/hooks.c       |    4 ++--
>  security/selinux/include/avc.h |    7 +++++--
>  3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
> index 81b3dff..8ecfab9 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/avc.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
> @@ -661,9 +661,18 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
>  						    "daddr", "dest");
>  				break;
>  			}
> -			if (a->u.net.netif)
> -				audit_log_format(ab, " netif=%s",
> -					a->u.net.netif);
> +			if (a->u.net.netif >= 0) {
> +				struct net_device *dev;
> +
> +				/* NOTE: we always use init's namespace */
> +				dev = dev_get_by_index(&init_net,
> +						       a->u.net.netif);
> +				if (dev) {
> +					audit_log_format(ab, " netif=%s",
> +							 dev->name);
> +					dev_put(dev);
> +				}
> +			}
>  			break;
>  		}
>  	}
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 2ca8dfb..e429a8c 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -3691,7 +3691,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  		family = PF_INET;
>  
>  	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
> -	ad.u.net.netif = skb->dev ? skb->dev->name : "[unknown]";
> +	ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
>  	ad.u.net.family = family;
>  
>  	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1, NULL);
> @@ -4023,7 +4023,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
>  	sksec = sk->sk_security;
>  
>  	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
> -	ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
> +	ad.u.net.netif = dev->ifindex;
>  	ad.u.net.family = family;
>  
>  	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 0, &proto);
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
> index 553607a..5185152 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
> @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ struct avc_audit_data {
>  			struct inode *inode;
>  		} fs;
>  		struct {
> -			char *netif;
> +			int netif;
>  			struct sock *sk;
>  			u16 family;
>  			__be16 dport;
> @@ -77,7 +77,10 @@ struct avc_audit_data {
>  
>  /* Initialize an AVC audit data structure. */
>  #define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(_d,_t) \
> -        { memset((_d), 0, sizeof(struct avc_audit_data)); (_d)->type = AVC_AUDIT_DATA_##_t; }
> +        { memset((_d), 0, sizeof(struct avc_audit_data)); \
> +	  (_d)->type = AVC_AUDIT_DATA_##_t; \
> +	  if ((_d)->type == AVC_AUDIT_DATA_NET) \
> +		  (_d)->u.net.netif = -1; }

As a minor nit, at the same time you do this, turn this into a static
inline function please.

>  
>  /*
>   * AVC statistics
> 
> 
> --
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> the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency


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Re: [RFC PATCH v8 09/18] SELinux: Only store the network interface's ifindex

[Paul Moore]

On Monday 17 December 2007 2:56:41 pm Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Fri, 2007-12-14 at 16:50 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> >  /* Initialize an AVC audit data structure. */
> >  #define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(_d,_t) \
> > -        { memset((_d), 0, sizeof(struct avc_audit_data)); (_d)->type =
> > AVC_AUDIT_DATA_##_t; }
> > +        { memset((_d), 0, sizeof(struct 
> > avc_audit_data)); \
> > +	  (_d)->type = AVC_AUDIT_DATA_##_t; \
> > +	  if ((_d)->type == AVC_AUDIT_DATA_NET) \
> > +		  (_d)->u.net.netif = -1; }
>
> As a minor nit, at the same time you do this, turn this into a static
> inline function please.

Can do ... although when talking about this with some other people I'm not 
sure I need to use -1 as a sentinel value, zero should work.  If that is the 
case I won't need to change this definition.

-- 
paul moore
linux security @ hp

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[RFC PATCH v8 10/18] SELinux: Add a network node caching mechanism similar to the sel_netif_*() functions

[Paul Moore]

This patch adds a SELinux IP address/node SID caching mechanism similar to the
sel_netif_*() functions.  The node SID queries in the SELinux hooks files are
also modified to take advantage of this new functionality.  In addition, remove
the address length information from the sk_buff parsing routines as it is
redundant since we already have the address family.
---

 security/selinux/Makefile          |    9 +
 security/selinux/hooks.c           |   33 ++-
 security/selinux/include/netnode.h |   32 +++
 security/selinux/include/objsec.h  |    9 +
 security/selinux/netnode.c         |  351 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 417 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile
index dc3502e..00afd85 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Makefile
+++ b/security/selinux/Makefile
@@ -4,7 +4,14 @@
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) := selinux.o ss/
 
-selinux-y := avc.o hooks.o selinuxfs.o netlink.o nlmsgtab.o netif.o exports.o
+selinux-y := avc.o \
+	     hooks.o \
+	     selinuxfs.o \
+	     netlink.o \
+	     nlmsgtab.o \
+	     netif.o \
+	     netnode.o \
+	     exports.o
 
 selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM) += xfrm.o
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index e429a8c..05b58cc 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
 #include "avc.h"
 #include "objsec.h"
 #include "netif.h"
+#include "netnode.h"
 #include "xfrm.h"
 #include "netlabel.h"
 
@@ -3158,7 +3159,7 @@ out:
 #endif /* IPV6 */
 
 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
-			     char **addrp, int *len, int src, u8 *proto)
+			     char **addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 
@@ -3167,7 +3168,6 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
 		ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
 		if (ret || !addrp)
 			break;
-		*len = 4;
 		*addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
 					&ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
 		break;
@@ -3177,7 +3177,6 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
 		ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
 		if (ret || !addrp)
 			break;
-		*len = 16;
 		*addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
 					&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
 		break;
@@ -3377,7 +3376,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 			break;
 		}
 		
-		err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, addrlen, &sid);
+		err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
 		if (err)
 			goto out;
 		
@@ -3589,7 +3588,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
 }
 
 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
-		struct avc_audit_data *ad, u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
+				       struct avc_audit_data *ad,
+				       u16 family, char *addrp)
 {
 	int err = 0;
 	u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, recv_perm = 0;
@@ -3649,7 +3649,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 	
-	err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
+	err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 	
@@ -3678,7 +3678,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	u16 family;
 	char *addrp;
-	int len, err = 0;
+	int err = 0;
 	struct avc_audit_data ad;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 
@@ -3694,13 +3694,12 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
 	ad.u.net.family = family;
 
-	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1, NULL);
+	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
 	if (selinux_compat_net)
-		err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad, family,
-						  addrp, len);
+		err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad, family, addrp);
 	else
 		err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
 				   PACKET__RECV, &ad);
@@ -3922,9 +3921,11 @@ out:
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
 
-static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk, struct net_device *dev,
+static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk,
+					    struct net_device *dev,
 					    struct avc_audit_data *ad,
-					    u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
+					    u16 family,
+					    char *addrp)
 {
 	int err = 0;
 	u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, send_perm = 0;
@@ -3975,7 +3976,7 @@ static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk, struct net_device *
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 		
-	err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
+	err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 	
@@ -4009,7 +4010,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
                                               u16 family)
 {
 	char *addrp;
-	int len, err = 0;
+	int err = 0;
 	struct sock *sk;
 	struct avc_audit_data ad;
 	struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
@@ -4026,13 +4027,13 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
 	ad.u.net.netif = dev->ifindex;
 	ad.u.net.family = family;
 
-	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 0, &proto);
+	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto);
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
 	if (selinux_compat_net)
 		err = selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(sk, dev, &ad,
-						       family, addrp, len);
+						       family, addrp);
 	else
 		err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
 				   PACKET__SEND, &ad);
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netnode.h b/security/selinux/include/netnode.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1b94450
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netnode.h
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/*
+ * Network node table
+ *
+ * SELinux must keep a mapping of network nodes to labels/SIDs.  This
+ * mapping is maintained as part of the normal policy but a fast cache is
+ * needed to reduce the lookup overhead since most of these queries happen on
+ * a per-packet basis.
+ *
+ * Author: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
+ *
+ */
+
+/*
+ * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2007
+ *
+ * This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_NETNODE_H
+#define _SELINUX_NETNODE_H
+
+int sel_netnode_sid(void *addr, u16 family, u32 *sid);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index e41a2aa..6140734 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -99,6 +99,15 @@ struct netif_security_struct {
 	u32 sid;			/* SID for this interface */
 };
 
+struct netnode_security_struct {
+	union {
+		__be32 ipv4;		/* IPv4 node address */
+		struct in6_addr ipv6;	/* IPv6 node address */
+	} addr;
+	u32 sid;			/* SID for this node */
+	u16 family;			/* address family */
+};
+
 struct sk_security_struct {
 	struct sock *sk;		/* back pointer to sk object */
 	u32 sid;			/* SID of this object */
diff --git a/security/selinux/netnode.c b/security/selinux/netnode.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0cd66b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/netnode.c
@@ -0,0 +1,351 @@
+/*
+ * Network node table
+ *
+ * SELinux must keep a mapping of network nodes to labels/SIDs.  This
+ * mapping is maintained as part of the normal policy but a fast cache is
+ * needed to reduce the lookup overhead since most of these queries happen on
+ * a per-packet basis.
+ *
+ * Author: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
+ *
+ * This code is heavily based on the "netif" concept originally developed by
+ * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *   (see security/selinux/netif.c for more information)
+ * 
+ */
+
+/*
+ * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2007
+ *
+ * This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/in6.h>
+#include <linux/ip.h>
+#include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <net/ip.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
+#include <asm/bug.h>
+
+#include "objsec.h"
+
+#define SEL_NETNODE_HASH_SIZE       256
+#define SEL_NETNODE_HASH_BKT_LIMIT   16
+
+struct sel_netnode {
+	struct netnode_security_struct nsec;
+
+	struct list_head list;
+	struct rcu_head rcu;
+};
+
+/* NOTE: we are using a combined hash table for both IPv4 and IPv6, the reason
+ * for this is that I suspect most users will not make heavy use of both
+ * address families at the same time so one table will usually end up wasted,
+ * if this becomes a problem we can always add a hash table for each address
+ * family later */
+
+static LIST_HEAD(sel_netnode_list);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sel_netnode_lock);
+static struct list_head sel_netnode_hash[SEL_NETNODE_HASH_SIZE];
+
+/**
+ * sel_netnode_free - Frees a node entry
+ * @p: the entry's RCU field
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function is designed to be used as a callback to the call_rcu()
+ * function so that memory allocated to a hash table node entry can be
+ * released safely.
+ *
+ */
+static void sel_netnode_free(struct rcu_head *p)
+{
+	struct sel_netnode *node = container_of(p, struct sel_netnode, rcu);
+	kfree(node);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv4 - IPv4 hashing function for the node table
+ * @addr: IPv4 address
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This is the IPv4 hashing function for the node interface table, it returns
+ * the bucket number for the given IP address.
+ *
+ */
+static u32 sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv4(__be32 addr)
+{
+	/* at some point we should determine if the mismatch in byte order
+	 * affects the hash function dramatically */
+	return (addr & (SEL_NETNODE_HASH_SIZE - 1));
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv6 - IPv6 hashing function for the node table
+ * @addr: IPv6 address
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This is the IPv6 hashing function for the node interface table, it returns
+ * the bucket number for the given IP address.
+ *
+ */
+static u32 sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv6(const struct in6_addr *addr)
+{
+	/* just hash the least significant 32 bits to keep things fast (they
+	 * are the most likely to be different anyway), we can revisit this
+	 * later if needed */
+	return (addr->s6_addr32[3] & (SEL_NETNODE_HASH_SIZE - 1));
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netnode_find - Search for a node record
+ * @addr: IP address
+ * @family: address family
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Search the network node table and return the record matching @addr.  If an
+ * entry can not be found in the table return NULL.
+ *
+ */
+static struct sel_netnode *sel_netnode_find(const void *addr, u16 family)
+{
+	u32 idx;
+	struct sel_netnode *node;
+
+	switch (family) {
+	case PF_INET:
+		idx = sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv4(*(__be32 *)addr);
+		break;
+	case PF_INET6:
+		idx = sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv6(addr);
+		break;
+	default:
+		BUG();
+	}
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(node, &sel_netnode_hash[idx], list)
+		if (node->nsec.family == family)
+			switch (family) {
+			case PF_INET:
+				if (node->nsec.addr.ipv4 == *(__be32 *)addr)
+					return node;
+				break;
+			case PF_INET6:
+				if (ipv6_addr_cmp(&node->nsec.addr.ipv6,
+						  addr) == 0)
+					return node;
+				break;
+			}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netnode_insert - Insert a new node into the table
+ * @node: the new node record
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Add a new node record to the network address hash table.  Returns zero on
+ * success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int sel_netnode_insert(struct sel_netnode *node)
+{
+	u32 idx;
+	u32 count = 0;
+	struct sel_netnode *iter;
+
+	switch (node->nsec.family) {
+	case PF_INET:
+		idx = sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv4(node->nsec.addr.ipv4);
+		break;
+	case PF_INET6:
+		idx = sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv6(&node->nsec.addr.ipv6);
+		break;
+	default:
+		BUG();
+	}
+	list_add_rcu(&node->list, &sel_netnode_hash[idx]);
+
+	/* we need to impose a limit on the growth of the hash table so check
+	 * this bucket to make sure it is within the specified bounds */
+	list_for_each_entry(iter, &sel_netnode_hash[idx], list)
+		if (++count > SEL_NETNODE_HASH_BKT_LIMIT) {
+			list_del_rcu(&iter->list);
+			call_rcu(&iter->rcu, sel_netnode_free);
+			break;
+		}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netnode_destroy - Remove a node record from the table
+ * @node: the existing node record
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Remove an existing node record from the network address table.
+ *
+ */
+static void sel_netnode_destroy(struct sel_netnode *node)
+{
+	list_del_rcu(&node->list);
+	call_rcu(&node->rcu, sel_netnode_free);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netnode_sid_slow - Lookup the SID of a network address using the policy
+ * @addr: the IP address
+ * @family: the address family
+ * @sid: node SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function determines the SID of a network address by quering the
+ * security policy.  The result is added to the network address table to
+ * speedup future queries.  Returns zero on success, negative values on
+ * failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int sel_netnode_sid_slow(void *addr, u16 family, u32 *sid)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct sel_netnode *node;
+	struct sel_netnode *new = NULL;
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock);
+	node = sel_netnode_find(addr, family);
+	if (node != NULL) {
+		*sid = node->nsec.sid;
+		ret = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (new == NULL) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	switch (family) {
+	case PF_INET:
+		ret = security_node_sid(PF_INET,
+					addr, sizeof(struct in_addr),
+					&new->nsec.sid);
+		new->nsec.addr.ipv4 = *(__be32 *)addr;
+		break;
+	case PF_INET6:
+		ret = security_node_sid(PF_INET6,
+					addr, sizeof(struct in6_addr),
+					&new->nsec.sid);
+		memcpy(&new->nsec.addr.ipv6, addr,
+		       sizeof(new->nsec.addr.ipv6));
+		break;
+	default:
+		BUG();
+	}
+	if (ret != 0)
+		goto out;
+	new->nsec.family = family;
+	ret = sel_netnode_insert(new);
+	if (ret != 0)
+		goto out;
+	*sid = new->nsec.sid;
+
+out:
+	spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock);
+	if (ret != 0)
+		kfree(new);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netnode_sid - Lookup the SID of a network address
+ * @addr: the IP address
+ * @family: the address family
+ * @sid: node SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function determines the SID of a network address using the fastest
+ * method possible.  First the address table is queried, but if an entry
+ * can't be found then the policy is queried and the result is added to the
+ * table to speedup future queries.  Returns zero on success, negative values
+ * on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int sel_netnode_sid(void *addr, u16 family, u32 *sid)
+{
+	struct sel_netnode *node;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	node = sel_netnode_find(addr, family);
+	if (node != NULL) {
+		*sid = node->nsec.sid;
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		return 0;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return sel_netnode_sid_slow(addr, family, sid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netnode_flush - Flush the entire network address table
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Remove all entries from the network address table.
+ *
+ */
+static void sel_netnode_flush(void)
+{
+	u32 idx;
+	struct sel_netnode *node;
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock);
+	for (idx = 0; idx < SEL_NETNODE_HASH_SIZE; idx++)
+		list_for_each_entry(node, &sel_netnode_hash[idx], list)
+			sel_netnode_destroy(node);
+	spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock);
+}
+
+static int sel_netnode_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+				    u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained)
+{
+	if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
+		sel_netnode_flush();
+		synchronize_net();
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static __init int sel_netnode_init(void)
+{
+	int iter;
+	int ret;
+	
+	if (!selinux_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	for (iter = 0; iter < SEL_NETNODE_HASH_SIZE; iter++)
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sel_netnode_hash[iter]);
+
+	ret = avc_add_callback(sel_netnode_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
+	                       SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0);
+	if (ret != 0)
+		panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", ret);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+__initcall(sel_netnode_init);


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Re: [RFC PATCH v8 10/18] SELinux: Add a network node caching mechanism similar to the sel_netif_*() functions

[Stephen Smalley]

On Fri, 2007-12-14 at 16:50 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> This patch adds a SELinux IP address/node SID caching mechanism similar to the
> sel_netif_*() functions.  The node SID queries in the SELinux hooks files are
> also modified to take advantage of this new functionality.  In addition, remove
> the address length information from the sk_buff parsing routines as it is
> redundant since we already have the address family.

This is very nice - we also need the same kind of cache for port SIDs.

> ---
> 
>  security/selinux/Makefile          |    9 +
>  security/selinux/hooks.c           |   33 ++-
>  security/selinux/include/netnode.h |   32 +++
>  security/selinux/include/objsec.h  |    9 +
>  security/selinux/netnode.c         |  351 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  5 files changed, 417 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile
> index dc3502e..00afd85 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/Makefile
> +++ b/security/selinux/Makefile
> @@ -4,7 +4,14 @@
>  
>  obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) := selinux.o ss/
>  
> -selinux-y := avc.o hooks.o selinuxfs.o netlink.o nlmsgtab.o netif.o exports.o
> +selinux-y := avc.o \
> +	     hooks.o \
> +	     selinuxfs.o \
> +	     netlink.o \
> +	     nlmsgtab.o \
> +	     netif.o \
> +	     netnode.o \
> +	     exports.o
>  
>  selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM) += xfrm.o
>  
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index e429a8c..05b58cc 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
>  #include "avc.h"
>  #include "objsec.h"
>  #include "netif.h"
> +#include "netnode.h"
>  #include "xfrm.h"
>  #include "netlabel.h"
>  
> @@ -3158,7 +3159,7 @@ out:
>  #endif /* IPV6 */
>  
>  static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
> -			     char **addrp, int *len, int src, u8 *proto)
> +			     char **addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
>  {
>  	int ret = 0;
>  
> @@ -3167,7 +3168,6 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
>  		ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
>  		if (ret || !addrp)
>  			break;
> -		*len = 4;
>  		*addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
>  					&ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
>  		break;
> @@ -3177,7 +3177,6 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
>  		ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
>  		if (ret || !addrp)
>  			break;
> -		*len = 16;
>  		*addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
>  					&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
>  		break;
> @@ -3377,7 +3376,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
>  			break;
>  		}
>  		
> -		err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, addrlen, &sid);
> +		err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
>  		if (err)
>  			goto out;
>  		
> @@ -3589,7 +3588,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
>  }
>  
>  static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
> -		struct avc_audit_data *ad, u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
> +				       struct avc_audit_data *ad,
> +				       u16 family, char *addrp)
>  {
>  	int err = 0;
>  	u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, recv_perm = 0;
> @@ -3649,7 +3649,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
>  	if (err)
>  		goto out;
>  	
> -	err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
> +	err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
>  	if (err)
>  		goto out;
>  	
> @@ -3678,7 +3678,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  {
>  	u16 family;
>  	char *addrp;
> -	int len, err = 0;
> +	int err = 0;
>  	struct avc_audit_data ad;
>  	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
>  
> @@ -3694,13 +3694,12 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  	ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
>  	ad.u.net.family = family;
>  
> -	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1, NULL);
> +	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
>  	if (err)
>  		goto out;
>  
>  	if (selinux_compat_net)
> -		err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad, family,
> -						  addrp, len);
> +		err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad, family, addrp);
>  	else
>  		err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
>  				   PACKET__RECV, &ad);
> @@ -3922,9 +3921,11 @@ out:
>  
>  #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
>  
> -static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk, struct net_device *dev,
> +static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk,
> +					    struct net_device *dev,
>  					    struct avc_audit_data *ad,
> -					    u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
> +					    u16 family,
> +					    char *addrp)
>  {
>  	int err = 0;
>  	u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, send_perm = 0;
> @@ -3975,7 +3976,7 @@ static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk, struct net_device *
>  	if (err)
>  		goto out;
>  		
> -	err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
> +	err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
>  	if (err)
>  		goto out;
>  	
> @@ -4009,7 +4010,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
>                                                u16 family)
>  {
>  	char *addrp;
> -	int len, err = 0;
> +	int err = 0;
>  	struct sock *sk;
>  	struct avc_audit_data ad;
>  	struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
> @@ -4026,13 +4027,13 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
>  	ad.u.net.netif = dev->ifindex;
>  	ad.u.net.family = family;
>  
> -	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 0, &proto);
> +	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto);
>  	if (err)
>  		goto out;
>  
>  	if (selinux_compat_net)
>  		err = selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(sk, dev, &ad,
> -						       family, addrp, len);
> +						       family, addrp);
>  	else
>  		err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
>  				   PACKET__SEND, &ad);
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netnode.h b/security/selinux/include/netnode.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..1b94450
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/netnode.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
> +/*
> + * Network node table
> + *
> + * SELinux must keep a mapping of network nodes to labels/SIDs.  This
> + * mapping is maintained as part of the normal policy but a fast cache is
> + * needed to reduce the lookup overhead since most of these queries happen on
> + * a per-packet basis.
> + *
> + * Author: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
> + *
> + */
> +
> +/*
> + * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2007
> + *
> + * This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
> + * it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public License as
> + * published by the Free Software Foundation.
> + *
> + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
> + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
> + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
> + * GNU General Public License for more details.
> + *
> + */
> +
> +#ifndef _SELINUX_NETNODE_H
> +#define _SELINUX_NETNODE_H
> +
> +int sel_netnode_sid(void *addr, u16 family, u32 *sid);
> +
> +#endif
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> index e41a2aa..6140734 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> @@ -99,6 +99,15 @@ struct netif_security_struct {
>  	u32 sid;			/* SID for this interface */
>  };
>  
> +struct netnode_security_struct {
> +	union {
> +		__be32 ipv4;		/* IPv4 node address */
> +		struct in6_addr ipv6;	/* IPv6 node address */
> +	} addr;
> +	u32 sid;			/* SID for this node */
> +	u16 family;			/* address family */
> +};
> +
>  struct sk_security_struct {
>  	struct sock *sk;		/* back pointer to sk object */
>  	u32 sid;			/* SID of this object */
> diff --git a/security/selinux/netnode.c b/security/selinux/netnode.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..0cd66b8
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/selinux/netnode.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,351 @@
> +/*
> + * Network node table
> + *
> + * SELinux must keep a mapping of network nodes to labels/SIDs.  This
> + * mapping is maintained as part of the normal policy but a fast cache is
> + * needed to reduce the lookup overhead since most of these queries happen on
> + * a per-packet basis.
> + *
> + * Author: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
> + *
> + * This code is heavily based on the "netif" concept originally developed by
> + * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
> + *   (see security/selinux/netif.c for more information)
> + * 
> + */
> +
> +/*
> + * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2007
> + *
> + * This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
> + * it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public License as
> + * published by the Free Software Foundation.
> + *
> + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
> + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
> + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
> + * GNU General Public License for more details.
> + *
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/types.h>
> +#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
> +#include <linux/list.h>
> +#include <linux/spinlock.h>
> +#include <linux/in.h>
> +#include <linux/in6.h>
> +#include <linux/ip.h>
> +#include <linux/ipv6.h>
> +#include <net/ip.h>
> +#include <net/ipv6.h>
> +#include <asm/bug.h>
> +
> +#include "objsec.h"
> +
> +#define SEL_NETNODE_HASH_SIZE       256
> +#define SEL_NETNODE_HASH_BKT_LIMIT   16
> +
> +struct sel_netnode {
> +	struct netnode_security_struct nsec;
> +
> +	struct list_head list;
> +	struct rcu_head rcu;
> +};
> +
> +/* NOTE: we are using a combined hash table for both IPv4 and IPv6, the reason
> + * for this is that I suspect most users will not make heavy use of both
> + * address families at the same time so one table will usually end up wasted,
> + * if this becomes a problem we can always add a hash table for each address
> + * family later */
> +
> +static LIST_HEAD(sel_netnode_list);
> +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sel_netnode_lock);
> +static struct list_head sel_netnode_hash[SEL_NETNODE_HASH_SIZE];
> +
> +/**
> + * sel_netnode_free - Frees a node entry
> + * @p: the entry's RCU field
> + *
> + * Description:
> + * This function is designed to be used as a callback to the call_rcu()
> + * function so that memory allocated to a hash table node entry can be
> + * released safely.
> + *
> + */
> +static void sel_netnode_free(struct rcu_head *p)
> +{
> +	struct sel_netnode *node = container_of(p, struct sel_netnode, rcu);
> +	kfree(node);
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv4 - IPv4 hashing function for the node table
> + * @addr: IPv4 address
> + *
> + * Description:
> + * This is the IPv4 hashing function for the node interface table, it returns
> + * the bucket number for the given IP address.
> + *
> + */
> +static u32 sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv4(__be32 addr)
> +{
> +	/* at some point we should determine if the mismatch in byte order
> +	 * affects the hash function dramatically */
> +	return (addr & (SEL_NETNODE_HASH_SIZE - 1));
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv6 - IPv6 hashing function for the node table
> + * @addr: IPv6 address
> + *
> + * Description:
> + * This is the IPv6 hashing function for the node interface table, it returns
> + * the bucket number for the given IP address.
> + *
> + */
> +static u32 sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv6(const struct in6_addr *addr)
> +{
> +	/* just hash the least significant 32 bits to keep things fast (they
> +	 * are the most likely to be different anyway), we can revisit this
> +	 * later if needed */
> +	return (addr->s6_addr32[3] & (SEL_NETNODE_HASH_SIZE - 1));
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * sel_netnode_find - Search for a node record
> + * @addr: IP address
> + * @family: address family
> + *
> + * Description:
> + * Search the network node table and return the record matching @addr.  If an
> + * entry can not be found in the table return NULL.
> + *
> + */
> +static struct sel_netnode *sel_netnode_find(const void *addr, u16 family)
> +{
> +	u32 idx;
> +	struct sel_netnode *node;
> +
> +	switch (family) {
> +	case PF_INET:
> +		idx = sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv4(*(__be32 *)addr);
> +		break;
> +	case PF_INET6:
> +		idx = sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv6(addr);
> +		break;
> +	default:
> +		BUG();
> +	}
> +
> +	list_for_each_entry_rcu(node, &sel_netnode_hash[idx], list)
> +		if (node->nsec.family == family)
> +			switch (family) {
> +			case PF_INET:
> +				if (node->nsec.addr.ipv4 == *(__be32 *)addr)
> +					return node;
> +				break;
> +			case PF_INET6:
> +				if (ipv6_addr_cmp(&node->nsec.addr.ipv6,
> +						  addr) == 0)
> +					return node;
> +				break;
> +			}
> +
> +	return NULL;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * sel_netnode_insert - Insert a new node into the table
> + * @node: the new node record
> + *
> + * Description:
> + * Add a new node record to the network address hash table.  Returns zero on
> + * success, negative values on failure.
> + *
> + */
> +static int sel_netnode_insert(struct sel_netnode *node)
> +{
> +	u32 idx;
> +	u32 count = 0;
> +	struct sel_netnode *iter;
> +
> +	switch (node->nsec.family) {
> +	case PF_INET:
> +		idx = sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv4(node->nsec.addr.ipv4);
> +		break;
> +	case PF_INET6:
> +		idx = sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv6(&node->nsec.addr.ipv6);
> +		break;
> +	default:
> +		BUG();
> +	}
> +	list_add_rcu(&node->list, &sel_netnode_hash[idx]);
> +
> +	/* we need to impose a limit on the growth of the hash table so check
> +	 * this bucket to make sure it is within the specified bounds */
> +	list_for_each_entry(iter, &sel_netnode_hash[idx], list)
> +		if (++count > SEL_NETNODE_HASH_BKT_LIMIT) {
> +			list_del_rcu(&iter->list);
> +			call_rcu(&iter->rcu, sel_netnode_free);
> +			break;
> +		}
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * sel_netnode_destroy - Remove a node record from the table
> + * @node: the existing node record
> + *
> + * Description:
> + * Remove an existing node record from the network address table.
> + *
> + */
> +static void sel_netnode_destroy(struct sel_netnode *node)
> +{
> +	list_del_rcu(&node->list);
> +	call_rcu(&node->rcu, sel_netnode_free);
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * sel_netnode_sid_slow - Lookup the SID of a network address using the policy
> + * @addr: the IP address
> + * @family: the address family
> + * @sid: node SID
> + *
> + * Description:
> + * This function determines the SID of a network address by quering the
> + * security policy.  The result is added to the network address table to
> + * speedup future queries.  Returns zero on success, negative values on
> + * failure.
> + *
> + */
> +static int sel_netnode_sid_slow(void *addr, u16 family, u32 *sid)
> +{
> +	int ret;
> +	struct sel_netnode *node;
> +	struct sel_netnode *new = NULL;
> +
> +	spin_lock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock);
> +	node = sel_netnode_find(addr, family);
> +	if (node != NULL) {
> +		*sid = node->nsec.sid;
> +		ret = 0;
> +		goto out;
> +	}
> +	new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC);
> +	if (new == NULL) {
> +		ret = -ENOMEM;
> +		goto out;
> +	}
> +	switch (family) {
> +	case PF_INET:
> +		ret = security_node_sid(PF_INET,
> +					addr, sizeof(struct in_addr),
> +					&new->nsec.sid);
> +		new->nsec.addr.ipv4 = *(__be32 *)addr;
> +		break;
> +	case PF_INET6:
> +		ret = security_node_sid(PF_INET6,
> +					addr, sizeof(struct in6_addr),
> +					&new->nsec.sid);
> +		memcpy(&new->nsec.addr.ipv6, addr,
> +		       sizeof(new->nsec.addr.ipv6));
> +		break;
> +	default:
> +		BUG();
> +	}
> +	if (ret != 0)
> +		goto out;
> +	new->nsec.family = family;
> +	ret = sel_netnode_insert(new);
> +	if (ret != 0)
> +		goto out;
> +	*sid = new->nsec.sid;
> +
> +out:
> +	spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock);
> +	if (ret != 0)
> +		kfree(new);
> +	return ret;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * sel_netnode_sid - Lookup the SID of a network address
> + * @addr: the IP address
> + * @family: the address family
> + * @sid: node SID
> + *
> + * Description:
> + * This function determines the SID of a network address using the fastest
> + * method possible.  First the address table is queried, but if an entry
> + * can't be found then the policy is queried and the result is added to the
> + * table to speedup future queries.  Returns zero on success, negative values
> + * on failure.
> + *
> + */
> +int sel_netnode_sid(void *addr, u16 family, u32 *sid)
> +{
> +	struct sel_netnode *node;
> +
> +	rcu_read_lock();
> +	node = sel_netnode_find(addr, family);
> +	if (node != NULL) {
> +		*sid = node->nsec.sid;
> +		rcu_read_unlock();
> +		return 0;
> +	}
> +	rcu_read_unlock();
> +
> +	return sel_netnode_sid_slow(addr, family, sid);
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * sel_netnode_flush - Flush the entire network address table
> + *
> + * Description:
> + * Remove all entries from the network address table.
> + *
> + */
> +static void sel_netnode_flush(void)
> +{
> +	u32 idx;
> +	struct sel_netnode *node;
> +
> +	spin_lock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock);
> +	for (idx = 0; idx < SEL_NETNODE_HASH_SIZE; idx++)
> +		list_for_each_entry(node, &sel_netnode_hash[idx], list)
> +			sel_netnode_destroy(node);
> +	spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock);
> +}
> +
> +static int sel_netnode_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
> +				    u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained)
> +{
> +	if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
> +		sel_netnode_flush();
> +		synchronize_net();
> +	}
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static __init int sel_netnode_init(void)
> +{
> +	int iter;
> +	int ret;
> +	
> +	if (!selinux_enabled)
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	for (iter = 0; iter < SEL_NETNODE_HASH_SIZE; iter++)
> +		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sel_netnode_hash[iter]);
> +
> +	ret = avc_add_callback(sel_netnode_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
> +	                       SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0);
> +	if (ret != 0)
> +		panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", ret);
> +
> +	return ret;
> +}
> +
> +__initcall(sel_netnode_init);
> 
> 
> --
> This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list.
> If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with
> the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency


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Re: [RFC PATCH v8 10/18] SELinux: Add a network node caching mechanism similar to the sel_netif_*() functions

[Paul Moore]

On Monday 17 December 2007 3:35:28 pm Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Fri, 2007-12-14 at 16:50 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> > This patch adds a SELinux IP address/node SID caching mechanism similar
> > to the sel_netif_*() functions.  The node SID queries in the SELinux
> > hooks files are also modified to take advantage of this new
> > functionality.  In addition, remove the address length information from
> > the sk_buff parsing routines as it is redundant since we already have the
> > address family.
>
> This is very nice - we also need the same kind of cache for port SIDs.

Thanks.  Any problem if we wait until 2.6.26 for a port SID cache?  It 
shouldn't be any worse than it is now (the new code is not concerned with 
ports) and the current patchset is already large enough that it keeps me up 
at night thinking about all the places it could go wrong ...

-- 
paul moore
linux security @ hp

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Re: [RFC PATCH v8 10/18] SELinux: Add a network node caching mechanism similar to the sel_netif_*() functions

[James Morris]

On Mon, 17 Dec 2007, Paul Moore wrote:

> On Monday 17 December 2007 3:35:28 pm Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > On Fri, 2007-12-14 at 16:50 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > This patch adds a SELinux IP address/node SID caching mechanism similar
> > > to the sel_netif_*() functions.  The node SID queries in the SELinux
> > > hooks files are also modified to take advantage of this new
> > > functionality.  In addition, remove the address length information from
> > > the sk_buff parsing routines as it is redundant since we already have the
> > > address family.
> >
> > This is very nice - we also need the same kind of cache for port SIDs.
> 
> Thanks.  Any problem if we wait until 2.6.26 for a port SID cache? 

Nope.



-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>

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Re: [RFC PATCH v8 10/18] SELinux: Add a network node caching mechanism similar to the sel_netif_*() functions

[Stephen Smalley]

On Mon, 2007-12-17 at 15:56 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Monday 17 December 2007 3:35:28 pm Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > On Fri, 2007-12-14 at 16:50 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > This patch adds a SELinux IP address/node SID caching mechanism similar
> > > to the sel_netif_*() functions.  The node SID queries in the SELinux
> > > hooks files are also modified to take advantage of this new
> > > functionality.  In addition, remove the address length information from
> > > the sk_buff parsing routines as it is redundant since we already have the
> > > address family.
> >
> > This is very nice - we also need the same kind of cache for port SIDs.
> 
> Thanks.  Any problem if we wait until 2.6.26 for a port SID cache?  It 
> shouldn't be any worse than it is now (the new code is not concerned with 
> ports) and the current patchset is already large enough that it keeps me up 
> at night thinking about all the places it could go wrong ...

Yes, that's fine - just a note to file away for the future.  We'll still
want the cache eventually though since the name_bind and name_connect
checks are based on the port SIDs and will remain even when the compat
checks are obsoleted.

-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency


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Re: [RFC PATCH v8 10/18] SELinux: Add a network node caching mechanism similar to the sel_netif_*() functions

[Paul Moore]

On Tuesday 18 December 2007 8:26:35 am Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Mon, 2007-12-17 at 15:56 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Monday 17 December 2007 3:35:28 pm Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > > On Fri, 2007-12-14 at 16:50 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > > This patch adds a SELinux IP address/node SID caching mechanism
> > > > similar to the sel_netif_*() functions.  The node SID queries in the
> > > > SELinux hooks files are also modified to take advantage of this new
> > > > functionality.  In addition, remove the address length information
> > > > from the sk_buff parsing routines as it is redundant since we already
> > > > have the address family.
> > >
> > > This is very nice - we also need the same kind of cache for port SIDs.
> >
> > Thanks.  Any problem if we wait until 2.6.26 for a port SID cache?  It
> > shouldn't be any worse than it is now (the new code is not concerned with
> > ports) and the current patchset is already large enough that it keeps me
> > up at night thinking about all the places it could go wrong ...
>
> Yes, that's fine - just a note to file away for the future.  We'll still
> want the cache eventually though since the name_bind and name_connect
> checks are based on the port SIDs and will remain even when the compat
> checks are obsoleted.

All righty, since neither you or James are in a hurry for this I'll "file it 
away" for 2.6.26.

Thanks.

-- 
paul moore
linux security @ hp

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[RFC PATCH v8 11/18] SELinux: Add a capabilities bitmap to SELinux policy version 22

[Paul Moore]

Add a new policy capabilities bitmap to SELinux policy version 22.  This bitmap
will enable the security server to query the policy to determine which features
it supports.
---

 security/selinux/Kconfig            |    2 -
 security/selinux/include/security.h |   15 ++++++
 security/selinux/selinuxfs.c        |   89 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c      |   18 +++++++
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.h      |    2 +
 security/selinux/ss/services.c      |   67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 185 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig
index b32a459..2b517d6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Kconfig
+++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
 config SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE
 	int "NSA SELinux maximum supported policy format version value"
 	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
-	range 15 21
+	range 15 22
 	default 19
 	help
 	  This option sets the value for the maximum policy format version
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index a33437b..a22de97 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -25,13 +25,14 @@
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS		19
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB		20
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS	21
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP		22
 
 /* Range of policy versions we understand*/
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN   POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX	CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE
 #else
-#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX	POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX	POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP
 #endif
 
 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr;
@@ -39,8 +40,19 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr;
 extern int selinux_enabled;
 extern int selinux_mls_enabled;
 
+/* Policy capabilities */
+enum {
+	POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER,
+	__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX
+};
+#define POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX - 1)
+
+extern int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
+
 int security_load_policy(void * data, size_t len);
 
+int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap);
+
 #define SEL_VEC_MAX 32
 struct av_decision {
 	u32 allowed;
@@ -91,6 +103,7 @@ int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses);
 int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms);
 int security_get_reject_unknown(void);
 int security_get_allow_unknown(void);
+int security_get_policycaps(int *len, int **values);
 
 #define SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR		1 /* use xattr */
 #define SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS		2 /* use transition SIDs, e.g. devpts/tmpfs */
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 2fa483f..b87e9eb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -2,6 +2,11 @@
  *
  * 	Added conditional policy language extensions
  *
+ *  Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul.moore@hp.com>
+ *
+ *      Added support for the policy capability bitmap
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
  * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
  * Copyright (C) 2004 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
  *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
@@ -35,6 +40,11 @@
 #include "objsec.h"
 #include "conditional.h"
 
+/* Policy capability filenames */
+static char *policycap_names[] = {
+	"network_peer_controls"
+};
+
 unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_ENABLE_SECMARK_DEFAULT
@@ -72,6 +82,9 @@ static int *bool_pending_values = NULL;
 static struct dentry *class_dir = NULL;
 static unsigned long last_class_ino;
 
+/* global data for policy capabilities */
+static struct dentry *policycap_dir = NULL;
+
 extern void selnl_notify_setenforce(int val);
 
 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a security operation. */
@@ -111,10 +124,11 @@ enum sel_inos {
 
 static unsigned long sel_last_ino = SEL_INO_NEXT - 1;
 
-#define SEL_INITCON_INO_OFFSET 	0x01000000
-#define SEL_BOOL_INO_OFFSET	0x02000000
-#define SEL_CLASS_INO_OFFSET	0x04000000
-#define SEL_INO_MASK		0x00ffffff
+#define SEL_INITCON_INO_OFFSET		0x01000000
+#define SEL_BOOL_INO_OFFSET		0x02000000
+#define SEL_CLASS_INO_OFFSET		0x04000000
+#define SEL_POLICYCAP_INO_OFFSET	0x08000000
+#define SEL_INO_MASK			0x00ffffff
 
 #define TMPBUFLEN	12
 static ssize_t sel_read_enforce(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
@@ -263,6 +277,7 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_policyvers_ops = {
 /* declaration for sel_write_load */
 static int sel_make_bools(void);
 static int sel_make_classes(void);
+static int sel_make_policycap(void);
 
 /* declaration for sel_make_class_dirs */
 static int sel_make_dir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
@@ -323,6 +338,12 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
 	}
 
 	ret = sel_make_classes();
+	if (ret) {
+		length = ret;
+		goto out1;
+	}
+
+	ret = sel_make_policycap();
 	if (ret)
 		length = ret;
 	else
@@ -1399,6 +1420,24 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_perm_ops = {
 	.read		= sel_read_perm,
 };
 
+static ssize_t sel_read_policycap(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+				  size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	int value;
+	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+	ssize_t length;
+	unsigned long i_ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
+
+	value = security_policycap_supported(i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK);
+	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", value);
+
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_policycap_ops = {
+	.read		= sel_read_policycap,
+};
+
 static int sel_make_perm_files(char *objclass, int classvalue,
 				struct dentry *dir)
 {
@@ -1545,6 +1584,36 @@ out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
+static int sel_make_policycap(void)
+{
+	unsigned int iter;
+	struct dentry *dentry = NULL;
+	struct inode *inode = NULL;
+
+	sel_remove_entries(policycap_dir);
+
+	for (iter = 0; iter <= POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX; iter++) {
+		if (iter < ARRAY_SIZE(policycap_names))
+			dentry = d_alloc_name(policycap_dir,
+					      policycap_names[iter]);
+		else
+			dentry = d_alloc_name(policycap_dir, "unknown");
+
+		if (dentry == NULL)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		inode = sel_make_inode(policycap_dir->d_sb, S_IFREG | S_IRUGO);
+		if (inode == NULL)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		inode->i_fop = &sel_policycap_ops;
+		inode->i_ino = iter | SEL_POLICYCAP_INO_OFFSET;
+		d_add(dentry, inode);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int sel_make_dir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 			unsigned long *ino)
 {
@@ -1673,6 +1742,18 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block * sb, void * data, int silent)
 
 	class_dir = dentry;
 
+	dentry = d_alloc_name(sb->s_root, "policy_capabilities");
+	if (!dentry) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	ret = sel_make_dir(root_inode, dentry, &sel_last_ino);
+	if (ret)
+		goto err;
+
+	policycap_dir = dentry;
+
 out:
 	return ret;
 err:
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index b582aae..bd7d6a0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -13,6 +13,11 @@
  *
  * 	Added conditional policy language extensions
  *
+ * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul.moore@hp.com>
+ *
+ *      Added support for the policy capability bitmap
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
  * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
  * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
  *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
@@ -102,6 +107,11 @@ static struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = {
 		.sym_num        = SYM_NUM,
 		.ocon_num       = OCON_NUM,
 	},
+	{
+		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP,
+		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM,
+	}
 };
 
 static struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version)
@@ -183,6 +193,8 @@ static int policydb_init(struct policydb *p)
 	if (rc)
 		goto out_free_symtab;
 
+	ebitmap_init(&p->policycaps);
+
 out:
 	return rc;
 
@@ -673,8 +685,8 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
 			ebitmap_destroy(&p->type_attr_map[i]);
 	}
 	kfree(p->type_attr_map);
-
 	kfree(p->undefined_perms);
+	ebitmap_destroy(&p->policycaps);
 
 	return;
 }
@@ -1554,6 +1566,10 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 	p->reject_unknown = !!(le32_to_cpu(buf[1]) & REJECT_UNKNOWN);
 	p->allow_unknown = !!(le32_to_cpu(buf[1]) & ALLOW_UNKNOWN);
 
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP &&
+	    ebitmap_read(&p->policycaps, fp) != 0)
+		goto bad;
+
 	info = policydb_lookup_compat(p->policyvers);
 	if (!info) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  unable to find policy compat info "
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
index ed6fc68..c4ce996 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -241,6 +241,8 @@ struct policydb {
 	/* type -> attribute reverse mapping */
 	struct ebitmap *type_attr_map;
 
+	struct ebitmap policycaps;
+
 	unsigned int policyvers;
 
 	unsigned int reject_unknown : 1;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index d4cc878..1e78786 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -16,12 +16,13 @@
  * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul.moore@hp.com>
  *
  *      Added support for NetLabel
+ *      Added support for the policy capability bitmap
  *
  * Updated: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
  *
  *  Added validation of kernel classes and permissions
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2006 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
  * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
  * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004, 2006 Tresys Technology, LLC
  * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
@@ -59,6 +60,8 @@
 extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);
 unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
 
+int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
+
 /*
  * This is declared in avc.c
  */
@@ -1299,6 +1302,12 @@ bad:
 	goto out;
 }
 
+static void security_load_policycaps(void)
+{
+	selinux_policycap_netpeer = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
+						  POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER);
+}
+
 extern void selinux_complete_init(void);
 static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p);
 
@@ -1346,6 +1355,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 			avtab_cache_destroy();
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
+		security_load_policycaps();
 		policydb_loaded_version = policydb.policyvers;
 		ss_initialized = 1;
 		seqno = ++latest_granting;
@@ -1404,6 +1414,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 	POLICY_WRLOCK;
 	memcpy(&policydb, &newpolicydb, sizeof policydb);
 	sidtab_set(&sidtab, &newsidtab);
+	security_load_policycaps();
 	seqno = ++latest_granting;
 	policydb_loaded_version = policydb.policyvers;
 	POLICY_WRUNLOCK;
@@ -2145,6 +2156,60 @@ int security_get_allow_unknown(void)
 	return policydb.allow_unknown;
 }
 
+/**
+ * security_get_policycaps - Query the loaded policy for its capabilities
+ * @len: the number of capability bits
+ * @values: the capability bit array
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Get an array of the policy capabilities in @values where each entry in
+ * @values is either true (1) or false (0) depending the policy's support of
+ * that feature.  The policy capabilities are defined by the
+ * POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_* enums.  The size of the array is stored in @len and it
+ * is up to the caller to free the array in @values.  Returns zero on success,
+ * negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int security_get_policycaps(int *len, int **values)
+{
+	int rc = -ENOMEM;
+	unsigned int iter;
+
+	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+	*values = kcalloc(POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (*values == NULL)
+		goto out;
+	for (iter = 0; iter < POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX; iter++)
+		(*values)[iter] = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, iter);
+	*len = POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX;
+
+out:
+	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_policycap_supported - Check for a specific policy capability
+ * @req_cap: capability
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function queries the currently loaded policy to see if it supports the
+ * capability specified by @req_cap.  Returns true (1) if the capability is
+ * supported, false (0) if it isn't supported.
+ *
+ */
+int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+	rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, req_cap);
+	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
 struct selinux_audit_rule {
 	u32 au_seqno;
 	struct context au_ctxt;


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[RFC PATCH v8 12/18] SELinux: Add new peer permissions to the Flask definitions

[Paul Moore]

Add additional Flask definitions to support the new "peer" object class.
---

 security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h |    3 +++
 security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h    |    3 +++
 security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h   |    7 +++++++
 security/selinux/include/flask.h             |    1 +
 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
index 049bf69..458b6aa 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
@@ -159,3 +159,6 @@
    S_(SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET, DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND, "node_bind")
    S_(SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET, DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT, "name_connect")
    S_(SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT, MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, "mmap_zero")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__INGRESS, "ingress")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__EGRESS, "egress")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, "recv")
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
index eda89a2..861a77d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
@@ -824,3 +824,6 @@
 #define DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND                    0x00400000UL
 #define DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT                 0x00800000UL
 #define MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO                     0x00000001UL
+#define PEER__INGRESS                             0x00000001UL
+#define PEER__EGRESS                              0x00000002UL
+#define PEER__RECV                                0x00000004UL
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
index e77de0e..b1b0d1d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
@@ -64,3 +64,10 @@
     S_(NULL)
     S_("dccp_socket")
     S_("memprotect")
+    S_(NULL)
+    S_(NULL)
+    S_(NULL)
+    S_(NULL)
+    S_(NULL)
+    S_(NULL)
+    S_("peer")
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/flask.h b/security/selinux/include/flask.h
index a9c2b20..09e9dd2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/flask.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/flask.h
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
 #define SECCLASS_KEY                                     58
 #define SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET                             60
 #define SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT                              61
+#define SECCLASS_PEER                                    68
 
 /*
  * Security identifier indices for initial entities


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[RFC PATCH v8 13/18] SELinux: Better integration between peer labeling subsystems

[Paul Moore]

Rework the handling of network peer labels so that the different peer labeling
subsystems work better together.  This includes moving both subsystems to a
single "peer" object class which involves not only changes to the permission
checks but an improved method of consolidating multiple packet peer labels.
As part of this work the inbound packet permission check code has been heavily
modified to handle both the old and new behavior in as sane a fashion as
possible.
---

 security/selinux/hooks.c            |  204 +++++++++++++++++++----------------
 security/selinux/include/netlabel.h |    3 +
 security/selinux/include/objsec.h   |    2 
 security/selinux/include/security.h |    4 +
 security/selinux/netlabel.c         |   10 +-
 security/selinux/ss/services.c      |   85 +++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 208 insertions(+), 100 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 05b58cc..e088a31 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
 #include <net/icmp.h>
 #include <net/ip.h>		/* for local_port_range[] */
 #include <net/tcp.h>		/* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
 #include <linux/bitops.h>
@@ -3189,36 +3190,39 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
 }
 
 /**
- * selinux_skb_extlbl_sid - Determine the external label of a packet
+ * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
  * @skb: the packet
  * @family: protocol family
- * @sid: the packet's SID
+ * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
  *
  * Description:
- * Check the various different forms of external packet labeling and determine
- * the external SID for the packet.  If only one form of external labeling is
- * present then it is used, if both labeled IPsec and NetLabel labels are
- * present then the SELinux type information is taken from the labeled IPsec
- * SA and the MLS sensitivity label information is taken from the NetLabel
- * security attributes.  This bit of "magic" is done in the call to
- * selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid().
+ * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
+ * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
+ * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp().  The function
+ * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
+ * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
+ * peer labels.
  *
  */
-static void selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb,
-				   u16 family,
-				   u32 *sid)
+static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
 {
 	u32 xfrm_sid;
 	u32 nlbl_sid;
+	u32 nlbl_type;
 
 	selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
-	if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb,
-					 family,
-					 (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL ?
-					  SECINITSID_NETMSG : xfrm_sid),
-					 &nlbl_sid) != 0)
-		nlbl_sid = SECSID_NULL;
-	*sid = (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL ? xfrm_sid : nlbl_sid);
+	selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb,
+				     family,
+				     SECINITSID_NETMSG,
+				     &nlbl_type,
+				     &nlbl_sid);
+
+	if (security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type,
+					 xfrm_sid,
+					 sid) != 0)
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /* socket security operations */
@@ -3284,6 +3288,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
 	if (sock->sk) {
 		sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
 		sksec->sid = isec->sid;
+		sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
 		err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
 	}
 
@@ -3587,104 +3592,114 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
-				       struct avc_audit_data *ad,
-				       u16 family, char *addrp)
+static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
+						struct sk_buff *skb,
+						struct avc_audit_data *ad,
+						u16 family,
+						char *addrp)
 {
-	int err = 0;
-	u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, recv_perm = 0;
-	struct socket *sock;
-	u16 sock_class = 0;
-	u32 sock_sid = 0;
-
- 	read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
- 	sock = sk->sk_socket;
- 	if (sock) {
- 		struct inode *inode;
- 		inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
- 		if (inode) {
- 			struct inode_security_struct *isec;
- 			isec = inode->i_security;
- 			sock_sid = isec->sid;
- 			sock_class = isec->sclass;
- 		}
- 	}
- 	read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
- 	if (!sock_sid)
-  		goto out;
-
-	if (!skb->dev)
-		goto out;
+	int err;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	u16 sk_class;
+	u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
+	u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
 
-	err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
-	if (err)
-		goto out;
+	sk_sid = sksec->sid;
+	sk_class = sksec->sclass;
 
-	switch (sock_class) {
+	switch (sk_class) {
 	case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
 		netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
 		node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
 		recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
 		break;
-	
 	case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
 		netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
 		node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
 		recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
 		break;
-
 	case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
 		netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
 		node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
 		recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
 		break;
-
 	default:
 		netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
 		node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
+		recv_perm = 0;
 		break;
 	}
 
-	err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
+	err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
 	if (err)
-		goto out;
+		return err;
+	err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
 	
 	err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
 	if (err)
-		goto out;
-	
-	err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
+		return err;
+	err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
 	if (err)
-		goto out;
+		return err;
 
-	if (recv_perm) {
-		u32 port_sid;
+	if (!recv_perm)
+		return 0;
+	err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
+				sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad->u.net.sport),
+				&port_sid);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
+}
 
-		err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
-		                        sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad->u.net.sport),
-		                        &port_sid);
-		if (err)
-			goto out;
+static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+				       struct avc_audit_data *ad,
+				       u16 family, char *addrp)
+{
+	int err;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	u32 peer_sid;
+	u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
+
+	if (selinux_compat_net)
+		err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, ad,
+							   family, addrp);
+	else
+		err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+				   PACKET__RECV, ad);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
 
-		err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid,
-				   sock_class, recv_perm, ad);
+	if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
+		err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+		err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
+				   SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, ad);
+	} else {
+		err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, ad);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+		err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, ad);
 	}
 
-out:
 	return err;
 }
 
 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	u16 family;
-	char *addrp;
-	int err = 0;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	int err;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	u16 family = sk->sk_family;
+	u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
+	u32 peer_sid;
+	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	char *addrp;
 
-	family = sk->sk_family;
 	if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
-		goto out;
+		return 0;
 
 	/* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
 	if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
@@ -3693,26 +3708,27 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
 	ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
 	ad.u.net.family = family;
-
 	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
 	if (err)
-		goto out;
+		return err;
 
-	if (selinux_compat_net)
-		err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad, family, addrp);
-	else
-		err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
-				   PACKET__RECV, &ad);
-	if (err)
-		goto out;
+	/* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
+	 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
+	 * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
+	 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
+	if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
+		return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
+						   family, addrp);
 
-	err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
+	err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+			   PACKET__RECV, &ad);
 	if (err)
-		goto out;
+		return err;
 
-	err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
-out:	
-	return err;
+	err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
 }
 
 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
@@ -3775,7 +3791,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
 	if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
 		selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
 	else if (skb)
-		selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
+		selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
 
 	if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
 		err = -EINVAL;
@@ -3801,6 +3817,7 @@ static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
 
 	newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
 	newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
+	newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
 
 	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(ssec, newssec);
 }
@@ -3824,6 +3841,7 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock* sk, struct socket *parent)
 	if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
 	    sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
 		isec->sid = sksec->sid;
+	sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
 
 	selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(sk, parent);
 }
@@ -3836,7 +3854,9 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	u32 newsid;
 	u32 peersid;
 
-	selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &peersid);
+	err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &peersid);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
 	if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
 		req->secid = sksec->sid;
 		req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
@@ -3874,7 +3894,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
 {
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 
-	selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &sksec->peer_sid);
+	selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &sksec->peer_sid);
 }
 
 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
index 272769a..c8c05a6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
 int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
 				 u16 family,
 				 u32 base_sid,
+				 u32 *type,
 				 u32 *sid);
 
 void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock);
@@ -89,8 +90,10 @@ static inline void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(
 static inline int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
 					       u16 family,
 					       u32 base_sid,
+					       u32 *type,
 					       u32 *sid)
 {
+	*type = NETLBL_NLTYPE_NONE;
 	*sid = SECSID_NULL;
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 6140734..1114629 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ struct sk_security_struct {
 	struct sock *sk;		/* back pointer to sk object */
 	u32 sid;			/* SID of this object */
 	u32 peer_sid;			/* SID of peer */
-#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
 	u16 sclass;			/* sock security class */
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
 	enum {				/* NetLabel state */
 		NLBL_UNSET = 0,
 		NLBL_REQUIRE,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index a22de97..9347e2d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -99,6 +99,10 @@ int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
 
 int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid);
 
+int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
+				 u32 xfrm_sid,
+				 u32 *peer_sid);
+
 int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses);
 int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms);
 int security_get_reject_unknown(void);
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 4073d5a..af78cb9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -134,7 +134,6 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
 	 * lock as other threads could have access to ssec */
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, ssec->sk->sk_family);
-	newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 }
 
@@ -143,6 +142,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
  * @skb: the packet
  * @family: protocol family
  * @base_sid: the SELinux SID to use as a context for MLS only attributes
+ * @type: NetLabel labeling protocol type
  * @sid: the SID
  *
  * Description:
@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
 int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
 				 u16 family,
 				 u32 base_sid,
+				 u32 *type,
 				 u32 *sid)
 {
 	int rc;
@@ -174,6 +175,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
 			netlbl_cache_add(skb, &secattr);
 	} else
 		*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+	*type = secattr.type;
 	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
 
 	return rc;
@@ -191,13 +193,10 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
  */
 void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock)
 {
-	struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
 	u32 nlbl_peer_sid;
 
-	sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
-
 	rcu_read_lock();
 
 	if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQUIRE) {
@@ -235,11 +234,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock)
 {
 	int rc = 0;
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-	struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 
-	sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
-
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	if (sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_REQUIRE)
 		rc = selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid(sk, sksec->sid);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 1e78786..3f2af1c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -2051,6 +2051,91 @@ out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
+/**
+ * security_net_peersid_resolve - Compare and resolve two network peer SIDs
+ * @nlbl_sid: NetLabel SID
+ * @nlbl_type: NetLabel labeling protocol type
+ * @xfrm_sid: XFRM SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Compare the @nlbl_sid and @xfrm_sid values and if the two SIDs can be
+ * resolved into a single SID it is returned via @peer_sid and the function
+ * returns zero.  Otherwise @peer_sid is set to SECSID_NULL and the function
+ * returns a negative value.  A table summarizing the behavior is below:
+ *
+ *                                 | function return |      @sid
+ *   ------------------------------+-----------------+-----------------
+ *   no peer labels                |        0        |    SECSID_NULL
+ *   single peer label             |        0        |    <peer_label>
+ *   multiple, consistent labels   |        0        |    <peer_label>
+ *   multiple, inconsistent labels |    -<errno>     |    SECSID_NULL
+ *
+ */
+int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
+				 u32 xfrm_sid,
+				 u32 *peer_sid)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct context *nlbl_ctx;
+	struct context *xfrm_ctx;
+
+	/* handle the common (which also happens to be the set of easy) cases
+	 * right away, these two if statements catch everything involving a
+	 * single or absent peer SID/label */
+	if (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
+		*peer_sid = nlbl_sid;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* NOTE: an nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED is a "fallback" label
+	 * and is treated as if nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL when a XFRM SID/label
+	 * is present */
+	if (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL || nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED) {
+		*peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* we don't need to check ss_initialized here since the only way both
+	 * nlbl_sid and xfrm_sid are not equal to SECSID_NULL would be if the
+	 * security server was initialized and ss_initialized was true */
+	if (!selinux_mls_enabled) {
+		*peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+	nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, nlbl_sid);
+	if (!nlbl_ctx) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR
+		       "security_sid_mls_cmp:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       nlbl_sid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_slowpath;
+	}
+	xfrm_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, xfrm_sid);
+	if (!xfrm_ctx) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR
+		       "security_sid_mls_cmp:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       xfrm_sid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_slowpath;
+	}
+	rc = (mls_context_cmp(nlbl_ctx, xfrm_ctx) ? 0 : -EACCES);
+
+out_slowpath:
+	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	if (rc == 0)
+		/* at present NetLabel SIDs/labels really only carry MLS
+		 * information so if the MLS portion of the NetLabel SID
+		 * matches the MLS portion of the labeled XFRM SID/label
+		 * then pass along the XFRM SID as it is the most
+		 * expressive */
+		*peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
+	else
+		*peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
+	return rc;
+}
+
 static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
 {
 	struct class_datum *datum = d;


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[RFC PATCH v8 14/18] SELinux: Enable dynamic enable/disable of the network access checks

[Paul Moore]

This patch introduces a mechanism for checking when labeled IPsec or SECMARK
are in use by keeping introducing a configuration reference counter for each
subsystem.  In the case of labeled IPsec, whenever a labeled SA or SPD entry
is created the labeled IPsec/XFRM reference count is increased and when the
entry is removed it is decreased.  In the case of SECMARK, when a SECMARK
target is created the reference count is increased and later decreased when the
target is removed.  These reference counters allow SELinux to quickly determine
if either of these subsystems are enabled.

NetLabel already has a similar mechanism which provides the netlbl_enabled()
function.

This patch also renames the selinux_relabel_packet_permission() function to
selinux_secmark_relabel_packet_permission() as the original name and
description were misleading in that they referenced a single packet label which
is not the case.
---

 include/linux/selinux.h         |   45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c      |   13 ++++++++++-
 security/selinux/exports.c      |   20 +++++++++++++++--
 security/selinux/hooks.c        |   46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 security/selinux/include/xfrm.h |   12 ++++++++++
 security/selinux/xfrm.c         |   18 ++++++++++++++-
 6 files changed, 132 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/selinux.h b/include/linux/selinux.h
index 6080f73..8c2cc4c 100644
--- a/include/linux/selinux.h
+++ b/include/linux/selinux.h
@@ -120,16 +120,35 @@ void selinux_get_task_sid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *sid);
 int selinux_string_to_sid(char *str, u32 *sid);
 
 /**
- *     selinux_relabel_packet_permission - check permission to relabel a packet
- *     @sid: ID value to be applied to network packet (via SECMARK, most likely)
+ *     selinux_secmark_relabel_packet_permission - secmark permission check
+ *     @sid: SECMARK ID value to be applied to network packet
  *
- *     Returns 0 if the current task is allowed to label packets with the
- *     supplied security ID.  Note that it is implicit that the packet is always
- *     being relabeled from the default unlabled value, and that the access
- *     control decision is made in the AVC.
+ *     Returns 0 if the current task is allowed to set the SECMARK label of
+ *     packets with the supplied security ID.  Note that it is implicit that
+ *     the packet is always being relabeled from the default unlabeled value,
+ *     and that the access control decision is made in the AVC.
  */
-int selinux_relabel_packet_permission(u32 sid);
+int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet_permission(u32 sid);
 
+/**
+ *     selinux_secmark_refcount_inc - increments the secmark use counter
+ *
+ *     SELinux keeps track of the current SECMARK targets in use so it knows
+ *     when to apply SECMARK label access checks to network packets.  This
+ *     function incements this reference count to indicate that a new SECMARK
+ *     target has been configured.
+ */
+void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void);
+
+/**
+ *     selinux_secmark_refcount_dec - decrements the secmark use counter
+ *
+ *     SELinux keeps track of the current SECMARK targets in use so it knows
+ *     when to apply SECMARK label access checks to network packets.  This
+ *     function decements this reference count to indicate that one of the
+ *     existing SECMARK targets has been removed/flushed.
+ */
+void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void);
 #else
 
 static inline int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op,
@@ -184,11 +203,21 @@ static inline int selinux_string_to_sid(const char *str, u32 *sid)
        return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int selinux_relabel_packet_permission(u32 sid)
+static inline int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet_permission(u32 sid)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
+{
+	return;
+}
+
+static inline void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
+{
+	return;
+}
+
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX */
 
 #endif /* _LINUX_SELINUX_H */
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
index 235806e..db4a1fe 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
@@ -72,12 +72,13 @@ static bool checkentry_selinux(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
 		return false;
 	}
 
-	err = selinux_relabel_packet_permission(sel->selsid);
+	err = selinux_secmark_relabel_packet_permission(sel->selsid);
 	if (err) {
 		printk(KERN_INFO PFX "unable to obtain relabeling permission\n");
 		return false;
 	}
 
+	selinux_secmark_refcount_inc();
 	return true;
 }
 
@@ -109,11 +110,20 @@ static bool checkentry(const char *tablename, const void *entry,
 	return true;
 }
 
+void destroy(const struct xt_target *target, void *targinfo)
+{
+	switch (mode) {
+	case SECMARK_MODE_SEL:
+		selinux_secmark_refcount_dec();
+	}
+}
+
 static struct xt_target xt_secmark_target[] __read_mostly = {
 	{
 		.name		= "SECMARK",
 		.family		= AF_INET,
 		.checkentry	= checkentry,
+		.destroy	= destroy,
 		.target		= target,
 		.targetsize	= sizeof(struct xt_secmark_target_info),
 		.table		= "mangle",
@@ -123,6 +133,7 @@ static struct xt_target xt_secmark_target[] __read_mostly = {
 		.name		= "SECMARK",
 		.family		= AF_INET6,
 		.checkentry	= checkentry,
+		.destroy	= destroy,
 		.target		= target,
 		.targetsize	= sizeof(struct xt_secmark_target_info),
 		.table		= "mangle",
diff --git a/security/selinux/exports.c b/security/selinux/exports.c
index b6f9694..87d2bb3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/exports.c
+++ b/security/selinux/exports.c
@@ -17,10 +17,14 @@
 #include <linux/selinux.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/ipc.h>
+#include <asm/atomic.h>
 
 #include "security.h"
 #include "objsec.h"
 
+/* SECMARK reference count */
+extern atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount;
+
 int selinux_sid_to_string(u32 sid, char **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
 {
 	if (selinux_enabled)
@@ -74,7 +78,7 @@ int selinux_string_to_sid(char *str, u32 *sid)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_string_to_sid);
 
-int selinux_relabel_packet_permission(u32 sid)
+int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet_permission(u32 sid)
 {
 	if (selinux_enabled) {
 		struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
@@ -84,4 +88,16 @@ int selinux_relabel_packet_permission(u32 sid)
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_relabel_packet_permission);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_secmark_relabel_packet_permission);
+
+void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
+{
+	atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_secmark_refcount_inc);
+
+void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
+{
+	atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_secmark_refcount_dec);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index e088a31..c384949 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -51,8 +51,10 @@
 #include <net/ip.h>		/* for local_port_range[] */
 #include <net/tcp.h>		/* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
+#include <asm/atomic.h>
 #include <linux/bitops.h>
 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
 #include <linux/netdevice.h>	/* for network interface checks */
@@ -89,6 +91,9 @@ extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
 extern int selinux_compat_net;
 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
 
+/* SECMARK reference count */
+atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
 int selinux_enforcing = 0;
 
@@ -155,6 +160,21 @@ getsecurity_exit:
 	return len;
 }
 
+/**
+ * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
+ * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
+ * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled.  Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
+ * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
+{
+	return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
+}
+
 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
 
 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
@@ -3694,7 +3714,6 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 	u16 family = sk->sk_family;
 	u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
-	u32 peer_sid;
 	struct avc_audit_data ad;
 	char *addrp;
 
@@ -3720,15 +3739,24 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
 						   family, addrp);
 
-	err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
-			   PACKET__RECV, &ad);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
+	if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
+		err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+				   PACKET__RECV, &ad);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
 
-	err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-	return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
+	if (netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled()) {
+		u32 peer_sid;
+
+		err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+		err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
+				   PEER__RECV, &ad);
+	}
+
+	return err;
 }
 
 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index 31929e3..36b0510 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -32,6 +32,13 @@ static inline struct inode_security_struct *get_sock_isec(struct sock *sk)
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
+extern atomic_t selinux_xfrm_refcount;
+
+static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void)
+{
+	return (atomic_read(&selinux_xfrm_refcount) > 0);
+}
+
 int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
 			struct avc_audit_data *ad);
 int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
@@ -43,6 +50,11 @@ static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void)
 	atomic_inc(&flow_cache_genid);
 }
 #else
+static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
 			struct avc_audit_data *ad)
 {
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index e076039..7e15820 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -46,11 +46,14 @@
 #include <net/checksum.h>
 #include <net/udp.h>
 #include <asm/semaphore.h>
+#include <asm/atomic.h>
 
 #include "avc.h"
 #include "objsec.h"
 #include "xfrm.h"
 
+/* Labeled XFRM instance counter */
+atomic_t selinux_xfrm_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
 
 /*
  * Returns true if an LSM/SELinux context
@@ -293,6 +296,9 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp,
 	BUG_ON(!uctx);
 
 	err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&xp->security, uctx, 0);
+	if (err == 0)
+		atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
+
 	return err;
 }
 
@@ -340,10 +346,13 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
 	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = xp->security;
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	if (ctx)
+	if (ctx) {
 		rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
 				  SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
 				  ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
+		if (rc == 0)
+			atomic_dec(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
+	}
 
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -360,6 +369,8 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uct
 	BUG_ON(!x);
 
 	err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&x->security, uctx, secid);
+	if (err == 0)
+		atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
 	return err;
 }
 
@@ -382,10 +393,13 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
 	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	if (ctx)
+	if (ctx) {
 		rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
 				  SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
 				  ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
+		if (rc == 0)
+			atomic_dec(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
+	}
 
 	return rc;
 }


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[RFC PATCH v8 15/18] SELinux: Allow NetLabel to directly cache SIDs

[Paul Moore]

Now that the SELinux NetLabel "base SID" is always the netmsg initial SID we
can do a big optimization - caching the SID and not just the MLS attributes.
This not only saves a lot of per-packet memory allocations and copies but it
has a nice side effect of removing a chunk of code.
---

 security/selinux/hooks.c            |    6 --
 security/selinux/include/netlabel.h |    2 -
 security/selinux/include/security.h |    2 -
 security/selinux/netlabel.c         |   55 ++++++++++------
 security/selinux/ss/services.c      |  124 ++++++-----------------------------
 5 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 134 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index c384949..2f221b2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3231,11 +3231,7 @@ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
 	u32 nlbl_type;
 
 	selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
-	selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb,
-				     family,
-				     SECINITSID_NETMSG,
-				     &nlbl_type,
-				     &nlbl_sid);
+	selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
 
 	if (security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type,
 					 xfrm_sid,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
index c8c05a6..00a2809 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
@@ -48,7 +48,6 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
 
 int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
 				 u16 family,
-				 u32 base_sid,
 				 u32 *type,
 				 u32 *sid);
 
@@ -89,7 +88,6 @@ static inline void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(
 
 static inline int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
 					       u16 family,
-					       u32 base_sid,
 					       u32 *type,
 					       u32 *sid)
 {
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 9347e2d..23137c1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -124,7 +124,6 @@ int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype, char *name, u16 sclass,
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
 int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
-				   u32 base_sid,
 				   u32 *sid);
 
 int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid,
@@ -132,7 +131,6 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid,
 #else
 static inline int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(
 					    struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
-					    u32 base_sid,
 					    u32 *sid)
 {
 	return -EIDRM;
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index af78cb9..e07adf9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -36,6 +36,33 @@
 #include "security.h"
 
 /**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached - Cache a SID lookup
+ * @skb: the packet
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
+ * @sid: the SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Query the SELinux security server to lookup the correct SID for the given
+ * security attributes.  If the query is successful, cache the result to speed
+ * up future lookups.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb,
+					   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
+					   u32 *sid)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(secattr, sid);
+	if (rc == 0 &&
+	    (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHEABLE) &&
+	    (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE))
+		netlbl_cache_add(skb, secattr);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
  * selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid - Label a socket using the NetLabel mechanism
  * @sk: the socket to label
  * @sid: the SID to use
@@ -141,7 +168,6 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
  * selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid - Get the sid of a packet using NetLabel
  * @skb: the packet
  * @family: protocol family
- * @base_sid: the SELinux SID to use as a context for MLS only attributes
  * @type: NetLabel labeling protocol type
  * @sid: the SID
  *
@@ -153,7 +179,6 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
  */
 int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
 				 u16 family,
-				 u32 base_sid,
 				 u32 *type,
 				 u32 *sid)
 {
@@ -167,13 +192,9 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
 
 	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
 	rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
-	if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE) {
-		rc = security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&secattr, base_sid, sid);
-		if (rc == 0 &&
-		    (secattr.flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHEABLE) &&
-		    (secattr.flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE))
-			netlbl_cache_add(skb, &secattr);
-	} else
+	if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE)
+		rc = selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(skb, &secattr, sid);
+	else
 		*sid = SECSID_NULL;
 	*type = secattr.type;
 	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
@@ -207,9 +228,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock)
 	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
 	if (netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, &secattr) == 0 &&
 	    secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE &&
-	    security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&secattr,
-					   SECINITSID_NETMSG,
-					   &nlbl_peer_sid) == 0)
+	    security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&secattr, &nlbl_peer_sid) == 0)
 		sksec->peer_sid = nlbl_peer_sid;
 	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
 
@@ -313,15 +332,9 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
 
 	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
 	rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
-	if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE) {
-		rc = security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&secattr,
-						    SECINITSID_NETMSG,
-						    &nlbl_sid);
-		if (rc == 0 &&
-		    (secattr.flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHEABLE) &&
-		    (secattr.flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE))
-			netlbl_cache_add(skb, &secattr);
-	} else
+	if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE)
+		rc = selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(skb, &secattr, &nlbl_sid);
+	else
 		nlbl_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
 	if (rc != 0)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 3f2af1c..703dae5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -2544,50 +2544,10 @@ void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void))
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
-/*
- * NetLabel cache structure
- */
-#define NETLBL_CACHE(x)           ((struct selinux_netlbl_cache *)(x))
-#define NETLBL_CACHE_T_NONE       0
-#define NETLBL_CACHE_T_SID        1
-#define NETLBL_CACHE_T_MLS        2
-struct selinux_netlbl_cache {
-	u32 type;
-	union {
-		u32 sid;
-		struct mls_range mls_label;
-	} data;
-};
-
-/**
- * security_netlbl_cache_free - Free the NetLabel cached data
- * @data: the data to free
- *
- * Description:
- * This function is intended to be used as the free() callback inside the
- * netlbl_lsm_cache structure.
- *
- */
-static void security_netlbl_cache_free(const void *data)
-{
-	struct selinux_netlbl_cache *cache;
-
-	if (data == NULL)
-		return;
-
-	cache = NETLBL_CACHE(data);
-	switch (cache->type) {
-	case NETLBL_CACHE_T_MLS:
-		ebitmap_destroy(&cache->data.mls_label.level[0].cat);
-		break;
-	}
-	kfree(data);
-}
-
 /**
  * security_netlbl_cache_add - Add an entry to the NetLabel cache
  * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
- * @ctx: the SELinux context
+ * @sid: the SELinux SID
  *
  * Description:
  * Attempt to cache the context in @ctx, which was derived from the packet in
@@ -2596,60 +2556,46 @@ static void security_netlbl_cache_free(const void *data)
  *
  */
 static void security_netlbl_cache_add(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
-				      struct context *ctx)
+				      u32 sid)
 {
-	struct selinux_netlbl_cache *cache = NULL;
+	u32 *sid_cache;
 
-	secattr->cache = netlbl_secattr_cache_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
-	if (secattr->cache == NULL)
-		return;
-
-	cache = kzalloc(sizeof(*cache),	GFP_ATOMIC);
-	if (cache == NULL)
+	sid_cache = kmalloc(sizeof(*sid_cache), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (sid_cache == NULL)
 		return;
-
-	cache->type = NETLBL_CACHE_T_MLS;
-	if (ebitmap_cpy(&cache->data.mls_label.level[0].cat,
-			&ctx->range.level[0].cat) != 0) {
-		kfree(cache);
+	secattr->cache = netlbl_secattr_cache_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (secattr->cache == NULL) {
+		kfree(sid_cache);
 		return;
 	}
-	cache->data.mls_label.level[1].cat.highbit =
-		cache->data.mls_label.level[0].cat.highbit;
-	cache->data.mls_label.level[1].cat.node =
-		cache->data.mls_label.level[0].cat.node;
-	cache->data.mls_label.level[0].sens = ctx->range.level[0].sens;
-	cache->data.mls_label.level[1].sens = ctx->range.level[0].sens;
 
-	secattr->cache->free = security_netlbl_cache_free;
-	secattr->cache->data = (void *)cache;
+	*sid_cache = sid;
+	secattr->cache->free = kfree;
+	secattr->cache->data = sid_cache;
 	secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE;
 }
 
 /**
  * security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid - Convert a NetLabel secattr to a SELinux SID
  * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
- * @base_sid: the SELinux SID to use as a context for MLS only attributes
  * @sid: the SELinux SID
  *
  * Description:
  * Convert the given NetLabel security attributes in @secattr into a
  * SELinux SID.  If the @secattr field does not contain a full SELinux
- * SID/context then use the context in @base_sid as the foundation.  If
- * possibile the 'cache' field of @secattr is set and the CACHE flag is set;
- * this is to allow the @secattr to be used by NetLabel to cache the secattr to
- * SID conversion for future lookups.  Returns zero on success, negative
- * values on failure.
+ * SID/context then use SECINITSID_NETMSG as the foundation.  If possibile the
+ * 'cache' field of @secattr is set and the CACHE flag is set; this is to
+ * allow the @secattr to be used by NetLabel to cache the secattr to SID
+ * conversion for future lookups.  Returns zero on success, negative values on
+ * failure.
  *
  */
 int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
-				   u32 base_sid,
 				   u32 *sid)
 {
 	int rc = -EIDRM;
 	struct context *ctx;
 	struct context ctx_new;
-	struct selinux_netlbl_cache *cache;
 
 	if (!ss_initialized) {
 		*sid = SECSID_NULL;
@@ -2659,43 +2605,13 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
 	POLICY_RDLOCK;
 
 	if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE) {
-		cache = NETLBL_CACHE(secattr->cache->data);
-		switch (cache->type) {
-		case NETLBL_CACHE_T_SID:
-			*sid = cache->data.sid;
-			rc = 0;
-			break;
-		case NETLBL_CACHE_T_MLS:
-			ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, base_sid);
-			if (ctx == NULL)
-				goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return;
-
-			ctx_new.user = ctx->user;
-			ctx_new.role = ctx->role;
-			ctx_new.type = ctx->type;
-			ctx_new.range.level[0].sens =
-				cache->data.mls_label.level[0].sens;
-			ctx_new.range.level[0].cat.highbit =
-				cache->data.mls_label.level[0].cat.highbit;
-			ctx_new.range.level[0].cat.node =
-				cache->data.mls_label.level[0].cat.node;
-			ctx_new.range.level[1].sens =
-				cache->data.mls_label.level[1].sens;
-			ctx_new.range.level[1].cat.highbit =
-				cache->data.mls_label.level[1].cat.highbit;
-			ctx_new.range.level[1].cat.node =
-				cache->data.mls_label.level[1].cat.node;
-
-			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &ctx_new, sid);
-			break;
-		default:
-			goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return;
-		}
+		*sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
+		rc = 0;
 	} else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) {
 		*sid = secattr->attr.secid;
 		rc = 0;
 	} else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
-		ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, base_sid);
+		ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
 		if (ctx == NULL)
 			goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return;
 
@@ -2722,7 +2638,7 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
 		if (rc != 0)
 			goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup;
 
-		security_netlbl_cache_add(secattr, &ctx_new);
+		security_netlbl_cache_add(secattr, *sid);
 
 		ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
 	} else {


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[RFC PATCH v8 16/18] NetLabel: Introduce static network labels for unlabeled connections

[Paul Moore]

Most trusted OSs, with the exception of Linux, have the ability to specify
static security labels for unlabeled networks.  This patch adds this ability to
the NetLabel packet labeling framework.

If the NetLabel subsystem is called to determine the security attributes of an
incoming packet it first checks to see if any recognized NetLabel packet
labeling protocols are in-use on the packet.  If none can be found then the
unlabled connection table is queried and based on the packets incoming
interface and address it is matched with a security label as configured by the
administrator using the netlabel_tools package.  The matching security label is
returned to the caller just as if the packet was explicitly labeled using a
labeling protocol.
---

 include/net/netlabel.h            |    6 
 net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c      |   16 
 net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 1367 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h |  145 ++++
 4 files changed, 1516 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/netlabel.h b/include/net/netlabel.h
index a3bffb4..b3213c7 100644
--- a/include/net/netlabel.h
+++ b/include/net/netlabel.h
@@ -67,7 +67,11 @@
  * NetLabel NETLINK protocol
  */
 
-#define NETLBL_PROTO_VERSION            1
+/* NetLabel NETLINK protocol version
+ *  1: initial version
+ *  2: added static labels for unlabeled connections
+ */
+#define NETLBL_PROTO_VERSION            2
 
 /* NetLabel NETLINK types/families */
 #define NETLBL_NLTYPE_NONE              0
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
index 4914615..c69e3e1 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ socket_setattr_return:
  * @secattr: the security attributes
  *
  * Description:
- * Examines the given sock to see any NetLabel style labeling has been
+ * Examines the given sock to see if any NetLabel style labeling has been
  * applied to the sock, if so it parses the socket label and returns the
  * security attributes in @secattr.  Returns zero on success, negative values
  * on failure.
@@ -320,13 +320,7 @@ socket_setattr_return:
  */
 int netlbl_sock_getattr(struct sock *sk, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
-	int ret_val;
-
-	ret_val = cipso_v4_sock_getattr(sk, secattr);
-	if (ret_val == 0)
-		return 0;
-
-	return netlbl_unlabel_getattr(secattr);
+	return cipso_v4_sock_getattr(sk, secattr);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -350,7 +344,7 @@ int netlbl_skbuff_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb,
 	    cipso_v4_skbuff_getattr(skb, secattr) == 0)
 		return 0;
 
-	return netlbl_unlabel_getattr(secattr);
+	return netlbl_unlabel_getattr(skb, family, secattr);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -434,6 +428,10 @@ static int __init netlbl_init(void)
 	if (ret_val != 0)
 		goto init_failure;
 
+	ret_val = netlbl_unlabel_init(NETLBL_UNLHSH_BITSIZE);
+	if (ret_val != 0)
+		goto init_failure;
+
 	ret_val = netlbl_netlink_init();
 	if (ret_val != 0)
 		goto init_failure;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 5e11394..d289ff4 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
  */
 
 /*
- * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2006
+ * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2006 - 2007
  *
  * This program is free software;  you can redistribute it and/or modify
  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -36,22 +36,93 @@
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/in6.h>
+#include <linux/ip.h>
+#include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/notifier.h>
+#include <linux/netdevice.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <net/sock.h>
 #include <net/netlink.h>
 #include <net/genetlink.h>
-
+#include <net/ip.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
 #include <net/netlabel.h>
 #include <asm/bug.h>
+#include <asm/atomic.h>
 
 #include "netlabel_user.h"
 #include "netlabel_domainhash.h"
 #include "netlabel_unlabeled.h"
+#include "netlabel_mgmt.h"
+
+/* NOTE: at present we always use init's network namespace since we don't
+ *       presently support different namespaces even though the majority of
+ *       the functions in this file are "namespace safe" */
+
+/* The unlabeled connection hash table which we use to map network interfaces
+ * and addresses of unlabeled packets to a user specified secid value for the
+ * LSM.  The hash table is used to lookup the network interface entry
+ * (struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface) and then the interface entry is used to
+ * lookup an IP address match from an ordered list.  If a network interface
+ * match can not be found in the hash table then the default entry
+ * (netlbl_unlhsh_def) is used.  The IP address entry list
+ * (struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr) is ordered such that the entries with a
+ * larger netmask come first.
+ */
+struct netlbl_unlhsh_tbl {
+	struct list_head *tbl;
+	u32 size;
+};
+struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 {
+	__be32 addr;
+	__be32 mask;
+	u32 secid;
+
+	u32 valid;
+	struct list_head list;
+	struct rcu_head rcu;
+};
+struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 {
+	struct in6_addr addr;
+	struct in6_addr mask;
+	u32 secid;
+
+	u32 valid;
+	struct list_head list;
+	struct rcu_head rcu;
+};
+struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface {
+	int ifindex;
+	struct list_head addr4_list;
+	struct list_head addr6_list;
+
+	u32 valid;
+	struct list_head list;
+	struct rcu_head rcu;
+};
+
+/* Argument struct for netlbl_unlhsh_walk() */
+struct netlbl_unlhsh_walk_arg {
+	struct netlink_callback *nl_cb;
+	struct sk_buff *skb;
+	u32 seq;
+};
+
+/* Unlabeled connection hash table */
+/* updates should be so rare that having one spinlock for the entire
+ * hash table should be okay */
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
+static struct netlbl_unlhsh_tbl *netlbl_unlhsh = NULL;
+static struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *netlbl_unlhsh_def = NULL;
 
 /* Accept unlabeled packets flag */
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(netlabel_unlabel_acceptflg_lock);
 static u8 netlabel_unlabel_acceptflg = 0;
 
-/* NetLabel Generic NETLINK CIPSOv4 family */
+/* NetLabel Generic NETLINK unlabeled family */
 static struct genl_family netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family = {
 	.id = GENL_ID_GENERATE,
 	.hdrsize = 0,
@@ -63,11 +134,674 @@ static struct genl_family netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family = {
 /* NetLabel Netlink attribute policy */
 static const struct nla_policy netlbl_unlabel_genl_policy[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_MAX + 1] = {
 	[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_ACPTFLG] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
+	[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR] = { .type = NLA_BINARY,
+				      .len = sizeof(struct in6_addr) },
+	[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6MASK] = { .type = NLA_BINARY,
+				      .len = sizeof(struct in6_addr) },
+	[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4ADDR] = { .type = NLA_BINARY,
+				      .len = sizeof(struct in_addr) },
+	[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4MASK] = { .type = NLA_BINARY,
+				      .len = sizeof(struct in_addr) },
+	[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IFACE] = { .type = NLA_NUL_STRING,
+				   .len = IFNAMSIZ - 1 },
+	[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX] = { .type = NLA_BINARY }
 };
 
 /*
- * Helper Functions
+ * Unlabeled Connection Hash Table Functions
+ */
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_unlhsh_free_addr4 - Frees an IPv4 address entry from the hash table
+ * @entry: the entry's RCU field
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function is designed to be used as a callback to the call_rcu()
+ * function so that memory allocated to a hash table address entry can be
+ * released safely.
+ *
+ */
+static void netlbl_unlhsh_free_addr4(struct rcu_head *entry)
+{
+	struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *ptr;
+
+	ptr = container_of(entry, struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4, rcu);
+	kfree(ptr);
+}
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+/**
+ * netlbl_unlhsh_free_addr6 - Frees an IPv6 address entry from the hash table
+ * @entry: the entry's RCU field
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function is designed to be used as a callback to the call_rcu()
+ * function so that memory allocated to a hash table address entry can be
+ * released safely.
+ *
+ */
+static void netlbl_unlhsh_free_addr6(struct rcu_head *entry)
+{
+	struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *ptr;
+
+	ptr = container_of(entry, struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6, rcu);
+	kfree(ptr);
+}
+#endif /* IPv6 */
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_unlhsh_free_iface - Frees an interface entry from the hash table
+ * @entry: the entry's RCU field
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function is designed to be used as a callback to the call_rcu()
+ * function so that memory allocated to a hash table interface entry can be
+ * released safely.  It is important to note that this function does not free
+ * the IPv4 and IPv6 address lists contained as part of an interface entry.  It
+ * is up to the rest of the code to make sure an interface entry is only freed
+ * once it's address lists are empty.
+ *
+ */
+static void netlbl_unlhsh_free_iface(struct rcu_head *entry)
+{
+	struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
+
+	iface = container_of(entry, struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface, rcu);
+	kfree(iface);
+}
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_unlhsh_hash - Hashing function for the hash table
+ * @ifindex: the network interface/device to hash
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This is the hashing function for the unlabeled hash table, it returns the
+ * bucket number for the given device/interface.  The caller is responsible for
+ * calling the rcu_read_[un]lock() functions.
+ *
  */
+static u32 netlbl_unlhsh_hash(int ifindex)
+{
+	/* this is taken _almost_ directly from
+	 * security/selinux/netif.c:sel_netif_hasfn() as they do pretty much
+	 * the same thing */
+	return ifindex & (rcu_dereference(netlbl_unlhsh)->size - 1);
+}
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_unlhsh_search_addr4 - Search for a matching IPv4 address entry
+ * @addr: IPv4 address
+ * @iface: the network interface entry
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Searches the IPv4 address list of the network interface specified by @iface.
+ * If a matching address entry is found it is returned, otherwise NULL is
+ * returned.  The caller is responsible for calling the rcu_read_[un]lock()
+ * functions.
+ *
+ */
+static struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *netlbl_unlhsh_search_addr4(
+	                               __be32 addr,
+	                               const struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface)
+{
+	struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *iter;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(iter, &iface->addr4_list, list)
+		if (iter->valid && (addr & iter->mask) == iter->addr)
+			return iter;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+/**
+ * netlbl_unlhsh_search_addr6 - Search for a matching IPv6 address entry
+ * @addr: IPv6 address
+ * @iface: the network interface entry
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Searches the IPv6 address list of the network interface specified by @iface.
+ * If a matching address entry is found it is returned, otherwise NULL is
+ * returned.  The caller is responsible for calling the rcu_read_[un]lock()
+ * functions.
+ *
+ */
+static struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *netlbl_unlhsh_search_addr6(
+	                               const struct in6_addr *addr,
+	                               const struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface)
+{
+	struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *iter;
+
+	/* We could use ipv6_masked_addr_cmp() below, but our way should be a
+	 * bit quicker and we want this to be fast. */
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(iter, &iface->addr6_list, list)
+		if (iter->valid &&
+		    ((addr->s6_addr32[0] & iter->mask.s6_addr32[0])
+		     == iter->addr.s6_addr32[0]) &&
+		    ((addr->s6_addr32[1] & iter->mask.s6_addr32[1])
+		     == iter->addr.s6_addr32[1]) &&
+		    ((addr->s6_addr32[2] & iter->mask.s6_addr32[2])
+		     == iter->addr.s6_addr32[2]) &&
+		    ((addr->s6_addr32[3] & iter->mask.s6_addr32[3])
+		     == iter->addr.s6_addr32[3]))
+		return iter;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+#endif /* IPv6 */
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface - Search for a matching interface entry
+ * @ifindex: the network interface
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Searches the unlabeled connection hash table and returns a pointer to the
+ * interface entry which matches @ifindex, otherwise NULL is returned.  The
+ * caller is responsible for calling the rcu_read_[un]lock() functions.
+ *
+ */
+static struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface(int ifindex)
+{
+	u32 bkt;
+	struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iter;
+
+	bkt = netlbl_unlhsh_hash(ifindex);
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(iter,
+				&rcu_dereference(netlbl_unlhsh)->tbl[bkt],
+				list)
+		if (iter->valid && iter->ifindex == ifindex)
+			return iter;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface_def - Search for a matching interface entry
+ * @ifindex: the network interface
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Searches the unlabeled connection hash table and returns a pointer to the
+ * interface entry which matches @ifindex.  If an exact match can not be found
+ * and there is a valid default entry, the default entry is returned, otherwise
+ * NULL is returned.  The caller is responsible for calling the
+ * rcu_read_[un]lock() functions.
+ *
+ */
+static struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface_def(int ifindex)
+{
+	struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *entry;
+
+	entry = netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface(ifindex);
+	if (entry != NULL)
+		return entry;
+
+	entry = rcu_dereference(netlbl_unlhsh_def);
+	if (entry != NULL && entry->valid)
+		return entry;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4 - Add a new IPv4 address entry to the hash table
+ * @iface: the associated interface entry
+ * @addr: IPv4 address in network byte order
+ * @mask: IPv4 address mask in network byte order
+ * @secid: LSM secid value for entry
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Add a new address entry into the unlabeled connection hash table using the
+ * interface entry specified by @iface.  On success zero is returned, otherwise
+ * a negative value is returned.  The caller is responsible for calling the
+ * rcu_read_[un]lock() functions.
+ *
+ */
+static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
+				   const struct in_addr *addr,
+				   const struct in_addr *mask,
+				   u32 secid)
+{
+	struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *entry;
+	struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *iter;
+
+	entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (entry == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	entry->addr = addr->s_addr & mask->s_addr;
+	entry->mask = mask->s_addr;
+	entry->secid = secid;
+	entry->valid = 1;
+	INIT_RCU_HEAD(&entry->rcu);
+
+	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
+	iter = netlbl_unlhsh_search_addr4(entry->addr, iface);
+	if (iter != NULL &&
+	    iter->addr == addr->s_addr && iter->mask == mask->s_addr) {
+		spin_unlock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
+		kfree(entry);
+		return -EEXIST;
+	}
+	/* in order to speed up address searches through the list (the common
+	 * case) we need to keep the list in order based on the size of the
+	 * address mask such that the entry with the widest mask (smallest
+	 * numerical value) appears first in the list */
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(iter, &iface->addr4_list, list)
+		if (iter->valid &&
+		    ntohl(entry->mask) > ntohl(iter->mask)) {
+			__list_add_rcu(&entry->list,
+				       iter->list.prev,
+				       &iter->list);
+			spin_unlock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
+			return 0;
+		}
+	list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, &iface->addr4_list);
+	spin_unlock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+/**
+ * netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6 - Add a new IPv6 address entry to the hash table
+ * @iface: the associated interface entry
+ * @addr: IPv6 address in network byte order
+ * @mask: IPv6 address mask in network byte order
+ * @secid: LSM secid value for entry
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Add a new address entry into the unlabeled connection hash table using the
+ * interface entry specified by @iface.  On success zero is returned, otherwise
+ * a negative value is returned.  The caller is responsible for calling the
+ * rcu_read_[un]lock() functions.
+ *
+ */
+static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
+				   const struct in6_addr *addr,
+				   const struct in6_addr *mask,
+				   u32 secid)
+{
+	struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *entry;
+	struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *iter;
+
+	entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (entry == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ipv6_addr_copy(&entry->addr, addr);
+	entry->addr.s6_addr32[0] &= mask->s6_addr32[0];
+	entry->addr.s6_addr32[1] &= mask->s6_addr32[1];
+	entry->addr.s6_addr32[2] &= mask->s6_addr32[2];
+	entry->addr.s6_addr32[3] &= mask->s6_addr32[3];
+	ipv6_addr_copy(&entry->mask, mask);
+	entry->secid = secid;
+	entry->valid = 1;
+	INIT_RCU_HEAD(&entry->rcu);
+
+	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
+	iter = netlbl_unlhsh_search_addr6(&entry->addr, iface);
+	if (iter != NULL &&
+	    (ipv6_addr_cmp(&iter->addr, addr) == 0 &&
+	     ipv6_addr_cmp(&iter->mask, mask) == 0)) {
+		spin_unlock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
+		kfree(entry);
+		return -EEXIST;
+	}
+	/* in order to speed up address searches through the list (the common
+	 * case) we need to keep the list in order based on the size of the
+	 * address mask such that the entry with the widest mask (smallest
+	 * numerical value) appears first in the list */
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(iter, &iface->addr6_list, list)
+		if (iter->valid &&
+		    memcmp(&entry->mask.s6_addr,
+			   &iter->mask.s6_addr,
+			   16) > 0) {
+			__list_add_rcu(&entry->list,
+				       iter->list.prev,
+				       &iter->list);
+			spin_unlock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
+			return 0;
+		}
+	list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, &iface->addr6_list);
+	spin_unlock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* IPv6 */
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_unlhsh_add_iface - Adds a new interface entry to the hash table
+ * @ifindex: network interface
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Add a new, empty, interface entry into the unlabeled connection hash table.
+ * On success a pointer to the new interface entry is returned, on failure NULL
+ * is returned.  The caller is responsible for calling the rcu_read_[un]lock()
+ * functions.
+ *
+ */
+static struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *netlbl_unlhsh_add_iface(int ifindex)
+{
+	u32 bkt;
+	struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
+
+	iface = kzalloc(sizeof(*iface), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (iface == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	iface->ifindex = ifindex;
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&iface->addr4_list);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&iface->addr6_list);
+	iface->valid = 1;
+	INIT_RCU_HEAD(&iface->rcu);
+
+	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
+	if (ifindex >= 0) {
+		bkt = netlbl_unlhsh_hash(ifindex);
+		if (netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface(ifindex) != NULL)
+			goto add_iface_failure;
+		list_add_tail_rcu(&iface->list,
+				  &rcu_dereference(netlbl_unlhsh)->tbl[bkt]);
+	} else {
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&iface->list);
+		if (rcu_dereference(netlbl_unlhsh_def) != NULL)
+			goto add_iface_failure;
+		rcu_assign_pointer(netlbl_unlhsh_def, iface);
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
+
+	return iface;
+
+add_iface_failure:
+	spin_unlock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
+	kfree(iface);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_unlhsh_add - Adds a new entry to the unlabeled connection hash table
+ * @net: network namespace
+ * @dev_name: interface name
+ * @addr: IP address in network byte order
+ * @mask: address mask in network byte order
+ * @addr_len: length of address/mask (4 for IPv4, 16 for IPv6)
+ * @secid: LSM secid value for the entry
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Adds a new entry to the unlabeled connection hash table.  Returns zero on
+ * success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
+			     const char *dev_name,
+			     const void *addr,
+			     const void *mask,
+			     u32 addr_len,
+			     u32 secid)
+{
+	int ret_val;
+	int ifindex;
+	struct net_device *dev;
+	struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
+
+	if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
+	    addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	if (dev_name != NULL) {
+		dev = dev_get_by_name(net, dev_name);
+		if (dev == NULL) {
+			ret_val = -ENODEV;
+			goto unlhsh_add_return;
+		}
+		ifindex = dev->ifindex;
+		dev_put(dev);
+		iface = netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface(ifindex);
+	} else {
+		ifindex = -1;
+		iface = rcu_dereference(netlbl_unlhsh_def);
+	}
+	if (iface == NULL) {
+		iface = netlbl_unlhsh_add_iface(ifindex);
+		if (iface == NULL) {
+			ret_val = -ENOMEM;
+			goto unlhsh_add_return;
+		}
+	}
+	switch (addr_len) {
+	case sizeof(struct in_addr):
+		ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(iface, addr, mask, secid);
+		break;
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+	case sizeof(struct in6_addr):
+		ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(iface, addr, mask, secid);
+		break;
+#endif /* IPv6 */
+	default:
+		ret_val = -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (ret_val == 0)
+		atomic_inc(&netlabel_mgmt_protocount);
+
+unlhsh_add_return:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return ret_val;
+}
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4 - Remove an IPv4 address entry
+ * @iface: interface entry
+ * @addr: IP address
+ * @mask: IP address mask
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Remove an IP address entry from the unlabeled connection hash table.
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.  The caller is
+ * responsible for calling the rcu_read_[un]lock() functions.
+ *
+ */
+static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
+				      const struct in_addr *addr,
+				      const struct in_addr *mask)
+{
+	int ret_val = -ENOENT;
+	struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *entry;
+
+	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
+	entry = netlbl_unlhsh_search_addr4(addr->s_addr, iface);
+	if (entry != NULL &&
+	    entry->addr == addr->s_addr && entry->mask == mask->s_addr) {
+		entry->valid = 0;
+		list_del_rcu(&entry->list);
+		ret_val = 0;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
+
+	if (ret_val == 0)
+		call_rcu(&entry->rcu, netlbl_unlhsh_free_addr4);
+	return ret_val;
+}
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+/**
+ * netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6 - Remove an IPv6 address entry
+ * @iface: interface entry
+ * @addr: IP address
+ * @mask: IP address mask
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Remove an IP address entry from the unlabeled connection hash table.
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.  The caller is
+ * responsible for calling the rcu_read_[un]lock() functions.
+ *
+ */
+static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
+				      const struct in6_addr *addr,
+				      const struct in6_addr *mask)
+{
+	int ret_val = -ENOENT;
+	struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *entry;
+
+	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
+	entry = netlbl_unlhsh_search_addr6(addr, iface);
+	if (entry != NULL &&
+	    (ipv6_addr_cmp(&entry->addr, addr) == 0 &&
+	     ipv6_addr_cmp(&entry->mask, mask) == 0)) {
+		entry->valid = 0;
+		list_del_rcu(&entry->list);
+		ret_val = 0;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
+
+	if (ret_val == 0)
+		call_rcu(&entry->rcu, netlbl_unlhsh_free_addr6);
+	return ret_val;
+}
+#endif /* IPv6 */
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_unlhsh_condremove_iface - Remove an interface entry
+ * @iface: the interface entry
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Remove an interface entry from the unlabeled connection hash table if it is
+ * empty.  An interface entry is considered to be empty if there are no
+ * address entries assigned to it.
+ *
+ */
+static void netlbl_unlhsh_condremove_iface(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface)
+{
+	struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *iter4;
+	struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *iter6;
+
+	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(iter4, &iface->addr4_list, list)
+		if (iter4->valid)
+			goto unlhsh_condremove_failure;
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(iter6, &iface->addr6_list, list)
+		if (iter6->valid)
+			goto unlhsh_condremove_failure;
+	iface->valid = 0;
+	if (iface->ifindex >= 0)
+		list_del_rcu(&iface->list);
+	else
+		rcu_assign_pointer(netlbl_unlhsh_def, NULL);
+	spin_unlock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
+
+	call_rcu(&iface->rcu, netlbl_unlhsh_free_iface);
+	return;
+
+unlhsh_condremove_failure:
+	spin_unlock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
+	return;
+}
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_unlhsh_remove - Remove an entry from the unlabeled hash table
+ * @net: network namespace
+ * @dev_name: interface name
+ * @addr: IP address in network byte order
+ * @mask: address mask in network byte order
+ * @addr_len: length of address/mask (4 for IPv4, 16 for IPv6)
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Removes and existing entry from the unlabeled connection hash table.
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove(struct net *net,
+				const char *dev_name,
+				const void *addr,
+				const void *mask,
+				u32 addr_len)
+{
+	int ret_val;
+	struct net_device *dev;
+	struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
+
+	if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
+	    addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	if (dev_name != NULL) {
+		dev = dev_get_by_name(net, dev_name);
+		if (dev == NULL) {
+			ret_val = -ENODEV;
+			goto unlhsh_remove_return;
+		}
+		iface = netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface(dev->ifindex);
+		dev_put(dev);
+	} else
+		iface = rcu_dereference(netlbl_unlhsh_def);
+	if (iface == NULL) {
+		ret_val = -ENOENT;
+		goto unlhsh_remove_return;
+	}
+	switch (addr_len) {
+	case sizeof(struct in_addr):
+		ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(iface, addr, mask);
+		break;
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+	case sizeof(struct in6_addr):
+		ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(iface, addr, mask);
+		break;
+#endif /* IPv6 */
+	default:
+		ret_val = -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (ret_val == 0) {
+		netlbl_unlhsh_condremove_iface(iface);
+		atomic_dec(&netlabel_mgmt_protocount);
+	}
+
+unlhsh_remove_return:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return ret_val;
+}
+
+/*
+ * General Helper Functions
+ */
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_unlhsh_netdev_handler - Network device notification handler
+ * @this: notifier block
+ * @event: the event
+ * @ptr: the network device (cast to void)
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Handle network device events, although at present all we care about is a
+ * network device going away.  In the case of a device going away we clear any
+ * related entries from the unlabeled connection hash table.
+ *
+ */
+static int netlbl_unlhsh_netdev_handler(struct notifier_block *this,
+					unsigned long event,
+					void *ptr)
+{
+	struct net_device *dev = ptr;
+	struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface = NULL;
+
+	if (dev->nd_net != &init_net)
+		return NOTIFY_DONE;
+
+	/* XXX - should this be a check for NETDEV_DOWN or _UNREGISTER? */
+	if (event == NETDEV_DOWN) {
+		spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
+		iface = netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface(dev->ifindex);
+		if (iface != NULL && iface->valid) {
+			iface->valid = 0;
+			list_del_rcu(&iface->list);
+		} else
+			iface = NULL;
+		spin_unlock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
+	}
+
+	if (iface != NULL)
+		call_rcu(&iface->rcu, netlbl_unlhsh_free_iface);
+
+	return NOTIFY_DONE;
+}
 
 /**
  * netlbl_unlabel_acceptflg_set - Set the unlabeled accept flag
@@ -98,6 +832,48 @@ static void netlbl_unlabel_acceptflg_set(u8 value,
 	}
 }
 
+/**
+ * netlbl_unlabel_addrinfo_get - Get the IPv4/6 address information
+ * @info: the Generic NETLINK info block
+ * @addr: the IP address
+ * @mask: the IP address mask
+ * @len: the address length
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Examine the Generic NETLINK message and extract the IP address information.
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int netlbl_unlabel_addrinfo_get(struct genl_info *info,
+				       void **addr,
+				       void **mask,
+				       u32 *len)
+{
+	u32 addr_len;
+
+	if (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4ADDR]) {
+		addr_len = nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4ADDR]);
+		if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
+		    addr_len != nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4MASK]))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		*len = addr_len;
+		*addr = nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4ADDR]);
+		*mask = nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4MASK]);
+		return 0;
+	} else if (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR]) {
+		addr_len = nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR]);
+		if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr) &&
+		    addr_len != nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6MASK]))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		*len = addr_len;
+		*addr = nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR]);
+		*mask = nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6MASK]);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
 /*
  * NetLabel Command Handlers
  */
@@ -173,11 +949,470 @@ list_failure:
 	return ret_val;
 }
 
+/**
+ * netlbl_unlabel_staticadd - Handle a STATICADD message
+ * @skb: the NETLINK buffer
+ * @info: the Generic NETLINK info block
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Process a user generated STATICADD message and add a new unlabeled
+ * connection entry to the hash table.  Returns zero on success, negative
+ * values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
+				    struct genl_info *info)
+{
+	int ret_val;
+	char *dev_name;
+	void *addr;
+	void *mask;
+	u32 addr_len;
+	u32 secid;
+
+	/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
+	 * single entry.  However, allow users to create two entries, one each
+	 * for IPv4 and IPv4, with the same LSM security context which should
+	 * achieve the same result. */
+	if (!info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX] ||
+	    !info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IFACE] ||
+	    !((!info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4ADDR] ||
+	       !info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4MASK]) ^
+	      (!info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR] ||
+	       !info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6MASK])))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ret_val = netlbl_unlabel_addrinfo_get(info, &addr, &mask, &addr_len);
+	if (ret_val != 0)
+		return ret_val;
+	dev_name = nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IFACE]);
+	ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
+		                  nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
+				  nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
+				  &secid);
+	if (ret_val != 0)
+		return ret_val;
+
+	return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
+				 dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, secid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef - Handle a STATICADDDEF message
+ * @skb: the NETLINK buffer
+ * @info: the Generic NETLINK info block
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Process a user generated STATICADDDEF message and add a new default
+ * unlabeled connection entry.  Returns zero on success, negative values on
+ * failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
+				       struct genl_info *info)
+{
+	int ret_val;
+	void *addr;
+	void *mask;
+	u32 addr_len;
+	u32 secid;
+
+	/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
+	 * single entry.  However, allow users to create two entries, one each
+	 * for IPv4 and IPv6, with the same LSM security context which should
+	 * achieve the same result. */
+	if (!info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX] ||
+	    !((!info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4ADDR] ||
+	       !info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4MASK]) ^
+	      (!info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR] ||
+	       !info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6MASK])))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ret_val = netlbl_unlabel_addrinfo_get(info, &addr, &mask, &addr_len);
+	if (ret_val != 0)
+		return ret_val;
+	ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
+		                  nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
+				  nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
+				  &secid);
+	if (ret_val != 0)
+		return ret_val;
+
+	return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net, NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, secid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_unlabel_staticremove - Handle a STATICREMOVE message
+ * @skb: the NETLINK buffer
+ * @info: the Generic NETLINK info block
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Process a user generated STATICREMOVE message and remove the specified
+ * unlabeled connection entry.  Returns zero on success, negative values on
+ * failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int netlbl_unlabel_staticremove(struct sk_buff *skb,
+				       struct genl_info *info)
+{
+	int ret_val;
+	char *dev_name;
+	void *addr;
+	void *mask;
+	u32 addr_len;
+
+	/* See the note in netlbl_unlabel_staticadd() about not allowing both
+	 * IPv4 and IPv6 in the same entry. */
+	if (!info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IFACE] ||
+	    !((!info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4ADDR] ||
+	       !info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4MASK]) ^
+	      (!info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR] ||
+	       !info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6MASK])))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ret_val = netlbl_unlabel_addrinfo_get(info, &addr, &mask, &addr_len);
+	if (ret_val != 0)
+		return ret_val;
+	dev_name = nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IFACE]);
+
+	return netlbl_unlhsh_remove(&init_net, dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len);
+}
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_unlabel_staticremovedef - Handle a STATICREMOVEDEF message
+ * @skb: the NETLINK buffer
+ * @info: the Generic NETLINK info block
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Process a user generated STATICREMOVEDEF message and remove the default
+ * unlabeled connection entry.  Returns zero on success, negative values on
+ * failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int netlbl_unlabel_staticremovedef(struct sk_buff *skb,
+					  struct genl_info *info)
+{
+	int ret_val;
+	void *addr;
+	void *mask;
+	u32 addr_len;
+
+	/* See the note in netlbl_unlabel_staticadd() about not allowing both
+	 * IPv4 and IPv6 in the same entry. */
+	if (!((!info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4ADDR] ||
+	       !info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4MASK]) ^
+	      (!info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR] ||
+	       !info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6MASK])))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ret_val = netlbl_unlabel_addrinfo_get(info, &addr, &mask, &addr_len);
+	if (ret_val != 0)
+		return ret_val;
+
+	return netlbl_unlhsh_remove(&init_net, NULL, addr, mask, addr_len);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen - Generate messages for STATICLIST[DEF]
+ * @cmd: command/message
+ * @iface: the interface entry
+ * @addr4: the IPv4 address entry
+ * @addr6: the IPv6 address entry
+ * @arg: the netlbl_unlhsh_walk_arg structure
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function is designed to be used to generate a response for a
+ * STATICLIST or STATICLISTDEF message.  When called either @addr4 or @addr6
+ * can be specified, not both, the other unspecified entry should be set to
+ * NULL by the caller.  Returns the size of the message on success, negative
+ * values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
+				       const struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
+				       const struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *addr4,
+				       const struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *addr6,
+				       void *arg)
+{
+	int ret_val = -ENOMEM;
+	struct netlbl_unlhsh_walk_arg *cb_arg = arg;
+	struct net_device *dev;
+	void *data;
+	u32 secid;
+	char *secctx;
+	u32 secctx_len;
+
+	data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).pid,
+			   cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
+			   NLM_F_MULTI, cmd);
+	if (data == NULL)
+		goto list_cb_failure;
+
+	if (iface->ifindex >= 0) {
+		dev = dev_get_by_index(&init_net, iface->ifindex);
+		ret_val = nla_put_string(cb_arg->skb,
+					 NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IFACE, dev->name);
+		dev_put(dev);
+		if (ret_val != 0)
+			goto list_cb_failure;
+	}
+
+	if (addr4) {
+		struct in_addr addr_struct;
+
+		addr_struct.s_addr = addr4->addr;
+		ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
+				  NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4ADDR,
+				  sizeof(struct in_addr),
+				  &addr_struct);
+		if (ret_val != 0)
+			goto list_cb_failure;
+
+		addr_struct.s_addr = addr4->mask;
+		ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
+				  NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4MASK,
+				  sizeof(struct in_addr),
+				  &addr_struct);
+		if (ret_val != 0)
+			goto list_cb_failure;
+
+		secid = addr4->secid;
+	} else {
+		ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
+				  NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR,
+				  sizeof(struct in6_addr),
+				  &addr6->addr);
+		if (ret_val != 0)
+			goto list_cb_failure;
+
+		ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
+				  NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6MASK,
+				  sizeof(struct in6_addr),
+				  &addr6->mask);
+		if (ret_val != 0)
+			goto list_cb_failure;
+
+		secid = addr6->secid;
+	}
+
+	ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_len);
+	if (ret_val != 0)
+		goto list_cb_failure;
+	ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
+			  NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX,
+			  secctx_len,
+			  secctx);
+	security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+	if (ret_val != 0)
+		goto list_cb_failure;
+
+	cb_arg->seq++;
+	return genlmsg_end(cb_arg->skb, data);
+
+list_cb_failure:
+	genlmsg_cancel(cb_arg->skb, data);
+	return ret_val;
+}
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_unlabel_staticlist - Handle a STATICLIST message
+ * @skb: the NETLINK buffer
+ * @cb: the NETLINK callback
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Process a user generated STATICLIST message and dump the unlabeled
+ * connection hash table in a form suitable for use in a kernel generated
+ * STATICLIST message.  Returns the length of @skb.
+ *
+ */
+static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist(struct sk_buff *skb,
+				     struct netlink_callback *cb)
+{
+	struct netlbl_unlhsh_walk_arg cb_arg;
+	u32 skip_bkt = cb->args[0];
+	u32 skip_chain = cb->args[1];
+	u32 skip_addr4 = cb->args[2];
+	u32 skip_addr6 = cb->args[3];
+	u32 iter_bkt;
+	u32 iter_chain = 0, iter_addr4 = 0, iter_addr6 = 0;
+	struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
+	struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *addr4;
+	struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *addr6;
+
+	cb_arg.nl_cb = cb;
+	cb_arg.skb = skb;
+	cb_arg.seq = cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	for (iter_bkt = skip_bkt;
+	     iter_bkt < rcu_dereference(netlbl_unlhsh)->size;
+	     iter_bkt++, iter_chain = 0, iter_addr4 = 0, iter_addr6 = 0) {
+		list_for_each_entry_rcu(iface,
+			        &rcu_dereference(netlbl_unlhsh)->tbl[iter_bkt],
+				list) {
+			if (!iface->valid ||
+			    iter_chain++ < skip_chain)
+				continue;
+			list_for_each_entry_rcu(addr4,
+						&iface->addr4_list,
+						list) {
+				if (!addr4->valid || iter_addr4++ < skip_addr4)
+					continue;
+				if (netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(
+					             NLBL_UNLABEL_C_STATICLIST,
+						     iface,
+						     addr4,
+						     NULL,
+						     &cb_arg) < 0) {
+					iter_addr4--;
+					iter_chain--;
+					goto unlabel_staticlist_return;
+				}
+			}
+			list_for_each_entry_rcu(addr6,
+						&iface->addr6_list,
+						list) {
+				if (!addr6->valid || iter_addr6++ < skip_addr6)
+					continue;
+				if (netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(
+						     NLBL_UNLABEL_C_STATICLIST,
+						     iface,
+						     NULL,
+						     addr6,
+						     &cb_arg) < 0) {
+					iter_addr6--;
+					iter_chain--;
+					goto unlabel_staticlist_return;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+unlabel_staticlist_return:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	cb->args[0] = skip_bkt;
+	cb->args[1] = skip_chain;
+	cb->args[2] = skip_addr4;
+	cb->args[3] = skip_addr6;
+	return skb->len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_unlabel_staticlistdef - Handle a STATICLISTDEF message
+ * @skb: the NETLINK buffer
+ * @cb: the NETLINK callback
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Process a user generated STATICLISTDEF message and dump the default
+ * unlabeled connection entry in a form suitable for use in a kernel generated
+ * STATICLISTDEF message.  Returns the length of @skb.
+ *
+ */
+static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlistdef(struct sk_buff *skb,
+					struct netlink_callback *cb)
+{
+	struct netlbl_unlhsh_walk_arg cb_arg;
+	struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
+	u32 skip_addr4 = cb->args[0];
+	u32 skip_addr6 = cb->args[1];
+	u32 iter_addr4 = 0, iter_addr6 = 0;
+	struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *addr4;
+	struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *addr6;
+
+	cb_arg.nl_cb = cb;
+	cb_arg.skb = skb;
+	cb_arg.seq = cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	iface = rcu_dereference(netlbl_unlhsh_def);
+	if (iface == NULL || !iface->valid)
+		goto unlabel_staticlistdef_return;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(addr4, &iface->addr4_list, list) {
+		if (!addr4->valid || iter_addr4++ < skip_addr4)
+			continue;
+		if (netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(NLBL_UNLABEL_C_STATICLISTDEF,
+					   iface,
+					   addr4,
+					   NULL,
+					   &cb_arg) < 0) {
+			iter_addr4--;
+			goto unlabel_staticlistdef_return;
+		}
+	}
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(addr6, &iface->addr6_list, list) {
+		if (addr6->valid || iter_addr6++ < skip_addr6)
+			continue;
+		if (netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(NLBL_UNLABEL_C_STATICLISTDEF,
+					   iface,
+					   NULL,
+					   addr6,
+					   &cb_arg) < 0) {
+			iter_addr6--;
+			goto unlabel_staticlistdef_return;
+		}
+	}
+
+unlabel_staticlistdef_return:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	cb->args[0] = skip_addr4;
+	cb->args[1] = skip_addr6;
+	return skb->len;
+}
 
 /*
  * NetLabel Generic NETLINK Command Definitions
  */
 
+static struct genl_ops netlbl_unlabel_genl_c_staticadd = {
+	.cmd = NLBL_UNLABEL_C_STATICADD,
+	.flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM,
+	.policy = netlbl_unlabel_genl_policy,
+	.doit = netlbl_unlabel_staticadd,
+	.dumpit = NULL,
+};
+
+static struct genl_ops netlbl_unlabel_genl_c_staticremove = {
+	.cmd = NLBL_UNLABEL_C_STATICREMOVE,
+	.flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM,
+	.policy = netlbl_unlabel_genl_policy,
+	.doit = netlbl_unlabel_staticremove,
+	.dumpit = NULL,
+};
+
+static struct genl_ops netlbl_unlabel_genl_c_staticlist = {
+	.cmd = NLBL_UNLABEL_C_STATICLIST,
+	.flags = 0,
+	.policy = netlbl_unlabel_genl_policy,
+	.doit = NULL,
+	.dumpit = netlbl_unlabel_staticlist,
+};
+
+static struct genl_ops netlbl_unlabel_genl_c_staticadddef = {
+	.cmd = NLBL_UNLABEL_C_STATICADDDEF,
+	.flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM,
+	.policy = netlbl_unlabel_genl_policy,
+	.doit = netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef,
+	.dumpit = NULL,
+};
+
+static struct genl_ops netlbl_unlabel_genl_c_staticremovedef = {
+	.cmd = NLBL_UNLABEL_C_STATICREMOVEDEF,
+	.flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM,
+	.policy = netlbl_unlabel_genl_policy,
+	.doit = netlbl_unlabel_staticremovedef,
+	.dumpit = NULL,
+};
+
+static struct genl_ops netlbl_unlabel_genl_c_staticlistdef = {
+	.cmd = NLBL_UNLABEL_C_STATICLISTDEF,
+	.flags = 0,
+	.policy = netlbl_unlabel_genl_policy,
+	.doit = NULL,
+	.dumpit = netlbl_unlabel_staticlistdef,
+};
+
 static struct genl_ops netlbl_unlabel_genl_c_accept = {
 	.cmd = NLBL_UNLABEL_C_ACCEPT,
 	.flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM,
@@ -194,7 +1429,6 @@ static struct genl_ops netlbl_unlabel_genl_c_list = {
 	.dumpit = NULL,
 };
 
-
 /*
  * NetLabel Generic NETLINK Protocol Functions
  */
@@ -216,6 +1450,36 @@ int netlbl_unlabel_genl_init(void)
 		return ret_val;
 
 	ret_val = genl_register_ops(&netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
+				    &netlbl_unlabel_genl_c_staticadd);
+	if (ret_val != 0)
+		return ret_val;
+
+	ret_val = genl_register_ops(&netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
+				    &netlbl_unlabel_genl_c_staticremove);
+	if (ret_val != 0)
+		return ret_val;
+
+	ret_val = genl_register_ops(&netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
+				    &netlbl_unlabel_genl_c_staticlist);
+	if (ret_val != 0)
+		return ret_val;
+
+	ret_val = genl_register_ops(&netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
+				    &netlbl_unlabel_genl_c_staticadddef);
+	if (ret_val != 0)
+		return ret_val;
+
+	ret_val = genl_register_ops(&netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
+				    &netlbl_unlabel_genl_c_staticremovedef);
+	if (ret_val != 0)
+		return ret_val;
+
+	ret_val = genl_register_ops(&netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
+				    &netlbl_unlabel_genl_c_staticlistdef);
+	if (ret_val != 0)
+		return ret_val;
+
+	ret_val = genl_register_ops(&netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
 				    &netlbl_unlabel_genl_c_accept);
 	if (ret_val != 0)
 		return ret_val;
@@ -232,8 +1496,58 @@ int netlbl_unlabel_genl_init(void)
  * NetLabel KAPI Hooks
  */
 
+static struct notifier_block netlbl_unlhsh_netdev_notifier = {
+	.notifier_call = netlbl_unlhsh_netdev_handler,
+};
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_unlabel_init - Initialize the unlabeled connection hash table
+ * @size: the number of bits to use for the hash buckets
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Initializes the unlabeled connection hash table and registers a network
+ * device notification handler.  This function should only be called by the
+ * NetLabel subsystem itself during initialization.  Returns zero on success,
+ * non-zero values on error.
+ *
+ */
+int netlbl_unlabel_init(u32 size)
+{
+	u32 iter;
+	struct netlbl_unlhsh_tbl *hsh_tbl;
+
+	if (size == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	hsh_tbl = kmalloc(sizeof(*hsh_tbl), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (hsh_tbl == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	hsh_tbl->size = 1 << size;
+	hsh_tbl->tbl = kcalloc(hsh_tbl->size,
+			       sizeof(struct list_head),
+			       GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (hsh_tbl->tbl == NULL) {
+		kfree(hsh_tbl);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	for (iter = 0; iter < hsh_tbl->size; iter++)
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&hsh_tbl->tbl[iter]);
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
+	rcu_assign_pointer(netlbl_unlhsh, hsh_tbl);
+	spin_unlock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	register_netdevice_notifier(&netlbl_unlhsh_netdev_notifier);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /**
  * netlbl_unlabel_getattr - Get the security attributes for an unlabled packet
+ * @skb: the packet
+ * @family: protocol family
  * @secattr: the security attributes
  *
  * Description:
@@ -241,11 +1555,50 @@ int netlbl_unlabel_genl_init(void)
  * them in @secattr.  Returns zero on success and negative values on failure.
  *
  */
-int netlbl_unlabel_getattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+int netlbl_unlabel_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb,
+			   u16 family,
+			   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
+	struct iphdr *hdr4;
+	struct ipv6hdr *hdr6;
+	struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *addr4;
+	struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *addr6;
+	struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	iface = netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface_def(skb->iif);
+	if (iface == NULL)
+		goto unlabel_getattr_nolabel;
+	switch (family) {
+	case PF_INET:
+		hdr4 = ip_hdr(skb);
+		addr4 = netlbl_unlhsh_search_addr4(hdr4->saddr, iface);
+		if (addr4 == NULL)
+			goto unlabel_getattr_nolabel;
+		secattr->attr.secid = addr4->secid;
+		break;
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+	case PF_INET6:
+		hdr6 = ipv6_hdr(skb);
+		addr6 = netlbl_unlhsh_search_addr6(&hdr6->saddr, iface);
+		if (addr6 == NULL)
+			goto unlabel_getattr_nolabel;
+		secattr->attr.secid = addr6->secid;
+		break;
+#endif /* IPv6 */
+	default:
+		goto unlabel_getattr_nolabel;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
+	secattr->type = NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED;
+	return 0;
+
+unlabel_getattr_nolabel:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 	if (netlabel_unlabel_acceptflg == 0)
 		return -ENOMSG;
-	netlbl_secattr_init(secattr);
 	secattr->type = NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED;
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
index c2917fb..06b1301 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
@@ -36,6 +36,116 @@
 /*
  * The following NetLabel payloads are supported by the Unlabeled subsystem.
  *
+ * o STATICADD
+ *   This message is sent from an application to add a new static label for
+ *   incoming unlabeled connections.
+ *
+ *   Required attributes:
+ *
+ *     NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IFACE
+ *     NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX
+ *
+ *   If IPv4 is specified the following attributes are required:
+ *
+ *     NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4ADDR
+ *     NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4MASK
+ *
+ *   If IPv6 is specified the following attributes are required:
+ *
+ *     NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR
+ *     NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6MASK
+ *
+ * o STATICREMOVE
+ *   This message is sent from an application to remove an existing static
+ *   label for incoming unlabeled connections.
+ *
+ *   Required attributes:
+ *
+ *     NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IFACE
+ *
+ *   If IPv4 is specified the following attributes are required:
+ *
+ *     NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4ADDR
+ *     NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4MASK
+ *
+ *   If IPv6 is specified the following attributes are required:
+ *
+ *     NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR
+ *     NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6MASK
+ *
+ * o STATICLIST
+ *   This message can be sent either from an application or by the kernel in
+ *   response to an application generated STATICLIST message.  When sent by an
+ *   application there is no payload and the NLM_F_DUMP flag should be set.
+ *   The kernel should response with a series of the following messages.
+ *
+ *   Required attributes:
+ *
+ *     NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IFACE
+ *     NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX
+ *
+ *   If IPv4 is specified the following attributes are required:
+ *
+ *     NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4ADDR
+ *     NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4MASK
+ *
+ *   If IPv6 is specified the following attributes are required:
+ *
+ *     NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR
+ *     NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6MASK
+ *
+ * o STATICADDDEF
+ *   This message is sent from an application to set the default static
+ *   label for incoming unlabeled connections.
+ *
+ *   Required attribute:
+ *
+ *     NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX
+ *
+ *   If IPv4 is specified the following attributes are required:
+ *
+ *     NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4ADDR
+ *     NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4MASK
+ *
+ *   If IPv6 is specified the following attributes are required:
+ *
+ *     NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR
+ *     NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6MASK
+ *
+ * o STATICREMOVEDEF
+ *   This message is sent from an application to remove the existing default
+ *   static label for incoming unlabeled connections.
+ *
+ *   If IPv4 is specified the following attributes are required:
+ *
+ *     NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4ADDR
+ *     NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4MASK
+ *
+ *   If IPv6 is specified the following attributes are required:
+ *
+ *     NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR
+ *     NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6MASK
+ *
+ * o STATICLISTDEF
+ *   This message can be sent either from an application or by the kernel in
+ *   response to an application generated STATICLISTDEF message.  When sent by
+ *   an application there is no payload and the NLM_F_DUMP flag should be set.
+ *   The kernel should response with the following message.
+ *
+ *   Required attribute:
+ *
+ *     NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX
+ *
+ *   If IPv4 is specified the following attributes are required:
+ *
+ *     NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4ADDR
+ *     NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4MASK
+ *
+ *   If IPv6 is specified the following attributes are required:
+ *
+ *     NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR
+ *     NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6MASK
+ *
  * o ACCEPT
  *   This message is sent from an application to specify if the kernel should
  *   allow unlabled packets to pass if they do not match any of the static
@@ -62,6 +172,12 @@ enum {
 	NLBL_UNLABEL_C_UNSPEC,
 	NLBL_UNLABEL_C_ACCEPT,
 	NLBL_UNLABEL_C_LIST,
+	NLBL_UNLABEL_C_STATICADD,
+	NLBL_UNLABEL_C_STATICREMOVE,
+	NLBL_UNLABEL_C_STATICLIST,
+	NLBL_UNLABEL_C_STATICADDDEF,
+	NLBL_UNLABEL_C_STATICREMOVEDEF,
+	NLBL_UNLABEL_C_STATICLISTDEF,
 	__NLBL_UNLABEL_C_MAX,
 };
 #define NLBL_UNLABEL_C_MAX (__NLBL_UNLABEL_C_MAX - 1)
@@ -73,6 +189,24 @@ enum {
 	/* (NLA_U8)
 	 * if true then unlabeled packets are allowed to pass, else unlabeled
 	 * packets are rejected */
+	NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR,
+	/* (NLA_BINARY, struct in6_addr)
+	 * an IPv6 address */
+	NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6MASK,
+	/* (NLA_BINARY, struct in6_addr)
+	 * an IPv6 address mask */
+	NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4ADDR,
+	/* (NLA_BINARY, struct in_addr)
+	 * an IPv4 address */
+	NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4MASK,
+	/* (NLA_BINARY, struct in_addr)
+	 * and IPv4 address mask */
+	NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IFACE,
+	/* (NLA_NULL_STRING)
+	 * network interface */
+	NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX,
+	/* (NLA_BINARY)
+	 * a LSM specific security context */
 	__NLBL_UNLABEL_A_MAX,
 };
 #define NLBL_UNLABEL_A_MAX (__NLBL_UNLABEL_A_MAX - 1)
@@ -80,8 +214,17 @@ enum {
 /* NetLabel protocol functions */
 int netlbl_unlabel_genl_init(void);
 
+/* Unlabeled connection hash table size */
+/* XXX - currently this number is an uneducated guess */
+#define NETLBL_UNLHSH_BITSIZE       7
+
+/* General Unlabeled init function */
+int netlbl_unlabel_init(u32 size);
+
 /* Process Unlabeled incoming network packets */
-int netlbl_unlabel_getattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
+int netlbl_unlabel_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb,
+			   u16 family,
+			   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
 
 /* Set the default configuration to allow Unlabeled packets */
 int netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void);


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[RFC PATCH v8 17/18] NetLabel: Add auditing to the static labeling mechanism

[Paul Moore]

This patch adds auditing support to the NetLabel static labeling mechanism.
---

 include/linux/audit.h             |    2 
 net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c |  207 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 195 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index c687816..bdd6f5d 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -115,6 +115,8 @@
 #define AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_ADDSPD	1413	/* Not used */
 #define AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_DELSPD	1414	/* Not used */
 #define AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_EVENT	1415	/* Audit an IPSec event */
+#define AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_STCADD	1416	/* NetLabel: add a static label */
+#define AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_STCDEL	1417	/* NetLabel: del a static label */
 
 #define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG   1700
 #define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG    1799
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index d289ff4..cdeb6d9 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -148,6 +148,74 @@ static const struct nla_policy netlbl_unlabel_genl_policy[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_MAX + 1
 };
 
 /*
+ * Audit Helper Functions
+ */
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_unlabel_audit_addr4 - Audit an IPv4 address
+ * @audit_buf: audit buffer
+ * @dev: network interface
+ * @addr: IP address
+ * @mask: IP address mask
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Write the IPv4 address and address mask, if necessary, to @audit_buf.
+ *
+ */
+static void netlbl_unlabel_audit_addr4(struct audit_buffer *audit_buf,
+				     const char *dev,
+				     __be32 addr, __be32 mask)
+{
+	u32 mask_val = ntohl(mask);
+
+	if (dev != NULL)
+		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " netif=%s", dev);
+	audit_log_format(audit_buf, " src=" NIPQUAD_FMT, NIPQUAD(addr));
+	if (mask_val != 0xffffffff) {
+		u32 mask_len = 0;
+		while (mask_val > 0) {
+			mask_val <<= 1;
+			mask_len++;
+		}
+		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " src_prefixlen=%d", mask_len);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_unlabel_audit_addr6 - Audit an IPv6 address
+ * @audit_buf: audit buffer
+ * @dev: network interface
+ * @addr: IP address
+ * @mask: IP address mask
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Write the IPv6 address and address mask, if necessary, to @audit_buf.
+ *
+ */
+static void netlbl_unlabel_audit_addr6(struct audit_buffer *audit_buf,
+				     const char *dev,
+				     const struct in6_addr *addr,
+				     const struct in6_addr *mask)
+{
+	if (dev != NULL)
+		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " netif=%s", dev);
+	audit_log_format(audit_buf, " src=" NIP6_FMT, NIP6(*addr));
+	if (ntohl(mask->s6_addr32[3]) != 0xffffffff) {
+		u32 mask_len = 0;
+		u32 mask_val;
+		int iter = -1;
+		while (ntohl(mask->s6_addr32[++iter]) == 0xffffffff)
+			mask_len += 32;
+		mask_val = ntohl(mask->s6_addr32[iter]);
+		while (mask_val > 0) {
+			mask_val <<= 1;
+			mask_len++;
+		}
+		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " src_prefixlen=%d", mask_len);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
  * Unlabeled Connection Hash Table Functions
  */
 
@@ -524,6 +592,7 @@ add_iface_failure:
  * @mask: address mask in network byte order
  * @addr_len: length of address/mask (4 for IPv4, 16 for IPv6)
  * @secid: LSM secid value for the entry
+ * @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
  *
  * Description:
  * Adds a new entry to the unlabeled connection hash table.  Returns zero on
@@ -535,12 +604,18 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
 			     const void *addr,
 			     const void *mask,
 			     u32 addr_len,
-			     u32 secid)
+			     u32 secid,
+			     struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
 {
 	int ret_val;
 	int ifindex;
 	struct net_device *dev;
 	struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
+	struct in_addr *addr4, *mask4;
+	struct in6_addr *addr6, *mask6;
+	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
+	char *secctx = NULL;
+	u32 secctx_len;
 
 	if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
 	    addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
@@ -567,13 +642,28 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
 			goto unlhsh_add_return;
 		}
 	}
+	audit_buf = netlbl_audit_start_common(AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_STCADD,
+					      audit_info);
 	switch (addr_len) {
 	case sizeof(struct in_addr):
-		ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(iface, addr, mask, secid);
+		addr4 = (struct in_addr *)addr;
+		mask4 = (struct in_addr *)mask;
+		ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(iface, addr4, mask4, secid);
+		if (audit_buf != NULL)
+			netlbl_unlabel_audit_addr4(audit_buf,
+						   dev_name,
+						   addr4->s_addr,
+						   mask4->s_addr);
 		break;
 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
 	case sizeof(struct in6_addr):
-		ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(iface, addr, mask, secid);
+		addr6 = (struct in6_addr *)addr;
+		mask6 = (struct in6_addr *)mask;
+		ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(iface, addr6, mask6, secid);
+		if (audit_buf != NULL)
+			netlbl_unlabel_audit_addr6(audit_buf,
+						   dev_name,
+						   addr6, mask6);
 		break;
 #endif /* IPv6 */
 	default:
@@ -584,14 +674,26 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
 
 unlhsh_add_return:
 	rcu_read_unlock();
+	if (audit_buf != NULL) {
+		if (security_secid_to_secctx(secid,
+					     &secctx,
+					     &secctx_len) == 0) {
+			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
+			security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+		}
+		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
+		audit_log_end(audit_buf);
+	}
 	return ret_val;
 }
 
 /**
  * netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4 - Remove an IPv4 address entry
+ * @net: network namespace
  * @iface: interface entry
  * @addr: IP address
  * @mask: IP address mask
+ * @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
  *
  * Description:
  * Remove an IP address entry from the unlabeled connection hash table.
@@ -599,12 +701,18 @@ unlhsh_add_return:
  * responsible for calling the rcu_read_[un]lock() functions.
  *
  */
-static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
+static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
+				      struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
 				      const struct in_addr *addr,
-				      const struct in_addr *mask)
+				      const struct in_addr *mask,
+				      struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
 {
 	int ret_val = -ENOENT;
 	struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *entry;
+	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
+	struct net_device *dev;
+	char *secctx = NULL;
+	u32 secctx_len;
 
 	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
 	entry = netlbl_unlhsh_search_addr4(addr->s_addr, iface);
@@ -616,6 +724,25 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
 	}
 	spin_unlock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
 
+	audit_buf = netlbl_audit_start_common(AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_STCDEL,
+					      audit_info);
+	if (audit_buf != NULL) {
+		dev = dev_get_by_index(net, iface->ifindex);
+		netlbl_unlabel_audit_addr4(audit_buf,
+					   (dev != NULL ? dev->name : NULL),
+					   entry->addr, entry->mask);
+		if (dev != NULL)
+			dev_put(dev);
+		if (security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid,
+					     &secctx,
+					     &secctx_len) == 0) {
+			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
+			security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+		}
+		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
+		audit_log_end(audit_buf);
+	}
+
 	if (ret_val == 0)
 		call_rcu(&entry->rcu, netlbl_unlhsh_free_addr4);
 	return ret_val;
@@ -624,9 +751,11 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
 /**
  * netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6 - Remove an IPv6 address entry
+ * @net: network namespace
  * @iface: interface entry
  * @addr: IP address
  * @mask: IP address mask
+ * @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
  *
  * Description:
  * Remove an IP address entry from the unlabeled connection hash table.
@@ -634,12 +763,18 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
  * responsible for calling the rcu_read_[un]lock() functions.
  *
  */
-static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
+static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
+				      struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
 				      const struct in6_addr *addr,
-				      const struct in6_addr *mask)
+				      const struct in6_addr *mask,
+				      struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
 {
 	int ret_val = -ENOENT;
 	struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *entry;
+	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
+	struct net_device *dev;
+	char *secctx = NULL;
+	u32 secctx_len;
 
 	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
 	entry = netlbl_unlhsh_search_addr6(addr, iface);
@@ -652,6 +787,25 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
 	}
 	spin_unlock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
 
+	audit_buf = netlbl_audit_start_common(AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_STCDEL,
+					      audit_info);
+	if (audit_buf != NULL) {
+		dev = dev_get_by_index(net, iface->ifindex);
+		netlbl_unlabel_audit_addr6(audit_buf,
+					   (dev != NULL ? dev->name : NULL),
+					   addr, mask);
+		if (dev != NULL)
+			dev_put(dev);
+		if (security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid,
+					     &secctx,
+					     &secctx_len) == 0) {
+			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
+			security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+		}
+		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
+		audit_log_end(audit_buf);
+	}
+
 	if (ret_val == 0)
 		call_rcu(&entry->rcu, netlbl_unlhsh_free_addr6);
 	return ret_val;
@@ -702,6 +856,7 @@ unlhsh_condremove_failure:
  * @addr: IP address in network byte order
  * @mask: address mask in network byte order
  * @addr_len: length of address/mask (4 for IPv4, 16 for IPv6)
+ * @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
  *
  * Description:
  * Removes and existing entry from the unlabeled connection hash table.
@@ -712,7 +867,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove(struct net *net,
 				const char *dev_name,
 				const void *addr,
 				const void *mask,
-				u32 addr_len)
+				u32 addr_len,
+				struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
 {
 	int ret_val;
 	struct net_device *dev;
@@ -739,11 +895,15 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove(struct net *net,
 	}
 	switch (addr_len) {
 	case sizeof(struct in_addr):
-		ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(iface, addr, mask);
+		ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(net,
+						     iface, addr, mask,
+						     audit_info);
 		break;
 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
 	case sizeof(struct in6_addr):
-		ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(iface, addr, mask);
+		ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(net,
+						     iface, addr, mask,
+						     audit_info);
 		break;
 #endif /* IPv6 */
 	default:
@@ -969,6 +1129,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	void *mask;
 	u32 addr_len;
 	u32 secid;
+	struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
 
 	/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
 	 * single entry.  However, allow users to create two entries, one each
@@ -982,6 +1143,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	       !info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6MASK])))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(skb, &audit_info);
+
 	ret_val = netlbl_unlabel_addrinfo_get(info, &addr, &mask, &addr_len);
 	if (ret_val != 0)
 		return ret_val;
@@ -994,7 +1157,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		return ret_val;
 
 	return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
-				 dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, secid);
+				 dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
+				 &audit_info);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1016,6 +1180,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	void *mask;
 	u32 addr_len;
 	u32 secid;
+	struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
 
 	/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
 	 * single entry.  However, allow users to create two entries, one each
@@ -1028,6 +1193,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	       !info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6MASK])))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(skb, &audit_info);
+
 	ret_val = netlbl_unlabel_addrinfo_get(info, &addr, &mask, &addr_len);
 	if (ret_val != 0)
 		return ret_val;
@@ -1038,7 +1205,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	if (ret_val != 0)
 		return ret_val;
 
-	return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net, NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, secid);
+	return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
+				 NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
+				 &audit_info);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1060,6 +1229,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticremove(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	void *addr;
 	void *mask;
 	u32 addr_len;
+	struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
 
 	/* See the note in netlbl_unlabel_staticadd() about not allowing both
 	 * IPv4 and IPv6 in the same entry. */
@@ -1070,12 +1240,16 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticremove(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	       !info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6MASK])))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(skb, &audit_info);
+
 	ret_val = netlbl_unlabel_addrinfo_get(info, &addr, &mask, &addr_len);
 	if (ret_val != 0)
 		return ret_val;
 	dev_name = nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IFACE]);
 
-	return netlbl_unlhsh_remove(&init_net, dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len);
+	return netlbl_unlhsh_remove(&init_net,
+				    dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
+				    &audit_info);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1096,6 +1270,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticremovedef(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	void *addr;
 	void *mask;
 	u32 addr_len;
+	struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
 
 	/* See the note in netlbl_unlabel_staticadd() about not allowing both
 	 * IPv4 and IPv6 in the same entry. */
@@ -1105,11 +1280,15 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticremovedef(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	       !info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6MASK])))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(skb, &audit_info);
+
 	ret_val = netlbl_unlabel_addrinfo_get(info, &addr, &mask, &addr_len);
 	if (ret_val != 0)
 		return ret_val;
 
-	return netlbl_unlhsh_remove(&init_net, NULL, addr, mask, addr_len);
+	return netlbl_unlhsh_remove(&init_net,
+				    NULL, addr, mask, addr_len,
+				    &audit_info);
 }
 
 


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[RFC PATCH v8 18/18] SELinux: Add network ingress and egress control permission checks

[Paul Moore]

This patch implements packet ingress/egress controls for SELinux which allow
SELinux security policy to control the flow of all IPv4 and IPv6 packets into
and out of the system.  Currently SELinux does not have proper control over
forwarded packets and this patch corrects this problem.

Special thanks to Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@trustedcs.com> whose earlier
work on this topic eventually led to this patch.
---

 security/selinux/hooks.c |  335 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
 1 files changed, 228 insertions(+), 107 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 2f221b2..2a6d50f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@
  *  Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
  *  Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
  *                          <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
- *  Copyright (C) 2006 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
- *                     Paul Moore, <paul.moore@hp.com>
+ *  Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ *                     Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
  *  Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
  *                     Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
  *
@@ -3608,6 +3608,71 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
+				    u32 peer_sid,
+				    struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	int err;
+	u32 if_sid;
+	u32 node_sid;
+
+	err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	err = avc_has_perm(if_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__INGRESS, ad);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	return avc_has_perm(node_sid, peer_sid,
+			    SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__INGRESS, ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inet_sys_snd_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, int family)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+
+	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled()) {
+		u32 if_sid;
+		u32 node_sid;
+		u32 peer_sid;
+		char *addrp;
+		struct avc_audit_data ad;
+
+		AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+		ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
+		ad.u.net.family = family;
+		err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+
+		err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+
+		err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+		err = avc_has_perm(if_sid, peer_sid,
+				   SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__EGRESS, &ad);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+
+		err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+		err = avc_has_perm(node_sid, peer_sid,
+				   SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__EGRESS, &ad);
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
 						struct sk_buff *skb,
 						struct avc_audit_data *ad,
@@ -3748,6 +3813,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
+		err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
+					       peer_sid, &ad);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
 		err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
 				   PEER__RECV, &ad);
 	}
@@ -3965,151 +4034,175 @@ out:
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
 
-static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk,
-					    struct net_device *dev,
-					    struct avc_audit_data *ad,
-					    u16 family,
-					    char *addrp)
+static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
+				       u16 family)
 {
-	int err = 0;
-	u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, send_perm = 0;
-	struct socket *sock;
-	struct inode *inode;
-	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
+		return NF_ACCEPT;
 
-	sock = sk->sk_socket;
-	if (!sock)
-		goto out;
+	if (netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled()) {
+		char *addrp;
+		u32 peer_sid;
+		struct avc_audit_data ad;
 
-	inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
-	if (!inode)
-		goto out;
+		AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+		ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
+		ad.u.net.family = family;
+		if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
+			return NF_DROP;
+
+		if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
+			return NF_DROP;
+		if (selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
+					     peer_sid, &ad) != 0)
+			return NF_DROP;
+	}
 
-	isec = inode->i_security;
-	
-	err = sel_netif_sid(dev->ifindex, &if_sid);
-	if (err)
-		goto out;
+	return NF_ACCEPT;
+}
+
+static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
+					 struct sk_buff *skb,
+					 const struct net_device *in,
+					 const struct net_device *out,
+					 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
+{
+	return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
+}
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
+					 struct sk_buff *skb,
+					 const struct net_device *in,
+					 const struct net_device *out,
+					 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
+{
+	return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
+}
+#endif	/* IPV6 */
 
-	switch (isec->sclass) {
+static int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sock *sk,
+				       int ifindex,
+				       struct avc_audit_data *ad,
+				       u16 family, char *addrp)
+{
+	int err;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	u16 sk_class;
+	u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
+	u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
+
+	sk_sid = sksec->sid;
+	sk_class = sksec->sclass;
+
+	switch (sk_class) {
 	case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
 		netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
 		node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
 		send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
 		break;
-	
 	case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
 		netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
 		node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
 		send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
 		break;
-
 	case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
 		netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
 		node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
 		send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
 		break;
-
 	default:
 		netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
 		node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
+		send_perm = 0;
 		break;
 	}
 
-	err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
+	err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
 	if (err)
-		goto out;
+		return err;
+	err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
 		
 	err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
 	if (err)
-		goto out;
-	
-	err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
+		return err;
+	err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
 	if (err)
-		goto out;
-
-	if (send_perm) {
-		u32 port_sid;
-		
-		err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family,
-		                        sk->sk_type,
-		                        sk->sk_protocol,
-		                        ntohs(ad->u.net.dport),
-		                        &port_sid);
-		if (err)
-			goto out;
+		return err;
 
-		err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, port_sid, isec->sclass,
-				   send_perm, ad);
-	}
-out:
-	return err;
+	if (!send_perm)
+		return 0;
+	err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
+				sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad->u.net.dport),
+				&port_sid);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
 }
 
-static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
-                                              struct sk_buff *skb,
-                                              const struct net_device *in,
-                                              const struct net_device *out,
-                                              int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *),
-                                              u16 family)
+static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
+					 u16 family)
 {
-	char *addrp;
-	int err = 0;
+	int err;
 	struct sock *sk;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
-	struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
+	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	char *addrp;
 	u8 proto;
 
 	sk = skb->sk;
 	if (!sk)
-		goto out;
-
+		return NF_ACCEPT;
 	sksec = sk->sk_security;
 
 	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
-	ad.u.net.netif = dev->ifindex;
+	ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
 	ad.u.net.family = family;
-
 	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto);
 	if (err)
-		goto out;
+		return NF_DROP;
 
 	if (selinux_compat_net)
-		err = selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(sk, dev, &ad,
-						       family, addrp);
+		err = selinux_ip_postroute_compat(sk, ifindex, &ad,
+						  family, addrp);
 	else
 		err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
 				   PACKET__SEND, &ad);
-
 	if (err)
-		goto out;
+		return NF_DROP;
 
-	err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto);
-out:
-	return err ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
+	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
+		/* If the network peer controls are enabled we handle all the
+		 * outbound peer label access checks in the
+		 * selinux_inet_sys_snd_skb() hook. */
+		err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto);
+		if (err)
+			return NF_DROP;
+	}
+
+	return NF_ACCEPT;
 }
 
-static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
-						struct sk_buff *skb,
-						const struct net_device *in,
-						const struct net_device *out,
-						int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
+static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
+					   struct sk_buff *skb,
+					   const struct net_device *in,
+					   const struct net_device *out,
+					   int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
 {
-	return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, skb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET);
+	return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
 }
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
-
-static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
-						struct sk_buff *skb,
-						const struct net_device *in,
-						const struct net_device *out,
-						int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
+static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
+					   struct sk_buff *skb,
+					   const struct net_device *in,
+					   const struct net_device *out,
+					   int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
 {
-	return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, skb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET6);
+	return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
 }
-
 #endif	/* IPV6 */
 
 #endif	/* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
@@ -4991,6 +5084,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.inet_csk_clone =		selinux_inet_csk_clone,
 	.inet_conn_established =	selinux_inet_conn_established,
 	.req_classify_flow =		selinux_req_classify_flow,
+	.inet_sys_snd_skb =		selinux_inet_sys_snd_skb,
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
 	.xfrm_policy_alloc_security =	selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
@@ -5094,22 +5188,40 @@ security_initcall(selinux_init);
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
 
-static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_op = {
-	.hook =		selinux_ipv4_postroute_last,
-	.owner =	THIS_MODULE,
-	.pf =		PF_INET,
-	.hooknum =	NF_IP_POST_ROUTING,
-	.priority =	NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
+static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
+	{
+		.hook =		selinux_ipv4_postroute,
+		.owner =	THIS_MODULE,
+		.pf =		PF_INET,
+		.hooknum =	NF_IP_POST_ROUTING,
+		.priority =	NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
+	},
+	{
+		.hook =		selinux_ipv4_forward,
+		.owner =	THIS_MODULE,
+		.pf =		PF_INET,
+		.hooknum =	NF_IP_FORWARD,
+		.priority =	NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
+	}
 };
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
 
-static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_op = {
-	.hook =		selinux_ipv6_postroute_last,
-	.owner =	THIS_MODULE,
-	.pf =		PF_INET6,
-	.hooknum =	NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING,
-	.priority =	NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
+static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
+	{
+		.hook =		selinux_ipv6_postroute,
+		.owner =	THIS_MODULE,
+		.pf =		PF_INET6,
+		.hooknum =	NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING,
+		.priority =	NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
+	},
+	{
+		.hook =		selinux_ipv6_forward,
+		.owner =	THIS_MODULE,
+		.pf =		PF_INET6,
+		.hooknum =	NF_IP6_FORWARD,
+		.priority =	NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
+	}
 };
 
 #endif	/* IPV6 */
@@ -5117,22 +5229,27 @@ static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_op = {
 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
 {
 	int err = 0;
+	u32 iter;
 
 	if (!selinux_enabled)
 		goto out;
 
 	printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Registering netfilter hooks\n");
 
-	err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
-	if (err)
-		panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
+	for (iter = 0; iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops); iter++) {
+		err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv4_ops[iter]);
+		if (err)
+			panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv4: error %d\n",
+			      err);
+	}
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
-
-	err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
-	if (err)
-		panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
-
+	for (iter = 0; iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops); iter++) {
+		err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv6_ops[iter]);
+		if (err)
+			panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n",
+			      err);
+	}
 #endif	/* IPV6 */
 
 out:
@@ -5144,11 +5261,15 @@ __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
 {
+	u32 iter;
+
 	printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
 
-	nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
+	for (iter = 0; iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops); iter++)
+		nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv4_ops[iter]);
 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
-	nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
+	for (iter = 0; iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops); iter++)
+		nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv6_ops[iter]);
 #endif	/* IPV6 */
 }
 #endif


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Re: [RFC PATCH v8 18/18] SELinux: Add network ingress and egress control permission checks

[Paul Moore]

On Friday 14 December 2007 4:51:29 pm Paul Moore wrote:
> This patch implements packet ingress/egress controls for SELinux which
> allow SELinux security policy to control the flow of all IPv4 and IPv6
> packets into and out of the system.  Currently SELinux does not have proper
> control over forwarded packets and this patch corrects this problem.
>
> Special thanks to Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@trustedcs.com> whose earlier
> work on this topic eventually led to this patch.

I've been thinking about this over the weekend and realized a few things ...

{snip}

> +static int selinux_inet_sys_snd_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, int family)
> +{
> +	int err = 0;
> +
> +	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	if (netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled()) {
> +		u32 if_sid;
> +		u32 node_sid;
> +		u32 peer_sid;
> +		char *addrp;
> +		struct avc_audit_data ad;
> +
> +		AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
> +		ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
> +		ad.u.net.family = family;
> +		err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL);
> +		if (err)
> +			return err;
> +
> +		err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
> +		if (err)
> +			return err;

I realized I made a mistake here: we should check to see if the skb has a 
socket associated with it and if it does get the peer_sid from there instead.  
If there is no socket to be found then do what we are already going above.

> +		err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
> +		if (err)
> +			return err;
> +		err = avc_has_perm(if_sid, peer_sid,
> +				   SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__EGRESS, &ad);
> +		if (err)
> +			return err;
> +
> +		err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
> +		if (err)
> +			return err;
> +		err = avc_has_perm(node_sid, peer_sid,
> +				   SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__EGRESS, &ad);

We should probably have different permissions for the interface and node 
cases.  Take the example of an admin who is only interested in enforcing 
interface controls and not node controls.  They would most likely write the 
following policy rule to nullify the node check ...

 allow unlabeled_t peer_t:peer egress;

... which would end up applying to both the interface and node checks because 
they use the same permission.  I'm thinking we should split the permissions 
like this:

 allow netif_t peer_t:peer if_egress;
 allow netnode_t peer_t: peer node_egress;

... and do something similar for the ingress side.  Thoughts?

> +	}
> +
> +	return err;
> +}

-- 
paul moore
linux security @ hp

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Re: [RFC PATCH v8 18/18] SELinux: Add network ingress and egress control permission checks

[Stephen Smalley]

On Sun, 2007-12-16 at 11:47 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Friday 14 December 2007 4:51:29 pm Paul Moore wrote:
> > This patch implements packet ingress/egress controls for SELinux which
> > allow SELinux security policy to control the flow of all IPv4 and IPv6
> > packets into and out of the system.  Currently SELinux does not have proper
> > control over forwarded packets and this patch corrects this problem.
> >
> > Special thanks to Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@trustedcs.com> whose earlier
> > work on this topic eventually led to this patch.
> 
> I've been thinking about this over the weekend and realized a few things ...
> 
> {snip}
> 
> > +static int selinux_inet_sys_snd_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, int family)
> > +{
> > +	int err = 0;
> > +
> > +	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
> > +		return 0;
> > +
> > +	if (netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled()) {
> > +		u32 if_sid;
> > +		u32 node_sid;
> > +		u32 peer_sid;
> > +		char *addrp;
> > +		struct avc_audit_data ad;
> > +
> > +		AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
> > +		ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
> > +		ad.u.net.family = family;
> > +		err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL);
> > +		if (err)
> > +			return err;
> > +
> > +		err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
> > +		if (err)
> > +			return err;
> 
> I realized I made a mistake here: we should check to see if the skb has a 
> socket associated with it and if it does get the peer_sid from there instead.  
> If there is no socket to be found then do what we are already going above.

In what case do you expect the two SIDs to diverge?
What if we later provide an API to allow a sender to send a datagram
with a particular label rather than always requiring them to be the same
as the sending socket?

> > +		err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
> > +		if (err)
> > +			return err;
> > +		err = avc_has_perm(if_sid, peer_sid,
> > +				   SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__EGRESS, &ad);
> > +		if (err)
> > +			return err;
> > +
> > +		err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
> > +		if (err)
> > +			return err;
> > +		err = avc_has_perm(node_sid, peer_sid,
> > +				   SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__EGRESS, &ad);
> 
> We should probably have different permissions for the interface and node 
> cases.  Take the example of an admin who is only interested in enforcing 
> interface controls and not node controls.  They would most likely write the 
> following policy rule to nullify the node check ...
> 
>  allow unlabeled_t peer_t:peer egress;
> 
> ... which would end up applying to both the interface and node checks because 
> they use the same permission.  I'm thinking we should split the permissions 
> like this:
> 
>  allow netif_t peer_t:peer if_egress;
>  allow netnode_t peer_t: peer node_egress;
> 
> ... and do something similar for the ingress side.  Thoughts?

That starts to sound a lot like using netif and node classes instead of
the peer class.
	allow peer_t netif_t:netif egress;
	allow peer_t netnode_t:node egress;

> 
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	return err;
> > +}
> 
-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency


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Re: [RFC PATCH v8 18/18] SELinux: Add network ingress and egress control permission checks

[Paul Moore]

On Monday 17 December 2007 3:05:37 pm Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Sun, 2007-12-16 at 11:47 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Friday 14 December 2007 4:51:29 pm Paul Moore wrote:
> > > This patch implements packet ingress/egress controls for SELinux which
> > > allow SELinux security policy to control the flow of all IPv4 and IPv6
> > > packets into and out of the system.  Currently SELinux does not have
> > > proper control over forwarded packets and this patch corrects this
> > > problem.
> > >
> > > Special thanks to Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@trustedcs.com> whose
> > > earlier work on this topic eventually led to this patch.
> >
> > I've been thinking about this over the weekend and realized a few things
> > ...
> >
> > {snip}
> >
> > > +static int selinux_inet_sys_snd_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, int family)
> > > +{
> > > +	int err = 0;
> > > +
> > > +	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
> > > +		return 0;
> > > +
> > > +	if (netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled()) {
> > > +		u32 if_sid;
> > > +		u32 node_sid;
> > > +		u32 peer_sid;
> > > +		char *addrp;
> > > +		struct avc_audit_data ad;
> > > +
> > > +		AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
> > > +		ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
> > > +		ad.u.net.family = family;
> > > +		err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL);
> > > +		if (err)
> > > +			return err;
> > > +
> > > +		err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
> > > +		if (err)
> > > +			return err;
> >
> > I realized I made a mistake here: we should check to see if the skb has a
> > socket associated with it and if it does get the peer_sid from there
> > instead. If there is no socket to be found then do what we are already
> > going above.
>
> In what case do you expect the two SIDs to diverge?

The case of CIPSO immediately springs to mind.  If you query the packet 
directly you will get a SID similar to what you see on incoming packets: 
the "netlabel_peer_t" type plus the CIPSO MLS sensitivity label.  If you 
query the socket which originated the packet you'll get the original, native 
SELinux label/SID.  In my mind using the socket's label is a shortcut to get 
the full/true/original/etc. label quickly.

There is most likely also a performance advantage in pulling the SID from the 
socket.

> What if we later provide an API to allow a sender to send a datagram
> with a particular label rather than always requiring them to be the same
> as the sending socket?

Then we can transition from using a mix between socket and packet labels to 
just packet labels.  I don't see any _significant_ barriers to that approach 
in the ingress/egress controls as proposed.  If you do, let me know.

> > > +		err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
> > > +		if (err)
> > > +			return err;
> > > +		err = avc_has_perm(if_sid, peer_sid,
> > > +				   SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__EGRESS, &ad);
> > > +		if (err)
> > > +			return err;
> > > +
> > > +		err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
> > > +		if (err)
> > > +			return err;
> > > +		err = avc_has_perm(node_sid, peer_sid,
> > > +				   SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__EGRESS, &ad);
> >
> > We should probably have different permissions for the interface and node
> > cases.  Take the example of an admin who is only interested in enforcing
> > interface controls and not node controls.  They would most likely write
> > the following policy rule to nullify the node check ...
> >
> >  allow unlabeled_t peer_t:peer egress;
> >
> > ... which would end up applying to both the interface and node checks
> > because they use the same permission.  I'm thinking we should split the
> > permissions like this:
> >
> >  allow netif_t peer_t:peer if_egress;
> >  allow netnode_t peer_t: peer node_egress;
> >
> > ... and do something similar for the ingress side.  Thoughts?
>
> That starts to sound a lot like using netif and node classes instead of
> the peer class.
> 	allow peer_t netif_t:netif egress;
> 	allow peer_t netnode_t:node egress;

I see you noticed that too :)

I've been mulling this over and over in my head for some time and I'm not sure 
which is better.  I'm leaning towards sticking with the peer object class 
just because it reinforces the decision to treat the packet as an object.  
Good or bad, that is how SELinux currently treats packets and I fear that 
using the packet's peer label as the subject here could get confusing.

-- 
paul moore
linux security @ hp

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Re: [RFC PATCH v8 18/18] SELinux: Add network ingress and egress control permission checks

[Paul Moore]

On Monday 17 December 2007 3:05:37 pm Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Sun, 2007-12-16 at 11:47 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> > We should probably have different permissions for the interface and node
> > cases.  Take the example of an admin who is only interested in enforcing
> > interface controls and not node controls.  They would most likely write
> > the following policy rule to nullify the node check ...
> >
> >  allow unlabeled_t peer_t:peer egress;
> >
> > ... which would end up applying to both the interface and node checks
> > because they use the same permission.  I'm thinking we should split the
> > permissions like this:
> >
> >  allow netif_t peer_t:peer if_egress;
> >  allow netnode_t peer_t: peer node_egress;
> >
> > ... and do something similar for the ingress side.  Thoughts?
>
> That starts to sound a lot like using netif and node classes instead of
> the peer class.
> 	allow peer_t netif_t:netif egress;
> 	allow peer_t netnode_t:node egress;

Thinking about this some more ... egress/ingress make sense from an interface 
point of view but they sound out of place from a node point of view.  After 
all, you are not "egressing" to a node, to are "sending to" a node.  The same 
thing applies in the opposite direction, you don't "ingress" from a node, 
you "receive from" a node.  With that in mind I'm thinking of going with the 
following:

 allow netif_t peer_t:peer { ingress egress };
 allow netnode_t peer_t:peer { recv_from send_to };

Thoughts?  Should I just forget all this and use the peer label as a subject 
label?

-- 
paul moore
linux security @ hp

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Re: [RFC PATCH v8 18/18] SELinux: Add network ingress and egress control permission checks

[Stephen Smalley]

On Tue, 2007-12-18 at 08:59 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Monday 17 December 2007 3:05:37 pm Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > On Sun, 2007-12-16 at 11:47 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > We should probably have different permissions for the interface and node
> > > cases.  Take the example of an admin who is only interested in enforcing
> > > interface controls and not node controls.  They would most likely write
> > > the following policy rule to nullify the node check ...
> > >
> > >  allow unlabeled_t peer_t:peer egress;
> > >
> > > ... which would end up applying to both the interface and node checks
> > > because they use the same permission.  I'm thinking we should split the
> > > permissions like this:
> > >
> > >  allow netif_t peer_t:peer if_egress;
> > >  allow netnode_t peer_t: peer node_egress;
> > >
> > > ... and do something similar for the ingress side.  Thoughts?
> >
> > That starts to sound a lot like using netif and node classes instead of
> > the peer class.
> > 	allow peer_t netif_t:netif egress;
> > 	allow peer_t netnode_t:node egress;
> 
> Thinking about this some more ... egress/ingress make sense from an interface 
> point of view but they sound out of place from a node point of view.  After 
> all, you are not "egressing" to a node, to are "sending to" a node.  The same 
> thing applies in the opposite direction, you don't "ingress" from a node, 
> you "receive from" a node.  With that in mind I'm thinking of going with the 
> following:
> 
>  allow netif_t peer_t:peer { ingress egress };
>  allow netnode_t peer_t:peer { recv_from send_to };

nit:  recvfrom and sendto don't really require an underscore to be
readable, and we've already set a precedent for them in the socket and
association classes.

> Thoughts?  Should I just forget all this and use the peer label as a subject 
> label?

I'm not certain what we gain by using the peer as the object and class
in these checks, and it seems to make their meaning less clear.  It
should be noted that we already use process labels as both subjects
(when the actor) and objects (when the target/recipient of an action, as
in signal delivery or IPC), and that process labels "flow" to sockets
they create and socket labels "flow" to packets they send, and socket
labels likewise serve dual roles as subjects (Can this socket send/recv
this packet?) and objects (Can this process send/recv on this socket?). 

In the case of locally generated or destined traffic, we always have a
local socket that we can use as the subject of the check, which I think
is why we end up not using packet/peer as the subject generally - we
essentially have two subjects to choose from, and we favor the local
one.  But in the forwarded case, the packet/peer is the only
subject/actor in view really.

OTOH, I'm not sure your original concern about unlabeled_t is
well-founded now that I think about it; the netif and node type space is
disjoint and they default to discrete initial SIDs and types (netif_t,
node_t), not to unlabeled_t, right?  So the types themselves encode the
class there.

-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency


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Re: [RFC PATCH v8 18/18] SELinux: Add network ingress and egress control permission checks

[Paul Moore]

On Tuesday 18 December 2007 10:14:41 am Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Tue, 2007-12-18 at 08:59 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> > Thoughts?  Should I just forget all this and use the peer label as a
> > subject label?
>
> I'm not certain what we gain by using the peer as the object and class
> in these checks, and it seems to make their meaning less clear.  It
> should be noted that we already use process labels as both subjects
> (when the actor) and objects (when the target/recipient of an action, as
> in signal delivery or IPC), and that process labels "flow" to sockets
> they create and socket labels "flow" to packets they send, and socket
> labels likewise serve dual roles as subjects (Can this socket send/recv
> this packet?) and objects (Can this process send/recv on this socket?).
>
> In the case of locally generated or destined traffic, we always have a
> local socket that we can use as the subject of the check, which I think
> is why we end up not using packet/peer as the subject generally - we
> essentially have two subjects to choose from, and we favor the local
> one.  But in the forwarded case, the packet/peer is the only
> subject/actor in view really.

Yep, I think you are right and I'm just slow to realize it.  As pointed out 
earlier in the discussion, the awkwardness of using the packet's peer label 
as an object should have clued me into the fact that this was a bad idea.

So, my last question is what permissions do we want to use for the netif/node 
object classes?

 allow peer_t netif_t:netif { egress ingress };
 allow peer_t netnode_t:node { sendto/send recvfrom/recv };

What I'd like to avoid if possible is the protocol specific permissions we 
currently have for the netif and node object classes; it requires extra work 
in the kernel, it doesn't work at all for the forwarding case, and I have my 
doubts about the usefulness of the distinction.  I think the ingress/egress 
permissions still make sense when applied to the netif object class but it's 
a bit of a stretch when applied to the node object class.  I personally like 
the sendto/recvfrom permissions but if that is too much of a violation from 
existing precedence I imagine send/recv would work.

Thoughts?

-- 
paul moore
linux security @ hp

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